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Abstract 
 
The development of political modernity in Europe entailed a process whereby formerly 
important political forms increasingly lost significance and were transformed in a long 
process that led to the separation of individuals from political power, in the distinctive 
shape of modern (depoliticised) civil society and the state. The thought of G.W.F Hegel 
(1770–1831), which has fundamentally shaped the modern understanding of these 
developments, came to its maturity at the most advanced stage of this process, while the 
French Revolution was transforming the continental world. He thought through this 
process from a very early stage in his development (1800–4), and thereby formed the 
essentials of his political theory. But on the cusp of this modernity Hegel seemed to 
affirm what has appeared to many as the old powers that had disappeared in the formation 
of the modern state – the Stände. For many he thereby turned his political thought into an 
apparent anachronism. This dissertation, however, will argue that Hegel’s thought 
remains fundamentally modern and not at all anachronistic in its affirmation of the Stände. 
On the contrary, it is only through an examination of the concept of the Stände in Hegel’s 
thought, that one can fully understand the essentially institutional focus of his politics. 
This dissertation will argue for the significance of the concept of the Stände through 
historically situating Hegel’s thought and its engagement with the modern tradition. It will 
do so through a methodological examination of the concept in Hegel’s early period 
(1800–4) where the institutional character of his politics is first shaped and formed, in the 
perspective of insights from his mature political philosophy (1820/21). In so doing it will 
show how the concept of the Stände and the institutionalism it implies form Hegel’s 
unique response to the development of modern civil society. 
  
  5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION         6 
 
CHAPTER ONE: DETERMINATION OF THE CONCEPT  21 
 
I.1 Transformation of the Stände in the Early Modern Period  21 
I.2 The Philosophical Sources      35 
I.3 The Fundamental Difference between Stand and Klasse    40 
Conclusion        45 
 
CHAPTER TWO: CONSTITUTION     47 
 
II.1 The Critique of the Imperial Constitution    48 
II.2 The Stände: Hegel’s Attempt at Legitimate Organisational Form  66 
II.3 The Private ‘Indirect Powers’ of the Landstände   81 
Conclusion        94 
 
CHAPTER THREE: NATURAL RIGHT     100 
 
Hegel and Natural Law      104 
III.1 Geselligkeit: Pufendorf’s Socialisation of Hobbes’s Naturzustand 108 
III.2 Hegel and Kant        121 
III.3 The Critique of Plato and the Ancients     129 
III.4 From Nature to Right by way of Labour and Recognition  139 
Conclusion        155 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: ETHICAL LIFE      161 
  
IV.1 From Forum Externum to Forum Internum    164 
α Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)     164 
 β Christian Thomasius (1655–1728)     170 
 γ Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)     176 
 
IV.2 The Development of the Stände in System der Sittlichkeit   185 
 α The Contents and Contexts of System der Sittlichkeit  188 
 β From Love as Reconciliation to the House Community   195 
 γ The Structure of Rule and Freedom – the System of Sittlichkeit  208 
 
IV.3 Hegel’s Definition of Sittlichkeit      225 
 
CONCLUSION        231 
 
Afterword        237 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY        241 
  
  6 
Introduction 
 
The development of political modernity in Europe entailed a process whereby formerly 
important political forms increasingly lost significance and were transformed in a long 
process that led to the separation of individuals from political power, in the distinctive 
shape of modern (depoliticised) civil society and the state. The thought of G.W.F Hegel 
(1770–1831), which has fundamentally shaped the modern understanding of these 
developments, came to its maturity at the most advanced stage of this process, while the 
French Revolution was transforming the continental world. He thought through this 
process from a very early stage in his development (1800–4), and thereby formed the 
essentials of his political theory. But on the cusp of this modernity Hegel seemed to 
affirm what has appeared to many as the old powers that had disappeared in the formation 
of the modern state. Hegel first elaborated this dimension of his political theory in his late 
Frankfurt (1800) and early Jena period (1801–4) by appealing to the estates, or Stände in 
German. For many this seemed to indicate that he thereby turned his political thought into 
an apparent anachronism. This dissertation, however, will argue that Hegel’s thought 
remains fundamentally modern and not at all anachronistic in its affirmation of the Stände. 
On the contrary, it is only through an examination of the concept of the Stände in Hegel’s 
thought that one can fully understand the essentially institutional focus of his politics. 
 In contrast to the rich existing scholarship which only noted with some irritation 
the apparent anachronism of Hegel’s concept of the Stände, and therefore relegated it to 
the margins of analysis, this dissertation will offer the first comprehensive study of the 
concept in Hegel’s early writings with a view to its modernity, arguing that it is central for 
comprehending the development of his original institutional thought. Moreover, a study 
that focuses on the theoretical potential and the novelty of Hegel’s concept of the Stände 
and its distinctive development in his early period in order to utilise this as a mode of 
interpretation to bring out the originality of his institutional thought is currently lacking in 
the scholarship.1 Thus, the conceptual focus of this study – the Stände – will be shown to 
shed light on Hegel’s theoretical analysis and conceptual development of modern civil 
                                                
1 For the only current full-length study on this concept in the young Hegel, see Hočevar 1968. Hočevar’s 
study, however, is limited to the representational aspects of the concept of the Stände and its connection to 
the German political tradition. 
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society [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] as well as the formation of his concept of the state. I 
will proceed by focusing on the conceptual development of the Stände in Hegel’s thought 
in his early period where, as I will argue, the originality of his institutional politics is first 
expressed most forcefully. In Chapter One, I will introduce the concept of the Stände and 
give a general background of the theoretical debates and historical events that most 
influenced Hegel’s appropriation and utilisation of the concept. I will then proceed to 
analyse three early texts focussing on Hegel’s late Frankfurt (1800) and early Jena periods 
(1801–4): the Verfassungsschrift (1800–3) in Chapter Two, Über die wissenschaftlichen 
Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein 
Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften (1802–3) in Chapter Three, and System 
der Sittlichkeit (1802–3) in Chapter Four. It is in these early manuscripts that the concept 
first receives it theoretical articulation and central placement in Hegel’s thought, which 
makes them the central reference point for my analysis. Moreover, the concept for Hegel 
responds to the specificity of political modernity – which, for sake of simplicity, I will 
designate at this stage as the cleft between the social and the political that leads to modern 
bourgeois society and the state. 
The question of political modernity has been at the centre of the Hegel scholarship 
in the twentieth century. Prior to the Second World War, Hegel had been variously 
described as the most profound thinker of the modern period and as ‘its truest and most 
genuine son’,2 and, by contrast, also as a committed conservative reflecting the ideals of 
the nineteenth century Prussian absolutist state in his description of the Stände.3 In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the modernity of Hegel’s political thought has been 
expressed in a similar fashion. On the one hand, it has been noted that Hegel conceptually 
discovers modern civil society only to in turn limit it through the Stände and his 
                                                
2 See Barth 1973, pp. 386, 387. 
3 See Tönnies 1972, p. 782: …‘this conception of the people represented in the absolute monarchy defeats 
the enlightened liberal protestants on the one hand and, on the other, the protesting will of a growing 
proletariat’. As Henrich 1983, p. 29 has noted, Hegel had problems with the censor for the part on the 
theory of princely sovereignty in the Grundlinien; this came to give it its imperial tenor. The discovery of 
new manuscripts has now thrown Tönnies’s interpretation into question. Hegel is now understood to have 
‘grasped revolution not only as an historical fact and necessity, but to have captured and clarified it in the 
right to revolution out of a systematic analysis of one of its contemporary institutions’ – civil society and its 
failure to provide for the poor (p. 20). For Henrich, Hegel thus anticipates Marx’s Critique in the 1819/20 
lectures on the Rechtsphilosophie (see p. 21); compare Kouvelakis 2003, pp. 23–43. 
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institutional politics in one and the same gesture.4 On the other, Hegel is understood to 
have grasped ‘the historical essence of the Revolution and of the entire age and all its 
problems [in] the emergence of the modern industrial civil society of labor’.5 The latter 
evidently implies interpreting the Stände as a distinctively modern component of 
labouring society. Hegel’s modernity is thus ambiguous for many interpreters, and a 
central point in this ambiguity lies in the interpretation of the Stände. One of the central 
contributions of this dissertation will be to analyse this question in depth. The debates of 
the twentieth continue to determine the twenty-first century, notably in terms of Hegel’s 
theory of the concrete and institutional state that conflicts with the liberal tradition of the 
social contract.6 Moreover, there has been a concerted attempt to situate Hegel more 
firmly in the Kantian tradition, by the likes of Robert Pippen for example,7 or to take 
partial aspects of his thought, such as recognition, and to develop these in isolation from 
his systematic thinking.8 
Methodologically, my dissertation is based upon the modernising assumptions of 
the research on Hegel that has been carried out by Joachim Ritter (1903–74) and Manfred 
Riedel (1936–2009). Their ground-breaking work resituated the debates on Hegel’s 
political philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century, which had to a large extent 
been determined by the scholarship of the nineteenth century that had perceived Hegel’s 
political thought in view of the restorationist philosophy of the state – an interpretation 
that both Hegel’s followers and critics shared. 9  The orientation towards Hegel’s 
modernity or the modernising aspects of his thought continues to remain a determining 
conceptual framework and approach. 10  On the one hand, for Ritter, Hegel’s work 
corresponded to the modernity of the French Revolution with its foundation of individual 
right as the basis of the state while, on the other, for Riedel, it developed the conception 
                                                
4 See Riedel 2011, pp. 182–3. 
5 Ritter 1984, p. 69 (original emphasis). 
6 ‘In my view this doctrine represents the most important respect in which Hegel’s understanding of the 
state diverges from liberal political theory. I shall argue, further, that it is the only aspect of Hegel’s position 
that is unequivocally and irreconcilably at odds with the fundamental tenets of liberalism. I shall also claim 
that this unattractive and archaic doctrine is a relatively expendable part of Hegel’s social theory that has 
little bearing on the relation between individual and collective goods’ (Neuhouser 2000, p. 205 (original 
emphasis)). 
7 See Pippen 1989. 
8 See Honneth 1995. 
9 See Riedel 2011, p. 34. 
10 See Weisser-Lohmann and Köhler 2000. 
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of a depoliticised sphere of liberal individualism and the meeting of individual needs and 
the economic exchange that was their prerequisite, which formed the basis of Hegel’s 
innovative conceptual development of modern civil society in his later work.11 The 
position of each of these scholars has become canonical in the scholarship. 
A similar type of tendency can often be noted in the Anglophone scholarship as 
well not only insofar as the work of both Ritter and Riedel has appeared in translation, but 
also insofar as a distinctively liberal turn toward Hegel can be recognised at the basis of 
the English reception since the studies of T.M. Knox (1900–80), Z.A. Pelczynski (1925–), 
Shlomo Avineri (1933–) and others.12 These figures remain highly influential as does the 
attempt at a liberal interpretation of Hegel,13 despite the more recent appearance of 
alternative critical readings such as those of Stathis Kouvelalkis and Domenico Losurdo.14 
The importance of the former scholars in both the German and English scholarship, 
however, has been paramount in the rehabilitation of Hegel since the end of the Second 
World War; they have done much to give a more objective basis for research and have 
jettisoned much of the earlier biases and Hegel ‘myths and legends’.15 
My conceptual approach builds above all upon Manfred Riedel’s work, which has 
conceived of Hegel and his modernity in the most complex and articulate of fashions. 
Riedel’s approach has the merit of avoiding the assertions typical of the liberal 
rehabilitation of Hegel put forward by Pelczynski and others, which seeks to reduce Hegel 
to a theorist of the liberal state in many ways no different from other authors in the 
Western tradition such as Hobbes and Locke, Kant and Fichte.16 Yet it is clear that there 
are very specific limits to Hegel’s supposed liberalism, most notably his rejection of the 
contract and individualism in the formation of the state that, as he put it in his youth with 
                                                
11 See Ritter 1984 and Riedel 2011. 
12 See respectively Knox 1940; Pelczynski 1971, 1984 and 1998, pp. 5–137; Avineri 1972. 
13 See in particular Neuhouser 2000. 
14 See Kouvelakis 2003; Losurdo 2004. 
15 I take this from the title of Jon Stewart’s edited volume in which many of the canonical texts in the 
English literature have been collected (see Stewart 1996). 
16 See Pelczynski 1971, pp. 1–29; and also 1998, pp. 5–137 where he attempts to retrieve a ‘liberal’ Hegel 
more in tune with the Western tradition in his ‘publicist’ essays where he deals with the political issues of 
his day. For the definition of this as a liberal reading, and a synopsis, see Dickey 1999, pp. vii-xli. Another 
side to this debate stretches back to Eric Weil, who defended Hegel (1950) on the basis of his advocation 
that Prussia was the most advanced state on the Continent and in Europe more generally – thus Hegel’s 
supposed esteem for Prussia was justified (Weil pp. 14–17). 
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reference to Aristotle, is by ‘nature prior’.17 Moreover, in the late Frankfurt period, Hegel 
comes to a definitive conclusion that will determine his philosophy from this point 
onwards: that the Kantian ‘principle of “formal” autonomy must be subordinate to a 
higher principle’.18 As I will show in Chapter Four, Hegel eventually discovers this in the 
‘absolute concept’,19 which after the nature of the family emerges in the Stände in System 
der Sittlichkeit (1802–3). In the Grundlinien (1820/21),20 Hegel will initially speak of this 
in terms of ‘laws and institutions which have being in and for themselves’ – the emphasis 
is strictly on the institutional formation of subjectivity, which is ‘substance made concrete’ 
in the ‘objective sphere of ethics’.21 Karl Heinz Ilting (1925–84) noted the absence of the 
contract [Staatsvertrag] in Hegel as well as the identification of ‘Sitte’ with ‘Sittlichkeit’, 
whereby Hegel returned to a period prior to the Sophists and Socrates by identifying the 
customs of a people, their ethos, with ethics. Hegel stated this for the first in 1803 and 
thoroughly separated morality from ethics, emphasising the individualist character of 
latter and the universality of the Sittlichkeit of the community: ‘it is the nature of absolute 
ethical life [Sittlichkeit] to be a universal or an ethos [Sitten]’.22 Ilting condemned both the 
lack of contract and the theory of ethical life in Hegel in turn,23 and produced one of the 
most influential interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy of right in the twentieth century by 
publishing all extant lecture manuscripts on the philosophy of right at that time (1973–4) 
with critical commentary. However, arguably, significant dimensions of Ilting’s 
interpretation still labour under the influence of the dominant biases of those readings of 
the nineteenth century that argued how Hegel ‘reconciled’ himself to the Prussian state. 
This is how Henning Ottman interpreted Ilting’s reading after praising his edition of the 
Rechtsphilosophie.24 The ‘accommodation thesis’, as Ottmann put it, was not new as 
                                                
17 See Ilting 2006, p. 15 – a landmark study in the interpretation of Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3). 
18 Henrich 1983, p. 17. 
19 Hegel 2002, p. 4. 
20 The variations on the dates are due to the fact that Hegel first delivered it as a lecture in 1820 before the 
official publication in 1821. 
21 Hegel 1991a, p 189 (§144). 
22 Hegel 1999, p. 159. 
23 See Ilting 1983, pp. 108, and 246 referencing the remark to §153 of the Grundlinien, where Hegel 
approvingly cites a Pythagorean. 
24 See Ottmann 1979, pp. 228, 227; compare Losurdo 2004, pp. 282–6 who critiqued Ilting’s interpretation 
as determined by a significantly liberal bias. Losurdo has also traced the false dichtomisation of 
understanding Hegel’s thought in conservative or liberal terms, criticising Norberto Bobbio in particular 
(see pp. 71ff). 
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Rudolf Haym first expressed it in his Hegel und sein Zeit.25 What was new was the level 
of scholarship behind it in Ilting’s work. By way of comparative and analytic use of all 
existent lecture manuscripts on the philosophy of right, Ilting sought to prove a real 
transformation in Hegel’s attitude towards Prussia and a transformation in his political 
philosophy more generally. Dieter Henrich spoke of Ilting in much the same way as 
Ottmann, denouncing Ilting’s imputation of underlying psychological motivations (such 
as fear for his life) to Hegel, but also a more explicit ‘external theoretical partisanship’ 
both prior to and after Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse (1819).26 
Riedel’s method, on the other hand, problematises Hegel’s modernity and situates 
it in a period of transformation in which the historical and philosophical horizon shifts – 
as do words, concepts, and meanings – which Hegel’s political philosophy attempts to 
order in a systematic fashion. The grounds on which Riedel’s work is based are thus at 
once contextual and conceptual; his method rightly situates Hegel in his own time without, 
however, appealing to the impulse of directly and fully equating Hegel’s politics with the 
tradition of liberal political thought that had emerged fully with the French Revolution on 
the Continent.27 It is precisely in this way, according to Riedel, that Hegel is thereby ‘able 
to conceive the modern form of civil society and at the same time limit its substantial 
power by the older structures – although only “accidentally” and for his own time’.28 Thus 
if Riedel has indeed ‘secured’ a new paradigm in the interpretation of Hegel’s political 
philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century, which involves its orientation 
towards the modern constitutional state [Rechtstaat], he has done so by astutely 
perceiving the specificities that determine Hegel’s historical epoch which allow for the 
distinctive conceptual possibilities of his philosophy.29 Riedel was thus well aware of the 
                                                
25 See Haym 1972. 
26 See Henrich 1983, p. 27 whose criticism of Ilting is definitive insofar as on the discovery of the 1819/20 
lectures on the Rechtsphilosophie, as he put it, have ‘surprisingly and decisively transformed the body of 
source material’. 
27 See Riedel 2011, p. vii where he distinguishes his study as a contextual one that attempts to separate itself 
from the ‘global ideologies’ of Liberalism, Marxism and Fascism that had previously determined Hegel 
interpretation. For the conceptual approach, see pp. 139n, 146n, 163n, 185n; his criticism of Ritter appears 
on p. 131. See also Henrich 1971 for another contextual study. Harris’s analyses are also excellent (Harris 
1972, 1983) in terms of Hegel’s intellectual milieu as well as knowledge of historical detail. 
28 Riedel 2011, p. 156. 
29 I follow Henning Ottmann in his assertion that Riedel’s study, in combination with Ritter’s ‘enlightening 
interpretation’ has more or less secured the new paradigm in Germany of Hegel as a theorist of the modern 
state, which was first begun in France, England and America (see Ottmann 1984, pp. 316–17). It is in this 
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flaws behind the liberal interpretation and made no attempt to gloss over the fact that 
Hegel provided a different model than contractual right and individualism in his 
formation of the state. 
The following study takes its lead from Riedel’s contextual and conceptual 
approach but significantly transforms it. It does so through the addition of a comparative 
textual approach that utilises Hegel’s early period to study the development of his 
political and institutional thought in a genetic fashion. It is in this way that I will stress the 
novelty of Hegel’s political philosophy and his complex approach to modernity. This 
leads to the necessary introduction of other sources in the modern political tradition and 
the necessity of highlighting the French Revolution as the particular event that orients 
Hegel’s theory of the Stände. Moreover, this dissertation introduces a new perspective by 
interpreting the development of the Stände in Hegel as an attempt to provide a thoroughly 
distinctive and modern answer to the issue of organisation in an age where individualism 
and individual right became the central ordering principles in the constitutions of states. 
My approach thus builds on Riedel’s attempt to read Hegel in a contextual way, 
independent of the retrospective ideologisations that have shaped previous interpretations 
of his work,30 but it does so by substantially reforming Riedel’s ideas by focusing on the 
concept of the estates, which he himself rejected as anachronistic.31 My approach is thus 
guided by the idea that what Hegel precisely attempts to express in the Stände is a new 
reality under the guise of an older concept that will be transformed in turn, borrowed from 
various political, legal, and philosophical traditions. That is to say, rather than perceiving 
the Stände as anachronistic and simply relegating them to previous political forms, I will 
show their contemporaneity in Hegel’s thought by relating them to the broader historical 
and philosophical context. This allows for a distinctively conceptual approach to the 
Stände and their formation in Hegel’s thought, which leads directly to the possibility of 
interpretation at the level of textual analysis. The historical context leads to Hegel’s 
                                                                                                                                             
sense that I will frame my discussion as a way of interpreting the concept of the Stände, which has been 
viewed traditionally as the central problematic aspect of political modernity present in Hegel’s thought. 
30 See Riedel 2011, pp. vii, 130. If we are to truly operate according to the philosophical position of our own 
time grasped in thought, we must concede that such a scholarly approach would be the result of the history 
of Hegelian interpretation itself and the contestation that has marked this history – no matter the level of its 
‘judiciousness’, we do not escape the ‘objective spirit’ of our own period and thus the previous 
interpretations and subsequent history determines our own approach. 
31 See Riedel 2011, p. 148. 
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development of the concept and to the possibility of a textual reading of its development 
and significance in his writings. As Reinhart Koselleck has put it, ‘actuality may have 
changed long before the transformation has been brought to its concept and similarly 
concepts may have been formed which release new actualities’.32 It is with this idea in 
mind that the Stände will be analysed in this study. Moreover, in focusing explicitly on 
this concept, my research pushes beyond the limits of Riedel’s methodology, which 
isolated the turning point in Hegel’s thought explicitly in the return to individualist natural 
law at the end of the Jena period (1805–7). I will be led back to the late Frankfurt (1800) 
and early Jena periods (1801–4) in my analysis of the genesis of Hegel’s institutionalism 
and to the first systematic appearance of the Stände. In so doing I will show how Hegel’s 
political logic proceeded according to both the individual and the community whereby 
each was taken up into higher forms, and ultimately to the absolute.33 Thus rather than 
strictly stressing the individualist angle as determinative of Hegel’s mature 
Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31) I will also focus on the institutional character of right. Thus 
the dissertation will argue how it is only by way of Hegel’s early institutional thought in 
combination with the late Jena period (1805–7), in which individualism returns as a 
formative aspect, that his mature development and political modernity can be fully 
understood. This twofold analytical approach brings out the distinctive character of 
Hegel’s politics. The ‘paradoxical ambiguity’ that Riedel noted in his interpretation of 
Hegel’s modernity, and particularly of the problem of the Stände in this respect, will be 
thus overturned to reveal a different institutional type of modernity.34 In turning explicitly 
to the concept of the Stände it is thus necessary to engage with broader debates in the 
scholarship, either supplanting Riedel’s study or approaching the Stände from a different 
angle.35 
Principal in this respect are the discoveries in the 1980s of two manuscripts that 
shed new light on Hegel’s concept of the Stände and his institutional organisation of right 
– the Heidelberg lectures 1817/18 (the so-called Wannenmann manuscript) and the Berlin 
                                                
32 Koselleck 1989, p. 323. 
33 See Hegel 1991b, pp. 69–70 (§70) for his mature formulation where he consistently uses this logic as 
speculative contra the strict dichotomy of the either-or. 
34 Riedel 2011, p. 182. 
35 Riedel’s original German Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie (translated as Between Tradition and 
Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy) appeared in 1969, and in second edition 
in 1972. 
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lectures 1819/20 (of unknown compilation).36 The two editorial introductions to these 
lectures, the first by Otto Pöggeler and the second by Dieter Henrich, introduce two other 
important aspects or methodological issues for my research. Both Pöggeler and Henrich 
have made important references to the concept of the Stände and to Hegel’s institutional 
thought, yet while they have opened up an area for debate and research neither has 
attempted to read their insights back in a genetic fashion into the Stände in Hegel’s earlier 
manuscripts in which his institutional thought appears for the first time. This is precisely 
what this dissertation does in a novel fashion, which leads to a significant reinterpretation 
of Hegel’s understanding of political modernity and the centrality of his institutional 
thought. 
The latter point opens up an important methodological issue in the discussion and 
approach to the Stände employed in this dissertation, which in turn allows for the 
development of a particular approach to the conceptual character of Hegel’s political 
thought. I will develop a retrospective form of textual analysis in this dissertation to 
reveal the novelty and modernity of Hegel’s mature concept of the Stände through an 
explicitly genetic analysis of how it is formed and shaped in the earlier works. To be more 
specific, I will be using later insights into the structure of Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie and 
perspectives from Hegel’s mature political thought in the dissertation in order to open up 
the early material in an heuristic fashion to guide and structure my discussion of the 
development of the Stände. This will lead to an emphasis on the transformation of the 
concept from the Frankfurt and early Jena periods (1797–1804) onwards in view of later 
developments. The early period will thus be interpreted in an anticipatory fashion. The 
novelty of such an approach is that it will allow for the structure of Hegel’s political 
thought to be clarified in the very process of the development of one of its specific 
concepts. This will lend a structural significance to Hegel’s developing conception of 
political modernity and how it is shaped and formed in the specific character of the Stände 
and the institutional orientation of his politics. This interpretive strategy is justified 
insofar as it allows the entire character of the concept of the Stände in Hegel’s political 
                                                
36 See Hegel 1983a and 1983b. The Wannenmann manuscript has appeared in English translation (Hegel 
1995a) and this will be used by critical comparison with the original German edition. 
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thought to come into view and in so doing shows the distinctive significance of the 
concept’s modernity. 
 Pöggeler has made a very important observation regarding the novelty of the 
Stände in Hegel’s thought and their modernity. In so doing he has shifted the significance 
of the Stände beyond Riedel’s restriction of the concept to ‘older structures’.37 My 
research methodology follows Pöggeler very precisely in this respect and his 
consideration that the Stände are developed as Hegel’s ‘concrete conception’ of the 
French Revolution in understanding that ‘what had to be done was to reanchor the 
representatives to their proper sphere, the sphere of the estates or classes (using the term 
Stände in a new sense)’.38 Secondly, Henrich has isolated Hegel’s political form in his 
Rechtsphilosophie and designated it as ‘institutionalism’; he has, furthermore, analysed 
this institutionalism in what he termed ‘severe’ and ‘moderate’ forms. By the former, 
Henrich means that the right that is fulfilled in institutions could never be understood as a 
right against these institutions as such; by the latter, that institutions nevertheless required 
individual freedom in their realisation. The former, Henrich concludes, is indefensible on 
theoretical grounds as to achieve the absolute and actuality of the state it was unnecessary 
to do so by way of the recognition of the individual; the second, by contrast, Henrich 
problematized by recognising that even if ‘the principle of institution as such was not to 
be achieved out of subjective volition [Wollen]’ it nevertheless ‘required the right of the 
individual’.39 Even if Hegel’s institutional thought was solely connected to older long-
forgotten forms, to the Greek polis for example, or was merely tied distinctively to his 
own period, it still, as Henrich notes, ‘contains in the form of its structure a substantial 
theoretical potential’.40 This can be understood in terms of the capacity of institutions to 
conform with the individual will that leads to concrete freedom and vice versa, which 
allows Hegel to develop an alternative model to social contractualism and what he 
perceived as the strictly liberal character of individualism in the modern period.41 My 
dissertation analyses this theoretical potential in the concept of the Stände, which lay at 
                                                
37 See Riedel 2011, pp. 148, 156. 
38 Pöggeler 1995, p. 3 (emphasis added). I will problematise the issue of translating the Stände in Chapter 
One below. In Pöggeler’s original German essay introducing the Heidelberg lectures the word ‘class’ is 
entirely absent (see Pöggeler 1983, p. x). 
39 Henrich 1983, pp. 32, 33. 
40 Henrich 1983, p. 21. 
41 Hegel 1991a, p 344 (§303); compare Hegel 1999, p. 219. 
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the basis of the systematic form of Hegel’s institutional thought, from its earliest period 
(1802–3) onwards. 
Such a study is necessary for an understanding of Hegel’s fully developed 
institutional thought in the Grundlinien (1820/21) and his mature Rechtsphilosophie 
(1817–31). By way of a genetic approach to the concept of the Stände – that is, a study of 
its formal development in Hegel’s early works – the framing, orientation, and 
understanding of the theoretical potential and novelty of his institutional thought in the 
later works will become apparent. I will show how a new actuality lay precisely in 
Hegel’s concept of the Stände, how he expressed this as a confrontation between formal 
and concrete freedom, and how he developed it out of an encounter with the modern 
philosophical tradition and the French Revolution. Hegel rarely spoke of the future and 
when he did these were largely ‘scant references’.42 Yet in the Berlin Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History (1827–31), he identified the opposition between the formal will and 
organisation as a ‘collision’ and a ‘crux’ between ‘the atomistic principle of individual 
will’, which did ‘not allow any firmly based organisation to emerge’, and concrete 
freedom.43 ‘This problem is what history now faces, and it must solve it at some time in 
the future’.44 As I will show in this dissertation, Hegel was occupied with this problem 
from his earliest period and it directs the development of his politics and the theoretical 
potential and novelty of the Stände, which are not ‘older structures’, but a formative 
principle of institutionality. 
The main chapters of the following study each pursue a theme and explore a text of 
the young Hegel in detail. Firstly, however, I will examine the concept of the Stände in its 
historical context, and how it is transformed in Hegel’s period in Chapter One. This will 
then be further studied throughout Hegel’s early development in the other chapters in 
order to grasp the potential ingenuity of his institutional thought as it comes into being in 
the Frankfurt and early Jena periods (1797–1804). The Stände, as I will show, highlight 
Hegel’s institutional strategy and the complexity of his response, firstly to the 
philosophical tradition stemming from Hobbes until Fichte and, secondly, to the French 
                                                
42 See Löwith 1995, p. 200. 
43 Hegel 1999, p. 219. 
44 Ibid. 
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Revolution and ‘the crisis of the modern bourgeois production society’.45 By ‘production 
society’ Dieter Henrich indicates what Hegel isolates in the Grundlinien as, on the one 
hand, the ‘unrestricted’ activity of civil society, and, on the other, the development of an 
excess of artificial needs and of the limitation and specialisation in the division of labour, 
which leads to the concentration of wealth and the impoverishment of the labouring class. 
The crisis of this production society is that even if it has and produces an ‘excess of 
wealth’, it is no way ‘wealthy enough’ to respond to the needs of all of its members.46 As 
Henrich has noted, for Hegel the crisis of civil society ‘is the crisis of its defectiveness’ as 
‘this society is organised from self-interest’.47 What can be seen already at this initial 
stage then are two trajectories orienting and forming Hegel’s thought: on the one hand, 
the political and philosophical tradition and, on the other, the real actuality of history and 
the historical developments that lead to modernity. Any assessment of the validity of 
Hegel’s institutionalism must be based upon a prior analysis of the specificity of his 
position, which I will analyse in detail in this dissertation. 
 Chapter One provides a brief historical-conceptual introduction to the 
development of the Stände from the perspectives that most influenced Hegel’s 
development of the concept. It is important to undertake this analysis at this initial stage 
in the dissertation as it will clarify the complexity of the historical background and 
philosophical traditions underlying Hegel’s distinctive usage of the concept. This chapter 
thus has three essential tasks to fulfil. Firstly, it will give a general overview of the 
concept of the Stände, highlighting the essential importance of the French Revolution and 
analysing how this transformed the concept. The significance in doing this at this early 
stage in the dissertation is essential as the impact of the French Revolution will be an 
important theme in the remaining chapters. Secondly, I will analyse the sources that 
oriented Hegel’s usage of the concept and how such usage forms a distinctive political-
philosophical response to the period. Lastly, I will turn to the issue of how the concept has 
been translated in the English literature and compare Stand and Klasse to clarify this issue. 
I will show how the conceptual interpretation involves more than simple transformations 
in meaning and linguistic usage and forces the adoption of a much broader referential 
                                                
45 Henrich 1983, p. 21. 
46 Hegel 1991a, pp. 266, 267 (§§243, 245) (original emphasis). 
47 Henrich 1983, p. 21. 
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horizon. I close by analysing Koselleck’s theorisation of the ‘Sattelzeit’ as a very apt way 
of contextualising Hegel’s period and his usage of the Stände. 
Chapter Two traces Hegel’s early critique in the Verfassungsschrift (1798–1803) of 
the imperial constitution and the traditional function of the Landstände. This is important 
as it highlights Hegel’s early derivation of the concept, and his awareness of its historical 
meaning in constitutional history. The central thesis of the chapter will involve 
demonstrating the difference between the traditional concept of the Reichs- and 
Landstände in Hegel’s early critique and his late political conceptualisation of the Stände 
as an organisational form that contrasts with private particularity. Firstly, the chapter 
analyses the conflation between treaty (contract) and constitution in the Holy Roman 
Empire. This accords with Hegel’s critique of modern political association based on the 
contract and significantly differentiates his own political theory in turn. Secondly, this is 
contrasted with Hegel’s usage of the Stände in the Grundlinien (1820/21), where rather 
than the dominance of private right the public capacity of the Stände are conceived. I thus 
distinguish his early usage of the concept in the imperial context from his late 
conceptualisation. This is significant as it emphasises the political function of the concept, 
which will appear in the remaining chapters. Lastly, I will turn to the question of the 
specific linguistic usage of the concept that Hegel mentions in his maturity in the 
Grundlinien, which opens up his discussion to a contiguity between social and political 
dimensions. This is essential to understanding how the Stände will be formed once Hegel 
turns to elaborate his first system (1802–3). I conclude by comparing and contrasting 
Hegel’s concept to how it was developed in reactionary and conservative circles in the 
period of Restoration (1815–30) in the call for a return to the Ständestaat. 
Chapter Three examines how the Stände are transformed from a natural order in the 
Jena Natural Law essay of 1802–3 into a spiritual order through the concept of reciprocal 
recognition that establishes a nascent system of needs and a division of labour. This 
allows Hegel’s concept to be contextualised in a developing modern scenario of labour as 
social organisation and a society of needs. The critique of Plato as it appears in the 
Philosophie des Geistes of 1805–6 is taken up into the Grundlinien (1820/21) alongside 
Hegel’s transformation of the state of nature as a conceptual and spiritual moment. This in 
combination with the early Jena period leads Hegel to his institutional emphasis on the 
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individual will, that the individual can only be fully realised in the concrete circles in 
which they can act or work. Hegel thus develops the concept of the Stände in this period 
as a way of stemming the bellum omnium contra omnes, which will give the Stände their 
importance in Hegel’s fully developed institutional thought in the Grundlinien. He does 
this by transforming the way in which the basis of modern society is conceptualised from 
conflicting individuals to a system of needs and social labour whereby ‘particular interest’ 
is led to a ‘universal end [and] is therefore concrete’.48 This lays the foundation for 
Hegel’s critique of the emergence of the modern market economy as it is fully developed 
in the Grundlinien in terms of the ‘remnant of the state of nature’ that develops in a 
society based on the self-interestedness of individuals.49 The concept of the Stände are 
given a significant modern import in this respect as institutional structures of right, 
Hegel’s attempt to answer the problem of organisation in an era that has reduced 
individuals to depoliticised actors restricted to the social sphere. It is thus necessary to 
analyse the context that leads to this development. This will be detailed through an 
analysis of the tradition of natural law to show how the understanding of market society 
develops from a state of nature. I will show how Hegel’s valorisation of labour develops 
beyond the original Greek ethical ideal he drew from Plato’s Republic in which the polis 
was organised into a stratified hierarchy,50 as well as Aristotle’s teleology of polis life that 
divided the slave from the free man according to nature, which also lay at the basis of the 
Roman law of the status civilis. 
 Chapter Four analyses how Hegel attempts to overcome the dichotomy of inner 
and outer through his institutional formation of the Stände from the earliest period in 
which they are introduced in an explicitly Hobbesian and Fichtean context in System der 
Sittlichkeit (1802–3). I discuss the development of this paradigm that lays at the basis of 
the cleft between civil and political in modernity, and how it is transformed from a 
religious to a political and then to a metaphysical subject in the modern political tradition. 
Hegel reveals his concern over the separation of inner and outer – long before his 
conceptual innovation of civil society – in his initial rejection of Kant’s theory of 
autonomy in his Frankfurt period (1797–1800). For the young Hegel, love, or the 
                                                
48 Hegel 1991a, p. 270 (§251) (original emphasis). 
49 Hegel 1991a, p. 234 (§200). 
50 See Pöggeler 1995, pp. 17, 18. 
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Christian religion, was seen as overcoming the division between the isolated individual 
and the compulsion of the positive order of law. Yet already in System der Sittlichkeit 
(1802–3) love becomes limited to the family, and the positive order of law appears in the 
state. Sittlichkeit will eventually replace the traditional discussion of a civil religion. This 
becomes secular doctrine or embodied right in institutions. I will problematise this 
development that leads to the first positing of the concept of the Stände in System der 
Sittlichkeit and the first formation of Hegel’s institutional thought as a mediation between 
inner and outer. 
The character of the dissertation, while focusing on a distinctive concept in Hegel’s 
thought, therefore simultaneously opens onto the broader dimension of Hegel’s 
intellectual formation. Throughout the study I will reaffirm the significance of the late 
Frankfurt and early Jena periods (1797–1804) in the development of Hegel’s 
institutionalism. In this way I will introduce a novel aspect to the existing scholarship on 
this period insofar as the institutional dimension of Hegel’s thought in this period remains 
relatively unexplored. By emphasising the Stände and tracing their genetic origin to the 
early Jena period in the young Hegel’s political thought, this dissertation will reframe the 
debates on Hegel’s modernity, and emphasise a strong institutional and representative 
aspect to his politics. In so doing it will stress the importance of context and historical 
development in the interpretation of Hegel and his transformation of political modernity. 
This essentially leads in turn to the conceptual focus of this dissertation, which will prove 
the modernity of Hegel’s institutional thought in its formation, which fundamentally will 
be shown to determine the character of his politics precisely in a period of transformation 
in conceptual meaning and linguistic change. 
 
Chapter One: Determination of the Concept 
 
A concept by contrast in 
order to be a concept 
must remain ambiguous.1 
 
In this chapter I will examine the concept of the Stände from the perspective of the 
historical developments and philosophical transformations that most influenced Hegel’s 
perception and appropriation of the concept. The chapter will fulfil three main tasks: 
firstly, to give the reader an overview of the Stände. I will not attempt to trace the entire 
complex history of the concept, but rather, to outline the political and philosophical 
transformations that led Hegel to utilise the Stände. Consequently, I will analyse the 
concept in relation to the developments that occurred with the French Revolution, which 
will be analysed in further detail in the subsequent chapters. Secondly, I will briefly turn 
to analyse some of Hegel’s actual sources and continue to emphasise the philosophical 
context underlying his appropriation of the Stände. Thirdly, I will turn to compare Stand 
and Klasse to clarify this issue of translation in Hegel scholarship. The chapter will 
conclude with a reflection on the historical context of Hegel’s period, a period of ‘crisis’ 
that I will have traced in its different dimensions having completed the three preceding 
tasks. This crisis – both political and metaphysical – will subsequently set the tone for the 
thematic discussions in the following three chapters of my study. 
 
I.1 Transformation of the Stände in the Early Modern Period 
 
From the late Middle Ages to the early modern and modern periods the Stände underwent 
a great degree of transformation. This was not only specific to the German-speaking 
context, but also at the broader level of continental politics in which it was intertwined, 
culminating in the French Revolution and the post-Napoleonic period. Between France 
and Germany it is interesting to compare continuity and transformation in linguistic usage, 
which reveals the distinctiveness of their respective political developments. The reason 
why the term Stand remains at the centre of political life in Germany for example is 
precisely because the structures of domination remained largely continuous. As late as the 
                                                
1 Koselleck 1995, p. 115. 
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nineteenth century local diets [Landstände] remained equivalent to a parliament in a 
number of places in Germany while the term Mittelstand for ‘middle class’ continues to 
exist to this day.2 By contrast in France the ‘états’ represented an aspect of the ancien 
régime that, under the advancement of monarchical absolutism, had long since been 
abandoned as regional ancien parlements, easily making way for the assemblée nationale, 
while the division of society into classes replaced the société des ordres in the years 
immediately following Sieyès’s proclamation ‘le tiers État c’est la Nation’. 3  This 
simplified the social stratification in France to a large degree, at least from the perspective 
of modern eyes. 
 
The structure of government, the patterns of social stratification, the legal system: 
all seem perversely complication and confused. Some of the confusion was 
certainly inherent in the society. France in the century or two before the revolution 
was a very complex society, and the complexity was composed by social, 
economic and intellectual challenges. But most of the confusion is in our minds. 
The problem is that we are inheritors of the French Revolution and therefore tend 
to see the old regime through post-revolutionary eyes – as is proven, indeed, by the 
use of the very term ‘old regime’.4 
 
As I established in the Introduction the present study sets out from the modernising 
assumptions of the research on Hegel that has been carried out by Joachim Ritter. As he 
noted famously, Hegel speaks from the standpoint of the Revolution in both thought and 
actuality.5 But it must also be emphasised that from a very early stage Hegel also spoke of 
its one-sidedness in its abolishment of the états généraux [Generalstände] in the 
                                                
2 See Conze 1968, p. 53: ‘In France the opposition is already very clear, order [ordre] and estate [États] are 
a reality of the ancien régime, but in Germany, known for a failed [brisée] revolution, one can utilise the 
concepts of the ancien régime until 1918 to characterise social reality’. Originally Mittelstand can be 
brought into relationship with Aristotle’s ideal of the harmonising capacity of the middling element in his 
Politics (1295b3–1295b34). In the German political tradition it thus has more to do with the nobility as ‘an 
intermediary authority, transmitting the authority of the monarchy down to the peasantry’ than with the 
modern notion of a middle class (Berdahl 1988, p. 75). An extended discussion of the contemporary usage 
and significance of the Stände does not concern us here. It is also beyond the reach of this study to look to 
its application as a tool of analysis in sociology, legal thought, and the historical sciences where a consensus 
on the concept as a ‘terminus technicus’ has not yet been achieved (see Oexle, Conze, and Walther 2004, p. 
157). See Brady 1978, pp. 19–34 for a critique of the concept as a tool of historical sociology in contrast to 
stratification by class. The fact that Conze here uses Mittelstand as equivalent to ‘ordre intermédiare’ refers 
to an additional lexical issue in the scholarship. In the Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in 
Frankreich 1680–1820 no entry appears on the États, which is rather framed within a much more general 
discussion on Ordre, Désordre (see Scotti-Rosin 1993). The Handbuch thus engages with the demise of the 
estates within larger conceptual framework that involves questions of order and feudalism. 
3 See Ossowski 1969, p. 123; compare Stuke 1968, p. 45. 
4 Sewell 1974, p. 49. 
5 See Ritter 1984. 
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Verfassungsschrift (1800–3). 6  For Hegel, the French Revolution left the individual 
isolated and opposed to state power and destroyed the existence of the French constitution 
in its abolishment of all former means of representation. This was linked to its complete 
destruction of the feudal system, which Hegel, following Montesquieu (1689–1755), saw 
as the principle of freedom, as a representational and legal status system between vassal 
and lord that eventually formed into the Stände – that is, the representational bodies that 
followed on the development of the system of fiefs [Lehenswesen] the led in western 
Europe to the parliamentary form.7 Hegel expressed the same concern in a lecture on the 
Rechtsphilosophie (1824–5) by comparing the centralisation brought about by the French 
Revolution, which Napoleon then further developed, with the corporate forms of the 
Middle Ages. Hegel concluded that ‘legitimate power is to be found only when the 
particular spheres are organized’.8 Such ‘legitimacy’ was famously developed by way of 
the Stände in the Grundlinien and proceeded through to the administration of justice, the 
police and the corporation whereby the Stände reappear in the bi-cameralism of the state 
as a parliamentary form. The Stände for Hegel in the Grundlinien are an attempt 
organically to structure Rousseau’s ‘volonté général’. ‘Rousseau considered the will only 
in the determinate form of the individual will (as Fichte subsequently also did) and 
regarded the universal will not as the will’s rationality in and for itself’ – which would 
signal its ‘concrete universality’ in the Stände: the ‘individual makes his appearance only 
as a member of a universal’ – ‘but only as a common element arising out of the individual 
will as a conscious will’.9 Thus Hegel understood that the consequences of Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès’s (1748–1836) ‘“le tiers État c’est la Nation” were more profoundly 
revolutionary than anyone expected’.10 For when ‘a single estate identified itself with the 
nation, it abolished the very idea of the estates, which required a plurality of estates to 
constitute a social order’.11  The French Revolution thus brought the decay of the 
                                                
6 See Hegel 1999, p. 65; more details on this manuscript will be provided in Chapter Two. 
7 See Hegel 1999, pp. 64ff. Hegel anticipates the insights of Max Weber and Otto Hintze in his conviction, 
moreover, that the Stände are unique to western Europe; they form part of his early world historical 
conception. Hegel also recognised the importance of the religious question in this respect (see Weber 1978, 
pp. 1072ff; Hintze 1975, pp. 302–53). 
8 See Hegel 1991a, p. 331 (§290). 
9 Hegel 1991a, pp. 277 (§258), 344 (§303) (original emphasis). 
10 Schmitt 1996, p. 20 
11 Ibid; compare Riedel 2004, p. 763: ‘During the night of 4 August 1789 both the elite [oberen] Stände lost 
their rule as well as the provinces, parishes, and corporations their privileges and the underprivileged strata 
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ständischen Welt to a head; and Hegel’s later reformulation of the Stände (1820/21) can 
be seen perilously to reconstitute this system of representation into economic, social, and 
occupational elements, ‘which previously would be entirely contained in one concept in 
the appropriate political description of the Stände [Standesbezeichnung]’.12 
 
Sieyès saw the fundamental social conflict as a struggle between the estates, and 
used only the latter term in his picture of contemporary social structure and of the 
homogenous society of the future. Some years later, however, Babeuf was writing 
only of social classes, and was presenting French society as divided by a basic 
class antagonism. In the new conditions, a new term was essential to underline this 
antagonism, which Sieyès had not discerned or at least not mentioned.13 
 
The significance of the Stände thus transform, the meaning of the concept itself shifts 
until it is emptied of its original content while the ambit of other concepts such as Klasse 
in this instance expand. Yet the persistence of a different distribution of power in 
Germany allows the Stände to persist even beyond the collapse of the Holy Roman 
Empire (1806) as Werner Conze (1910–86) indicated above.14 This does not necessarily, 
however, tell us anything about Hegel’s usage of the concept. Indeed, in his early period 
he condemns the Stände in the form of the Landstände in his ‘playful’ 
Verfassungsgeschichte were he sketches ‘the main features of a comparative 
developmental history of representation’.15 According to Pöggeler, ‘Hegel seeks to build 
on the ideas of the French Revolution, but in a way that endeavours to correct the 
historical one-sidedness of the French solution… Hegel thus propounds a view of political 
science that as far as constitutional policy is concerned involves a concrete conception 
opposed to the guiding principle of the French Revolution’.16 For the purposes of this 
study, Hegel’s institutional form of the Stände develop ‘out of the radical crisis of civil 
                                                                                                                                             
their rightlessness. Thereby the entirety of the society became “civil” in the sense that it no longer existed 
on the basis of political entitlement, the Stände and Korporationen, but the entirety of the free and equal 
were enfolded under a “sovereign” force of associated individuals’. 
12 Koselleck 2004a, p. xvi. 
13 Ossowski 1969, p. 123. 
14 In the form of the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (1794) – which Koselleck has 
stated lay at Prussian society until 1900 – we have another example of such a thesis insofar as the code was 
an explicit organisation of the ständische Gesellschaft (see Koselleck 1975, p. 23). 
15 Maier 2004, p. 208. 
16 Pöggeler 1995, p. 36 (emphasis added). 
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society’, which is also premised on the development of liberalism and the market 
economy, on the Industrial Revolution as it appeared in England.17  
The French Revolution for Hegel had taken the principles of thought – the ideas of 
modern natural law and the Enlightenment, of individual consciousness (Thomas Hobbes 
1588–1679) and the will (Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712–88) – and placed them at the 
foundation of the modern state.18 Once the property qualification was theoretically seen to 
develop prior to the state [civitas] in the Naturzustand, economy came to form a second 
‘nature’ based on reciprocal recognition and exchange.19 In the German-speaking world it 
was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) who above all responded to the modern theories of 
natural law, and both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The categorical 
imperative supplied a renewed foundation for modern natural law theory, which 
reaffirmed the primacy of the individual, this time on a metaphysical plane.20 Kant’s 
theory of the categorical imperative represents a culmination of the Enlightenment insofar 
as the isolation of the individual directed by the moral law is now entirely cleft from the 
political order. Hegel’s early rapprochement to Aristotle and the Greeks is to be 
understood in this context, whereby he initially takes over the stratification and ordering 
of the ancient polis.21 For Hegel, it is only by ‘vindicating the old and utterly inconsistent 
empiricism [that] a great and pure intuition can in this way express the genuinely ethical 
in the purely architectonic qualities of its exposition’ thereby consolidating once again the 
theoretical and practical sciences that had been cleft by Kant’s axiomatic ‘either/or’ 
between the ‘formalism’ of reason and its absolute separation from the ‘material’ of the 
world. This failed to restore the ‘theoretical sciences’ – read, empirical – to philosophy by 
way of its critique of their scientific objectivity and ‘placed the absolute wholly within 
practical philosophy’.22 This is not a philosophical aside to the development of the 
                                                
17 See Ritter 1984, p. 73: ‘the revolutionary idea of the freedom of all is founded in the emergence of 
modern labour society’. 
18 Hegel 1995b, pp. 315–19; 1991a, p. 277 (§258). 
19 See Ilting 1971, p. 91. For further detailed discussion of this subject I refer the reader to Chapter Three. 
20 For this discussion, see Haakonssen 2006, p. 279. 
21 The Jena 1802–3 essay Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts seine Stelle in der 
praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften appeared in the 
Kritischen Journal der Philosophie co-edited with Schelling in two parts (the first in December 1802, the 
second in May 1803).  
22 Hegel 1999, pp. 115, 104. For Hegel, the critical philosophy had relegated all other (theoretical) sciences 
such as mechanics, physics, and natural law to empiricism through the isolation of the ‘philosophical 
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concept of the Stände, but central to its articulation in Hegel’s hands insofar as he 
perceived the Kantian and French revolutions as one and the same phenomenon.23 I will 
now pursue some of the transformations that affected Hegel’s appropriation of the 
concept in more elaborate detail. 
A decisive aspect to the evolution of the concept of the Stände in the seventeenth 
century was the development of modern natural law premised on the individual and the 
social contract with Hobbes.24 This eventually reduced all individuals equally to subjects 
of natural right, to physical existence with no regard for status.25 It was this that laid the 
foundation for the aristocratic opposition to natural law as well as social contract theory, 
enlightened absolutism and rationalism insofar as traditional society could not be 
preserved within these structures. Such resistance developed in the ensuing centuries, and 
stood against the modern forces that had led to state formation in the seventeenth century 
and to the development of society in the eighteenth. In Germany this could be seen most 
clearly in the persistence of the Prussian aristocracy, which rejected the rational 
formalisation of privilege in the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten 
(1794).26 In the guise of the Prussian nobility, the Stände had shown organised resistance 
since the seventeenth century when the Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia (1620–88) 
attempted to centralise and unify ‘the far flung territories of the state by limiting the 
                                                                                                                                             
element in philosophy’ solely to metaphysics. It was precisely through this move that practical philosophy 
became wholly metaphysical-moral, while theoretical sciences became empirical, ‘thereby renouncing their 
claim to be genuine sciences; they are content to consist of a collection of empirical knowledge [Kenntnisse] 
and to make use of the concepts of the understanding as postulates [bittweise], without claiming to make 
any objective assertion’ (Hegel 1999, p. 102). Hegel is concerned with overturning the divide between 
theoretical and practical philosophy, and he initially finds the solution in natural intuition and Sittlichkeit, 
the state as a ‘work’ or ‘the spirit of the people’ as it appears in System der Sittlichkeit. It is in this way that 
practical morality is ‘annihilated’ as well as the private property relation; the justification for the 
subordination of labouring Stände lies in the equalisation of all Stände in the state of ‘absolute equality’ – 
war with other nations where the state of nature real for the first time (Hegel 2002, pp. 52ff). This will 
eventually be overturned through the transition from the state as an ethical work to the practical as 
embodied in the labour process in the later Jena period (1805–7) as I will analyse in Chapter Three. Ethical 
life (Chapter Four) is what first allows for this transition as it connects the inner life of the subject with the 
outer order of the state as the customs of a people, while practical philosophy as isolated in metaphysical 
speculation turns into a ‘positive or dogmatic knowledge’ (Hegel 1999, p. 140). 
23 See Hegel 1991a, pp. 157–86 (§129–41); 1999, pp. 217ff. 
24 See Dreitzel 2003 for the relation of Hobbes to the German context. For Pufendorf’s role in ‘depreciating’ 
[Abwertung] the Stände in particular, see Oexle, Conze and Walther 2004, pp. 211–12. 
25 I will analyse the German natural law model and its exception in this respect below (III.1, III.3). 
26 See Berdahl 1973. 
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power of the nobility’.27 The growth of a state bureaucracy and an absolutist political 
form opposed to the nobility lost its edge over time as offices became inheritable. This is 
what made absolutism in Eastern Europe, ‘the repressive machine of a feudal class … a 
device for the consolidation of serfdom, in a landscape scoured of urban life and 
resistance’.28  
Both the natural law systems of the classical epoch of the seventeenth century and 
their eighteenth century vulgarisation in the Enlightenment had not in fact conflicted with 
state authority, but offered a unifying discourse for centralised power and state formation. 
In the German speaking lands they led to absolutism in the figure of a monarch 
consolidating power on the Reichs- and Landstände forming and giving shape to the state. 
The natural law systems moreover led to a trained officialdom, and to the positivisation of 
rights and functions in the drafting and establishment of various codifications. 
The distinctively modern concept of the state entailed a process that essentially 
involved a ‘socio-political’ transformation of the concept of the Stände, which modified 
the subject of politics – and, one might add, the political lexicon as well – from a 
decentralised system of domination and power sharing – a form of pluralism operative in 
feudalism – to a centralised territorial subject recognised by its rationalised system of 
jurisprudence and uniform bureaucracy. ‘We see everywhere in the West [that] the 
development of a standing army created and maintained, outfitted and trained according 
to the system of bureaucratic administration at state expense spelled the death of the 
feudal political order of the estates’.29 Thus ‘the fate of the Estates … was everywhere the 
clearest index of the progress of absolutisation’.30 
These phenomena can also be observed in the German-speaking context as well, in 
particular in the context of the Reichs- and Landstände and their transformation into state 
forms. Yet the peculiarity of German development led to the different political forms in 
the Holy Roman Empire. It is perhaps precisely for this reason that the state-concept even 
if it ‘had come to Germany with the Ratio-Status-Lehre remained in this context up until 
                                                
27 Berdahl 1988, p. 3 (text modified). 
28 Anderson 1974, p. 195. 
29 Hintze 1975, p. 332. 
30 Anderson 1974, p. 228. 
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the threshold of the nineteenth century’. 31  Indeed there were many ‘intermediate 
formations to be found, which lay mid-way between the federal form of state and the 
unitary state with autonomous provinces’.32 The German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf 
(1632–94) thus measured the empire according to the standards of the unified civitas 
attained by other continental powers and found it wanting. The political developments in 
the Holy Roman Empire thus conveyed in turn a distinct conception of law, whereby ‘it is 
often difficult to maintain the textbook division between universalist natural law – 
whether Thomasian or Wolffian – and particularist historical law and the associated 
division between reformist absolutism and traditionalist ideals of estate-based 
governance’.33 
What can initially be observed through these historical transformations is that 
‘modern’ [neuzeitliche] conceptuality … comprises more than only “modern” [modern] 
meanings’, and that the distinctiveness of the concept of the Stände itself emerges only by 
way of the historical processes. As Koselleck had adequately noted, a concept is 
inherently ambiguous [vieldeutig] and, citing Nietzsche, ‘only that which has no history is 
definable’. Such ambiguity leads to different interpretations, and ‘concepts are thus 
condensations [Konzentrat] of many meanings [Bedeutungsgehalt]’. For Koselleck, 
moreover, the history of words [Wortgeschichte] serves as an entry point’.34 I will begin 
to employ Koselleck’s insights here in more detail later in this chapter. The etymology of 
the Stände further provides us with the possibility of observing a broad historical process 
that involves the transformation of the European world. I have begun to show this in the 
case of the French Revolution and its dissolution of the états, which opens up the modern 
state to a ‘social’ foundation and a different form of stratification (what will eventually 
become stratification by class); this overlaps briefly with the ‘états’ and the société des 
ordres as I showed above.35 In Germany the context of transformation proceeds in a much 
                                                
31 Maier 2004, pp. 202. It should be remarked that the transformation to the state concept occurs precisely 
when the Holy Roman Empire begins to encounter the French Republic. 
32 Gierke 1934, p. 197. 
33 Haakonssen 2006, p. 276. 
34 Koselleck 2004a, pp. xvi, xxiii, xxii, xx; Koselleck uses ‘neuzeitlich’ in contrast with ‘modern’ to 
emphasise a new experience of time – indeed to emphasise a process, which is not conveyed by the 
synonym ‘modern’. 
35 There is a problematic point here that I cannot explore further; that is stratification by classes as a model 
of historical analysis – see footnote 1 above in this chapter. 
  29 
slower fashion, but in a ‘social’ ordering of Stände governed by economic or vocational 
criteria – as can be seen in the great codifications such as the Allgemeines Landrecht für 
die Preußischen Staaten, which provoked such resistance from the aristocracy36 – a 
difference and contrast can be seen to emerge between this and their ‘political’ 
descriptions. This moreover lies at the core of Hegel’s political philosophy and his 
distinctive etymological observation of the former ‘linguistic usage’ of the Stände. 
 
The idea [Vorstellung] that those communities [the Stände and the corporation] 
which are already present in the circles referred to above [civil society] can be split 
up again into a collection of individuals as soon as they enter the sphere of politics 
– i.e. the sphere of the highest concrete universality – involves separating civil and 
political life from each other and leaves political life hanging, so to speak, in the 
air; for its basis is then merely the abstract individuality of arbitrary will and 
opinion, and is thus grounded only on contingency rather than on a foundation 
which is stable and legitimate [berechtigt] in and for itself. – Although the Stände 
of civil society in general and the Stände in the political sense are represented, in 
so-called theories, as remote from each other, linguistic usage still preserves the 
unity which they certainly possessed in earlier times.37 
 
It is ‘precisely in this way that the overlapping and displacement [Verschiebung] of 
modern and old word meanings become observable’.38 When I turn towards the closing 
remark to this chapter I will have the opportunity to make some more specific 
observations on Hegel and to contextualise more precisely his political thought and the 
distinctiveness of the period that fundamentally shapes and forms it. For the moment, 
however, one can note how the slow dissolution and transformation of the Stände mark 
the emergence of the modern world as such. 
This process of dissolution and transformation can be taken up and analysed at the 
etymological level in the contiguity of the terms Stand and Staat. The German Staat, like 
Stand, derives from Middle Low German stehen and like the Latin ‘status’, from the 
Proto-Indo-European ‘Sta’ – to ‘stay’, ‘stand’, ‘remain’. ‘The English word “state” is, in 
fact, a contraction of the word “estate”. This is similar to the old French word estat and 
                                                
36 For extensive treatments of this subject see most notably Koselleck 1975; this should be compared with 
the Marxist approach in Heuer 1960. 
37 Hegel 1991a, p. 344 (§303) (original emphasis) the translation has been modified here to emphasis the 
Stände rather than the division between ‘social’ and ‘political’, which the translators in English have the 
habit to emphasise by using e/Estates of classes/estates in the Grundlinien see below I.3 when I turn to 
analyse the problem of translation. The additions in […] are mine. 
38 Koselleck 2004a , p. xiv. 
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the modern French état’.39 Estate derives from the Greek aorist esthsa [estēsa], as would 
the French état. 40  The basic meaning would be ‘something caused to stand’, i.e., 
something which stands in its own right. The estate/state/état – in the German Stand and 
Staat – would be something which gains an objective or independent existence apart from 
the majority, albeit created and propped up by a few.41  
In the fourteenth century German context for the first time ‘stant’ in the sense of 
‘Stand’, ‘Rang’ – as in rank, degree, or gradation – appears, and is derived from the Latin 
‘status’ and the related ‘ordo’ and means ‘action, place, type of standing’.42 But at this 
very early stage the sematic field is rather broad and signifies ‘a succession of other 
meanings such as “Verfassung”, “Herrschaft”, “Land” and “Reich”’: i.e., the words 
‘“stant” (= “Stand”) and “stat” (= “Staat”) are not yet used specifically; the separation of 
meanings as well as terms [Bezeichnungen] takes place first in modernity’.43 The word 
Stand eventually comes to replace the former Latinate concepts status, ordo, conditio, 
dignitas and gradus, and often officium and vocatio with Stellung, Zustand, Umstände, 
and Lage.44 The former related and even contiguous Latin words are of the utmost 
importance insofar as they convey how deeply the German concept of Stand is rooted in a 
reflection on the ordering of the entirety of the traditional civitas sive societas civilis sive 
res publica, or the status civilis that comes to be based on the Herrschaftsstände.45 
A central contradiction in Hegel’s usage of the Stände lies in the fact that he is the 
first to conceptually recognise and distinguish a political modernity that entails the 
division between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ but in the same gesture undoes this 
‘liberal-revolutionary idea of a contrast between state and society’.46 It is in this sense that 
the Stände for Hegel retain the traditional characterisation of ‘all estate systems and 
representative constitutions … as a reunion of the separate elements of state and 
society’.47 Indeed, Hegel sought to conceive of the Stände in the context of the history of 
                                                
39 Vincent 2004, p. 43. 
40 Liddell, Scott, Jones, McKenzie 1996, pp. 344, 1793–4. 
41 See Lewis 1915, pp. 949–50. 
42 Grimm 1971 quoted in Oexle, Conze and Walther 2004, p. 156. 
43 Oexle, Conze and Walther 2004, p. 156. 
44 See Stuke 1968, p. 38. 
45 Oexle, Conze and Walther 2004, pp. 156ff.  
46 Riedel 2011, p. 148  
47 Hintze 1975, p. 168. 
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European representation.48 There is a sufficient amount of contention, however, over the 
actual meaning of the Stände in this sense. To indicate a ‘reunion’ between ‘society’ and 
‘the state’ already implies another political stage in history and perhaps conveys a 
‘modern’ meaning to the Stände that does not accord with their historical actuality. This 
interpretation of the Stände as leading distinctively to parliamentarianism, writ large in 
Hegel’s constitutional history, can also be seen as conflictual with the ‘pre-modern’ 
period: 
 
The Stände were not arrayed against the prince, ‘representing’ the people before 
the institutions of the state. They were organized institutionally insofar as they 
shared in the rule; they represented in real and symbolic terms, the structure of 
authority before the people. As Otto Brunner put it, ‘The Stände do not “represent” 
the land, rather they “are” the land’. Thus, a ständisch assembly offered a public 
presentation of a Herrschaft that was in fact based on private relationships. In this 
situation, the ‘public’ exercise of authority was fused with the ‘private’.49 
 
Clearly Hegel does not use the concept in such a ‘patrimonial’ fashion in the Grundlinien, 
but employed it at the precise moment of the disorganisation of ‘modern’ civil society, 
and what he perceived as the necessary institutional organisation of individuals when they 
enter the political order of the state. ‘The relation between concepts and reality poses an 
important methodological question’; Hegel, in order ‘to better adapt words to reality, … 
sought to create a vocabulary as exact as possible’.50 What must be recognised then is that 
Hegel did not chose the concept of the Stand arbitrarily. Rather he took over the former 
‘linguistic usage’ of the concept, and its proximity to organisational terminology in his 
structuring of both civil society and the state and their unification – as can be seen in the 
quotation from the Grundlinien cited above – and emphasised their capacity for 
representation. 
What occurs on the linguistic and etymological level – as I noted above in the 
common etymology of the terms Stand and Staat – is reflected in the distinctive formation 
of the ‘modern’ European concept of the state; it entails historical processes that 
essentially involve a ‘socio-political’ transformation of the Stände; this subsequently 
                                                
48 See Hegel 1999, pp. 80, 94 for the earliest example of this tendency in his thought, which I will explore in 
more detail in Chapter Two. 
49 Berdahl 1988, p. 13, the quote is from Brunner Land und Herrschaft, p. 423. 
50 Conze 1968, pp. 52–3. 
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modifies the subject of politics – and, one might add, the political lexicon as well. The 
character of the Stände as inherently political patrimonial structures give way from a 
decentralised system of domination and power sharing – a form of pluralism, or more 
appropriation of co-regency in the era of the Ständestaat – to a centralised territorial 
subject recognised by its rationalised system of jurisprudence and uniform bureaucracy.51 
The development of the state essentially involves ‘a system of administrative levelling’ 
whereby the former independent ‘administrative and military tasks of the Stände [des 
ordres]’ are now ‘progressively carried out [assurées] by the State that, through the 
legislative and the administrative reinforcement of its powers, reduces the Stände [les 
ordres] to a private function [rôle]. The result of this evolution is the separation of the 
political and the social, the public and the private, in a word the separation of society and 
State …’.52 Thus at the same time as a singular Stand moves towards a State-like political 
condition and becomes increasingly independent and autonomous in its activities, the 
other Stände undergo an inverse process of ‘socialisation’ and are eventually relegated to 
a subservient and increasingly civil status. Thus there is simultaneously a movement 
toward a ‘depoliticised’ condition and the eventual formation of a ‘civil’ social order of 
stratification – the nascent object of sociology, statistics, and the like – as political power 
becomes concentrated in the movement from Stand to Staat. Suffice to say that the logic 
of modern political development is intrinsic to this process of separation, while 
historically speaking it is strongly reinforced by the development of patrimonialism, as 
‘political units in the process of becoming States are not seen in the first place as 
conquering entities, but as growing estates of dominant dynasties’.53 
 
Absolutism supressed what Montesquieu called the intermediary powers; it did not 
by any means abolish the differences between the Estates; on the contrary, it 
purposively sought to maintain the Estates’ social order as a useful basis of the 
absolute system of government. The preferential position which the nobility and 
the privileged classes enjoyed, however, was legal and social rather than political.54 
 
                                                
51 See Weber 1978, p. 56 for his by now infamous description of the political unity of the modern state. 
52 See Stuke 1968, p. 45; although he uses les ordres rather than Stände in this instance, which loses the 
sense of etymological proximity to the concept of the state, elsewhere he uses estat as a French synonym, 
from which the word état derives. His presentation is moreover on the development of the word ‘Stand’ in 
the German speaking territories. 
53 Poggi 2006, p. 98 (emphasis added). 
54 Hintze 1975, p. 175. 
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From a politicist perspective, the circumstances of continuous warfare on the Continent, 
the necessity of state building in order to survive, led originally patrimonial Stände to 
territorial state forms through an increase and appropriation of land; the expansion of 
certain demesne at the expense of others.55 Such events preceded the modern split 
between public and private law, civil society and state, as public authority [imperium] was 
the private property [dominium] of the ruler; this certainly coincided with the 
longstanding perception of the Stände as such, which were based historically on a series 
of private relationships of domination and of domestic economy.56 As I have established, 
this is not related to Hegel’s usage of the concept of the Stände. I have rather been 
emphasising the modern context as the structure in which Hegel’s concept is shaped and 
formed. The fluidity between patrimonial regimes and the developing absolutist tendency 
can perhaps be best seen in the theorisations of the absolutist thinkers themselves, who 
when conceptualising the state form conceived of sovereignty along the lines of the pater 
familias, something which both Jean de Bodin (1529–96) and Hobbes shared, which was 
maintained alongside the Aristotelian formulation of the oikos.57 It was only over an 
extended period of time that Aristotle’s dichotomy (domestic society – political society) 
was replaced by the Hobbesian model (state of nature – civil society).58 Yet insofar as the 
civitas, as the recognised sphere of politics, was modelled on the oikos of the 
paterfamilias subsequent to the state of nature the two models in the final analysis were 
mixed. Thus the former politische Gesellschaft was composed of Herrschaftsstände; ‘that 
is to say, of corporate associations of “lords” [seigneurs] that formed divisions of a 
political and social whole [ensemble]’.59 
Hegel was acutely aware of the differentiation between Staat and Stand or Reichs- 
and Landstände in the Verfassungsschrift, which he also used in his characterisation of 
the political forms existent in the Holy Roman Empire prior to its dissolution. The latter 
terms were far more common in the political descriptions of the Holy Roman Empire.60 
                                                
55 For this perspective see Anderson 1974; compare Brenner 1982. 
56 See Stuke 1968, p. 39; the reference is to Brunner 1949. 
57 See Bodin 1606, p. 8; Hobbes 1983, p. 117; Pufendorf 1994, pp. 89, 134 (I will analyse this below III.1). 
58 This development was implicit in Hegel’s departure from classical oikonomik and his shift towards 
modern political economy, which entailed his interpretation of the family as based on the love relation 
rather than household rule. 
59 Stuke 1968, p. 39. 
60 This will be analysed in much extensive detail in Chapter Two. 
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‘Even if state was an already established word and had long exceeded the realm of 
scholarly language … it stood in a wide context of competing concepts such as Herrschaft, 
Obrigkeit, gemeines Wesen, Landschaft – and even Reich and Stand’.61 As I have begun 
to analyse in the first section of this chapter, a concept is not an isolated phenomenon but 
structured by a broader historical context and semantic field of meaning. ‘Both words and 
concepts are always plurivalent [mehrdeutig], but they are so in different ways. This is 
what gives them their historical quality. … A word can become unambiguous, can be 
reduced to a single meaning [eindeutig], precisely because it is plurivalent. A concept, on 
the other hand, must remain ambiguous [vieldeutig] in order to be able to be a concept. 
The concept does indeed adhere to the word, but is simultaneously more than the word’.62 
It implies the broader political and social context of meaning that I have thus far analysed 
in order to apprehend the concept of the Stand. In this particular case, one can see how 
Hegel’s conception of the state, while the word Staat itself existed in the linguistic context 
of the Holy Roman Empire, is structured entirely by a revolutionary phenomenon: the 
emergence of the French Republic, ‘the condensation [Zusammenfassung] of all forces to 
a central point determined through law [Gesetze]; the association in a universal in 
“common subordination [Unterwürfigkeit] to a supreme state authority [oberste 
Staatsgewalt]”’.63 
 
Thus Hegel cannot get around an explication of his concept of the state. 
Considering the ambiguity of the usage of the word [this was] a plain necessity and 
a precaution against misunderstanding. He defines the concept rigorously from 
every angle and not without didactic emphasis. The state [of the Holy Roman 
Empire] is a Gedankenstaat. It must be made actual, not only in intentions and 
planning but be capable of defence and self-assertiveness.64  
 
The context here thus structures, conveys meaning and precisely defines Hegel’s concept, 
and from this point onwards he distinguishes a state as a necessity of reason: ‘even if no 
state is present reason requires that one be established’.65 On the other hand, as I have 
noted above, Hegel’s critical perspectives on revolutionary France also shape the 
peculiarity of his concept of the state. This is why he gives particular meaning to the 
                                                
61 Maier 2004, p. 202. 
62 Koselleck 2004a , p. xxii. 
63 Maier 2004, p. 197, the latter part of the quotation is from Hegel 2004, p. 62. 
64 Maier 2004, pp. 202, 203. 
65 Hegel 1991a, p. 106 (§75). 
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unification of the social and the political in the Stände – the unity and sovereignty of the 
modern state form for Hegel is not simply a question of the success of its ‘centralised’ 
power structure that permits the capability of defence, but also equally as important is its 
institutional articulation and how the different spheres come to be organised and 
participate within the state. 
 
I.2 The Philosophical Sources 
 
As I have begun to show in this chapter, the difficulty of approaching the concept of the 
Stände is that it involves many other phenomena such as state development, the collapse 
of the old regime and the French Revolution even in the limited case I am examining. 
This issue is further intensified when I turn to the philosophical sources of the Stände in 
Hegel’s thought, regarding which a consensus has not as yet been reached.66  My 
‘conceptual’ approach therefore involves studying more than simple transformations in 
meaning and linguistic usage; it requires rather a much broader referential horizon – for 
example, Hegel’s distinctive approach to the political (history) in Chapter Two, the legal 
(natural right) in Chapter Three, and the ethical (consciousness) in Chapter Four – in 
order to discover the particular way the concept is used and determined, developed and 
transformed in Hegel’s hands. As I aim to show, the existence of a context conveys 
meaning to a given concept, and can transform its underlying ideas and theoretical 
formation to such a degree that it becomes unrelated to the traditional milieu from which 
it arose. Yet in the continuance of the older language structures it still seems to relate to 
the tradition, but its usage, meaning, and theoretical formation betrays a different purpose 
and the coming into being of a different concept. It is in this way that the context of a 
                                                
66 Hočevar in a second study on Hegel’s Stände (Hočevar 1973) relates them to the Allgemeines Landrecht 
für die Preußischen Staaten; by contrast in his early study they are in part related also to the Greek polis 
(see Hočevar 1968, pp. 41–2). Clearly this relates to the distinctiveness of Hegel positions, his place in 
Frankfurt and Jena in the early period and his position in Berlin much later on. His more positive 
appreciation of codification – he condemned it as destroying Greek Sittlichkeit in 1802–3 and saw it as 
destructive of the possibility of a state form in Germany in the same period – can be seen to develop in view 
of the Historische Rechtsschule (see Becchi 2009; and the landmark study by Schiavone 1984). Hočevar’s 
later study should be compared to Walker 1978 who conceives of the German traditions of police science 
[Polizeiwissenschaft] and jurisprudence combined in the ‘rights’ and ‘functions’ of Hegel’s modern civil 
society. See also Waszek 1988, p. 171 who adds another dimension to this debate: ‘Hegel’s tripartite class 
distinction as well as a number of subdivisions and subsequent definitions show a number of significant 
affinities with Sir James Steuart’s corresponding exposition’. 
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given concept, its idea and theoretical formation can pre-exist its definitive entrance into 
language whereby it coincides with its definition.67 Thus a conceptual history neither 
simply entails 
  
a modification in linguistic usage nor a (perceived [vermeintliche]) history of the 
concept, but the history of the comprehension [Geschichte des Begreifens] (the 
interpretation of the conception [des Erfassens] or definition) a concept [Begriff] 
has in relation to the subject-matter [zum Gegenstand]. A conceptual-historical 
inquiry is therefore technically speaking always the exposition [Darstellung] of the 
history of the concept of a concept.68 
 
What K.H. Ilting indicates here is precisely the broader context that must be taken into 
account in the definition of a given concept. For example, the history of a concept implies 
more than the history of a word, it necessitates an analysis of the various forces that have 
determined and shaped its coming into being. In reference to the European philosophical 
and metaphysical tradition one confronts a further obstacle insofar as the grasping of a 
concept is all too easily structured with reference to specifically modern conceptuality; 
that is to say, the Stände are seen to be tied up with the ‘stratification’ of the European 
ancien régime. In sum, ‘modern thought discovers itself in its reflection on social order in 
a fundamental contradiction to each classical European system of thought, which 
encircles ‘Ordnung’ and ‘Stand’ in metaphysical, recognition-theoretical, and moral 
meanings’.69 It is precisely in this way that what is required is an act of distancing from 
the present whereby one can discover that the ‘emergence of modernity in its conceptual 
recognition [Erfassung] is only explicable if also directly shifted to earlier meanings 
[Sinngehalt]’.70 In this way, as Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006) explains, an ‘effect of 
alienation [Verfremdungseffekt] through past experience may then serve the present 
sharpening of consciousness which leads from historical clarification [Klarstellung] to 
                                                
67 See Koselleck 1989, p. 12: ‘What occurs at some point in time may be unique and new, but it is never so 
new that longer-term, pre-given social conditions had not made the one-time event in question possible. A 
new concept may be coined which had never before expressed experiences or expectations which had been 
present in words. But it can never be so new that it was not virtually laid out in the pre-given language at the 
time and even drawing its sense from its conventional linguistic context. The interplay of speaking and 
doing in which events occur is thus extended by the two directions of research around its – variously 
defined – diachronic dimensions. Without this history is neither possible nor comprehensible’. 
68 Ilting 1983, p. 13. 
69 Oexle, Conze, and Walther 2004, p. 157. 
70 Koselleck 2004a , p. xix. 
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political clarification [Klärung]’.71 This is a particularly distinctive process when one 
considers that the analysis of the Stände largely implies a ‘pre-modern’ context. A shift 
moreover in the perception of social order can be very precisely fixed in time to the rise of 
what is termed ‘philosophical functionalism’, which transformed the typical relationships 
between ontology, the theory of recognition and morality existent in traditional European 
metaphysics.72 As truly modern political theory emerged, the former Aristotelian and 
scholastic conception of the unity of politics broke into two parts; on the one hand, the 
theory of ‘the highest force [Gewalt] or sovereignty’ was formed while, on the other, 
‘political concepts [Begriffe]’ began to be deduced on the basis of natural law. Galilean 
physics also emerged and broke with the teleological conception of nature. ‘The nature 
and history of man, which in the classical tradition of politics formed a unity, now 
separated’.73 
 
The Aristotelian tradition of a single discipline was substituted by a distinction 
between theoretical reflection and practical application, and in this new context the 
leading role was attributed to natural law, the new ‘architectonic’ discipline which 
reduced other disciplines to a subordinate function.74 
 
As Manfred Riedel has noted, this eventually led to Christian Wolff’s ‘division of 
practical philosophy into a “rational” and “empirical” part’, which was followed by 
Kant’s rejection of all empiricism with the idea of the will’s pure ‘self-grounding’ that 
rendered ‘impossible the recapitulation of the concepts and objects transmitted by the 
tradition’.75 This was followed by the division between the theoretical and practical 
sciences that are at the centre of Hegel’s debate with the modern tradition in the Jena 
natural law essay of 1802–3. And in the essay it is telling that Hegel precisely 
appropriates the Stände by way of his renewed engagement with the ancient metaphysical 
tradition in order to solve the problems introduced by modern natural law.76 For Kant, the 
theoretical sciences are to be fundamentally excluded from practical philosophy as I 
showed above. In so doing he reduced politics and economics to ‘doctrines of prudence 
                                                
71 Koselleck 2004a , pp. xvi, xix.  
72 See Oexle, Conze, and Walther 2004, p. 157. 
73 Riedel 2004a, pp. 733, 737. 
74 Scattola 2009, p. 6. 
75 Riedel 2011, p. 11. 
76 See Ilting 2006, pp. 17ff; compare Riedel 2011, p. 13; and below III.2, III.3, III.4. 
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and pleasure’, which are ‘merely pragmatic, technical sciences which belong to the world 
of empirical experience’ and can no longer ‘borrow the ends which generate the power of 
ethical obligation in moral and political action’.77 Kant had stated this in no uncertain 
terms at the outset of his Metaphysik der Sitten by dividing the ‘material’ from the 
‘formal’.78 
As I argued in the Introduction, for Hegel the Stände respond to a contemporary 
metaphysical problem and represent an institutional form ‘at rest’ developed from the 
‘absolute movement or absolute relation’ to contrast with the ‘formal’ autonomy of the 
will that appeared with Kant and the civitas conceived as a ‘sovereign’ (Hobbes, 
Rousseau, Fichte) in System der Sittlichkeit.79 There is a correspondence here moreover 
between the metaphysical subject and the political subject of the French Revolution, 
which, as is well known, had its basis in the modern natural law tradition. Indeed for 
Hegel there will be no division between metaphysics and politics; it is thus that he 
simultaneously conceptualises the Stände in the context of modern ‘depoliticised’ society 
and as an answer to the formal ‘autonomy’ of the individual subject.80 Hegel’s earliest 
appropriation of the concept of the Stände as a structuring principle of his 
Rechtsphilosophie belongs precisely within the horizon of traditional European 
metaphysics. He retrieves the Stände from the other side of the irreparable break begun by 
Hobbes and metaphysically construed by Kant (of an axiomatic individualism). Following 
on the Spinozistic orientation of the Verfassungsschrift, according to Ilting, Hegel ‘sought 
to unify in a system Spinoza’s natural law theory [Naturrechtslehre] and Aristotle’s 
politics’.81 In this way Hegel identified ‘nature’ [natura sive Deus] in Spinoza with the 
political community organised according to nature in Aristotle – a metaphysically derived 
system of inequality, of a part that rules by nature over another part.82 
                                                
77 Riedel 2011, pp. 8–9. 
78 Kant 2011, p. 3. 
79 Hegel 2002, p. 4. 
80 I agree with Ilting’s perspective when he states that Hegel was not opposed to autonomy as such, which 
lay at the foundation of modern practical philosophy, but of its inadequate embodiment in the institutions of 
his own time (Ilting 1983, p 27). It is to this that the concept of the Stände is a response. 
81 Ilting 2006, pp. 17. 
82 See Politics 1252a24–1252b27. At the same time the European reflection on forms of stratification begins 
in Plato (Republic 431e–432a, 435b), the metaphor of the body or organism as an interpretive schema also 
appears (see Oexle, Conze, and Walther 2004, p. 162). The polis as an organism ordered along a natural 
hierarchy, just and necessary, between rulers and slaves is expressed by way of ‘the rule of the soul over the 
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Spinoza grounds his doctrine of infinite substance in the Aristotelian determination 
of entities, which in its affections is by nature prior [der Natur nach eher] (natura 
prior). This similarity between Spinoza and Aristotle entitles Hegel to identify up 
to a certain point Spinoza’s doctrine of substance with Aristotle’s political science 
[Staatslehre].83 
 
Hegel’s political philosophy represents a last systematic attempt at unity between the 
metaphysical and empirical, in a period of transition to the modern age. It is thus that, 
following Riedel, who ‘measured Hegel’s “civil society” directly against the tradition of 
this concept in European political philosophy’, I will analyse the Stände thematically in 
each following chapter of this study.84 This will allow me to reveal the differentiation of 
Hegel’s concept from the tradition and its distinctive relation to political modernity. 
From early on, and under the influence of Hölderlin, the Greeks orient Hegel’s 
political philosophy. This leads to his conception of the ‘system of needs’ that 
corresponds to Plato’s origin of the city, where individualism is not self-subsistent but is 
directed towards the community for its satisfaction.85 ‘The Platonic subdivision of the 
three Stände is set against Aristotle’s structural schema; on the one hand as a multitude of 
parts [and] on the other divided into six different functions’. 86  For Aristotle, the 
community is not only designed to meet the satisfaction of needs but is naturally oriented 
towards the good life – ‘actualisation is only possible when we step into community with 
others’.87 Moreover, for Ilting ‘the economics of Aristotle gave Hegel the philosophical 
basis for the appropriation of modern English national economy’.88 Thus from this 
                                                                                                                                             
body’ for Aristotle (see Politics 1254a29–1254b35). Chapter Three (III.3, III.4) will show Hegel’s break 
from the Greek natural hierarchical concept, by way of the prioritisation of labour and the negative, which 
leads him to a new basis for the concept of the Stände. As can be seen in both the Jena natural law essay and 
in System der Sittlichkeit, Hegel is employing the classical model of the body politic as organic as a contrast 
to the Hobbesian metaphor of the artificial man (see Hegel 1999, p. 156; and 2002, p. 51 where ethical life 
appears as the ‘independent spirit’ of the mythical Greek Briarius with his ‘myriad of eyes, arms and other 
members each of which is an absolute individual’). 
83 Ilting 2006, p. 19. Also see Ilting’s unpublished correspondence with Schmitt (letter 22.12.62). It is worth 
noting that Hegel’s earliest appropriation of the Stände in System der Sittlichkeit here – which expresses in 
embryonic form Hegel’s later philosophy of right – was written in 1802–3, a year after he co-edited 
Spinoza’s work with his colleague Paulus. It was also the time when he was closest to Schelling (1801–3).  
84 Riedel 2011, p. 132. 
85 See Republic 369b.  
86 Oexle, Conze and Walther 2004, p. 162. 
87 See Ilting 2006, p. 18. 
88 Ilting 2006, p. 23; see Politics 1291a1–1291a30, 1328b15–1328b22 and Hegel 1991a, p. 219 (§181) and 
pp. 227, 233 (§§189, 199) on how subjective need and satisfaction leads to a system of needs and social 
labour. 
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perspective, it is clear in the first instance that the Stände, in the earliest outlines of 
Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie (1801–7), are derived from two sources: from Plato and 
Aristotle and from his readings in modern political economy that will eventually push the 
transformative capacity of labour to the forefront in the organisation of the political 
community, as I will analyse in Chapter Three. It is appropriate to add here an additional 
element that drives Hegel’s political theory of institutionalism up to his maturity in the 
Berlin period (1818–31); that is, the correspondence between the soul and the polis.89 In 
the Grundlinien and in the Encyclopaedia, Hegel’s conception of the state descends from 
the Idea just as the individual, by contrast, ascends by way of subjective spirit through the 
institutional stages of its organisation. In this section I have thus traced an important 
aspect that gives definitive insight into the particular elements of Hegel’s institutional 
theory of the Stände. I have moreover indicated the origin of Hegel’s return to the Greeks 
in the ‘crisis’ of European metaphysics in his conceptualisation of the political. The initial 
formation of the concept of the Stände owes its origin in Hegel’s thought precisely to this 
circumstance, which in turn determines and shapes his philosophy. 
 
I.3 The Fundamental Difference between Stand and Klasse 
 
A large part of the problem in interpreting Hegel’s concept of the Stand is the horizon 
from which his epoch is viewed and the development of modernity. This points in the 
direction of a lexical problem in the translation of the term in Hegel’s writings, and its 
confusion with the concept of Klasse.90 This is a common issue in historical-sociological 
studies where the existence of a concept is presumed – such as ‘class’ in this case – but 
where the corresponding term itself is not present. The scholar or translator has thus read 
the concept back into Hegel, where it may or may not yet exist. This is not simply an 
issue of translation as it also appears in scholars working within the tradition of the 
German scholarship.91 Indeed here one is faced with a question of interpretation. The 
reader comes across a further complication in the Grundlinien, however, in that Hegel 
                                                
89 See Republic 577c–577d. 
90 In Nisbet’s English translation of the Grundlinien (1991a) he translates Stände as E/estates; he capitalises 
the Estates for Stände in the ‘political sense’ of a ‘parliament’ to make the distinction, while in Knox’s 
translation Stände in civil society is translated as ‘class’. 
91 For example, see Waszek 1988, pp. 171ff. 
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divides the Stände between civil (social) and political (state) functions only to reunify 
them with the concept of the Stände as a representational form mediating between the 
interests of civil society and the state. The extent to which a transformation in their 
conceptual character can be seen is given most definitively by the French Revolution. I 
remind the reader here of the importance of Carl Schmitt’s (1888–1985) reference to 
Sieyès cited above. There Schmitt noted how with Sieyès’s proclamation of ‘le tiers État 
c’est la Nation’, the identification of a singular Stand with the nation, the Stände that 
required a plurality of social orders to exist were dissolved. This undid the strict hierarchy 
of ‘status’ society, the ständische Gesellschaft. A citizen’s allegiance was now neither 
bound to a definitive group nor was it situated in relations of dependence (subordination) 
or independence (super-ordination) to those above or below.92 The state now claims every 
allegiance, which had formerly been divided into a plurality of duties and obligations on 
which the individual was dependent. This process eventually makes way for the 
conditions whereby Klasse – seen largely as governed by economic criteria or property 
qualifications – will increasingly come to replace Stand, even if for a time the two 
concepts frequently appear synonymous and interchangeable, which is indeed 
characteristic of periods undergoing conceptual innovation and linguistic change.93 
Yet in the Grundlinien and other works Hegel consistently distinguishes Stand from 
the Klasse. The latter betrays a sociological character alien to Hegel’s conception of the 
state as institutionalised and constructed on a foundational principle (of the 
correspondence between subjective and objective spirit). To translate the Stand in terms 
of Klasse is to lose precisely the integral aspect of organisation, the corporate or 
institutional significance that the Stände convey for Hegel and were distinctively implied 
in his usage of the term. On the other hand, it is to interpret class along the lines of an 
organisational structure that both Karl Marx (1818–83) and Max Weber (1864–1920) saw 
as particularly problematic. For Marx, Klasse posed a fundamental organisational 
problem as ‘separated individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a 
common battle against another class; in other respects they are on hostile terms with each 
                                                
92 Indeed as the Stände transformed so too did the concept of Bürger, see Koselleck 2004a , p. xx. 
93 See Ossowski 1969, in particular pp. 121–31. 
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other as competitors’.94 Similarly, for Weber, ‘a class does not in itself constitute a 
Gemeinschaft’: to ‘treat “Klasse” conceptually as being equivalent to “Gemeinschaft” is a 
warped form of reasoning’.95 
As I showed in section I.2 above, Hegel’s conceived of the French Revolution and 
the modern systems of natural law that preceded it as based on an axiomatic principle of 
individualism. This for Hegel leads fundamentally to a situation where individuals 
‘consists in being many, and since this many is … devoid of unity, they are destined to be 
mutually opposed and in absolute conflict with one another’.96 It is to this extent that he 
sought unity in the European tradition of metaphysics as I suggested. By contrast, Klasse 
for Hegel represents the isolated particularity of self-interest that threatens to destroy the 
unity of the state as such in the dialectic of poverty and wealth (the place where Klasse 
appears in the Grundlinien deals, without exception, with the accumulation of wealth and 
industrial production that leads to the impoverishment – ‘the dependence and want’ – ‘of 
the class which is tied to such work’).97 Central to the development of the class concept 
for Hegel, then, is the ‘creation of the rabble’, a political problem that had to be accounted 
for in his philosophy. 
  
Something inherently new came into being with this excess precisely because the 
dimension of the estates-order would be destroyed; thereby the overgrown rabble 
had imposed an impending question that must be accounted for politically.98  
 
Clearly it is in this instance that Hegel’s institutionalism comes once more into play, as 
well as the organisational capacities of the Stände that the strictly economic development 
of a class society threatens to destroy.99 In the Berlin lectures on Rechtsphilosophie of 
1819/20, ‘poverty has a right to revolt in civil society against the system, which 
prohibited any realisation of the will of the free. This is only to be understood as the 
assertion [Erklärung] of right against society itself that denies the will of the poor its 
                                                
94 Marx and Engels 1975–2004, vol. 4, p. 77. 
95 Weber 1978, p. 930. The two concepts overlap on occasion for Weber, but his sociological concept is 
unnecessary to engage with as concerns the purposes of my study. 
96 Hegel 1999, p. 112. 
97 Hegel 1991a, p. 266 (original emphasis) (compare §243, addition §244, §245, remark §253). 
98 Conze 1954, p. 338; see also now Ruda 2011. 
99 Hegel uses Klasse as early as the Jena natural law essay (1802–3) in the context of the merchants. Thus he 
already relates it at this early stage to economic criteria (see Hegel 1999). 
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existence’.100 The Stände in this context are thus meant to be the institutional forms – 
along with the other institutional aspects in the state such as the police and the corporation 
– that ward off the ever-impending crises of modern civil society. Yet Hegel’s 
institutionalism in its ‘severe’ form, as Henrich has termed it, ‘compellingly leads to his 
theory of sovereignty [fürstliche Gewalt] or to the full-fledged equivalent to it. This 
consequently ends in the thoughtlessness [Undenkbarkeit] of the boundaries of power 
[Gewalt] in any form of enforceable right’.101 Thus while organisation is the internal 
solution to the dynamic of modern civil society for Hegel, the rights and limits of it over 
the individual are in no way clarified. As for the external solutions these are well known, 
and are indeed consequent on the organisation of power in the state from Hegel’s earliest 
understanding of natural law as the right of power in the conflict between nations.102 This 
led to the development of colonies and the organisation for war between states. 
Hegel had also indeed distinguished between Stand and Klasse explicitly in the 
Nürnberger Propädeutik. There, for example, he argued that 
 
The different estates of a state are in general concrete distinctions, according to 
which the individuals are divided into classes; classes rest chiefly on the inequality 
of wealth, upbringing, and education, just as these again rest on inequality of birth, 
through which some individuals receive a kind of activity which is more useful for 
the state than that received by others.103 
 
Klassen thus appear here in a comparable way to how individualism will appear when I 
arrive at my extensive treatment of civil society as the state of nature in Chapter Three 
(III.4). Hegel’s usage quoted above should be compared with Adam Smith’s who had  
 
divided society into basic groups, according not to legal but to economic criteria. 
But he did not apply the term ‘class’ to these groups but the term ‘order’. We do 
find the word ‘class’, in the meaning of social group, in Smith’s works, but it is 
                                                
100 Henrich 1983, p. 20. 
101 Henrich 1983, p. 29; compare Ilting 2006, p. 26; Bobbio 1989, p. 67.  
102 See Ilting 2006, p. 28 who draws on the importance of Spinoza in Hegel’s thought on history and 
international law: …‘in the political-philosophical [staatphilosophischen] writings of 1802 … one can 
clearly recognise the presence of Aristotelian natural law in Hegel’s interpretation of the inner unity of the 
politically constituted community, the continuing impact of Spinozistic thought by contrast in his theory on 
war and international law, which will remain true for Hegel into the Rechtsphilosophie and the 
Encyclopaedia’ (Ilting 2006, p. 32). 
103 Hegel 1991a, p. 452 (original emphasis). 
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applied to a more differentiated division. The three basic orders are in turn divided 
into ‘classes’.104 
 
What can be observed then is the contiguity of the terms, which adds a problematic 
dimension to translation and meaning. Yet, as I have also noted above, this is not the case 
where Hegel is concerned. Even if both Stand and Klasse are often ambiguous and, at 
times, interchangeable in the period of transformation in which Hegel’s political 
philosophy develops, this is largely external to his conceptual concerns. Yet for the 
former reason, the two terms appear in the same entry in the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe.105 For Marx, in his Critique, the Stände appear as the point where ‘all of 
the contradictions of the modern state coalesce …’ and as ‘the posited contradiction of the 
state and civil society’.106 As Riedel has argued, Marx’s philosophy embodies most 
profoundly the ‘freeing of philosophy from law in favour of economics’107 – the transition 
to a polemical class-concept. 
 
During the nineteenth century, ‘class’ generally replaced the older term ‘estate’ in 
expressions which did not refer to legal criteria, particularly in expressions in 
which the term ‘class’ was used in its most general meaning: that is to say, when it 
referred to the basic groups in different societies. ‘Class’ ousted ‘estate’ in social 
theories, ideological declarations and the programmes of social movements. The 
only complication arose from the fact that as a consequence of socialist propaganda 
the word ‘class’ and its derivative expressions came to be regarded as typical of 
certain milieu and acquired a ‘class flavour’.108 
 
In conclusion, the confusion between the Stände with Klassen is something that Hegel 
himself appropriately clarified for the interpreter of his work. For the sake of my study 
and for clarity I will leave the term untranslated throughout insofar as to distinguished 
between the ‘civil’ and the ‘political’ Stände is already to dichotomise what Hegel 
attempted to structure organically and institutionally; it is precisely this unity which he 
was intent on expressing and which the young Marx, in turn, was intent on bringing to the 
point of ‘essential contradiction’ in his Critique.109 Moreover, to translate Stand in terms 
of class is to reduce the ordering principle that the concept conveys, even if reduced to 
                                                
104 Ossowski 1969, p. 123. 
105 See Oexle, Conze and Walther 2004. 
106 Marx and Engels 1975–2004, Vol. 3, pp. 67, 69 
107 Riedel 2011, p. 161. 
108 Ossowski 1969, p. 125. 
109 See Marx and Engels 1975–2004, Vol. 3, p. 91 (original emphasis). 
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occupational strata based on the organisation of labour and need. On the other hand, 
insofar as the concept has been emptied of its former characterisation as a patrimonial 
form, ‘the ständische principle is merely an artifice, the acceptance of it arbitrary, and its 
inner truth has been stripped away’.110 Georg Lukács (1885–1971) noted this by isolating 
‘the purely economic articulation’ of what he termed ‘class consciousness’ whereby 
‘social conflict was reflected in an ideological struggle for consciousness and the veiling 
or the exposure of class society’.111 Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit and the ständische 
principle of order sought to answer to this process, precisely through the preservation of 
social differences and distinctions. Even if these were interchangeable, whereby the 
offices of the state were open to social mobility through specialisation and education, they 
were maintained on the basis of Hegel’s conception freedom and the right of the 
individual to have a concrete sphere of action. And this will be explored in detail in the 
following chapters. By contrast, Hegel would have denounced Lukács’s Marxist 





Before I proceed more generally to the analysis of Hegel’s distinctive approach to the 
political (history) in Chapter Two, the legal (natural right) in Chapter Three, and the 
ethical (consciousness) in Chapter Four, it is necessary to methodologically frame and 
limit my approach and discussion accordingly. To this end I want to further delineate the 
historical period in which Hegel’s concept is shaped and formed. This will also allow for 
a more comprehensive contextualisation of the peculiarities of Hegel’s discussions of the 
Stände and what the determining factors underlying its usage are insofar as it takes shape 
within a very specific philosophical and historical horizon. I have begun to give hint at 
these details in this chapter, which will be explored in the thematic studies that follow. To 
methodologically frame my approach and the historical period in which Hegel’s concept 
                                                
110 This is how Hegel’s student Eduard Gans (1797–1839) and lecturer on his Rechtsphilosophie in Berlin 
perceived the Stände – Gans cited in Gräff 1846, p. 147 (I owe this reference and translation to Berdahl 
1988, p. 222).  
111 Lukács 1971, p. 59; see also 1975. 
112 See Harris 1979, p. 200. 
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is shaped and formed I appeal to what Koselleck has termed the ‘Sattelzeit’, a period of 
transformation in Germany from approximately 1770 to 1850 whereby older words and 
concepts receive new meaning and import or – as in the case of the Stände – undergo a 
political and social decline in significance. The Sattlezeit introduces the idea of a period 
stretched between the old and the new that allows for an analysis of conceptual 
transformation. The historical shift that leads to the modern profoundly transforms and 
increasingly limits the concept – indeed the long dissolution of the ‘ständischen Welt’ 
signifies the coming into being of modernity as such. It is in accordance with such logic 
that the Stände would be given ‘a new meaning as an antithesis to the historical processes 
that constitute modernity’.113 The extent to which Hegel’s concept can be conceived in 
this light or precisely contrary to it will methodologically structure the ensuing 
discussions in this study. If one can observe that the Stände initially arise ‘out of the 
radical crisis of civil society’ for Hegel, they must be at once perceived as an aspect of 
this same conceptuality; they are thus torn loose from the world in which they were 
originally shaped and formed. 
                                                
113 Oexle, Conze, and Walther 2004, p. 157 (‘Stand, Klasse’). ‘Therefore Stand became a twofold and 
contradictory laden [besetzen] “Kampfbegriff” (Otto Brunner)’. 
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Chapter Two: Constitution 
 
Hegel, nevertheless, remains everywhere 
political in the decisive sense. Those of his 
writings which concern the actual problems 
of his time, particularly the highly gifted 
work of his youth, Die Verfassung 
Deutschlands, are enduring documentations 
of the philosophical truth that all spirit is 
present spirit. This remains visible also 
through the correctness or incorrectness of 
Hegel’s ephemeral position on historical 
events of his time1.  
 
The central aim of the present chapter is to demonstrate the difference between the 
traditional concept of the Reichs- and Landstände and Hegel’s late political 
conceptualisation of the Stände as an organisational form that contrasts with private 
particularity. It is important to clarify this here as it will set up a further clarification of 
the concept in the context of Hegel’s developing state theory and reinforce the historical 
encounter with the French Republic that I have shown in the previous chapter orients his 
thinking. This chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly (II.1), I analyse how the young 
Hegel’s early critique of the imperial constitution in the ‘Verfassungsschrift’ (Hegels 
Über die Reichsverfassung) (1798–1803)2 involves a critique of the Stände in their 
traditional function as Reichs- and Landstände: the subordination of what Hegel saw as 
imperial political power to private legal arbitration in the Holy Roman Empire. Hegel 
viewed the constitution of the empire after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as dominated 
by contractual relations of private right; this has a structural similarity with his critique of 
the impossibility of forming a state based on the contract. Secondly (II.2), I then contrast 
this with his later affirmation of the Stände as an attempt to develop a legitimate 
organisational form in the Grundlinien (1820/21) in precisely the opposite sense: where 
one sees the Stände as a ‘socio-political’ form that overcomes the isolation of private 
particularity. The issue that dominates Hegel’s critique of the imperial constitution thus 
reappears in personality and abstract right in the Grundlinien. These initial sections of the 
Grundlinien are followed, by contrast, by the Stände in Sittlichkeit where they appear as 
an institutional solution to private particularity. Finally (II.3), I return to elaborate further 
on the constitutional problem for the young Hegel and contrast the private ‘indirect 
                                                
1 Schmitt 2007, p. 62. 
2 See the critical edition (Hegel 2004) edited by Kurt Rainer Meist. 
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powers’ of the Reichs- and Landstände in the Verfassungsschrift with Hegel’s mature 
concept of the Stände, which is conceived as the initial concretisation of universality. This 
involves returning to the conceptual modification of ‘linguistic usage’ that I analysed in 
Chapter One to show how Hegel maintains the contiguity of the social and political 
dimensions that were traditionally accorded to the Stände. I will examine this in the 
conclusion to the chapter, alongside Hegel’s mature position, the latter will be then 
opposed to the conservative and reactionary ideal that envisioned a return to the 
Ständestaat in the Restoration period.3 
 
II.1 The Critique of the Imperial Constitution 
 
The significance of exploring Hegel’s early criticism of the imperial constitution of the 
Holy Roman Empire in the Verfassungsschrift is that it allows for an approach to his 
thought on the peculiarity of the concept of the Stände in its early development. This will 
in turn clarify the historical meaning of the term in the constitutional history with which 
Hegel was engaged. Moreover it presents Hegel’s first rigorous political engagement with 
the concept. It is important to undertake this analysis because it will allow me to compare 
subsequently and contrast the originality of the later concept of the Stände in view of 
Hegel’s early arguments (II.2), which are related to the traditional usage of the term in the 
Verfassungsschrift. The present discussion also allows me to define further the thematic 
context of Hegel’s political and philosophical development, and the conception of the 
state that orients it. Moreover, by focusing on how Hegel conceives of the traditional 
function of the Landstände in the imperial constitution an example of his persistent 
concern with private interest dominating in the political sphere comes to the fore. 
The critical concern of the Verfassungsschrift was in the end a polemical and 
political one, which more generally marks the writings of the late Frankfurt and early Jena 
periods.4 Hegel’s intensive study of the constitution revealed for him, in his demand for a 
modern state concept in the Reich, the juridification of politics since the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) and the continuance of what he perceived as the feudal form of 
                                                
3 This has been termed the ‘polity of estates’ (see Poggi 1990, pp. 40ff). 
4 See Harris 1972, pp. 409–77. 
  49 
‘private’ right in the control of political offices in the Holy Roman Empire and in the 
electoral form of the Reichs- and Landstände. As Hans Meier noted, ‘Hegel saw in the 
encounter between revolutionary France and the empire a collision of contradictory 
principles’.5 What this meant was that Hegel observed, on the one hand with France, a 
modern concentration of power unified around a central idea of the nation and its 
universality, which he then compared and contrasted to, on the other, an empire that he 
saw dominated by individual private interests that were recalcitrant and unrelenting in 
maintaining their privileges inherited over the centuries. For Hegel in the Holy Roman 
Empire this led to what he saw as precisely the inversion of political universality and the 
idea of a unified nation; it led to the predominance of arbitrary custom, the persistence of 
intransigent individual interests, and the particular stubborn adherence to old ways that 
destroyed any possibility for political unity. Hegel’s argument must be considered the 
perspective of an individual highly engaged with the revolutionary events taking place in 
France and the revolutionary wars that had already proved fatal to the Holy Roman 
Empire and would be definitively destructive a few years later (August 6 1806). The 
Verfassungsschrift in its argument for political unity in a territorial state form in part then 
represents a gross simplification of a highly complex and varied constitutional situation in 
the German-speaking lands, and can in no way be taken at face value. The example of 
Hegel’s native Württemberg is paradigmatic in this instance and even when limited to the 
Habsburg territories there was high degree of variation.6 As the basis of this chapter is 
concerned mainly with the development of Hegel’s concept of the Stände, it will not 
proceed by extensively revising the historical fallacies of Hegel’s arguments but will 
make sure that they are defined strictly as Hegel’s opinions. 
For Hegel, the constitution of the empire was dominated by contractual relations 
of private right, and in this can be seen as another example of his criticism of the contract 
as a basis for political relations. The reason it is impossible for Hegel to form a state 
                                                
5 Maier 2004, p. 197. 
6 See Stuke 1968, p. 44. Karl Bosl has contributed to re-evaluating the negative perception of the 
Landständischen Verfassung – the territorial estates constitution – that was partly established by Hegel’s 
discussions (see Krüger 2003, p. 66). See Harris 1972, pp. xxix–xxx: …‘never was there such a liberal-
conservative revolutionary as the young Hegel. Unlike many “enlighteners” whom he revered, he did not 
admire the English constitution. He felt that it was decadent, that it had become a cloak of ministerial 
tyranny; and he felt the same way about the constitution of his native Württemberg, which was so often 
compared with that of England’. 
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based on contract (once he arrives at his conceptual distinction of society and state in 
circa 1820) is that the contract is limited to the civil, social sphere of private legal 
arbitration. The criticism of the contract distinguishes his political theory from the 
majority of modern attempts since Hobbes to develop a theory of state formation. It is to 
this extent, moreover, that a direct parallel can be drawn between the conflicts in the 
empire, and what appears as a spiritualised version of the state of nature in civil society in 
the Grundlinien. I will analyse the latter in Chapter Three, and it will be seen how the 
Stände play a completely different role in that context. This is to say that the same issue 
reappears in personality and abstract right in the Grundlinien as that which takes place at 
the imperial level in the Verfassungsschrift. By contrast, in the Grundlinien Hegel is led 
to an appropriation of the Stände as nascent forms of public power where the individual 
must become concrete in the sphere of organisation; the Stände thus represent the 
institutional formation of universal interests in the later work. In the Verfassungsschrift, 
Hegel is engaging with the history of feudalism in which the contract, pre-eminently of 
private right or the patrimonial Stände, is taken up and analysed in the modern conditions 
of the empire in the shadow of the French Republic. Thus the Stände are bound to remain 
as a concentration of private (patrimonial) interests, which however imply a distinctive 
constitutional development and history unique to Europe. 
As became apparent in Chapter One, the young Hegel measured the Holy Roman 
Empire according to the modern state form that had arisen in the French Republic. And he 
did so in the Verfassungsschrift according to the principles of national unity, patriotism 
and the destruction of the old feudal regime. The proximity of France and the continuing 
war and incursions of the French along the borders of the German-speaking lands gave 
Hegel the opportunity to reflect politically on the history of constitutional development in 
western Europe and why and how the Holy Roman Empire was successively defeated by 
the French Republic. 
For Hegel, the historical condition of the German-speaking lands at the time of the 
Verfassungsschrift – between 1798 and 18037 – is best summed up in its famous 
introductory words: ‘Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr’. As he saw it, however, the 
dissolution of ‘universal political power’ [allgemeine Staatsmacht] had long been a reality 
                                                
7 See Harris 1972, pp. 434–64. 
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in the Holy Roman Empire that, infamously in the words of Voltaire, ‘n’était en aucune 
manière ni saint, ni romain, ni empire’.8 For Hegel, it was essentially an ‘aggregate’ or 
loose ‘association’ of Reichs- and Landstände with two Great Powers, Austria and Prussia, 
vying for hegemony since the Peace of Westphalia;9 two powers, moreover, that caused 
the political ‘anarchy’ – referring once more to Voltaire – of the constitution by invading 
smaller states. For Hegel civil war was a more or less apt description of the situation 
insofar as he measured the constitution by way of the uniform characteristics of the 
modern state and not through the pluralism of ‘indirect powers’. This is clear by way of 
his positive esteem for Richelieu in the manuscript, and his destruction of the French états 
that, however, lays the basis for the later destruction of the French constitution and the 
principle of representation that Hegel sees as unique to European world.10 The problem of 
constructing a universal political power is essential to understanding Hegel’s 
rationalisation of the state, which cannot be premised on the contract and thus on the 
feudal era that he seems to come so close to idealising in the Verfassungsschrift. 
The historical era Hegel analyses stretches back to the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648 and forward to the Napoleonic period, which saw in the interval the rise of 
absolutism as the predominant political form that eventually determined Prussia’s 
development as a Great Power with the elector Frederick William, and the development 
of independent military force in the German states with standing armies that were a major 
force of centralisation. It was an era that saw the annexation of smaller states in the realm 
by both Austria and Prussia, while the German territory was subject to multiple invasions: 
by French absolutism under Louis XIV (1638–1715) – who was considered to have 
imported this ‘foreign’ political form through economic support of Prussia – and the 
northern incursions of Charles XII of Sweden (1682–1718), to name but a few. Thus for 
Hegel it was the foreign policy of other states that determined the domestic life of the 
German territory, while the ‘armed Stände’, a leftover of the former feudal form of 
vassalage and the right of private warfare, hired themselves out to the highest bidder, even 
in wars on German soil. As Montesquieu states in regard to this feudal type of 
                                                
8 Voltaire 1757, p. 70. 
9 See Aretin 1997, who problematizes the establishment of Austro-Prussian dualism in 1648. For him it is 
only truly dominant from the 1740s; compare Schlie 2013 
10 Hegel 1999, pp. 75–6. Hegel references Richelieu’s destruction of the Huguenot and the identification of 
personality with the principle of the state. 
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belligerence, ‘the armies were deadly only in their own country [and] were burdened with 
spoils before they arrived among the enemy’.11 It is thus that Hegel can characterise the 
era by its lack of unity, the ruination of the ‘Volksgeist’12 determined by the ‘spiritual 
exhaustion’ – i.e. for the young Hegel, the religious issue of the Reformation destroys the 
unity of the German-speaking lands – and universal disunity that was confirmed for him 
by the Thirty Years’ War and consolidated as German ‘freedom’ in the Peace of 
Westphalia.13 
The destruction of the period for Hegel represented the culmination of a loss of 
social and political cohesion that had been going on for centuries, which saw the retreat of 
the individual Landstände into their own private-political claims. They developed into 
principalities and arbitrated through military means any demands from the imperial centre. 
The constitution for Hegel was a mere organised means to such private interests, while the 
individual subject was integrated into the developing absolutist political order with ever-
increasing efficiency. At the same time, the institutions that had formerly mediated 
between ‘private’ and ‘public’ concerns – such as guilds, corporations, and ‘organic’ 
communities – were largely abolished in the consolidation of absolute power in 
monarchical states.14 For Hegel, Germany remained determined by the primordial notion 
                                                
11 Montesquieu 1989, p. 678. 
12 See Kantorowicz 1912, p. 300 on Hegel’s usage of this term, firstly in 1793 in Volksreligion und 
Christentum where ‘religion is judged [zugesprochen] as an “aspect [Anteil] of the formation [Bildung] of 
the Volksgeist”’. According to Kantorowicz, Hegel took the concept over from Voltaire and Montesquieu. It, 
along with Volksreligion, is part of a conceptual development in Hegel’s thought that will lead him to 
identify ‘Sittlichkeit’ with ‘Sitte’, – custom or mores, as is in the ‘more of the Germans’ that he takes from 
Tacitus and Montesquieu. Sittlichkeit will come to replace both these terms as well as the concept of 
Moralität, which will be seen as a declining and isolated form of ethical life where the individual is no 
longer one with the ‘sittliches Ganzes’ (see Ilting 1983, pp. 244–5). Aspects of this discussion will return in 
Chapter Four. But I already draw attention here to foregrounding of the context of the differentiation 
between morality and ethical life, how the individual disappears in the Gemeinsamkeit des Lebens in the 
early Hegel, which will be a central issue in any attempt to breathe new life into his early institutional 
thought or to show how it transforms into his maturity. For Ilting the differentiation between morality and 
ethical life led to the relativisation of all morality since ‘the universal mandatory norms of right and 
morality’ are taken up into the customs of a people or state, Sittlichkeit in turn became a mere ‘standpoint of 
consciousness’, morality a ‘worldview’ that the individual overcomes (see Ilting 1983, pp. 245–7). 
13 See Harris 1972, p. 461 – i.e. the freedom of the territorial prince or Kurfürsten. 
14 There are important exceptions to this general trend, among the most notable being Hegel’s native 
Württemberg, as mentioned above, and also Mecklenburg. In the former, the peasants and the burgers 
dominated the Landstände. It cannot be doubted that Hegel was aware of such situations, specifically later 
in his attack on Württemberg Landstände in favour of the prince (see Hegel 1998, pp. 246–94 for a partial 
translation) and in his youthful reference to Justus Möser (1720–94), the historian of German constitutional 
law, in his diary on the day of the former’s death (see Harris 1972, p. 11). Hegel’s argument against the 
Württemberg Landstände has been simplified, by stating that it signalised ‘the shift from a corporate society 
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of its ‘freedom’,15 an originary feudal form of independence that now resulted in the 
‘farce’ of the imperial constitution and the sovereignty of Landstände – which in many 
places developed into essentially absolutist states. 
 
From the point of view of constitutional law of the countries that participated in the 
Peace of Westphalia, the principle of royal supremacy over both church and state 
… was reaffirmed… The treaty recognized the sovereignty not only of each of the 
German principalities but also of other European states… The empire itself 
continued to exist in name but was in fact a phantom; it could not enact laws or 
raise taxes or mount armies or otherwise function as a state.16 
 
For Hegel, Germany did not make the transition to a modern state based on a political 
power [Staatsmacht] precisely because ‘the old independence of the parts of Germany 
was consolidated in the peace of Westphalia’ – the rights of the independence of the 
Reichs- and Landstände for Hegel were declared absolute as were the rulers that gained 
sovereignty over them.17 
The reasons that lay behind foreign rule in Germany for Hegel were not the 
product of the mere present appearance of the constitution, but of a much more deep-
seated reality and spiritual movement that must be brought to the fore. Max Weber’s 
assertion that ‘the only kind of political passion which inspired the ideas of classical 
writers, other than angry rebellion against foreign rule, lay in their ideal enthusiasm for 
moral demands’18 cannot be applied to Hegel, who is far more analytic in his approach, 
sidesteps morality for politics and will later avoid the developing national enthusiasm of 
the wars of liberation that enticed Fichte, even though Hegel himself develops a 
                                                                                                                                             
composed of particular estates (Stände) to a civil society governed by universal precepts and the “rational” 
state’ (see McNeely 2004, p. 345). By contrast, Hegel’s conception of the rational state explicitly involves 
the institutional capacities of the Stände. As Habermas has rightly noted, it is the appeal to das Alte Recht 
that Hegel opposes in the Württemberg Stände (see Habermas 1974, p. 122); on the contrary, the Stände 
must be constructed on the basis of modern right and the principles of the French Revolution. The claim that 
places like Württemberg, which even though it ‘preserved its old institutions’ saw the Stände ‘disregarded 
by its rulers all throughout the eighteenth century’ (Holborn 1982, p. 21), has been contested in the 
historical literature (see Krüger 2003 for an historiographical overview). 
15 See Montesquieu 1989, p. 166 (the reference was made popular by Tacitus’ On the Mores of the 
Germans). 
16 Berman 2003, p. 62. 
17 Hegel 1999, pp. 74, 97 (text modified). 
18 Weber 2003, p. 123. 
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distinctive conception of the German nation – or more appropriately of the ‘Germanic’ – 
well into his Berlin period.19 
The comparative conception of the European states system that develops at the 
core of the Verfassungsschrift through its analysis of the history of representation shows 
the young Hegel’s acuity and knowledge as a historian, jurist, economist, and as an expert 
in constitutional, military and financial history.20 It moreover determines Hegel’s mature 
state concept, and his conception of the ‘modern’ state form as he conceived of it as 
distinctively representational. Below, in this chapter, I will develop this representational 
aspect further in its connection with the history of European feudalism. For the moment, 
however, it is necessary to further determine the distinctiveness of the young Hegel’s state 
theory in the Verfassungsschrift in reference to both the Reichs- and Landstände. The 
central issue here is of sufficiently analysing the details behind their development so that 
it can be understood how Hegel conceives of them in differentiation from the Stände as an 
aspect of the modern state. 
According to Hegel’s diagnosis, the feudal system in the German-speaking lands 
neither developed into a more general notion of the Stände (along the lines of a 
parliament) as it had in England, nor had a unified political authority existed in Germany 
since the Thirty Years’ War. As he perceived it, ‘in the peace of Westphalia, the 
sovereignty – or at least the supremacy – of the emperor was declared irredeemable [and] 
Germany’s statelessness became organized’.21 The German Middle Ages moreover only 
formed a negative ideal for Hegel as they were at once ‘a radically free nation, [that] had 
not, as France had, any dominant family as a central authority’; it thus possessed no 
existent comparable form of political universality, and Hegel appealed to the imperial 
centre of Austria in his manuscript as an ideal that could possibly transform what he saw 
                                                
19 The ‘Germanic World’ for Hegel is not the state of Germany, but also encompasses France, England, and 
Scandinavia; it is thus the Germanic peoples. For Hegel this means a form of representation, and thus is 
intricately connected to his conceptualisation of the Stände and the modern state. See Maier in Hegel 2004, 
p. 214 who notes how in the Verfassungsschrift there is a trichotomous division of history, which anticipates 
Hegel’s Berlin lectures on the philosophy of world history, though in the latter there will be four phases: 
Oriental, Greek, Roman and Germanic. As for Hegel’s direct opposition to the national question, this is 
most clear in his mature period in his polemic against the student fraternities and Jakob Friedrich Fries 
(1773 –1843) (see Hegel 1991a, pp. 9–23). 
20 See Maier 2004, p. 195. 
21 Hegel 1999, pp. 95, 74. 
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as the current malaise of disunity.22 Thus the same characteristics that predominated in the 
feudal epoch for Hegel remained in the present, which he saw as the sovereignty of 
private individual right – arguably as the original arbitrary power of a patrimonial Lord – 
or, in his present, the independence of the Reichs- and Landstände from the empire. 
Indeed, later, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1827–31),23 Hegel saw the 
undoing of the Holy Roman Empire paralleled in the elective capabilities of the princes of 
the medieval period who ‘refused to surrender the privileges of choosing their sovereign 
for themselves. The kings and emperors were no longer chiefs of the State, but of the 
Princes, who were indeed vassals, but possessed sovereignty and territorial lordships of 
their own’.24 
The German constitution established since the Treaty of Westphalia was also 
‘anarchy’ for Hegel insofar as he saw it merely guaranteed for and by foreign powers. But 
it must be clear that Hegel contrasted it with the contemporary conditions that had 
brought for him such private and foreign interests to light; the revolutionary wars that 
revealed to him the conviction that ‘life which is close to decay can be reorganized only 
by the most drastic means… and that concepts and insight fraught with self-distrust must 
be justified by force before people will submit to them’.25 This is to be contrasted with 
many other perspectives on the imperial constitution and the relative peace and stability it 
provided, albeit prior to the war with France.26 For Hegel centralisation was also a 
chimera to German thinking and in this he followed Montesquieu. 27  But such 
decentralisation for Hegel became meaningless in the context of continual foreign 
invasion. He saw the ‘decentralised’ character of manorial feudalism [Lehenswesen] from 
which the Reichs- and Landstände themselves had been formed as having led to the 
fragmentation and diffusion of power in the empire, to what he saw as the 
                                                
22 See Pöggeler 1977. 
23 Eduard Gans originally edited the text that has been published under this title; it was assembled from 
various lecture manuscripts (for a detailed overview, see Waszek 1988) (see Hegel 2001, p. 333). 
24 Hegel 2001, p. 388. 
25 Hegel 1999, pp. 80, 101 (text modified). 
26 See Epstein 1966, pp. 252–3 referencing Johannes von Müller (1752–1809): ‘A decentralized and loosely 
federated Germany … avoided the disadvantages inherent in any centralized monarchy per se. These 
disadvantages included the propensity to wage aggressive war and to supress domestic liberty, two evils 
known in individual states within the empire but not in the Holy Roman Empire as a whole. The empire was, 
on the contrary, an expression of the deeply rooted German sense for liberty’. 
27 For a prehistory of these ideas see the landmark study by Hölzle 1925. 
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meaninglessness of the Imperial Diet, a form of pseudo-parliamentarianism, in his opinion, 
where the private interests of the Reichs- and Landstände reigned. The fact for Hegel was 
that centralisation had indeed taken place, but only in the individual Reichs- and 
Landstände. Hegel’s critique of the constitution came to the definitive conclusion that the 
empire was decidedly not a modern state form, nor was this the case at the level of the 
individual Reichs- and Landstände as absolutist principalities and bishoprics insofar as he, 
one-sidedly perhaps, viewed these as lacking in the representational forms that would 
have led to a more universal power in which an active citizenry could be engaged.28 What 
Hegel sarcastically calls contemporary German freedom was what he saw as a relatively 
dominant force in the concentrated power of nefariously self-interested absolute states, 
with two Great Powers, Austria and Prussia, vying for hegemony. 
What had taken place in the German-speaking lands for Hegel was comparable to 
the transition from political monarchy to feudal law in the Middle Ages. What he saw was 
how originally patrimonial fiefs had become independent of the imperial structure and 
given up their real tribute to the monarch. The requirement of going to war and raising 
troops for the emperor on the Reichs- and Landstände for Hegel had disappeared as they 
themselves became embroiled in private warfare against each other in the realm. The 
universal characteristics of a centralised authority, taxation and a standing army had little 
or no significance in the empire as a whole.29 Hegel now perceived the arbitrary freedom 
and independence of the local lord at the level of the empire in the independence of 
absolute monarchs. What this meant for Hegel is that an alternative must be discovered, 
which is his critical and constructive purpose in his reference to a German Theseus at the 
close of the Verfassungsschrift who would enliven a universal principle and found a 
modern state. 
Hegel is very close to Montesquieu when he is writing the Verfassungsschrift. He 
explicitly referenced him in the work alongside a critique of the French Republic and the 
abolishment of the états généraux in France. As Hans Maier has noted, Montesquieu’s 
                                                
28 I will show, however, that France also in no way represented an ideal for Hegel. Indeed in this and much 
else he follows Montesquieu in an attempt to envision constructively the formation of Rousseau’s (and 
Fichte’s) general will. 
29 See footnote 25 above. 
  57 
influence moreover can be seen to predominate over Rousseau.30 This is an important fact 
in Hegel’s development at this stage, and arguably leads him to affirm the principles of 
representation he sees in the feudal political form and the parliamentarianism that stems 
from it. This will lead to his appropriation of the Stände in his Rechtsphilosophie, and also 
from a very early date – indeed in the same period as the Verfassungsschrift as I will 
analyse in more detail in Chapter Three. Already at this stage for Hegel in the 
Verfassungsschrift ‘representation is the universal principle of modern history. The 
system of representation is the system of every modern European state’.31 This is also 
comparable to the mature Hegel in his understanding of this universal historical principle 
of modernity in his interpretation of the Germanic World in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History. Rousseau may have laid the basis of the modern revolutionary 
conception of state with the will but, like Fichte after him, had a highly limited conception 
of its institutionalisation.32 It is in precisely this respect that the young Hegel turns to 
Montesquieu and to the history of the ‘mores of the Germans’. This leads Hegel to trace 
the history of representation from feudalism to the imperial constitution in the 
Verfassungsschrift. 
Arguably what Hegel also takes over from the Middle Ages in his evocation of 
feudalism as the history of representation is ‘the idea of the social contract as the basis of 
the distribution of political power, an idea which led to constitutionalism…’.33 But he 
very precisely problematises this by showing how private right and privilege dominate in 
the Middle Ages. By contrast, the modern state grew beyond the traditional sphere of the 
contract, which remains for Hegel restricted to the sphere of abstract right in the 
Grundlinien. This leads fundamentally to his characterisation of all former natural law 
theory, as I will analyse in Chapter Three, which only ever had the traditional civitas in 
view and substituted private relations for manifestly political ones in the 
Herrschaftsvertrag and Gesellschaftsvertrag. Yet beyond the contract that characterises 
private right in modern civil society in the Grundlinien, Hegel affirms aspects of the 
medieval social structure, which he first drew from his critical interpretation of the 
                                                
30 Maier 2004, p. 206. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See Hegel 1991a, p. 277 (§258). 
33 Weber 1978, p. 1082. 
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imperial constitution and the decadence of the feudal form in the Holy Roman Empire in 
the Verfassungsschrift. The feudal system ‘born in the forests of Germany’, systematised 
in the contractual dualism of prince and Stände, the Ständestaat, is overcome in the 
modern period with the historical awakening of ‘a people’s tremendous struggle for 
freedom’ with the French Revolution, which undoes the strict hierarchy of ‘status’ 
[ständische] society.34 Yet it does not introduce the principle of social mobility within the 
institutional and representational structures that had determined European history for the 
young Hegel up into his maturity. The French Revolution in its call for equality abolishes 
all the older institutional structures and the very possibility of concretising freedom and 
right for Hegel. Thus, ‘in spite of his criticisms, he displays a sympathy with feudal 
modes of thought’ as he also ‘thinks that the centralised … organisation of the modern 
state has many dangers within it’.35 
In the Verfassungsschrift, Hegel conceives of the medieval polity in an ideal fashion 
like Montesquieu insofar as he states that the ‘great advantage of the older European 
states [was that] their political authority was secure in respect of its needs and functions, 
[but left] free scope for the citizens’ own activity in individual aspects of judicial 
procedure, administration, etc.’.36 For Montesquieu, the predominant forms of the feudal 
order ‘diminished the whole of the weight of lordship by giving many people various 
kinds of lordship over the same thing or the same persons, which set various limits to 
empire that was too extensive, which produced rule with an inclination to anarchy and 
anarchy with a tendency to order and harmony’.37 It is thus that feudalism can be 
characterised as ‘the most extreme type of systematically decentralized domination’, 
while, on the contrary, ‘the absolutist state, based on taxation and office, developed in 
conflict with and at the expense of, the old decentralised forms of seigniorial extraction’.38 
Thus for Hegel feudalism remains an ideal of the past, and is taken up only in the 
conceptualisation of the institutional aspects that provide for the individual’s engagement 
with a universal political structure in the modern state form. Feudalism is the prehistory of 
the modern European state forms constructed on a representational and constitutional 
                                                
34 Hegel 2004, p. 107. 
35 Harris 1972, p. 453. 
36 Hegel 1999, p. 21. 
37 Montesquieu 1989, p. 619. 
38 Weber 1978, p. 1079; Brenner 1982, p. 80. 
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basis. 
To return to the constitutional question for Hegel, the ‘obduracy of the German 
character’ is perhaps best represented by the image of the Lord’s arbitrary domination. 
Feudalism became a corrupted form when justices that were patrimonial became strict 
private right, and benefices ‘became real rather than personal’.39 The transition from a 
political – under Charlemagne – to a civil government in the Middle Ages is directly 
related to the inheritance of fiefs (the hereditary nature of private property), something 
true for both Montesquieu and Hegel. 
 
When fiefs were revocable or for life, they scarcely belonged to any but the 
political laws; this is why in the civil laws of those times so little mention is made 
of the laws of fiefs. But, when they became hereditary, they could be given, sold, 
or given as legacies, and they belonged both to the political and civil laws.40 
 
At this moment, the political community became, as Hegel expressed it in his maturity in 
the Grundlinien, ‘a patchwork of private rights, and a rational political life was the tardy 
issue of wearisome struggles and convulsions’. 41  The medieval character of the 
constitution was composed of oppositional powers fragmented into local sovereignties 
each standing under the other, or of power struggles between different branches of one 
and the same society. For Hegel in the Grundlinien the constitution in the Middle Ages 
‘was destitute of any firm bond; it had no objective support in subjectivity; for in fact no 
constitution was as yet possible. [What] renders a constitution real is that it exists as 
objective freedom – the substantial form of volition – as duty and obligation 
acknowledged by the subjects themselves…’.42 What it requires is self-consciousness, the 
recognition of the common will in the legal order and in this respect for Hegel it was 
                                                
39 ‘Lordship was never mere right; primarily it was a duty … Rulers are instituted for the sake of peoples, 
not peoples for the sake of rulers’ (Gierke 1922, p. 34). See Montesquieu 1989, p. 709. Montesquieu points 
to the time of Charlemagne when the benefice was personal rather than real, and were the vassal was 
obligated to the lord. Through the inheritance of fiefs passing ‘to more different relatives’ these ‘justices 
that were patrimonial’ resulted in the development of mediatory institutions between the crown and the lord 
and led to the corruption of the feudal epoch (Montesquieu 1989, pp. 653, 709, 712). Thus, for Hegel, again 
following Montesquieu very closely ‘it is not the principle of feudalism that has cut off the possibility of 
Germany becoming a state; on the contrary, the disproportionate expansion of individual estates has 
destroyed both the principle of feudalism itself and Germany’s continued existence as a state’ (Hegel 1999, 
p. 56). 
40 Montesquieu 1989, p. 721. 
41 Hegel 1991a, p. 370. 
42 Hegel 1991a, p. 386. 
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Rousseau’s discovery; not only in form, as it had been for Pufendorf and Hobbes, but in 
content also.43 What existed by contrast in the Middle Ages was private patrimony. 
It is important to discuss these matters here as they have an integral bearing on the 
historical meaning of the Reichs- and Landstände in the constitutional development that I 
am tracing in this section, and on the Stände as representational and institutional forms in 
the Grundlinien. It was for this reason for Hegel in the Verfassungsschrift that with the 
disappearance of the feudal political form, ‘German freedom was not attained when the 
princes gained sovereignty, quite the reverse’.44 It led, following the young Hegel’s logic, 
to the privatisation of the constitution and to the juridical arbitration of the Reichs- and 
Landstände which sought to assert their private patrimonial rights at the level of the 
imperial realm. 
The ideal of a political monarchy with an electoral component in the distribution 
of royal power is a representational form born with the feudal system according to 
Montesquieu. It places limitations on the sovereign power or ‘usurps’ the very rights of 
princes. For Montesquieu, while ‘the peoples who came from Germany [were not] the 
only ones on earth to usurp the rights of princes’ – that is, ‘history clearly teaches us that 
other peoples have made attempts against their sovereigns’ – such usurpations have ‘not 
been seen to give rise to what has been called the justices of the lords’.45 According to 
Hegel in the Verfassungsschrift, this was ‘the principle of the original German state which 
had apparently survived in the Imperial Diet’, but its actual substance had vanished. One 
must recognise the contradictory character of Hegel’s conception at this stage. He seeks to 
embody the representative principle and valorises the feudal epoch, but only insofar as to 
show how later in the Verfassungsschrift this tears the empire apart; he shows how the 
early form of ‘freedom’ in feudalism, which passed from the political to the legal, led to 
the intransigence of the electors in the later constitution. 
A unique facet of state development as it progressed in Europe was that the highly 
fragmented distribution of power operative in feudalism or, more precisely, the system of 
                                                
43 Hegel 1991a, p. 277 (§258). 
44 Hegel 1999, p. 97. 
45 Montesquieu 1989, p. 653. 
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fiefs [Lehenswesen],46 required a more central body to enact generally agreed legal 
statutes, determine on economic questions, and to decide on whether to raise troops for 
the monarch. On the one hand, while this fragmented distribution of power logically 
resulted in the highly limited character of feudal monarchy, on the other it led to the 
necessary development of intermediary institutions, like the imperial Diet in the Holy 
Roman Empire, between the monarch and the lords. It is also here that the Ständestaat – 
as a polity of Stände – comes into being. 
According to Otto Hintze (1861–1940), in reference to Montesquieu’s natural 
determinations of climate, what elsewhere fell on fallow ground came to fruition in the 
Germanic ‘life of the forests’ [Waldleben] or ‘primitive culture of the forest’ [Waldkultur]. 
Montesquieu had contrasted the culture of the Mediterranean with that of ‘the great inland 
[binnenländischen] river- [Strom-] and woodlands [Waldgebiet]’ whose ‘social impulse 
sprung [from] the excessively [übermäßig] strong development of lordly 
[herrschaftlichen] factors in state formation [Staatbildung] through the connection 
[Verbindung] with religion’.47 In the feudatory relationship of vassalage the ‘honour’ and 
‘status’ of the vassal was not diminished, and this would lead to the formation of ‘an 
estate-type patrimonialism, a marginal case that contrasts with patriarchal 
patrimonialism’.48 
For Max Weber, the Ständestaat was brought about by a twofold economic and 
social change: it was linked to circumstances of military administration and a money 
economy. Needs could no longer be met by ‘the stereotyped feudal-patrimonial 
administration’ as large amounts of money were required in competition and conflict with 
other polities. It was in this circumstance that holders of feudal rights and privileges had 
to form concrete associations, which were then ‘adapted to new administrative 
requirements … [and] developed into an autonomous legal group’. 49  The new 
                                                
46 ‘Feudalism is a concept that still needs to be clarified and is rather complex. One must … distinguish it 
from the genuine system of fiefs. The system of fiefs is a clearly definable legal concept, whereas feudalism 
is a more sociological type or the collective term for such a type. The system of fiefs is the narrower, 
feudalism the broader concept… there is no general connection between the feudal system and the system of 
estates’ (Hintze 1975, p. 310). 
47 Hintze 1931, p. 11. 
48 See Weber 1978, pp. 1072, 1086. Compare Hintze 1975, p. 333: ‘In Germanic law, the status relationship 
was that of a free man, whose status, through voluntary subordination to a military chief, who looked out for 
his livelihood, was not lowered but raised, particularly when the chief was a prince or a king’. 
49 Weber 1978, p. 1086. 
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circumstances demanded a more unified structure than the previous diffusion of power 
that ‘eventually required a consociation of the individual power-holders in the form of a 
corporate assembly’. 
 
This very association either included the prince or turned privileged persons into 
‘Estates’, and thus changed the mere agreed upon action of the various power-
holders and the temporary associations into a permanent structure. Within this 
structure, however, ever new and impelling administrative tasks created the 
princely bureaucracy, which was destined in turn to dissolve the Ständestaat.50 
 
Moreover the ‘estates-system cannot be regarded as a universal and necessary extension 
of the feudal system’, as elsewhere feudalism involved a far more extensive subordination 
of the vassal than occurred in Europe.51 Due to this characteristic no explicit association 
was developed as the co-bearers of power that would form it were lacking; it was truly 
unnecessary for the lord to extensively confer with his vassals. The ‘considerable 
patriarchal authority of the lord’ did not allow for the legal dualism so basic to the system 
of Estates in the west to develop’.52 It was the free character of the vassal, their 
independence from the patrimonial power of the lord, which led to the Stände and the 
legal perpetuation in the Ständestaat.53 
If Hegel can characterise feudalism along the lines of a ‘German drive for 
freedom’, while in the period of the Verfassungsschrift ‘European states have now more 
or less abandoned the feudal system’,54 it is because it precisely constitutes a primitive 
form of constitutional representation, and certainly once it develops into the legal 
association of Reichs- and Landstände. Yet as I already noted above, for Hegel this 
constitutional character was inherently flawed as it was based on the private right of the 
contract; it led, moreover, to Hegel’s negative characterisation of the constitution of the 
Holy Roman Empire and his critique of its ‘statelessness’. On the other hand, for Hegel 
insofar as in feudalism there is a multiplicity of rights, there is no longer a situation where 
only one is free, which came to characterise his conception of the Roman World in his 
                                                
50 Weber 1978, p. 1087. 
51 Hintze 1975, p. 334; in reference to feudal development in Japan, see also p. 306: ‘As for the system of 
estates … it remains my conviction that they are limited to the cultural realm of the Christian West’. 
52 Hintze 1975, p. 334. 
53 See Weber 1978, pp. 1075ff. 
54 Hegel 1999, p. 30. 
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later development of the history of freedom.55 
In the words of the Grundlinien, the medieval state was ‘externally’ sovereign in 
regard to other states, ‘but internally neither the monarch himself nor the state was 
sovereign’.56 The same is true in the Verfassungsschrift specifically at the level of the 
imperial constitution where the feudal system of vassalage, now developed into a polity of 
independent states, operates free of any submission to centralised authority. As I have 
shown the exception to this development of centralisation occurs territorially in the 
independence of Reichs- and Landstände from the imperial centre – in other words, 
centralisation takes place in the territorial state at the expense of the imperial form. 
Indeed it was from feudalism that ‘German Freedom’ first developed, which was 
now threatened, in the age of absolutism, with the decadence of the Ständestaat and the 
independence of Reichs- and Landstände, which certainly made the dualistic 
characteristics of the Stände largely disappear or transform into more concentrated 
bureaucratic elements in the reigning autocracy of the state.57 During the period of the 
Verfassungsschrift, then, before the complete collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, 
Germany was neither strictly feudal as Hegel indeed claims, nor a Ständestaat; that 
‘explicit association’, as ‘that form of political order that stood between feudal and 
modern’;58 the explicit legal association of lords (and in some cases commoners), which 
had been under attack since the Peace of Westphalia and was undone through the 
                                                
55 See Hintze 1975, p. 339: ‘If at its apogee ancient civilisation failed altogether to produce the category of 
popular representation, then the institution of slavery surely had a large share in this’. There is a direct 
equation to be drawn for the young Hegel between ancient Rome and revolutionary France, as he conceives 
of each as either abolishing the differences between Stände, which arguably later he will be unconcerned 
with, and of abolishing the Stände altogether – and this he consistently has a problem with (see Hegel 1999, 
p. 147). 
56 Hegel 1991, p. 315 (§278). 
57 See Rosenberg, 1958 for an excellent analysis of this transition to bureaucracy that follows the work of 
Max Weber. 
58 Berdahl 1973, p. 299. Berdahl follows Rosenberg (1958) in asserting a certain persistence of the Stände 
bodies in the transitional period between absolutism and the modern state. Historical evidence bears out the 
persistence of the Stände bodies in Germany up and far into the modern period, as ‘it did not necessarily 
follow that the centralization of government under dynastic absolutism inevitably destroyed all corporate 
(ständisch) institutions’. While the ‘powers of these corporate institutions were severely limited’ in that ‘in 
most matters they could never seriously challenge royal authority … their significance has often been 
underestimated’ (Berdahl 1973, p. 299). Corporatism endured at the heart of the German state and, despite 
all overtures to the contrary, it was impossible to entirely resist the dominion, in the case of Prussia, of the 
Junker that, by the French Revolution, moved closer and closer to dominating the state bureaucracy and the 
centres of power; this Stand formed a resistance theory (literally a Wider-Stand) to the strict wielding of 
autocratic power and played a role in undermining and transforming the Allgemeines Landrecht für die 
Preußischen Staaten (see Berdahl 1988; Epstein 1966). 
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development of monarchical absolutism. What had taken its place in the century after the 
Thirty Years’ War was the ascension of absolutism. In many places in the German-
speaking lands ‘the dualistic state was abolished, and the princes emerged as absolute 
rulers’.59 Epstein goes to the heart of the matter, by stating that the ‘fact of absolutism 
may be defined by the absence (or impotence) of the historic Stände bodies, in other 
words by the elimination of the constitutional dualism between prince and Stände which 
had characterized earlier German government’.60 
For Hegel the reason why ‘Germany’ never developed into a state is because it 
never progressed beyond its ‘original character whereby the individual is independent of 
the universal, i.e. the state’.61 The Reichs- and Landstände remained in their ‘private-
rightly’ capacity for Hegel and served the interests of their respective lords and did not 
progress to a more universal participatory form. At the centre of Hegel’s argument is that 
if a state is to come into being and persist it must not allow ‘private right to prevail in full 
force’.62 It is precisely this that lies behind the young Hegel’s criticism of the Treaty of 
Westphalia, which he sees as assuring the continued existence of Reichs- and Landstände 
as largely absolute powers to the detriment of the Holy Roman Empire. Hegel here 
equates treaty with the contract: the private-rightly character that I have shown 
predominated in the ‘constitutionalism’ of the Middle Ages in this section. Yet as I also 
showed, Hegel’s approach is subtle, as on the other hand he affirms the mediatory 
institutions that France abolished, which had abandoned representation and the 
constitutional history of Europe of which the Stände played an important part. Hegel thus 
perceived that Rousseau’s general will historically ‘converged with the arbitrary 
conception of political absolutism’.63 It is in this way that Hegel’s historical vision is a 
history of representation derived from Montesquieu, which compares and contrasts the 
different constitutional forms that developed in Europe in the Verfassungsschrift. 
For Hegel in the Verfassungsschrift the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire is 
constructed on the private rightly conception of feudalism [Lehenswesen], what 
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Montesquieu called the ‘civil law of fiefs’.64 While feudalism for Hegel is considered 
freedom, it is dismissed in the same gesture as it leads to fragmentation through private 
interests and the incapacity to form the political unity of the state. Historically, as I have 
shown in this section, this then led to representational forms such as the Reichs- and 
Landstände and the Ständestaat; and in the intervening centuries up until Hegel’s time, to 
the corruption of such forms under absolutism in continental Europe and their revolution 
(the abolishment of the états généraux in France) or their potential reform into concrete 
institutions based on modern right. The latter is Hegel’s objective in the Grundlinien, 
whereby he gives a new meaning to the Stände, but the history of this development in 
Hegel can already be found in the early period of the Verfassungsschrift. This also shows 
how in Hegel’s conception of the state in the Grundlinien, while it affirms the mediatory 
or institutional capacity of the ‘intermediary powers’, limits these in turn in the 
construction of a universal political power. 
The origins of German ‘fate’ in the Verfassungsschrift lay in the medieval feudal 
regime more generally, and in the genesis of so-called ‘German freedom’, the 
intransigence of the local lord or ‘the peculiarity of feudal administration that used 
efficient household arrangements for the conduct of public business’ and prevented the 
organisation of a universal political authority: the word ‘state’ neither applies to the 
patrimonial polity nor to Stände type patrimonialism.65 This section has shown how these 
developments led to the legal formation of the Stände that were distinctive to the West. It 
was the destruction of the Stände as ‘co-bearers of power’ moreover that led to 
monarchical absolutism66 – to the growth of the Reichs- and Landstände whereby they 
themselves were transformed into absolutist states. The nature of the legal relationship of 
the Landstände to the empire for Hegel, then, was ‘not defined by universal laws in the 
strict sense; on the contrary, the relationship of each Stände to the whole is a particular 
matter … which took the form of [private] property [having] an essential effect on the 
nature of political authority’.67 It is in this sense that I can begin to differentiate the 
‘political’ concept of the Landstände from the Stände more generally considered (Reichs- 
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and Landstände, états généraux, états provinciaux generally have nothing in common 
with Stände as a description for clergy, nobles, etc. as a ‘couche sociale’), which I will 
turn to in more detail (II.3 and at the close of this chapter).68 The significance of having 
analysed the historical bases of Hegel’s argument is that it allows us to now turn to 
analyse in more detail the complexity of his later arguments in favour of the Stände. 
 
II.2 The Stände: Hegel’s Attempt at a Legitimate Organisational Form 
 
In the current section I will analyse how Hegel’s usage of the Stände change in the 
Grundlinien to become a ‘socio-political’ form that overcomes the isolation of private 
particularity. This is central to my overall argument. Hegel’s usage of the Stände provide 
him with an alternative constitutional arrangement to the by then predominant social 
contract theory prevalent in modern natural law. This takes us to the core of the matter of 
concept of the state in Hegel’s thought, which is based on the institutional formation of 
right occurring in modern civil society whereby civil society itself is political. Once this 
institutionalism takes place initially by way of the Stände – before proceeding to other 
institutions (the administration of justice, the police, and the corporation, which by and 
large will not be treated in this study), Hegel’s alternative becomes apparent. It is 
important to highlight this in Hegel’s politics insofar as he is the first to conceptually 
establish the division between civil society and the state and at the same time makes very 
explicit that contractual relations of right cannot be applied to the higher order of the 
political.69 
As I showed above (II.1), private contractual relations for Hegel were ‘suitable’ to 
a period like the Middle Ages when services and offices were patrimonial, but not to 
modernity. In this section I will begin to show how Hegel articulates the legitimacy of his 
concept of the Stände. I will also further expand on the historical derivation of the concept 
of the Stände. It is precisely in carrying out this task that I will be able to contrast how the 
concept appears in the context of the imperial constitution in the Verfassungsschrift as a 
question of private right, and how it then later reappears with a renewed significance by 
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developing as a concrete institutional form in the Grundlinien (II.3). The Stände in 
Hegel’s maturity take over the spheres of personality and abstract right where private 
particularity and contract once predominated. They give the individual a concrete sphere 
for social and political action, and if lacking for Hegel would leave the individual 
depoliticised. Thus in this section I will emphasise the broader significance and 
importance of the concept for Hegel’s political theory. 
In the Lectures On the Philosophy of History Hegel speaks of the resistant 
particularity that develops in the Germanic World to Charlemagne’s universal political 
power and the end of the Frankish empire. This begins the period of decline, the ‘infinite 
falsehood’ of the Middle Ages, which are noted for their opposition to political 
universality; indeed, this period knows of no other form of ‘politics’ than patrimonial 
dominium – the constriction of private right determining the entire structure of ‘the 
political’. It is necessary to put politics and the political in inverted commas here because 
prevalent social and political categories do not apply to the medieval period. The stress on 
dominium was the patrimonial character of household property. The mature Hegel knew 
this all too well insofar as his developing conception of the state overcame the traditional 
oikonomik that he originally conflated with modern political economy in his early 
Rechtsphilosophie (1802–4). 70  Hegel came to understand that ‘People who possess 
something they own freely, privately, have quite a different feeling from those who still 
have over them a master with dominium. Servitudes are jura in re, but they must have a 
rational external determination’. And indeed Hegel recognised that ‘with the feudal 
constitution ownership became unfree, and this was one of the causes of the French 
Revolution’. 
 
With the rise of states no regard was had to the single individual. The field was 
owned by the family, and the individual had to take the fief from the head of the 
family what he wanted to cultivate.71 
 
Hegel realised that if constitutions do not reform themselves to accord with reason then 
revolution becomes a possibility: the French Revolution thus arose to destroy an ancien 
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régime where everything rested on the privilege of the société des ordres.72 Yet Hegel 
observes with the French Revolution that the progressive dismantling of all institutional 
and political forms – such as the intermediary communities, guilds and Stände – leave the 
individual depoliticised and separate from state power. This was a process moreover 
intrinsic to the modern natural right on which the French Republic rested.73 By contrast, 
for Hegel the ‘proper strength of states resides in their [internal] communities’ where 
sovereign, executive, power confronts legitimate interests.74 The sovereignty of the state 
itself is thus derived from such institutional organisation. The introduction of modern 
(‘abstract’ and ‘formal’) individuality for Hegel must be concretised; and the institutions, 
first and foremost the Stände after the natural ethical life of the family, are what make this 
possible in the mature Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31).75 
The history of freedom for Hegel in the Verfassungsschrift is carried forward by the 
history of representation, and this, as I have shown above, is distinctively related to 
feudalism, or more specifically the system of fiefs [Lehenswesen], that led in Europe to 
the development of the Stände and the Rechtsstaat or constitutional state – to the 
Germanic ideal Hegel took from Montesquieu and contrasts with the development of the 
French Republic. Yet in Hegel’s mature interpretation of the Grundlinien, the subject 
becomes the universal substance of the state only with Rousseau and the French 
Revolution, which is neither arbitrary nor contingent but built on the principles of modern 
reason as they had progressed through history. The error of revolutionary France, 
however, is to have abolished the institutional structures that permitted mediation, but in 
its attacks on the feudal epoch in which private right had ascended and dominated all 
political questions it was entirely justified.76 
                                                
72 Hegel consistently held this opinion, and in On the English Reform Bill asserted it a last time before his 
death (1831): ‘…if an opposition were established on a basis hitherto alien to parliament as at present 
constituted, and if this opposition felt unable to stand up to the opposing party in parliament, it might well 
be misguided enough to look to the people for its strength, and so inaugurate not a reform but a revolution’ 
(Hegel 1999, p. 270). 
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74 Hegel 1991a, p. 331 (§290). 
75 See Hegel 1991a, pp. 220–40 (§§182–208). 
76 It has not been established if Hegel ever read Edmund Burke, but they do have something in common in 
terms of their appeal to the mediatory institutions in the state in light of the French Revolution (see Suter 
1971). It must be admitted, however, that the similarities stop there, insofar as Hegel takes up the modern 
revolution in right into his philosophy. As is also evidenced by On English Reform Bill, the institutions that 
Burke affirms for Hegel represented unjust privilege. 
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Here belong the revolutions of recent times. There were Stände and individuals 
who possessed, as purely private rights, rights belonging to the state, especially in 
regard to taxes (e.g. freedom from taxation) and jurisdiction. And our day has seen 
a step taken toward the rational existence of the state that has not been taken for a 
thousand years past: the right of reason has been asserted over against the form of 
private right.77 
 
Yet just as the ‘intermediary powers’ are affirmed by Montesquieu in his appeal to 
English parliamentarianism and Tacitus’s ‘mores of the Germans’, so too for Hegel the 
unique character of the Germanic World lies in the representational and constitutional 
state that developed from the feudal order. Hegel will thus be seen to affirm the explicit 
association of the Stände, in part drawn from the feudal epoch, once taken beyond the 
private sphere of the contract and feudal privilege. On the one hand, the ‘existence of 
these circles in their own right’ is esteemed against centralising (absolutising) tendencies 
in the Grundlinien while, on the other, Hegel stresses the issue of the incapacity to form a 
state in the Middle Ages.78 
As regards Hegel’s changing perspectives on the Stände, a shift can be superficially 
observed between the Verfassungsschrift and the Grundlinien – the Reichs- and 
Landstände, relentlessly critiqued in the early years, return as institutional forms in his 
maturity. Indeed, there can be no doubt that a large and significant period in Hegel’s 
development of his Rechtsphilosophie separates the Verfassungsschrift and the 
Grundlinien. Hegel had only just begun his Rechtsphilosophie as he returned one last time 
to the earlier manuscript.79 But this misses the point, as Hegel had already affirmed 
alongside Montesquieu the unique character of the Germanic World at a specific 
historical period of feudal constitutionalism. It is a peculiarity of the political 
development of Europe that the state formed as such, and is thus considered ‘unique to the 
Occident’ with its ‘technical, rational, written constitution, etc. as is capitalism’.80 
Moreover, for Hegel, ‘Europe is a concept that develops not from out of itself but rather 
                                                
77 Hegel 1995a, p. 225 (§125). 
78 See Hegel 1991a, p. 331 (§290). 
79 See Harris 1983, p. x1ix speaking of the development of System der Sittlichkeit: ‘But when he reached the 
problem of public morale, and “the classifications of constitutions” – i.e. the part where the evolution of 
“Absolute Spirit” had to be considered – Hegel gave up working on the systematic manuscript, and turned 
back to the political project that had brought him to Jena, but which he had laid aside in the spring of 1801. 
He now began to revise the manuscript…’ 
80 Weber 2005, p. xxxi. Poggi 1990 has nicely framed the occidental prejudice of these ideas. 
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from out of its essential contrast with Asia.81 The Greek realm has as its basis Oriental 
substantiality, which is, however, born out of spirit into spiritual individuality and 
transfigured into beauty’.82 The principle of particularity, emergent with Socrates and 
with the decline of the Platonic or substantial state migrates to Rome and ascends with 
Christianity, mixed with the Germanic freedom of the forests that led to the ‘feudal 
association … of purely concrete rights and duties’. It amounts ‘to a constitutional state 
[Rechtsstaat] on the basis of “subjective” rights [and] not [yet] “objective” law’.83 
For Hegel, like Montesquieu, the absolutist regime was precisely the opposite of 
feudal monarchy, and he sees the condition for ‘a perfect despotism’ precisely in 
‘absolute rule’. This is intimately connected with Montesquieu’s express advocation that 
‘privileged corporations and their mediatory functions in a monarchical form of state’ 
must be preserved ‘because their destruction inevitably perverts monarchy into 
despotism’.84 As a monarchist also proximate to Hobbes however, Hegel recognised that 
‘the universal will is made to reside in the will of one monarch’ in the modern state. Yet 
‘the arbitrary will of one man’ does not ‘constitute absolute law, for the universal will is 
no despotism’; for ‘being rational … it is consistently expressed and determined in 
laws’.85 
Hegel, by contrast, sees the issue of the sovereign in Hobbes alongside the general 
will in Rousseau – and for him both Hobbes and Rousseau retreat into the contingency of 
individual will, either that of the sovereign or that of the individual. It is precisely for this 
reason that Hegel appropriates Montesquieu’s perspectives on European constitutionalism 
from a very early period, as I have shown. Hegel’s rationalisation of Rousseau’s general 
will conceives of the condition of law along explicitly constitutional lines. For Hegel, 
moreover, it is embodied in the right and obligations of Stände, which in part have their 
origins in the feudal epoch. This is an incredibly paradoxical vision of the general will 
insofar as Rousseau had thoroughly rejected ‘the idea of representation’ as derived from 
‘feudal government’; he went on to add that ‘the moment a people allows itself to be 
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represented it is no longer free; it no longer exists’.86 On the one hand, for Hegel, the 
basis of right in the modern state cannot be reduced to the private nature of the civil, 
social sphere; on the other, political power should not be opposed to modern civil society. 
Hegel viewed the latter problem as the inevitable result if all institutions were abolished 
between modern civil society and the state. This would lead to the individual will of the 
subject lacking substantiality, just as the modern state would lack its true substance, the 
individual. For Hegel, ‘the state is the actualisation of freedom not in accordance with 
subjective caprice’ – the arbitrariness of the particular will of the individual – ‘but in 
accordance with the concept of the will’ as universal, ‘the principle of subjectivity itself’ 
reunited with the political where right and freedom exists.87 This was only possible for 
Hegel if the modern state took on the principle of the organisation of the general will, 
however, which existed in the right and obligations of Stände. 
As I noted at the outset of this chapter, for Hegel Rousseau had ‘considered the will 
only in the determinate form of the individual will’.88 For Hegel, by contrast, the universal 
or general will is only universal through institutionalism; its ‘constitution’ as an organic 
state opposed to the centralism dominant in absolutism that has no ‘circles in which 
particular and universal interests come together’.89 It is only here that right and duty 
coincide for Hegel in the modern formation of the state based on self-consciousness 
(Hobbes), thought and the will (Rousseau), and in Montesquieu’s ‘philosophical view that 
the part should be considered only with reference to the whole’. 
 
Duty is primarily an attitude towards something which, for me, is substantial and 
universal in and for itself. Right, on the other hand, is in general the existence 
[Dasein] of this substantial element, and is consequently the latter’s particular 
aspect and that of my own particular freedom’.90 
 
Right and duty thus correspond for the individual in their substantial freedom in the 
political community for the mature Hegel. This is where discussions on Hegel’s 
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institutionalism should be directed, between the correspondence between subjective and 
objective spirit, which makes for rationality and actuality of the state.91 
In the Grundlinien one can see how the Stände are to be conceived along the lines 
of a public form of power rather than a private, patrimonial one, and are therefore 
essentially distinguished from the early strata of the medieval period. The Stände are 
firstly spheres of concrete socialisation whereby the initial private interests of the 
individual merge with communal interest developing from the system of needs and the 
organisation and division of labour, and precisely though this relation, through their 
organisation, they become political.92 For Hegel in the Grundlinien this comes down to a 
question of the division of labour and of authority at each level of the state, and their 
actuality – ‘the transition from universal to the particular and individual’ spheres. It is 
precisely here that the organic principle comes to the fore. The question is that of assuring 
‘that civil life should be governed in a concrete manner from below, where it is concrete’ 
while, conversely, the danger is that, for sake of ‘speed’ and ‘facility’ ‘everything is again 
controlled from above by the ministerial power, and that functions are, to use the common 
expression, centralized’; the ‘difficulty … is [that of assuring] that they come together 
again at upper and lower levels’.93 For Germans writing in the period of the French 
Revolution and following the Napoleonic Wars (1789–1815) the ‘opposition to 
absolutism and centralization was one and the same thing’.94 It is for this reason, as can be 
seen from the quote above, that Hegel pursues an institutional ideal even if he adds a 
proviso that these circles ‘gained too great a degree of self-sufficiency in the Middle Ages, 
when the corporations and communal associations, [the] circles in which particular and 
universal interests come together, became states within the state and behaved in an 
obdurate manner like independently established bodies’.95 For Hegel, modern freedom is 
only realised in a ‘universal political power’ if it safeguards the subjective moment, if the 
state is ‘actual’, which was absent in the medieval period. It is thus that he distinguishes 
his political conception from the reactionary medieval ideal, which I will show in further 
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detail in the conclusion of this chapter. The French Revolution by contrast, as an inheritor 
of the antithetically abstract ideas of the Enlightenment, led to absolute terror: the 
disintegration of the universality it was meant to uphold through the abolishment of the 
états généraux and the principle of representation, which the feudal order had originally 
brought into being. Thus, already in the Verfassungsschrift, Hegel sees ‘the causes of 
France’s misfortune … in the complete degeneration of the feudal system and the 
consequent loss of its true character’.96 The bitter opposition of the French Enlightenment 
to the medieval period is an extremism that simply leads to the arbitrary domination of 
abstract ideals as a secular version of the Catholic control over conscience for Hegel.97 
Hegel expressed this most forcefully in his Berlin period in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History, where he identified a central distinction between the German and 
French Enlightenment that related to the confessional character of the Stände established 
with the ius reformandi;98 the former took its lead from theology due to the characteristics 
of the German history of the Reformation rather than opposition to Catholic Church.99 
The caution against centralisation quoted above from the Grundlinien references 
the plebiscitary dictatorship of Napoleon; it is moreover a repetition of a theme that 
already appears in his early period in the Verfassungsschrift against the mechanisation 
and centralisation of the state in the case of Prussia. Such analogy and criticism of the 
centralised state persists throughout his political writings – and the Stände in such 
instances serve as an organisational form that stands opposite bureaucratic power in the 
universal Stand, the specialisation attained through the examination.100 Moreover, both 
Prussia and modern France are mutually inclusive and reciprocally developing political 
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forms for the young Hegel. This had at least been true since the Great Elector (1620–88), 
who originally built his standing army on the financial means of Louis XIV’s absolutism. 
For the Napoleonic period, Rosenberg put it thus: ‘A strange bedfellow gave the Prussia 
bureaucracy the opportunity for bringing to its climax the struggle to abridge royal 
prerogatives and to acquire the powers of “cabinet government.” Napoleon Bonaparte, 
Emperor of France “par la grâce de Dieu et les constitutions de la République,” was 
consolidator of the most effective type of bureaucratized absolutism theretofore 
known’.101 H.S. Harris saw in the young Hegel’s preference of Austria over Prussia and 
France – both of which he perceived as bourgeois societies – ‘the essentially platonic 
origin of his inspiration’.102 
The key to understanding Hegel’s mature institutionalism is the correspondence 
between subjective and objective spirit. This is what leads the individual beyond their 
private isolation and self-interestedness to participate in the institutions that make up the 
sovereignty of the state, to become the substance of the state as such. The Stände in this 
case represent the return of the familial and ethical element at the level of civil society, 
the sphere of individualism, and are meant to lead to a higher level of self-consciousness 
in the unity of the state. The Stände moreover are beyond the natural ethical life of the 
family and take place in the sphere of spiritual, albeit ‘formal’, liberation that is modern 
civil society for Hegel. Now that I have explained how Hegel articulates the legitimacy of 
his concept of the Stände and its distinction from the feudal epoch of private right it 
remains to further expand on its historical derivation, which indeed takes us precisely 
back to the feudal period once again. 
Following Montesquieu, the feudal constitution forms an initial Rechtsstaat where, 
as Max Weber specifies, ‘the idea of the social contract is anticipated in primitive 
fashion’.103 It is a ‘“separation of powers”, but unlike Montesquieu’s scheme, which 
constitutes a qualitative division of labor, it is simply a quantitative division of 
authority’. 104 Once this ‘system of [feudal] alliances has developed into a chronic 
condition because of the contractual guarantee of all rights and duties and because of the 
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resulting inelasticity, the existence of a Ständestaat [is] unavoidable, which under certain 
circumstances was legally perpetuated through an explicit association’.105 This is what led 
to the Reichs- and Landstände in the Holy Roman Empire, which in the form of the 
electors maintained their legal veto on imperial decisions. 
But the era of the Ständestaat also grew out of a rudimentary form of (albeit 
limited) medieval ‘public power’ that had ‘gained practical significance and found, to 
some extent, formal recognition … serving the collective ends of … little 
commonwealths’.106 It had coincided or risen out of the generalised ‘feudal protection 
relation’, according to Hegel in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, which 
developed with the rise of the city; the latter, along with the Church and together with the 
king ‘had enforced the edicts of peace’ [Landfrieden] and put an end to private warfare.107 
This was abolished for Hegel, however, in the period of princely reaction that led to 
absolutism, and in the Verfassungsschrift he perceived the continuance of private warfare 
at the level of the absolutist state system in the Holy Roman Empire. 
 
The change from the right of private warfare [Faustrecht] to politics should not be 
regarded as a transition from anarchy to constitutionalism. The true principle 
remains the same, and the change is purely superficial. In the days before the 
prohibition on private warfare [Landfrieden], the injured party or anyone bent on 
conquest simply struck out at his enemies. In politics, on the other hand, 
calculations are made before battle is joined, and major interests are not put at risk 
for sake of minor gain; but if this gain seems assured, the opportunity is not 
missed.108 
  
Hegel recognised the importance of the rise of the city in the development of the 
constitutional history of Europe, and traced the development of the modern state based on 
representation back, in part, to this phenomenon, which had precisely limited private 
warfare and throughout the intervening centuries laid the basis for the development of 
modern civil society. 
 
Representation is so intimately bound up with the essence of the feudal constitution 
in its further development, in conjunction with the rise of the Mittelstandes, that it 
may be classed as the silliest of illusions to regard it as an invention of recent times. 
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All modern states exist through representation…109 
  
What Hegel expresses is a broader concept of representation than the strict association of 
lords, the Herrschaftsstände. The latter was the hausväterlich character of feudal 
patrimonialism, of which the lord formed a particular part, and that operated on the basis 
of alliances between lords and Prince. What Hegel refers to above is undoubtedly the 
municipal associations that gained a degree of independence from the crown and founded 
loyalty, by contrast, not on the honour of submission to a lord, but on the communal 
association itself, as Rosenberg has pointed out. This was the ‘triumph of [early] medieval 
constitutionalism, founded on association and voluntary cooperation from below rather 
than coercion from above …’ in which ‘some of the modern ideas of public need and 
public service’ developed ‘which the thoroughly bureaucratized absolute monarchies 
applied in their practice of public administration at a later period and in a perverted 
form’.110 Even if such ständische civil administrations disappeared as quickly as they 
appeared, their original force was integrated into developing civil bureaucracies that 
conflicted with and curbed the continuous expansion of royal power.111 ‘A massive 
resistance movement against royal encroachments checked the stabilization of 
monarchical authority which had been sustained by the formation of a civil 
bureaucracy’.112 More immediately it led to the formation of ‘a new transitional type of 
state’, in which the Stände were the co-bearers of the central power, as I have shown 
above. It also led to the very varied constitutional make up of the German speaking lands 
that Hegel tends to neglect in his analysis in the Verfassungsschrift. 
Hegel’s view is undoubtedly complex, and it is a danger to insinuate that he 
ascribes to this ideal of liberal historiography in the rise of the Stadt.113 In the end, 
however, the importance of labour will become paramount in his development, as I will 
show in Chapter Three. It will not be the labour founded in the countryside in the 
patriarchal (‘natural’, ‘substantial’) relations of kinship groups, but the increasing 
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development of the system of needs that outstrips the initial relation of Lordship and 
Bondage. This leads to the history of freedom for Hegel, which distinctively entails the 
development of modern civil society as he conceives of it in his mature period. In the 
submission of the serf after the initial struggle a community of needs arises, which 
contains the principle of universality as well history, freedom and representation. In his 
early work, in System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3) for example, and the Jena period more 
generally (1801–7), household authority remains dominant as he constructs his vision of 
the state built on the Greek model of the division between polis and oikos. But already at 
this stage, the feudal ideal of representation predominates and does not accord with the 
slave relations predominant in Greece; it accords rather with the principle of 
representation.114 Thus Hegel contrasted the relation of a vassal to a lord to the non-
contractual relationship of slavery, which did not form a Stand – ‘Sklavenstand ist kein 
Stand’.115 And in the Jena natural law essay (1802–3) he showed how this led to the 
destruction of Greek Sittlichkeit in Rome where only one was free, which is the return of 
what he calls ‘oriental despotism’ in the heart of the West.116 
The rejection of Prussia in the Verfassungsschrift as a possible political factor for 
unification in the Reich hinges on this debate as well, as it is a land scoured of art and 
culture, both of which depended on the rise of the towns – and it remained bound to 
largely patriarchal patrimonial form of the Stände and much has been made of its largely 
agricultural character.117 As Max Weber remarks in reflecting on the relation of war to the 
production of culture: ‘Pure art and literature of a specifically German character did not 
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develop in the political center of Germany’.118 This most likely refers to Prussia, not only 
in terms of the ‘political center’ but also to its lack of the specifically ‘German character’ 
in cultural development – French had been the political language of the court circle (even 
Pufendorf was read in Barbeyrac’s French translation by Frederick II), while military 
organisation was left to the demands of a patrimonial nobility that left the East with few 
towns and little resistance to their power.119 The young Hegel holds the same opinion as 
Weber: ‘what life and what aridity rules in another equally controlled state, in Prussia. 
This stands out as soon as one sets foot in the first village. Prussia shows a complete lack 
of scientific and artistic genius, not considering the ephemeral energy which a lone genius 
for a time was known to have forced out of it’.120 Hegel is here comparing Prussia and the 
French Republic – the ‘lone genius’ to whom he refers is Frederick II (1712–86). 
The shift in Hegel’s valuation of Prussia must seen in light of the reforms (1806–
19) that took place under Stein, Hardenberg and Humboldt. He turns to Prussia, and to a 
political role in Berlin for himself, insofar as the reforms engendered by defeat at the 
hands of Napoleon opened the military to a rational – modern – form of organisation, as 
well as state office, education and the economy (though in the latter respect he expresses 
his reservations).121 This cut off the ascension of the hereditary Stände to patrimonial 
inheritance of office in the leadership of the state that, as Hegel noted in the quote at the 
outset of this section, led to the revolution in France. Hegel himself was also in close 
proximity to the reformed university system and acquainted with both Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (1767–1835) and Karl August von Hardenberg (1750–1822). The reformed 
university by the end of Restoration period (1830) was the main visible trace, other than 
the rationalisation of the military, of the earlier efforts of these statesmen. The reforms 
met their end as the intransigent nobility organised in the romanticist-reactionary circle of 
Frederick IV (1795–1861) sought to restore a medieval ideal of the Reich and the 
Ständestaat.122 The patrimonial character of the Stände advocated by the nobility was 
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contrary to Hegel’s conception, which as has been rightly pointed out was partly 
influenced by the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten at this time. This 
can be seen in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History in his positive esteem for the 
codification and Frederick II, and one might also compare them to the Stände as 
conceived in Hardenberg’s reforms.123 
Hegel’s valorisation of the feudal system is based on representation, and hinges on 
the corporate [ständische] form taken by the nobility, the Church and the commoners in 
the towns. The ‘protective relation of feudal protection’ between Lord and Bondsman, 
which Hegel’s develops as an originary conflict and substitute for the social contract, had 
developed into the ‘principle of free possession; i.e. freedom originated in its direct 
contrary’. The development of ‘municipal rights’, however, with the rise of the Stadt and 
the refuge it provided was ‘subsequently lost under the rule of feudal governors [and] the 
citizens, like their rural neighbors, had been reduced to vassalage’. 124  This latter 
phenomenon eventually led to the ‘progressive’ right of resistance against monarchical 
power in the era of ‘feudal reaction’,125 where the ruler’s authority existed in a reciprocal 
relation with those of his dependents. Yet this is what led to the private rightly character 
of the imperial constitution when the Reichs and Landstände assumed the status of state 
forms, as was seen above (II.1). However, as I have shown, the critique of the medieval 
period is not as straightforward as it at first appears. Indeed it reflects the same subtle 
ambiguity as Montesquieu’s valuation of the period as a form of ‘free unification’ was 
always possible even in the separation of medieval polities and the later self-
interestedness of the Reichs and Landstände. In Hegel’s contemporary Germany in the 
Verfassungsschrift, by contrast, the separation of Stände and their development into ‘state 
powers’, into the Reichs and Landstände, had placed them in fundamental opposition, in 
contest over the assertion of their private rights in the mere ‘empiricism’ of the German 
constitution.126 The constitution of the empire represented perfectly for Hegel, as I 
analysed above (II.1), the formation of a ‘political’ order on the basis of private right – the 
personality of the electors predominated over the universal interests of the state that Hegel 
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sought to establish. It represented in his ‘playful’ Verfassungsgeschichte 127  of the 
Frankfurt and Jena period (1800–3) the return of the state of nature at the level of 
constitutional conflict. The return of the right of private warfare destroyed the original 
feudal constitution and its original representation as well as hindering the development of 
the Städte. Furthermore, one is no longer dealing with an individual [Einzelne] relation 
such as that of Herr and Knecht, but the ‘fate’ of German freedom in the machine state, 
which consolidates its dominion at the expense of lesser powers.128 In other words, the 
development of absolutism and princely rule as well as the intransigence of feudal custom 
and the old law had destroyed the possibility of the freedom provided by the Städte that 
led to a more participatory form of political community for Hegel. 
As I have shown in this section, for Hegel the social and political capacity of the 
institutional organisation of the Stände was emphasised in order to provide a concrete 
formulation of Rousseau’s general will, which in its limitation to the individual will was 
seen as leading to abstract universality or absolutism. This took the Stände well beyond 
the medieval private patrimonial concept and its absolutist variant (more on this below, in 
II.3) that Hegel criticised at the outset of this section in the form of dominium and the 
unjust privilege that he saw leading to the modern revolution. In reference to Hobbes, 
Rousseau, and Montesquieu, it was further shown how Hegel’s solution in his mature 
Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31) was an original ‘eclecticism’ of the modern tradition. 
Hegel’s conception of Stände was an attempt to establish a reciprocity between the 
highest and the lowest orders, present in individual duty and right, in the substance and 
subjectivity of the state in his mature conception – thus dissolving the very hierarchy 
between such orders and creating the unity of the state in organisation that I will explore 
further in the conclusion of this study. Hegel developed his concept of the Stände as a 
response to the centralised absolutist state. It is this that differentiates it from the Reichs- 
and Landstände in his early analysis insofar as these are absolutist states. This revealed a 
continuity in Hegel’s perception of political order insofar as he expressed something 
similar already in the Verfassungsschrift when he stated that the ‘inhuman mechanism’ of 
the absolutist state ‘displays to [its] subjects a conviction of lack of understanding and 
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contempt for their ability to judge and perform what is conducive to their private welfare 
… [and] therefore cannot hope for any lively activity or support from the self-confidence 
of citizens’.129 It is not without a sense of irony that Hegel retrieved a concept which 
would institutionalise individual right in precisely those spheres that he had previously 
rejected, but as I have already begun to note there is a very large differentiation to be 
drawn between the existence of the Reichs- and Landstände in the imperial constitution 
and what Hegel fundamentally affirms in his mature period as an institutional form. This I 
will continue to distinguish in the remainder of this chapter. 
Towards the close of this section I drew on some further aspects of the historical 
derivation of the concept by way of reference to medieval constitutionalism in the 
Verfassungsschrift and in the Grundlinien, and then in particular to the development of 
the towns, which led to a different type of honour, the relation of the individual to the 
community and representation. This conception will be explored further below in relation 
to what Hegel terms Sittlichkeit and in the early stage of his development in the 
Verfassungsschrift as ‘the mores of the Germans’ (II.3). 
 
II.3 The Private ‘Indirect Powers’ of the Landstände 
 
In this section I will further explore the originality of Hegel’s concept in reference to the 
distinctions I have been drawing in the last two sections (II.1, II.2) between the traditional 
usage of the Reichs and Landstände in the imperial context and Hegel’s distinctive 
approach. This will allow me to differentiate further Hegel’s mature concept of the Stände 
from the private ‘indirect powers’, the ‘intermediate powers’ of the Reichs and 
Landstände that undermined the imperial form in the Verfassungsschrift. By contrast, I 
will show how Hegel conceives the Stände as the initial concretisation of universality. 
As I analysed in Chapter One, Hegel’s usage of the Stände involved a particular 
linguistic emphasis whereby he conceived of the reunification of the social and the 
political; he sought to emphasise how the Stände preserved ‘the unity they certainly 
possessed in former times’.130 This was central to his institutional thought and his 
opposition to what he declaimed was the one-sidedness of the liberalism that emerged 
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with modern revolutionary France, which ended with the individual standing isolated and 
depoliticised in contrast to the political concentration of state power – this was the crisis 
of civil society and it led to the fundamental dichotomy that marked the crisis of 
modernity for Hegel.131 Political life for Hegel was left ‘hanging in the air’ if the spheres 
– the Stände – he identified in modern civil society were fragmented once again into 
isolated individuals at the level of the state. This reveals the contiguity between the social 
and political dimensions in Hegel’s thought – insofar as individuals are organised 
concretely in the social they are structurally concrete in the political. If this were not the 
case, the state would be turned into a sphere of arbitrariness and contingency as it would 
leave private opinion determining the political rather than what was ‘stable and legitimate 
[berechtigt] in and for itself’.132 The young Hegel paradoxically discovers this private 
opinion in the Verfassungsschrift with the Landstände, which will allow for a further 
comparison and contrast to the development of his thought. In so doing, I will be able to 
distinguish the modern conceptuality of the Stände in Hegel’s institutional theory from 
the early constitutional history to which they are connected. 
For Hegel, ‘the great advance made by the modern state’ recognised in the 
Grundlinien – built on the individual will, self-consciousness and thought, following 
Rousseau – had yet to arrive on German soil when he was writing the Verfassungsschrift. 
The concern of Hegel’s polemical critique of the imperial constitution was to serve as a 
propaedeutic to such ends. The stark difference between the period of the early 
manuscript and Hegel’s mature Rechtsphilosophie, developed after the collapse of the 
empire and in the Reform period in Prussia and up and into the Restoration, does not 
mean that comparisons between them are fruitless. This can be brought out much more 
clearly: the anarchy of the empire represented a state of nature, a war of all against all, 
where the private interests of the Landstände stood opposed to each other as isolated 
individuals. In the Grundlinien one will discover a similar structure refracted into the civil, 
social, or abstract spheres of the state. There the Stände will take on the form of 
productive organisational structures that stem social conflict.133 Thus I can already 
indicate the central problem of this section, which will involve the distinction of the 
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traditional concepts of the Reichs- and Landstände from Hegel’s late political 
interpretation of the Stände as organisational forms that contrast with private particularity. 
For Hegel, a realistic approach to the politics of the empire in the 
Verfassungsschrift involved an analysis of the historical facts of the German constitution 
and the factors that led to its crisis. This, as I showed above (II.1), involved the history of 
feudalism that had led to the independence of the Reichs- and Landstände in the later 
constitution. Hegel perceived the Reichs- and Landstände as absolutist states that resulted 
in the fundamental disunity of the imperial constitution and its non-existence as a modern 
state form that he measured against the French Republic. For Hegel a constitution was far 
more than a document as it involved the social and psychological makeup of a people. He 
again followed Montesquieu (and also Voltaire) here into the realm of climate, manners 
and custom, reflecting the original methodology of the early social sciences.134 This 
permanently marked his characterisation of the state along the lines of custom and ethical 
life, which would develop far more poignantly in the early Rechtsphilosophie (1802–3) in 
System der Sittlichkeit, which, as I showed above, coincided with the final editing of the 
Verfassungsschrift.135 
The Verfassungsschrift belongs alongside Hegel’s early reflections on natural 
religion, which will eventually develop (1802–3) into his distinction between custom 
[Sitten] and morality.136 In the political context of the Holy Roman Empire, Hegel 
attempts to breathe life back into the mores of the Germans, notably the independence 
established with the feudal order and its concomitant forms of representation, the 
corporate life of the Stände that I traced above (II.2) in reference to the representation that 
developed in the communal associations of the towns. Much later in Hegel’s Berlin period 
(1818–31), a similar historical schema of representation can be seen, which is sublated 
from the medieval period to become the Germanic World in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History. At this stage, Hegel has a much more favourable and nuanced 
interpretation of the Holy Roman Empire and its place in history. He perceives its 
existence after the Reformation and in the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia as 
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marking the beginning of modernity with the establishment of international law and the 
rights of conscience. At this early stage in Hegel’s development in the Verfassungsschrift, 
however, such independence tragically leads to the ‘fate’ of German freedom, to the 
destruction of the Germans as a people in this case.137 That is to say that for the young 
Hegel the Reformation and the religious wars leading to the Treaty of Westphalia lead to 
the decay of the ‘Volksgeist’. For Hegel, the earlier form of feudal independence leads to 
the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire and to the arbitrariness that determines the 
appearance of the German constitution as a ‘legal fiction’ based on Privatrecht with its 
‘natural and proper sphere’ being clearly that of the courts.138 It is in this way that the 
young Hegel asserts that the imperial constitution since 1648 is a ‘system of right against 
the state’ – in the interests of the Reichs- and Landstände.139 
 
Thus, if the problem of how Germany can simultaneously be a state and not be a 
state is to be solved, it must, in so far as it is a state, exist only as a state in thought 
[Gedankenstaat], while its non-existence must possess the reality.140 
 
The more reserved tone of the Grundlinien should be noted as an attempt to solidify the 
modern revolution through the mode of a political metaphysics: i.e., ‘in right, the human 
being encounters his own reason; he must therefore consider the rationality of right, and 
this is the business of our science, in contrast with positive jurisprudence’. 141 The starting 
point of the Grundlinien is already constituted right and the legitimate positive order of 
law as such – ‘insofar as [the] coming into being of the concept of right is concerned, 
[this] falls outside the science of right’142 – while the Verfassungsschrift is concerned with 
the constitution of such right, precisely with its ‘coming into being’.143 This is made clear 
through Hegel’s appeal to Machiavelli, which at this stage has more significance than to 
authors of the natural law tradition. ‘The German empire had proved [just as] futile to 
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construct … on the basis of the deductions of natural law’144 as it had proved impossible 
to categorise along the lines of the Aristotelian typology of polities. Hegel follows Samuel 
von Pufendorf in this respect, when he infamously declared the empire a res publica 
irregularis.145 If the concepts of the Verfassungsschrift are largely existential, born in the 
context of civil war and the impending collapse of the empire and aimed at the destruction 
of the positivity of ancient privilege, those of the Grundlinien depart from the 
identification of right with the state. 
For the young Hegel it was after the Peace of Westphalia that ‘the principle of 
what was then called German freedom, namely the dissolution of the empire into 
independent states … [was] consolidated’.146 What had occurred in the ‘the progressive 
princely polities of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’, where public policy was 
identified with the private right of the sovereign, returns in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries with autocratic authority.147 Thus if the imperial constitution operated under the 
political form of the defunct feudal system for Hegel, it does so in the context of the 
‘whittling away of the powers of the assemblies of estates [and] in a new era in the history 
of the ownership, control, and management of the means of political domination’.148 It is 
precisely in this sense that there is a contrast to be drawn between the development of the 
Landstände into monarchical state forms based on princely domination and the Stände as 
Hegel develops them in their organisational capacity in the Grundlinien. ‘Hegel’s view 
was that the old Germany was a community of estates, which could not now become a 
state precisely because it did now consist of states’.149 The communal and representational 
power disappeared along with the possibility of the ‘explicit association’ of the Stände; 
feudal power remained intransigent and isolated in its private interest wherein which 
alliances were concretised and the municipal associations of the cities lost any rights they 
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had of their own.150 For Hegel the Reichs- and Landstände were relatively independent 
centralised powers, opposed and obstacles to the concentration of power in the imperial 
centre where the young Hegel sought to develop a modern concept of the state. The 
Ständestaat had been transformed, and the efficacy of its limitations on the caprice of the 
prince – its ‘co-regency’ – was in large part undone; the notables, as the local rulers in the 
‘Estates of the realm’, lost all influence.151 
After the Peace at Westphalia, and with the consolidation of absolutism, this gave 
way to the beginnings of modern bureaucracy and centralised power. Thus, while after the 
Peace of Westphalia Germany was carved up into territorial states, and the empire lost its 
political authority over events, at the same time absolute autocratic power developed in 
the decentralised fashion of the sovereign princes on the Reichs- and Landstände. The 
Stände thus had grown from their original definition when they had ‘detached themselves 
from the court in the narrow sense and partially emancipated themselves from their ruler’s 
personal intervention’;152 for Hegel they were ‘autonomous’ (private) powers that had a 
‘civil’ (private) stake in the maintenance of the present German constitution. 
The loss of organic unity in the empire for Hegel was the major result of the 
independence of the individual Reichs- and Landstände, where each developed its own 
conception of the general good and, thus, strictly stuck to its particular good as such. ‘As 
[Hegel] saw it, political life in Germany had decayed into class war because the ‘universal 
sovereign power’ had disappeared or decayed into partisan force… in [his] view the older 
natural spontaneous unity of the Volk perished in the Thirty Years’ War’.153 There was no 
longer anything to hold the empire together other than a constitution that was the sum of 
private, ‘civil’, right. It followed that since the sovereignty of the empire had disappeared 
after the Peace of Westphalia, ‘a particular state, must not sacrifice itself to a universal 
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from which it can expect no help’.154 The collapse of the political efficacy of the empire 
ended with the self-interestedness of the various powers, which transformed the 
constitution into ‘nothing other than the sum of the rights which individual parts have 
extracted from the whole, and this justice, which watches carefully to ensure that no 
power remains in the hands of the state, is the essence of the constitution’.155 Individual 
self-interest and competition among the monarchies of princely absolutism arose, while 
the ‘independence’ of the smaller German states was completely reliant on the politics of 
the two great powers, Austria and Prussia, which vied for political hegemony. Such a 
danger inhibits the consolidation of universal political power for Hegel insofar as the 
Landstände are already independent powers in their own right. If this ‘independence’ is 
more fictive than real it is precisely due to the dominance of Austria and Prussia, where 
the ‘fate’ of the other states ‘lies directly between the politics of [these] two great 
powers’.156 
 
Germany … must be regarded not as a state, but as a mass of independent states, 
the larger of which act independently even in foreign relations, whereas the smaller 
must follow some broader movement.157  
 
For Hegel in the Verfassungsschrift feudalism recurs at the higher level of sovereign 
absolutist states, which subordinate the domestic affairs of smaller and weaker 
principalities that allow such ‘foreign’ intervention in order to guarantee their so-called 
independence. Any fidelity towards the German constitution after 1648 for Hegel is 
‘established on unjust principles, a relation that does indeed contemplate a legitimate 
object, but whose import is not a whit the less injustice; for the fidelity of vassals is not an 
obligation to the commonwealth, but a private one – ipso facto therefore subject to the 
sway of change, caprice, and violence’.158 The isolation that defines the Middle Ages is 
rediscovered at the cusp of the modern period in a Germany that has ‘never yielded 
sufficiently for the individual parts to sacrifice their particular characteristics to society, to 
unite in a universal [whole] and to discover freedom in common, free subjection to a 
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supreme political authority’.159 This represents the gravest danger in the era of absolutism 
where it has lost its original form with the rise of absolute princes. 
The constitution in such a context was arbitrated by the Privatrecht of competing 
individual powers, and the nature of the legal relationship of the Landstände to the 
constitution ‘is not defined by universal laws in the strict sense; on the contrary, the 
relationship of each estate to the whole is a particular matter – in the same way as civil 
rights – which takes the form of a [private] property’.160 This had an essential effect on 
the nature of the political authority; the imperial constitution can be considered as 
modelled after the contract that, as I noted above (II.1, II.2), cannot be applied to the 
higher order of the political for Hegel. The same would be true for Hegel in the 
Grundlinien if the Stände were to decay into partisan force as they had in the 
Verfassungsschrift. This would be the state as the understanding envisages it, as made up 
of oppositional Stände opposed to political authority as such, against the very sovereignty 
they are meant to establish by acting in unity, which led to the sovereignty of the state 
itself. For Hegel in the Grundlinien, ‘if this opposition does make its appearance, and if it 
is not just superficial but actually takes on a substantial character, the state is close to 
destruction’.161 Thus the political and the social for Hegel must be ideally fused. The 
Stände are a product of Hegel’s logic, a method in which the theorisation of political 
reality can take a practical form and is embodied in a dialectic of institutions, which 
‘brings the universal interest into existence not only in itself but also for itself, i.e., the 
personal insight and the personal will of that sphere which has been described [as] civil 
society comes into existence in relation to the state’.162 
The private ‘indirect powers’ of the Reichs- and Landstände that undermine the 
imperial form in the Verfassungsschrift are thus contrasted in the Grundlinien with 
Hegel’s mature concept of the Stände, which is conceived as the initial concretisation of 
universality. The concept of the Stände in the later work now realises the particularity of 
the sphere of difference, civil society that, once organised, becomes political society and 
makes for the sovereignty of the state. Yet it is important to recognise that the basic 
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contours of Hegel’s arguments take on the particular form of a critique of modern liberal 
individualism and of an essential hostile opposition of the Stände to the ‘universal 
political authority’ as such. Thus while it is necessary to recognise Hegel’s affirmation of 
the form of the Stände in the Grundlinien and elsewhere, it is also important to recognise 
how he limits these forces through institutional subordination in the state.163 Thus Hegel 
develops a structure of reciprocity in unity into what he had built up in the civil, social, 
sphere as concrete universality, which becomes the sovereignty of the state as such. Yet 
there must be a restriction on right that comes into contradiction with the state, insofar as 
‘the Stände have their origin in individuality [Einzelheit], in the private point of view and 
in particular interests [and] are inclined to direct their efforts towards these at the expense 
of the universal interest’.164 Hegel’s solution is to stock the Stände with delegates from 
the executive state power in order to avoid the ‘ idea with which the ordinary 
consciousness usually begins… for example, that the Stände [are] the delegates of the 
people, or indeed the people themselves…’. It is in this respect that ‘the highest 
officials are able to do what is best even without the Stände.165 
To return to the Verfassungsschrift, what Hegel analyses is the political situation of 
the constitution in the Holy Roman Empire at the cusp of the Napoleonic wars, which 
would soon realise many of his predictions, including the dangers to ‘German freedom’ – 
that is, representational and participatory power as he saw it – that both Austria and 
Prussia posed in the contemporary period. By remaining neutral or in acting in the self-
interested fashion that had dichotomised the empire since the Peace of Westphalia, they 
increased their size and influence through Napoleon’s dissolution of the Ritterschaft, the 
Imperial Cities and various smaller principalities in the re-organisation of Germany. This 
was a perfect example of what Hegel had denoted as the Privatrecht of individual Reichs- 
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and Landstände that ‘depoliticised’ the workings of the empire: the private independence 
or gain of a given state was higher than any conception of national unity. Private interests 
as such dominated political concerns and the constitution appeared as a contract that, for 
Hegel, realised the independent freedom of the feudal era. 
The proximity of the French Republic – not to mention the wars between it and the 
Holy Roman Empire – influenced the development of the young Hegel’s thought like 
many other intellectuals of his time. It also significantly shaped his later state theory and 
mature Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31). For example, the very usage of the Stände as 
political forms of institutionalism in his later thought are drawn from circumstances in 
France, as I have shown consistently throughout this study thus far (see I.1, II.2 above). 
As far nationalism is concerned, this would have been an entirely new concept to the 
German-speaking lands, and one that would have been foreign to the interests or ways of 
thinking of the Reichs- and Landstände. Yet Hegel measures the Holy Roman Empire, 
and gauges it in terms of the new state concept as I established already in Chapter One. 
 
Thus, in the war with the French Republic, Germany has found by its own 
experience that it is no longer a state. Both in the war itself and in the peace which 
concluded it, it has become aware of its political condition. The following are the 
tangible results of this peace: some of the finest German territories have been lost, 
together with several million of the country’s inhabitants; a burden of debt, which 
weighs more heavily on the southern than on the northern half, prolongs the misery 
of the war far into the peace; and apart from those states which have come under 
the rule of the conquerors, and hence also of foreign laws and customs, many will 
lose what is their highest good, namely their existence as independent states.166 
 
But, just as the ‘principle of free possession began to develop itself from the protective 
relation of feudal protection; i.e. freedom originated in its direct contrary’, as Hegel notes 
in Berlin,167 so too does the solution to the malaise of the German constitution reveal 
itself in the present ‘peace’ established after the war with the French Republic. 
 
The French Republic in which power is concentrated as no other country in Europe, 
forces the old empire on the defensive, manifesting for all to see its lack of power, 
making it into a ‘Gedankenstaat’.168 
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It is in a precise reflection on current conditions, an acceptance of the fact that what is, is 
also what must be, that it is as it ‘ought to be’ if considered in light of the current 
constitutional system, which established the absolutism and the sovereignty of the princes 
that will lead to a confrontation with the reality of the post-war situation. For Hegel, this 
meant a ‘consideration [of] the inner causes, or spirit, of these results, which are merely 
the external and necessary appearances of this spirit’. Arbitrary independence and 
domination, the feudal form, reveals that the ‘German state has not yet accomplished its 
transition [to civilisation], but has succumbed to the convulsions that accompany it; its 
members have broken away to complete independence, and the state has dissolved’.169 
Hegel begins the Verfassungsschrift with an advocation for political rationality, an 
understanding that things are as they are due to historical circumstances and to wish them 
to be otherwise, to assume the stand point of what ‘ought’ to be, is to deny the very 
historical conditions weighing on the present. Moreover, an assessment of the present is a 
priority for any change to take place in the political order. To do otherwise for Hegel 
would be to deny the form German freedom and custom took after the Thirty Years’ War 
when it retreated into particular private interest – particularly that of princes – in the 
consolidation of the absolute states of the empire. 
 
The whole history of the war [with France…] makes it clear not only that Germany 
is split up into independent states, but also that their interests are completely 
separate; and while the political bond is as loose as the Middle Ages, no free 
unification can now be expected.170 
 
It is thus already at this very early stage that one can discover Hegel’s conception of 
realism in the political order, and the first instance of the rationality of the actual that will 
be central to his thought – and later to the substance and subjectivity of the state. 
The intellectual context in which the Verfassungsschrift is written deals with the 
historical ramifications of ‘Machiavellianism’ and ‘Spinozism’ in the eighteenth 
century,171 where ‘the modern absolute state’ could no longer be brought ‘under strict 
ethical norms’ in a very distinct sense insofar as there was an entirely ‘new concept of the 
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state’ – a state based on power politics and raison d’état.172 Hegel will enter the fray here 
with his own distinct approach to the intellectual and political context: he will affirm 
Machiavelli in the Verfassungsschrift, but also the undercurrent of custom or Sitten, the 
‘ethical life’ – or ‘mores of the Germans’ – revealing his relation to Montesquieu and 
Voltaire, each of who appear in the manuscript and determine the early form of Hegel’s 
Rechtsphilosophie along with Spinoza, Hobbes and Aristotle.173 For Hegel, political 
rationality will be grounded on something other than the crass reading of Machiavelli, 
based on the mere arbitrary will set by a ruler in cases of exigency; it will not be a mere 
question of how a ruler can proceed of their own accord if the welfare of the state is 
threatened, but of a ‘universal political power’ that involves the custom and life of a 
people – its preservation or the foundation of the state as such which then gives way to 
right. 
The character of Hegel’s analysis of Cesare Borgia in the Verfassungsschrift already 
has all of the elements of the cunning of reason that will be explicit in the Lectures On the 
Philosophy of History: these are not really great personages, but forces of nature where 
the streams of history run together in a given activity unbeknownst to the individual and 
despite their explicit intentions. For Hegel, a political figure of Cesare Borgia’s type will 
not be the ideal to bring about a German state (nor will Napoleon either, for that matter). 
Raison d’état will be affirmed only in the demand for the German Theseus who will unite 
the people in a state with the goal of founding a democratic order or a natural Volk 
religion comparable to the Greeks. 
For Hegel in the Verfassungsschrift and consistently throughout his work, ‘freedom 
is only possible when a people is legally united within a state’ and ‘a firm government is 
necessary for such freedom; but an equally deep impression has been made by the 
realisation that the people must take part in the making of laws and the most important 
affairs of the state’. To this end a representative body must be established for ‘the 
participation of the general will in the most important matters of general concern’.174 As 
Hegel put it profoundly in the Heidelberg manuscript (1817–18), it is to this extent that 
‘what is rational must be, but it has its existence only in the self-consciousness of a 
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people’.175 This ‘actuality’, the subject’s self-consciousness embodied in the institutions 
of the state as its ‘substance’, becomes moreover a way to gauge the rationality of a given 
state. Hegel’s mature conception of political rationality has the additional dimension of 
actuality as the unity of the individual, the particular, and the universal: i.e., in the 
formation of the state as such, which is represented as an Idea in the Grundlinien and 
contains the former logical moments. The right of Theseus in the Verfassungsschrift by 
contrast is the right of heroes, which gives way to a legal form of association – as it is 
stated in the Encyclopaedia (1817/31): 
 
The trembling of the particular will, the sense of the nothingness of self-seeking, 
the custom of obedience is a necessary moment in the formation of each man. … in 
order to be free, each nation must first undergo the severe discipline of submission 
to a lord after which lordship becomes redundant. Servitude and tyranny are also a 
necessary stage in the history of nations and thus something consequentially 
beneficial.176 
 
For Hegel, in the establishment of a state of reason and actuality every means is justified 
but only as means consequent to an end as the preservation of law and right. It can be 
contended that with the maturity of the Encyclopaedia Hegel departs from his earlier 
forays into the subject of state foundation where he remained closest to the Spinozistic 
tradition – for example in the Verfassungsschrift and System der Sittlichkeit – and that a 
shift from the logic of political development to an attempt to conceive of lasting political 
forms occurs. Force can be constitutive of right but is not to be identified with right as 
such: ‘The violence [Gewalt] which in this appearance is the foundation is [precisely] for 
this reason not the basis of right’. Thus it could be argued that Hegel stands opposite the 
traditional Weberian interpretation of the state: ‘Violence is the external phenomenal 
beginning of states, not their substantial principle’. 177  This is significant to the 
understanding of Hegel’s concept of the Stände and his institutional thought where the 
question of reason and actuality are central insofar as the organised institutions (civil 
society as the state) must provide for and preserve the right of the individual at their 
foundations. An ambiguity develops, however, on the basis of the limits of such 
institutionalisation, and Sittlichkeit as the custom of the political community complicates 
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any reading that would like to attribute a radical core to Hegel’s politics. Yet part of the 
ingenuity of Hegel’s methodological approach is that what he eventually denotes as 
‘objective spirit’ (Encyclopaedia 1817) also encompasses a peculiarly ‘subjective’ 
dimension insofar as it is developed out of his subjective psychology (subjektiver Geist) 
even if this is raised to the level of universality, and ideally fused in an identity of 
opposites. For Hegel this implies the embodiment of the particular in the universal, in 
social and political institutions where it becomes the ‘concrete’. According to this 
perspective the subject, not the particular but the concrete individual, carries the universal 
and makes for the actuality of the state – however, each are only moments in the 




As Hans Maier has pointed out, the Verfassungsschrift, never published in Hegel’s 
lifetime, represents ‘a true laboratory of ideas’.178 One can discover in it much material 
that will appear in a far more polished form in Hegel’s later political reflections; it is 
above all an attempt to develop a unified political form in the German imperial context 
and eliminate the pluralism – the ‘indirect powers’, the Reichs- and Landstände – that had 
divided the empire. In a similar way in which Hegel had attempted to form a national 
unity through his polemic against the constitution and the ‘indirect powers’ in his defence 
of Machiavelli in the Verfassungsschrift, so too in the Grundlinien it has been declared 
that ‘he sought to free the state, with its attributes of sovereignty, from society’.179 This, 
however, is a simplification as Hegel sought to construct the very principle of sovereignty 
on the basis of the Stände that developed institutionally in the social, civil spheres, where 
individuality became concrete and objective, and came to embody the political as such.180 
The importance of the Stände as intermediate institutions is not the central concern 
of the Verfassungsschrift, as I have shown above (II.3). It is concerned with constructing a 
modern state that implies in its very principle the elimination of the ‘indirect powers’. Yet 
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in the early Jena period, as I will show in Chapter Three, Hegel’s Stände appear initially 
as a functional model of analysis and as a ‘socio-political’ composition of forces, as an 
‘appropriate political organisation’. The question is: how they can appear within the same 
period as the Verfassungsschrift as a form of useful stratification, but are damned 
simultaneously as the Reichs- and Landstände in their absolutist form as centralised 
states? Perhaps Otto Hintze can clarify this situation: 
 
Absolutism supressed what Montesquieu called the intermediary forces; it did not 
by any means abolish the differences between Estates; on the contrary, it purposely 
sought to maintain the Estates’ social order as a useful basis of the absolute system 
of government. The preferential position which the nobility and the privileged 
classes enjoyed, however, was legal and social rather than political.181 
 
As I have shown above (II.2), the Hegel of the mature Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31) was 
opposed to these unjust privileges when it came to the place of the nobility as exempt 
from taxes, with patrimonial dominium, etc. On the other hand, however, it is clear that he 
retains their institutional character as a basis for social and political order. By now it is 
clear that the ‘independence of Reichs- and Landstände’ and the Stände as Hegel utilises 
them later are wholly different from each other. The Stände as Hegel utilises them in his 
mature work are, moreover, to be precisely opposed to the absolutisation that occurred in 
the Reichs- and Landstände in the empire. In the early Jena period when he turned back to 
work on ‘the political project’,182 Hegel had already begun to construct the Stände as an 
intermediary social and political form by drawing on the Aristotelian and Platonic 
hierarchies (this will be explored fully in Chapter Three). Yet on the discovery of the 
subject (also to be analysed in Chapter Three), the Stände will not be a strictly aristocratic 
body, but a ‘concrete universal’ or what, following Rousseau, he had termed a ‘general 
will’ open to social mobility rather than the feudal strictures of hierarchical organisation, 
which in the Grundlinien he will also opposed to Plato’s ‘substantial’ state. Hegel laments 
the destruction of the Generalstände in the Verfassungsschrift as leading to the failure of 
representation, ‘the complete destruction of the feudal principle’; ‘its degeneration, i.e. the 
loss of its true nature, has destroyed France’s constitution (though not France as a 
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state)’.183 As Hegel will later develop it, this will lead to the descent of revolutionary 
France into abstraction and terror. For Hegel, ‘a constitution [is] real, [only if] it exists as 
objective freedom – the Substantial form of volition – as duty and obligation 
acknowledged by the subjects themselves’.184 By referencing a former ‘linguistic usage’ 
that ‘still preserves the unity which the Stände of civil society in general and the Stände in 
the political sense possessed in earlier times’, Hegel reveals that he saw the function of 
the Stände ‘as a reunion of the separate elements of state and society’.185 
Hegel kept coming back to the Verfassungsschrift to incorporate more and more 
new events, and returned to it during the formation of his early system. As Hans Maier 
has stated, ‘one ought to read the Verfassungsschrift more appropriately as a concentrated 
[angereichert] diagnosis of the times [Zeitdiagnose] … [as] it contains in itself so many 
tensions, inconsistencies [Ungleichheiten] and undissolved contradictions’.186 H.S. Harris 
speculated that the precise moment Hegel set it aside for the final time was in early 1803. 
As Wilhelm Dilthey pointed out long ago, the imperial deputation of 25 February 1803 
[Reichsdeputationshauptschluss] – the last significant law enacted by the Holy Roman 
Empire – would have given the lie to Hegel’s ‘solution’ that ‘the great interest of the 
people had returned to its source’ and was simply waiting to find ‘satisfaction in an 
appropriate political organisation’. When Austria proved no less self-interested than 
Prussia in the division of territories, Hegel’s contrast based on the idea that ‘the 
Emperor’s relationship with Germany appears in a different light, very different from that 
of Prussia’, was most definitively put to rest.187 
What Hegel affirms is not the ständisch resistance to central authority per se, 
which resulted in the ‘highly limited’ character of the medieval polity, nor the 
anachronistic dreaming of reactionaries for the pre-absolutist Ständestaat that was current 
in the Germany of his age, but the identification of the ‘sphere of difference’ – civil 
society – with an ‘essential self-consciousness in social institutions as that universal 
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aspect of particular interests’.188 If for Hegel the feudal system was supposedly destroyed 
during the French Revolution, this is less present in the direct declaration of the National 
Assembly of August 11, 1789 than it is perhaps in the abolishment of the états généraux 
as a system of representation. It is in this sense that he responds to the reactionaries of his 
period: ‘there is a great call in recent times for Stände, but if these Stände were to lack a 
sense of state, they would bring with them hatred for officials, judges and government. 
The proper significance of the Stände is that it is through them that the state enters into 
the subjective consciousness of the people, and the people begins to participate in the 
state’.189 Hegel had no interest in the anachronism of the ständische Gesellschaft, the 
société des ordres that remains fixed in the old honorific hierarchy of rank society, for 
him the customary barriers of this status society have disappeared. But he is interested in 
sublating the honorific form and aspects of the institutional structure of the medieval 
polity to develop partisanship among the citizens in the modern state.190 This appears, 
albeit at this stage limited to the Aristotelian natural hierarchy, in the first appearance of 
the Rechtsphilosophie in System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3) and in the Verfassungsschrift in 
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the recognition of the towns as a sphere of communal representation. It is in System der 
Sittlichkeit that one finds the first system of Stände and the concept of Rechtschaffenheit – 
virtue or rectitude – which belongs with them.191 Hegel will couple the political order to 
the Stände and their Ständeehre, the honour of belonging to a Stand, from System der 
Sittlichkeit onwards as an aspect of the realisation of ethical life, which will eventually 
develop as consciousness and participation in the modern state as his mature 
Rechtsphilosophie develops. This institutionalism for Hegel is an answer to the 
inconsistency of the modern political and constitutional traditions that formed the political 
on the basis of the contract; this developed into the concept of suffrage, which Hegel saw 
as inevitably leading to the predominance of the private, civil principle, in the modern age 
over the political order of the state. The predominance of private right Hegel already 
attacked in what he perceived as the contractual-like basis of the constitution of the Holy 
Roman Empire where the arbitrariness of private right predominated over the political 
centre in the form of the Reichs- and Landstände, and the electoral princes that 
determined the constitution (II.3). 
Like certain ideological forces of conservatism, Hegel does affirm a medieval 
ideal of sorts, but unlike the latter he conceives of it as a solution to modernity, not as the 
romantic abolition of the modern age as such but as its affirmation. This is indeed part of 
his contradictory modernity, and his utilisation of the Stände at the point where civil 
society and depoliticisation spread outwards in what he fears will engulf the modern state. 
I may add that the appropriate ‘universal bond’ he seeks to discover in the Stände is 
peculiar to modernity and that his usage of the Stände as a way of institutionally 
providing for this is then modern in turn. Rather than the medieval ideal of the pre-
modern Ständestaat where the ‘picture of earlier social relations as patriarchal rather than 
exploitative did more [for] the romantic imagination than … historical accuracy’,192 
Hegel’s political ideas are more difficult to situate. Moreover, in his advocacy for the 
monarchical form of government, along with Montesquieu, he is more perceptive than 
‘those who criticised monarchy in the name of self-government [and] evoked the 
reminiscence of the old historic Stände [which] could bring them into an ad hoc alliance 
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with the Reactionary critics of monarchical absolutism whose ideal remained the 
preabsolutist Ständestaat.’193 For Hegel, ‘the essential constituent of a state [remains] a 
political power governed by a supreme head’; this must be remembered even if the Stände 
appear as a form of social and political organisation that can oppose the reduction of the 
individual to a mere cog in the political machinery of absolutism (II.3).194 As I have 
shown in this chapter, Hegel’s use of the Stände is of a peculiar sort and is connected with 
modern constitutional developments. As I will continue to show in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four, it is also integrally linked to an encounter with the modern philosophical 
and political tradition, and to what Hegel conceives as the crisis of this metaphysical 
tradition and of civil society. 
In this chapter I have shown how Hegel’s concept of the Stände is to be 
significantly differentiated from their traditional function as Landstände (II.1, II.3). I 
analysed this in Hegel’s early critique of the imperial constitution in the 
Verfassungsschrift (1798–1803) throughout this chapter, where he observed the 
subordination of imperial political power to private legal arbitration in the Holy Roman 
Empire. This was contrasted with his later affirmation of the Stände as a legitimate 
organisational form in the Grundlinien (II.2, II.3) in precisely the opposite sense: where 
one sees the concept of the Stände as a ‘socio-political’ form that overcomes the isolation 
of private particularity. This lays the basis for now turning this inquiry to questions 
related more directly to the philosophical tradition, which I will analyse in Chapter Three. 
 
                                                
193 Epstein 1966, p. 255. 
194 Hegel 1999, p. 98. 
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Chapter Three: Natural Right 
 
Hegel’s polemic against the doctrine 
of natural law has been lost from the 
historical context in which it grew; it 
is seen as an isolated and entirely 
new event whereby one forgot that 
the critique of the foundational 
concepts of natural law, from the 
state of nature to the social contract 
was a common feature of every 
philosophical current.1 
 
In this chapter I examine how the Stände are transformed from a natural order in Hegel’s 
Jena essay of 1802–32 to a spiritual order in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) through 
the development of the concept of reciprocal recognition. This involves tracing a well-
established moment in the Hegel scholarship, 3  whereby Hegel leaves the ethical 
conceived as ‘nature’ and as a ‘work’ behind him and emphasises the relationship of 
labour and the recognition of right by grasping the individual according to his ‘concept’. 
Prior to the discovery of reciprocal recognition, individuals for Hegel, following on his 
interpretation of the tradition of Greek Antiquity, were assigned to Stände. Indeed the 
Stände are decisively drawn from the Platonic and Aristotelian hierarchies in the young 
Hegel as an attempt to solve the modern dichotomy of individuality and sovereignty 
(Hobbes), and the cleft between morality and politics introduced by the Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution.4 This resulted in an uncritical appropriation of the hierarchies 
of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies (III.3), which had seen labour as an entirely 
negative phenomenon, marred by lack and the need from which the original community 
arose.5 Just as the soul is valued higher than the body and the one is naturally ruler over 
the other, so too did the political community ‘by nature’ rule over those who provided for 
the necessities of life.6 For Hegel, the negative and lack of being at the foundation of the 
natural contingency of humankind leads initially to the development of a system of needs 
                                                
1 Bobbio 1975, pp. 82 –3. 
2 Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie 
und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften. 
3 See Riedel 2011, p. 95. 
4 See Hegel 2002, pp. 3–4; 1999, pp. 147ff in reference to Rome, which can be equated with his vision of 
contemporary France that destroyed the Generalstände, and the principle of representation and 
constitutionalism as I showed in Chapter Two and, through the introduction of abstract equality, led to the 
Terror (1792–4). 
5 Republic 369b. 
6 Politics 1254a29–1254b35. 
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and to the political community as a higher form of activity, just as it for Aristotle.7 As 
K.H. Ilting has shown, this orients Hegel’s appropriation of modern political economy.8 
But negativity for Hegel through the eventual development of reciprocal recognition leads 
to the subordination of the serf whose labour as the negative expands ever outwards to 
overwhelm stable existence and reduces the lord, most famously in the Phenomenology 
(1807), to a mere catalyst of the true history of freedom that is founded, in its first 
instance, on subordination (III.3). Negativity becomes the negation of the existing and in 
turn undoes the hierarchy – established ‘according to nature’ for Aristotle – of classical 
polis life, of the Stand of the free and the Stand of the unfree. This leads, some have 
argued, to modern labour society.9 I will analyse this below in detail (III.3, III.4). 
 As I will show in this chapter, the concept and the transformation of the 
Naturzustand is what truly orients Hegel’s thinking. This is already the case in his early 
engagement in the Jena period – in both the Jena natural law essay (1802–3) as well as 
System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3). It was in System der Sittlichkeit that he first employed 
the Stände in a truly systematic fashion in response to the modern dichotomy of 
individuality and sovereignty and the cleft between morality and politics, whereas in the 
Jena natural law essay the Stände as an idealised version of the hierarchy of the Greek 
polis are contrasted with the appearance of ‘formal’ legal equality in Rome (III.3). Hegel, 
following Hobbes, often deems equality a state of war or conflict, as a state of nature. He 
interprets it in the Jena natural law essay for the first time as the historical decay of polis 
through the equalisation of the Stände. As I will show below (III.1) a major 
transformation occurred in the description of the Naturzustand when it came into contact 
with German natural law, and Pufendorf particularly. Pufendorf laid down a real basis for 
property [dominium] and contracts to take place prior to the state and in so doing he 
maintained the right that Hobbes had found necessary to discard in the formation of the 
civitas. This redescription of natural right in the state of nature as a real sphere of 
contractual relations led to the development of a natural society. For Pufendorf, 
                                                
7 See Ilting 2006, pp. 20, 21. 
8 See Ilting 2006, p. 23. 
9 See Ritter 1984, pp. 124–51. The derivation of the Stände has been traced to contemporary German 
conditions (Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten) and to Sir James Steuart (see Hočevar 1968, 
1973; Walker 1978; Waszek 1988, p. 171). They firstly appear most explicitly, however, as a ‘couche 
sociale’ in the ordering of the polis in Greek antiquity (Hegel 1999, pp. 147ff). 
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‘sociability’ [Geselligkeit] lay at its basis, and this he in turn established as the natural law 
and duty. Once this natural form of society had been conveyed to John Locke (1632–
1704), the theoretical foundations for the later revolution in right that led to the French 
Revolution as a redescription of the – equal – natural rights of man became possible. 
These natural rights could then be preserved in a positivist fashion at the basis of the 
modern state in what became modern civil society. 
The importance of this discovery is that it lay at the conceptual core of Hegel’s 
division between civil society and the state.10 As far as the present study is concerned, this 
leads to a transformation of the significance of the Stände in Hegel’s later work (III.4). 
Once natural right has been laid down as the basis of modern society, the state of nature is 
conventionally seen to disappear from political and philosophical discussion. 11  By 
contrast, I will analyse how for Hegel this leads to the state of nature becoming real for a 
‘second time’ as the human being’s ‘spiritual’, ‘second nature’ in civil society – the first 
time is in the field of international relations and state sovereignty, just as it had been for 
Hobbes. I will then show how Hegel’s theory of institutionalism is developed as a specific 
response to what he conceives of as the spiritualised conflict – the ‘remnants of a state of 
nature’ – that appears at the basis of modern civil society in the Grundlinien. It is 
precisely this conflictual nature of civil society that necessitates Hegel’s development of 
the organisation of the Stände.12 
Thus in this chapter I will analyse how the redescription of the state of nature as 
natural rights established in society transforms the concept of the Stände in turn and how 
the Stände respond to the new conditions of the crisis of modern civil society. Hegel 
observes the crisis of modern civil society as a crisis of conflict and self-interest that he 
places at its foundation alongside the Aristotelian and Platonic origin of the community as 
a reciprocity of shared needs – both of which lead, for Hegel, to the necessity of 
                                                
10 See Riedel 2004, pp. 719–800 for an exhaustive treatment of this development, for Hegel’s conceptual 
innovation and structural transformation of civil society [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] see in particular pp. 
779–83. 
11 See Hochstrasser 2004, p. 36. 
12 Hegel 1991a, p. 234 (§200). As Ilting has shown in reference to the Grundlinien and ‘abstract right’, 
‘Hegel makes use of the same method as his predecessors since Hobbes. He abstracts from all conditions of 
social life which are created by human activity itself. The background of his arguments, then, is the fiction 
of a state of nature without any form of established society and, above all, without the coercive power of the 
state’ (Ilting 1971, p. 91). 
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institutions. I will show how Hegel through the prioritisation of ‘abstract right’ conceives 
in an original fashion the conflictual basis of individual interests established at the 
foundation of modern civil society and how the Stände come to be conceived as spheres 
of ‘concrete universality’ and ‘subjective freedom’ leading to Sittlichkeit (Chapter Four). I 
will show how the Stände are designed to stem social conflict and receive a new 
significance as institutional forms in Hegel’s modernity leaving behind the traditional 
‘status society’ [ständische Gesellschaft] through the prioritisation of labour (III.3). It 
now remains to outline precisely the five sections in this chapter and to explain their 
importance, in brief, for its overall argument and of the present study more generally. 
After a short introduction situating Hegel in relation to the classical and modern 
natural law traditions, I will proceed with an analysis of Pufendorf’s theory of natural law 
(III.1) in order to explain how the central concept of the modern tradition – the state of 
nature – came to form the structural basis for modern civil society. Hegel’s relationship to 
Kant’s practical philosophy played the most central role in his development of the 
‘concrete’ institutionalisation of the merely ‘formal’ will from a very early period 
(Frankfurt 1797–1801). This section (III.2) will thus show this formative influence of 
Kant on Hegel’s developing theory of the Stände and natural law, which lead him back to 
the Greeks and Volksreligion. Hegel’s discovers dimensions similar to the Stände in the 
Greek conception of hierarchy and appropriates them in response to Kant’s formal will 
and the French Revolution. I will show how this leads to the development of a ‘status’ 
society, which placed Hegel in proximity to the German natural law tradition as well as 
Roman law despite his criticisms during the early Jena period (1801–4) (III.3). The 
question of how the Stände are transformed from a natural to a spiritual order through the 
process of reciprocal recognition will then be analysed (III.4), and how this is connected 
to a revaluation of labour in Hegel’s political theory. I will show how the Stände are a 
distinctive attempt to answer the ‘defectiveness’ of modern civil society (III.4), which 
implies a revaluation of the concept of the state of nature, and how Hegel leave his 
hierarchical conceptions fundamentally behind (III.3). In the conclusion of this chapter I 
will reflect on Hegel’s ‘philosophical science of right’, which implies a distinctive method 
that will transform the conceptualisation of the Stände in Hegel’s politics from his early 
period onwards. 
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Hegel and Natural Law 
 
The failure to treat the entire development of modern natural law in the consideration of 
Hegel’s philosophical position, or to isolate simply the development from Kant and Fichte 
insofar as it concerns his youth has been considered highly problematic in the 
scholarship.13 ‘It is characteristic of the final phase of rational natural law that Hegel 
initially must travel a very long way in order to generally approach it, and then to find 
[and] integrate it into his systematic conception’.14 Hegel recognised in antiquity that 
natural law as well as the classical conception of economy [oikonmik] – the needs of the 
household – began from the community and only later did personality and individuality 
become central in explicit contrast to the modern tradition begun by Hobbes and 
radicalised metaphysically in Kant.15 The young Hegel prioritises the whole or the ethical 
community (here following Aristotle closely) over the part, or the individual. ‘For a state 
is not a mere aggregate of persons, but, as we say, a union of them sufficing for the 
purposes of life… A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfilment of these 
functions’.16 Indeed, the young Hegel follows Aristotle to the letter in the Jena natural law 
essay of 1802–3, dividing the various functions of the political community between those 
who labour, the classical artisans, and those oriented towards death – respectively, the 
Stände of relative and absolute ethical life.17 This colours Hegel’s initial encounter with 
the modern political tradition, and particularly with Hobbes in his attempt to develop a 
rational method to account for the individual and the community – and indeed by the time 
of the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) he discovers this in his reinterpretation of the 
                                                
13 See Bobbio 1975, p. 82. 
14 Ilting 1983, p. 103. 
15 See below (III.2) for a more extensive treatment of this discussion. 
16 Aristotle 1328b15–1328b22. The political community is then divided by Aristotle into various status 
groups – famers, artisans, a warring and wealthy class, priests and judges. The other significant reference 
for Hegel is Plato; his trichotomy remains in form the basis from this early stage to the mature work. As I 
will show below, however, with the addition of self-consciousness the Republic becomes a very limited 
ideal. 
17 See Hegel 1999, p. 147. Hegel refers to Plato in this context and the capacity of the philosophical and 
warring Stände, in relation to Sittlichkeit. 
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state of nature as a relation whereby right is initially established and consciousness as a 
concept truly emerges.18 
Yet once political economy is foregrounded in his political analysis, the originary 
Greek ideal of a hierarchy of beings comes apart at the seams, and his historical 
interpretation of freedom emerges. This is true even if Hegel still maintains in the 
development of the system of needs a thorough orientation on the classical model of Plato 
and Aristotle, which conceived of the ends of the community as the final objective 
orienting the economy as well as providing the basis for human gathering.19 For Hegel, 
this is driven by an interpretation of the division of labour and the negative, and he 
conceives of history as the realisation of freedom in his expansive historical account – a 
history of the development of thought that made ‘the unity of freedom and man’s being … 
the principle of world history’.20 To a large degree the concrete conception that Hegel 
provides in his developing political theory is developed from precisely the mediating 
institutions that the French Revolution had completely destroyed.21 What I showed at a 
largely historical level in Chapter Two I will now discuss at a philosophical (natural-
legal) level. The concept of the Stände will play a central role here as embodied spheres 
of right in the institutional organisation of the civil – a distinct response to the French 
Revolution and to Rousseau, who ‘rejected entirely any idea of the corporative 
articulation of the state, on the ground that it would falsify the general will’, and to Fichte, 
who saw ‘civil society [as] simply an aggregate of so many associated individuals’.22 
Even if there will be a fundamental shift in the early idealisation of Greek ethical 
life, Hegel will continue to affirm the ständische form of organisation harking back to its 
linguistic associations of re-uniting the social and the political as I analysed in Chapter 
                                                
18 Again this will be stated with the most clarity in the Encyclopaedia where Hegel speaks of how in order 
to be free each nation must first undergo the severe discipline of subordination to a lord after which lordship 
becomes redundant. The forming principle of a state can be violence, but law is its substantial principle 
insofar as the subject recognises itself therein: ‘In the state the spirit of the nation are the customs, the laws 
the rulers’ (Hegel 1974, p. 221 (§423 Zusatz)). Hegel contrasts Hobbes here for whom ‘Aristotle and 
others… by reason of humane infirmity, suppose the Supreme Power be committed to the laws onely’ 
(Hobbes 1983, p. 149). Yet in the recognition of right with custom as a higher law, Hegel harkens back to a 
tradition prior to Plato and Socrates (see Ilting 1983, p. 246) as I noted already in the Introduction. 
19 Ilting 2006, p. 23; see Politics 1291a1–1291a30, 1328b15–1328b22 and Hegel 1991a, p. 219 (§181) and 
pp. 227, 233 (§§189, 199) on how subjective need and satisfaction leads to a system of needs and social 
labour. 
20 Ritter 1984, p. 50. 
21 See Pöggeler 1995, p. 36 (emphasis added). 
22 Gierke 1934, pp. 363, 131; compare Hegel 1991a, p. 277 (§258). 
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Two (II.3), and thus conflating the very differentiation between its political and social 
description. 
Hegel opposes the Stände to the emergence, arguably with Hobbes (and then 
Rousseau, Kant and Fichte), of what he sees as the foundational principle of modern 
practical philosophy: ‘atomism’, or ‘the abstraction of man’, in which, as he put it in the 
Jena essay of 1802–3, ‘the isolated energies of the ethical realm must be thought of as 
embroiled in a war of mutual annihilation’.23 According to some commentators, when 
Hegel stated that the absolute ‘ethical totality is nothing other than a people’ the 
dissolution of modern rational natural law theory began, which saw ‘individuated reason’ 
as the ‘only recognised authority capable of producing right and law’.24 Thus the common 
good of the classical natural law model – best exemplified in Aristotle – will for the 
young Hegel once again become the only true aim of the individual who at this stage is 
conceived of as a negative in respect to the community. Hegel would eventually develop 
this as foreign and hostile to the Greek conception in his final theorisation that opposes 
the modernity of ‘self-sufficient particularity’ – the product of modern civil society – to 
Plato’s ‘substantial state’. ‘Hegel is the first (and the last) to merge the [classical and 
modern] models in his system. His system of practical philosophy is a synthesis because it 
tries to mediate between, or more precisely, not to drop the classical as well as the modern 
tradition of political philosophy’. 25  Hegel breaks with the tradition entirely and 
definitively brings it to conclusion, while opening up a new epoch. 
 
In [a] paradoxical way Hegel’s philosophy of right is portrayed as the negation of 
all systems of natural law [and] at the same time also as the last and most complete 
system of natural law, which, as the last, the end, and as the most absolute [is] 
portrayed as the completion of what precedes him. … [O]ne cannot [however] 
think of Hegel’s philosophy of right [Rechtsphilosophie] without having the 
tradition of natural law in sight. 26 
                                                
23 Hegel 1999, p. 112. 
24 See Bobbio 1975, p. 86; Scattola 2003, p. 15 (emphasis added). 
25 Bobbio 1989, p. 24. Bobbio’s perspective here is a simplification, and entirely neglects the German 
natural law tradition and eclecticism. It is more precise to say that Hegel is the last, but even this may be an 
exaggeration. Riedel 2011, p. 9 has made much of the renewed proximity to Aristotle. I will discuss this at 
greater length below (III.2). 
26 Bobbio 1975, p. 81 (original emphasis). Clearly – and certainly insofar as Hegel’s expansive historical 
perspective is taken into account – his work is a complex philosophical engagement with both ‘tradition’ – 
the classical philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and the German political tradition – and 
‘revolution’ – ‘the political realization of freedom [which] the Revolution raised to the “intellectual 
principle of the state”’ and the Industrial Revolution in England (Ritter 1984, p. 47). 
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The modernity of the French Revolution fully realised modern natural law and the 
‘separation of the social contract from the contract of submission’ that Pufendorf 
established, ‘[which] had the meaning that the people themselves [were] constituted as 
subjects of right [Rechtssubjekt]’.27 Hobbes had introduced natural right as the basis of the 
state – or ‘civil society’ as he termed it, insofar as the scholastic terminology of the 
societas civilis was still predominant – but the people disappeared in the formation of the 
contract and natural right was assimilated through sovereignty and limitless rule. It only 
reappeared for Hobbes insofar as ‘the law of nations and the law of nature is the same 
thing’.28 Natural right, therefore, was synonymous for Hobbes with the natural condition; 
and he made a point of distinguishing right [ius] and law [lex]. 
Whereas the societas civilis for Hobbes was radically distinguished from the state 
of nature, in the intervening century this was transformed. The German natural law 
tradition begun by Pufendorf turned this state of nature into a nascent society with its 
corresponding rights and duties. Locke and the Scottish moral philosophers and 
economists took this even further.29 Contracts no longer required the use of the sword to 
be made valid, but could be completed by private individuals themselves in this ‘natural’ 
and ‘social’ state. But this also went beyond the realm of the contract as such as it implied 
as well a sphere where needs and reciprocal exchange developed. In the following section 
(III.1) I will show how this gives Hegel the object for his later conceptual distinction 
between modern civil society and the state. It is necessary at this stage to consider this 
development more extensively in order to grasp the extent and significance of Hegel’s 
equation of civil society with the Naturzustand. This will be the backdrop of much of the 
present chapter and my arguments for the theoretical potential of Hegel’s institutional 
theory. This will allow me to show how Hegel’s concept of the Stände develops in an 
original fashion by relating them to the discovery of society as a natural object. By 
analysing how the state of nature and a nascent society coincide, I will be able to show 
how Hegel is able to equate civil society and the state of nature once again in the 
                                                
27 Denzer 1979. 
28 Hobbes 1651, p. 217. As Hegel put it, ‘civil society, the state, is to Hobbes absolutely preeminent’ (Hegel 
1995b, p. 316). 
29 For an extensive treatment of both of these schools of thought and the ‘natural history’ of civil society, 
see Medick 1973. 
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Hobbesian fashion as a site of conflict. In so doing it will also become possible to 
distinguish Hegel from the German natural legal tradition more generally. 
 
III.1 Geselligkeit: Pufendorf’s socialisation of Hobbes’s Naturzustand 
 
Prior to the Kantian revolution, which thoroughly shifted the emphasis to metaphysics, 
the pre-critical German natural law model was close to Aristotle. The German political 
tradition as seen for example in Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Johann Gottlieb 
Heineccius (1681–1741)30 continued to view the creation of the civitas along the lines of 
its central foundation in the domestic life of the household economy, just as Aristotle and 
the Roman concept of household rule by the paterfamilias had: i.e., the politische 
Gesellschaft was based on the accepted notion of domestic society, the oikos, the 
Hausstand and its corresponding Hausgewalt [patria potestas].31 The appearance of the 
Aristotelian economic model alongside the conceptual one innovated in Hobbes reveals 
the German natural law model’s proximity to the Scholastic tradition, which had been 
conveyed by way of the Protestant Aristotelianism of Phillip Melanchthon (1497–1560). 
Yet even for Hobbes the civitas stands in immediate political relation to oikonmik insofar 
as it is understood according to the unity of many households. 32 This appearance 
alongside the ‘modern’ conceptual model of natural law is a contradiction in Hobbes, and 
one that might be considered a mere matter of convention.33 For when Hobbes founded 
                                                
30 Heineccius was a student of Christian Thomasius who combined the conceptual model of natural law in 
his investigation of Roman law. He is a significant source for Hegel’s understanding of Roman law as can 
be seen, for example, in the Grundlinien (see Hegel 1991a, p. 34, 71 (§§3, 40); 1986, pp. 42–6 (§3 Zusatz)). 
31 See Finley 1985, p. 19; Stuke 1968, p. 38. 
32 See Riedel 2004, pp. 722, 734. 
33 Bodin and Hobbes should be compared here: ‘… the definition of a Commonweale by us set downe, 
concerneth a Familie, which is the true … beginning of every Commonweale…’ (Bodin 1606, p. 8). ‘For to 
be a king, is nothing else but to have Dominion over many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, 
and a little kingdome a family’ (Hobbes 1983, p. 117). Bodin maintained the indissoluble character of the 
family as an immanently natural community and sovereign power as governed society. He thus remained 
within Aristotle’s definition of the state when the latter conceived that ‘the state comes into existence, 
originating in the bare needs of life, and continues in existence for the sake of a good life’ (Politics 
1252b28–1252b31). It can thus be seen how domestic society grew into the civitas in Aristotle as the unity 
of many houses. Yet Aristotle, in contrast to Roman law, criticises those who see in the state a mere 
extension of the rule over the household (Politics 1252a9–1252a13). Hobbes’s Naturzustand on the contrary 
‘designates the break with the natural horizon of classical conceptual theory… civil society here has no 
“natural” origin, but a derived being [Dasein], it is the result of a process that begins with the particular 
individual’ (Riedel 2004, pp. 737, 734). The concern here and in the following exposition will be to show 
how the German political tradition, by way of a proximity to Aristotle and the original oikonomik, begins to 
conceive of the Naturzustand as a place where the originary formations of association take place. The state 
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natural law on the individual will he did so on the basis of the contract, whereby the 
absolute power of the sovereign mirrored the individual in a state of nature pre-existing 
both social and domestic association. For Pufendorf, and in explicit contrast to Hobbes, 
‘natural law theory is not a theory of the inalienable rights of the individual, but a theory 
of duties’.34 Firstly there is the divine obligation to sociability, and only then do rights 
follow. Thus German natural law remained in close proximity to Aristotle and Roman law 
developing ‘status’ in particular (with Wolff and Heineccius) as the social mark and legal 
distinction of the person. Hegel is no less different in this regard in his demand that an 
individual have a Stand. Yet for Hegel once he has abandoned his early Greek ideal this is 
not based on hierarchy or rank, but on vocation and the determination of particularity – 
the individual must become enter the sphere of concrete universality.35 
As I have already mentioned the Protestant Aristotelianism stemming from 
Melanchthon complicated the development of natural law in Germany, but so did the 
combined influence of the classical Greek tradition and Roman law. Each of these 
elements were, moreover, directly beneficial to the social hierarchy and enforced the 
traditional forms of stratification in the German speaking lands. Germany was in part far 
more amiable to Platonic and Aristotelian ideas of social hierarchy than elsewhere. 
Protestantism subsequent to the Peasants’ War had placed positive law in the hands of 
territorial rulers, while Luther and Melanchthon’s Dreiständelehre (theory of the three 
estates) had a normalising function on society, reinforcing traditional rule. Aristotle’s 
natural law played well into this scenario as it legitimated the lord’s rule over the serf.36 It 
is thus understandable that the starting point for German natural law is not the individual, 
but the social and the individual’s designated place, obligations, and duties within it. Thus 
‘Pufendorf’s natural law theory is based upon an anthropology in which individualist and 
social traits are completely and mutually determined’.37 Society and rule at this historical 
                                                                                                                                             
of nature thus becomes an originary sphere of social relations whereby the structures of rule – Hausstand 
and Stand – are re-naturalised. I will thus show how Pufendorf adapts Hobbes’s theory to the German 
context by firmly placing the origin of dominium in the Naturzustand – establishing the primacy of the 
property relation and domestic society with a view to socialitas [Geselligkeit] (see Pufendorf 1994, pp. 89, 
134). Pufendorf, however, in this way distinguishes ownership and sovereignty: ‘Authority over one’s own 
things is called dominium… Authority over other persons is called sovereignty’ (Pufendorf 1991, p. 134). 
34 Denzer 1979, p. 65. 
35 See Hegel 1995a, p. 187 in reference to the Ständeehre as an aspect of ethical life. 
36 See Riedel 2004, p. 725. 
37 Denzer 1979, p. 63. 
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stage were moreover entirely cohesive, and the traditional basis of domination remained 
untouched by the apparently individualistic premises of Hobbesian natural law.38 Indeed, 
individualism in Pufendorf was restrained by the divine compulsion to cultivate society, 
which not only left the traditional structures of domination unaffected, but also could 
explicitly reinforce them.  
 
[For] thinkers in the Leibnizian tradition and especially for Wolff, law and politics 
were essentially concerned with the perfectibility of human nature as part of the 
general system of the world. In contrast, for those in the Pufendorfian line, and 
Thomasius in particular, law and politics were concerned with restraining and 
pacifying a human nature that was inherently passionate and tended to be 
ungovernable.39 
 
In this respect Pufendorf directly followed Hobbes, but by giving a social and pre-
historical content to the Naturzustand the traditional structure of rule was more or less 
laid down as the foundation. For Pufendorf, the family and the Hausstand were seen to 
pre-exist the political and thus there was a continuity between the dominium of the 
household community and the political order. 
For Aristotle, the state was not an aggregate of persons, but their unification; the 
self-sufficiency of the community that described the social whole framed as the fulfilment 
of particular functions.40 This went along with a discrete ‘natural’ hierarchy, and for 
Aristotle an immanently teleological order of domination. ‘The stability of [such] 
practical philosophy follows from its non-speculative nature, i.e., its independence from 
the premises of “first philosophy”’.41 Modern natural law by contrast introduced a new set 
of concepts that were foreign to the classical model, principally, the concept of the state of 
nature. This developed individual natural right, as in Hobbes, prior to social 
differentiation and thus could potentially break with the traditional order of society. With 
Hobbes, the principle of first philosophy in politics ‘could find nothing apparently so 
solid and indubitable as individual human nature’ wherein which humanity was reduced 
to a purely physical existence,42 while rationality ‘consisted in the mechanical capability 
                                                
38 See Riedel 2004, pp. 729–32, 740, 741. 
39 Haakonssen 2006, p. 260. 
40 See Politics 1254a29–1254b35. 
41 Riedel 2011, p. 6. 
42 Sabine 1973, p. 475. 
  111 
of inferring true conclusions from true premises’.43 This conceptual model of natural law, 
moreover, had developed an epistemology of the body politic based on a pessimistic 
anthropology of individual voluntarism, which, according to Leo Strauss, had been 
substituted for the Aristotelian teleological conception. 
 
The experiment with extreme skepticism was then guided by the anticipation of a 
new type of dogmatism… The mere fact that the only certain knowledge which 
was available is not concerned with ends but consists in comparing figures and 
motions only created a prejudice against any teleological view or a prejudice in 
favor of the mechanistic view’. … what later on came to be called ‘epistemology’ 
becomes the substitute for teleological cosmology.44 
 
The distinction between modern rational natural law and the classical formulation, while 
not lost on the German natural law school begun with Pufendorf, was complicated due to 
the eclectic approach which historicised morality and took all older conceptions (such as 
Stoicism and humanism) into its theoretical (and developing academic) discourse, while 
retaining a certain continuity with the Aristotelian scholastic tradition. The eclectic 
approach, moreover, was taken up in explicit contrast to Hobbes in an attempt to mediate 
between the new theories stemming from the concepts of the state of nature and 
sovereignty and classical natural law, a mixture that was most easily accessed in the 
classical references of Grotius’s writings that could once convey a normative and moral 
character in the direction of politics.45 It was in Grotius, moreover, that a different 
emphasis on the division between ius and lex than that of Hobbes had come into being. 
Grotius had ‘transformed the concept of ius as it was found in Roman law and Aquinas. 
Instead of being something that an action or state of affairs or a category of these is when 
it is in accordance with law (in casu, natural law), ius is seen by Grotius as something a 
person has. The concept becomes “subjectivised”, centred on the person’.46 The ancient 
                                                
43 Scattola 2003, p. 14. 
44 Strauss’s insight here (Strauss 1965, pp. 171, 177) on the contradiction between Aristotelian teleology 
and the new anthropology only holds insofar as Hobbes and Locke are concerned, as already Pufendorf saw, 
with the obligation to cultivate sociability [Geselligkeit], ‘the aspiration of human nature after perfection 
which [he] based on the Aristotelian-Thomastic tradition’ (Denzer 1979, pp. 65–6); even if Pufendorf 
remains, following Hobbes, mired in a thoroughgoing pessimism. As soon as figures such as Leibniz and 
Wolff are considered with their ‘Neo-Scholasticism’, and with the teleological drive to Glückseligkeit, the 
issue becomes even more complicated. 
45 See Stein 1999, p. 108. 
46 Haakonssen 1985, p. 240. I am not making the claim here, however, that Grotius was the founder of the 
modern tradition of natural law; that honour belongs to Hobbes, who was simultaneously the destroyer of 
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natural law accessed through Grotius’s writing could not, however, like modern natural 
law, ‘be an academic discipline and could not offer any philosophical foundations’. 47 It 
was primarily conceived as a law in practice and as a general set of rules;48 it was neither 
universally binding, nor was it concerned with deducing the political order. By contrast, 
modern natural law set out to explain the origin of rule prior to the civitas or how the 
civitas as such came into existence. It thus set out to justify the order of rule on the basis 
of a corrupted form of the will in the state of nature. To this extent civil and positive law 
were only deduced subsequent to the formation of the political order, which became the 
primary subject of natural law and its theory of the state of nature. From this perspective 
‘natural law theory is essentially a moral theory, not a legal theory’. 49  The legal 
foundation of the political community in the modern era moreover reveals how ‘theory 
permeates the structure of practical philosophy, and practical philosophy advances the 
same claim to universal validity found in the modern notion of scientific method’.50 
In the context of Roman law and Stoicism from which the tradition stemmed in 
Grotius, ‘ius naturale is not considered … a juristic conception denoting a special sphere 
of law, a particular category of law, or a system of legal norms. Nor do the occasional 
“definitions” of the ius naturale, found in the sources, give the picture of a certain 
uniformity of the conception, although the influence of Greek philosophy is evident’.51 
While Pufendorf’s natural law model emphasised the sociability [Geselligkeit] he 
discovered by way of Grotius, he founded such sociability on the innate weakness of the 
human creature existing in a corrupted state. Pufendorf’s eclecticism, through its 
historicisation of morality, set about giving a systematic order to classical natural law 
discourse and in turn set this beside its ‘redescription of natural law as subjective natural 
rights’ taken from Grotius. This eventually ‘brought with it a change in focus from the 
metaphysical understanding of the world to the anthropological understanding of the 
                                                                                                                                             
the classical natural law tradition as he ‘initially attempted on the basis and with the tools of natural law 
[Naturrechts] to blow apart [zu sprengen] natural law itself’ (see Gierke 1880, p. 300 quoted in Ilting 1983, 
p. 75). 
47 Scattola 2003, p. 2. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Berman 2003, p. 98. 
50 Riedel 2011, p. 6. 
51 Berger 1953, p. 530. 
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individual’.52 German natural law thus bridged the gap between the modern and classical 
frameworks, but in this sense was explicitly modern itself insofar as it turned this into an 
academic discipline guided by a historically constructive method, which prioritised the 
origin of the ruler’s power by way of the universally deductive principle of the state of 
nature. 
Reflecting its growing political and legal importance, natural law became 
institutionalised. It became a major field of study. … As is common when an area 
of study acquires “disciplinary” status, natural law received its own historiography, 
which was commonly used as an introduction to the topic.53 
 
Its significance lay in the formation of the civil service,54 and the positivisation of law that 
led eventually to the codification process. Natural law circumscribed the purely political 
theory of state and established juridical uniformity between ruler and ruled. Moreover, it 
‘provided a theoretical justification for the historical process under which territories were 
unified, governments centralised, law systematised, and all individuals within the state 
made subject to the sovereign’s political power.55 
The state was conceived for Pufendorf as ‘a composite moral person’, whereas for 
Hobbes ‘the societas civilis is persona civilis, because it has no unity in itself’.56 While 
Hobbes’s state of nature was immanently asocial, Pufendorf had ‘posited the sociality of 
man as the foundation of universal natural law…’.57 To this extent, Pufendorf did not 
require a fictive persona to bind individuals together as Hobbes had. On the contrary, he 
developed a real basis for the common will in the persona moralis conceived of as ‘either 
single individuals or those joined together into one system by a moral bond, considered 
                                                
52 Hochstrasser 2004, p. 5. 
53 Haakonssen 2006, p. 258 
54 The non-confessional aspect of modern natural law lent it a character of broad applicability, and its was 
given a scientific status through its analysis of the origin of the civitas derived from the state of nature; it 
thus encapsulated the shift from metaphysics to a (negative) anthropology and served as an academic 
discipline in the instruction of civil servants. As Hochstrasser shows in reference to Christian Wolff, ‘the 
doctrine of the self-perfection of the individual within the state or community is used to breathe new life 
into the Aristotelian conception of the potential that lies within the polis for development to perfection; but 
with the difference here that the perfection may be effected through the intervention of state officials and 
bureaucrats enforcing a concept of duty. Both Hellmuth and Klippel have demonstrated how Wolff’s belief 
that the individual most nearly achieved perfection within the community was transmuted into a 
bureaucratic ethic of service that anticipated elements of Kant’s subjugation of public dissent to the greater 
public good’ (Hochstrasser 2004, p. 175). 
55 Canale 2009, p. 144. 
56 Riedel 2004, p. 735. 
57 Pufendorf 1994, p. 97. 
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with their status or function in communal life’.58 The individual and their reciprocal 
relationship or dependence on a larger communal and social whole led to a concept of 
society that was rooted in the particular status or function. The status civilis was taken 
over and modified from Roman law whereby the individual was conceived in relation to a 
larger social or political whole. By contrast, in order to form the idea of the unity of the 
will the fictive persona for Hobbes required an absolute form of violence. Only by this 
means could the reality of the fictive unity of the represented person in the civitas be 
realised. The societas civilis up until Hobbes had been determined by ‘the authoritative 
[herrschaftlich] corporate unification of free pater familias’.59 Similarly, Pufendorf’s 
theory of the persona moralis conceived of the state as coming into existence through the 
pacts of families and associations, which were also considered moral persons. 
By referring to Hobbes’s attempt to refute the Aristotelian idea of man as, by 
nature, a political animal, one can discover the fundamental distinction between Hobbes 
and the German model. Insofar as Hobbes understood it, ‘Man is made fit for Society not 
by Nature, but by Education’ – man, on the contrary, is by nature a wolf to man [homo 
homini lupus]. ‘The foundation which therefore I have laid firm, I demonstrate in the first 
place, that the state of men without civil society … is nothing else but a meere war of all 
against all’. 60 The foundation of the political community was thus based on the mutual 
fear each individual felt towards the other in the state of nature. It is in this sense that 
Hobbes ‘had given the practical philosophy of the modern period a fundamentally 
inconclusive truth in a similar way as Descartes had attempted for theoretical philosophy 
with his axiom Cogito ergo sum’.61 By way of contrast, Pufendorf stated that ‘The 
meaning of that threadbare saying, “Man is by nature a social animal”, is this: Man is 
destined by nature for the society of those similar to himself, and this society is to the 
highest degree congruent with and useful to him’.62 
                                                
58 Pufendorf 1994, p. 103 (emphasis added); in speaking of duty and obligation, social status and function, it 
is possible to trace how this form of natural law theory could lead to positive prescription with Thomasius 
and the later codification movements. 
59 See Riedel 2004, p. 735 – I am following Riedel’s analysis very closely on these points. 
60 Hobbes 1983, pp. 44, 34. 
61 Ilting 1983, p. 77. 
62 Pufendorf 1994, p. 81 (emphasis added). 
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Thus Pufendorf’s ‘fiction of the state of nature… is a conceptual model for the 
free decision of the individual to interpersonal contractual relations and social union’.63 
This is an important distinction from the Hobbesian model as I have just shown insofar as 
it permits a sphere of natural social relations to develop prior to the state. This is what 
lays the foundation for modern civil society as a sphere of economic relations as well as 
the naturalisation of property. This appeared even more pronounced in Locke whereby the 
state of nature ‘changed into a natural society; that is to say, into an actual pre-political 
society which comprises all social relationships, which the individual is established under 
independent of public coercion and prior to the origin of the state’.64 Pufendorf grounded 
the social as an imposition on the natural order as such: i.e., ‘there is no such thing among 
men as a common universal war of all against all, since that follows upon the state of 
beasts. Such would be the state of men if they had not been obligated through the law of 
nature to cultivate society’.65 In the emphasis on sociability and the necessary need of 
human beings for community, Pufendorf follows to a large degree the classical tradition 
for which social needs were the origin of community. Yet Pufendorf moreover 
complicates the modern dichotomy between nature and history through the concept of a 
society that overlaps the natural order as such and comes to form the basis of modern 
natural right as human subjective rights, as rights by dominium existing prior to the state. 
He articulates these in the state of nature as such, and through a similar model of 
deduction to that of Hobbes that was utterly foreign to the classical tradition. This 
essentially coincides with an uncritical enrichment of stoic natural law where all are 
conceived of as equal and free – no longer as political, but as social beings – which, by 
Locke’s time, is interpreted as an unqualified right to private property.66 For Pufendorf 
dominium, however, carries with it no objective moral standard of justice and thus 
inequality or absolute equality – war – is laid down at the foundation as it was in Hobbes. 
From the pessimistic conception of the state of nature, the necessity of the absolutist state 
logically follows. Natural liberty must be subject to constraint, even if the force of the 
                                                
63 Denzer 1979, p. 63. 
64 Bobbio 1975, p. 97. 
65 Pufendorf 1994, pp. 103, 37. 
66 Ilting 1983, p. 84. 
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civitas (the political order) is designed to preserve natural property rights as such and 
society.67 
What remains true for both Hobbes and Pufendorf is the deductive principle of the 
state of nature whereby ‘only when one transcends all societies and imagines the state of 
man outside of them (namely when one hypothesises a state of nature) [does] one succeed 
in grasping all the elements which make up civil society’.68 Just as Hobbes had placed the 
basis of the state [civitas] in the will rather than in the order of creation, which was both 
asocial and apolitical,69 so too had Pufendorf subordinated the principal of creation to the 
individual will – but only subsequent to the divine imposition to cultivate society whereby 
the civil condition as a state of peace and order is maintained. Pufendorf thus reinvented a 
normative theory of natural law that, while likewise derived from anthropological 
pessimism, set about giving a moral content to the state of nature. ‘Morality for us, for the 
dependent being, for man, exists only through imposition. This is the central content of 
Pufendorf’s so-called voluntarism’.70 
The shift that occurs with Pufendorf’s transference of social primacy to the state of 
nature where ‘the preservation of social life is deservedly laid down as a foundation for 
the laws of nature and indeed not secondarily assumed to be something that men have 
been compelled to take up by accident…’71 allows for a divinely ordained sphere of 
obligations and duties to develop prior to the establishment of the political order. This by 
consequence also permits the preservation of a traditional society based on the private 
rights of the household [dominium]. Such rights moreover need not necessarily be 
relinquished on the formation of the state. On the progressive side of things, the same will 
be true of individual natural rights for Pufendorf in the formation of the social contract.72 
In other words, a sphere of natural social relations develops prior to the civitas that has 
individual right as its basis. 
The continuance of classical political theory alongside the modern conceptual 
doctrine of natural right is clear with Pufendorf’s obligation to sociability that re-
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emphasises the priority of the whole rather than the parts insofar as the individual ‘has 
been destined by the creator to cultivate society with other men…’.73 It is precisely in this 
way that Pufendorf’s modern natural law theory could be mixed with a traditional 
hierarchy of domination and, according to Leibniz, ‘left no room for a universal criterion 
with which to judge the justice or injustice of the acts of God’.74 Natural law, that is, 
developed as a form of positive coercion on the basis of a corrupted human nature, which 
would come to be elaborated over the ensuing century in positive law. Thereby it is 
apparent that the individual’s duty to preserve society is higher than the individual as 
such: i.e., ‘it is indeed appropriate that he care for and preserve himself as much as he can, 
but that he so temper his care for himself that he does not become unsociable with others 
or disturb society among men. This very thing is what we call the law of nature’.75 
With the foundational norms of natural law Pufendorf had connected all of the 
essential experiences of natural legal reflection from Plato to Hobbes and subordinated 
each to the other with the previously inaccessible aim of providing a natural jurisprudence 
that was at once non-utilitarian and theologically neutral.76 In contrast to Hobbes, who 
had seen liberty as the absence of physical impediments to motion, Pufendorf had 
conceived of freedom on the basis of capable action. For Hobbes freedom was conceived 
on a negative basis, while for Pufendorf it grew rather from positive foundations and 
norms. The basis of the contract of submission [Herrschaftsvertrag] that had emerged 
with Hobbes, which demanded the absoluteness of the sovereign to unify the civitas in the 
fictive persona, had transformed in the eighteenth century into the social contract 
[Gesellschaftsvertrag]. This was certainly contingent on the elaboration of the concept of 
the Naturzustand into a nascent society that Pufendorf had developed, which provided 
another deductive principle whereby the construction of the political order could be 
envisioned. For Hobbes, ‘each constraint on the right to subjective freedom needed a 
justification, which eventually the individual must restore through an act of his own will’ 
insofar as the individual will – or right – lies at the basis of the covenant.77 For Pufendorf, 
by contrast, with the obligation to sociability and the preservation of society implicit in 
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the Naturzustand, the claims to right could be inscribed in a traditional order. Any right of 
resistance [Widerstandsrecht] can only be practiced through designated bodies: Volksrat, 
Senat, or Stände. 78  Even if Pufendorf began ‘his account of human nature …by 
conceiving a single individual outside society’, self-preservation drove individuals to 
associate. 79  Therefore the claims of individual right must take place through such 
institutions of society, and society comes to pre-exist the formation of the state. Pufendorf 
‘had no desire to argue, as against Hobbes, that the consequences of man’s paradoxical 
nature needed no regulation through a system of obligations. But these “plain” obligations 
now had their own separate foundation in man’s sociability, rather than in state power 
founded upon contract’.80  To this extent a social order of rank could precede the 
formation of the civitas. For Pufendorf right was a consequence of the divine compulsion 
to sociability of man, whereas for Hobbes, by contrast, right was surrendered in the 
formation of the state. 
As I have shown in this section, Pufendorf solidified a ‘natural’ sphere of social 
relations prior to the political. This would lay the basis for later economic determinations 
of the state of nature and lead in the end to its eventual re-description as ‘civil society’ – 
the preservation of a separate economic sphere prior to the coercion of the state. This 
followed from Pufendorf’s introduction of a ‘principle of differentiation… between a 
natural and normative order that proved to be the foundation of the differentiation 
between a kingdom of nature and a kingdom of freedom in Leibniz, Kant and Hegel’.81 
What this means is that Pufendorf retained natural right, which he asserted could not be 
fully abandoned in the creation of the community.82 It is to this extent that Pufendorf lays 
the conceptual basis for the subsequent political developments in Europe insofar as he 
made natural rights into concrete rights that led to the French Revolution, the rights of 
man and human rights.83 The French Revolution occurred against the backdrop of this 
shift from a natural right abandoned in the formation of the political and the establishment 
of coercive positive law, to a society of natural rights that should not be abandoned but 
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indeed maintained in and by the creation of the state. Thus rights of nature ‘instead of 
being human attributes surrendered at the creation of civil society became current moral 
and political claims in society’.84 This lay at the basis of modern civil society as Hegel 
came to understand it in light of the French Revolution and the rights of man. 
 
The necessity which, for example, the institution ‘state’ acquires in relationship to 
the individual no longer means that it is a law of nature for the individual to live in 
the state; the ethical necessity of the state rests instead on the law of freedom, given 
not by an immutable nature, but by the concept itself – dependent in its dialectic on 
the historical realization in institutions.85 
 
In this section I have shown how the modern natural law model begun with Hobbes is to 
be differentiated from the German natural law tradition that, through the sociability taken 
over from Grotius and the Protestant Aristotelian tradition, formed a theory of natural 
rights in a natural society. This not only led to the prioritisation of the duty and function 
of the individual in preserving such society, but to the maintenance of this as the natural 
law. This was shown to take place already in the state of nature prior to the formation of 
the civitas, which in the century after Pufendorf can be seen to develop into a nascent 
society that coincides with the obligation and compulsion to preserve it. This directly 
conflicted with Hobbes’s view, and he had attempted to deflect such criticisms already in 
De Cive: ‘what’s objected by some, that the propriety of goods, even before the 
constitution of Cities, was found in the Fathers of Families, that objection is vaine’.86 By 
contrast, Pufendorf attempted directly to ‘show the falsity of Hobbes’s claim … that 
justice, no less than dominion over other things, owes its ultimate existence to states’.87 
By way of his continual assertion that a stage of sociality [Geselligkeit] pre-existed the 
political, Pufendorf laid the foundation for a natural society and the primacy of the 
property qualification that would likewise come to be viewed as natural.88 Pufendorf had 
shown how sociality as an original natural law for human beings at the basis of the 
community – shared natural needs led, in an Aristotelian fashion, to common needs and to 
the political. This was designed to refute the Hobbesian conflict-based model whereby 
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natural right was replaced by positive law, natural ‘society’ (war) by artificial society 
(peace). Yet sociability was a compulsion for Pufendorf that lay at the basis of social 
order.89 This led to a transformation throughout the seventeenth century that would lead to 
other figures such as Locke, and from him the way was opened to influence the Scottish 
Enlightenment. 
 The independence of property and exchange slowly transformed into an 
established fact (Locke), which then led to the market relations that were at the basis of 
the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith. In 
the external administration of the new natural social order, it has already been clearly 
established in the Hegel scholarship how Hegel in his division of the Stände comes very 
close to James Steuart.90 This influence has been traced back to Hegel’s earliest period 
when he began to construct his first systematic Rechtsphilosophie (1802–6).91 Indeed it 
was at this time that Hegel divided his ‘state’ – what he refers to in Jena as Gemeinwesen 
or Gemeinsamkeit des Lebens – into Stände. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, 
I will stress how Hegel essentially maintained the organisation of the Aristotelian 
community at the basis of his philosophy as ‘originating in the bare needs of life, and 
continuing in existence for the sake of a good life’.92 This will be fully analysed below 
(III.3, III.4). In the following section, however, I must first examine Hegel’s relationship 
to Kant as it fundamentally orients his developing institutional theory and underlies its 
objectives, as Dieter Henrich has pointed out.93 I will show how Hegel consistently 
viewed Kant’s formalism of the will as leading to the isolation of individuals and how this 
led Hegel to his early concepts and solutions in natural law, religion and Sittlichkeit. Kant 
took over the insights of ‘empirical’ natural law (Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Rousseau), 
as Hegel termed it in Jena (1802–3), but placed them on strictly metaphysical formal 
foundations. In so doing the material world was transformed into dead matter, and formal 
individualism was posited as absolute. This significantly shaped the young Hegel’s 
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developing theory of natural law, which led to the convergence of the Greek oikonomik 
and ancient practical philosophical with modern political economy. Thus I need to analyse 
Kant first before I turn to a substantive discussion of the Greeks. 
 
III.2 Hegel and Kant 
 
In this section I will analyse how Hegel’s concern with natural law develops in relation to 
Kant’s practical philosophy, and how his criticism of Kant significantly shapes his 
concrete conception of the will in institutions (through love, religion and spirit). It is 
important to undertake this discussion here because it will lead us through to the 
subsequent analyses of the ancients and labour – and the transformative capacity of the 
latter (III.3, III.4). My discussion of Kant here will show moreover how the young Hegel 
originally arrives at this return to the Greeks and Volksreligion, which will foreground 
Sittlichkeit in his work and set the stage for the subsequent discussions in Chapter Four. It 
is also in this way, in the original rapprochement to the Greeks alongside modern political 
economy, as I have shown above, that Hegel’s theory of the Stände can be initially 
understood. In this way I will be able to show their relation as an initial polemical concept 
in relation to Kant’s practical philosophy before turning in the subsequent sections (III.3, 
III.4) to how they are transformed from this initial context. This will lead the argument to 
the essential shift in Hegel thinking of the Stände from a ‘natural’ (Greek) hierarchy of 
being or derivation to a spiritual one by way of recognition, which implies the distinctive 
development of Hegel’s metaphysics and a fundamental transformation of the 
Naturzustand as I will analyse below (III.4). 
As Dieter Henrich has pointed out, it was Kantian moral philosophy that informed 
the development and independence of Hegel’s thought more than any other factor. He 
also indicated, as I will do throughout this chapter, that Hegel’s ‘conclusion’ – already 
articulated in the Frankfurt years (1797–1800) – was that Kant’s ‘principle of “formal” 
autonomy must be subordinate to a higher principle, which fulfils the meaning of 
freedom’. 
 
This principle Hegel initially calls love, then life and eventually spirit. It is 
conceived in the ‘philosophy of right’ as ‘Sittlichkeit’ and the relationship of right 
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actualising itself will be brought together in a system of institutions and forms of 
life, which gains its sense of unity and its differentiation out of what Hegel calls the 
becoming objective of the ‘Idea’. Only in this relationship shall the Kantian 
freedom of the good will thus be fully defined, and saved from its uncontrollable 
antinomies and threatened position.94 
  
Hegel’s concern with natural law – or what frames his later discussions in the Jena period 
(1801–7) – stretches back to the 1790s in his preoccupation with the Volksreligion and 
Volksgeist of the Greeks that he adapted to the concepts of Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason and Christianity.95 Only with the publication of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 
(1797) did Hegel depart from Kant’s practical philosophy, which no longer allowed him 
to mix the ideas of ancient republicanism and duty ‘since it offered no foothold for 
transplanting the idea of autonomy into the sphere of politics’.96 In so doing, for Hegel 
Kant’s philosophy relegated duty to the isolated subject by way of ‘purely moral 
commands which are incapable of becoming civil ones’ and consigned ‘the philosophical 
element in philosophy … exclusively to metaphysics, [while] the sciences have been 
allowed little share in it [and] have been kept independent of the Idea’.97 Thus the critical 
philosophy of Kant, and subsequently of Fichte, have ‘had the important negative effect 
on the theoretical sciences of demonstrating that the scientific element within them is not 
something objective, but belongs to the intermediate realm between nothingness and 
reality, to a mixture of being and not-being, inducing them to confess that they are 
[engaged] only in empirical conjecture’.98 Thus for Hegel, the critical philosophy of Kant 
pre-eminently represents a ‘formal science’, and had retreated so far into the purely ideal 
that it was absolutely opposed to the empirical, to the real; in its complete isolation in 
metaphysics, however, it (contradictorily) led axiomatically to ‘the absolute principle of 
empiricism’ itself: modern positivism.99 
As the new practical philosophy is based solely in metaphysics and remains 
isolated with no interest in politics, economics, and ethics, which belong merely ‘to the 
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world of empirical experience’, divided from ‘the inner working of moral subjectivity’,100 
the logic of purely empirical intuition ‘vainly attempts to arrive at positive organisation’ 
whereby a singular determinant – an individual detail such as the correction of the 
accused, the reforming capacity of punishment – is made into the essence of the juridical 
as such and raised to the status of the absolute; this ‘transformation which takes place 
unconsciously in empirical knowledge … is accomplished by the critical philosophy with 
reflection and as absolute reason and duty’.101 It is thus that the formal and empirical 
sciences are unified insofar as practical reason has nothing to say ‘beyond the pure 
concept’ while empirical science has nothing to say beyond what is both ‘real and 
universal’, or of ‘a unity of differences’, and ‘must not embrace pure qualities but 
relations, whether negative ones like the drive for self-preservation or positive ones like 
love and hate, sociability, and the like’.102 Whereas Kant represents the absolute purity of 
the abstraction of the concept, the empirical scientists – Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf – also 
divide the moral and political realms; this leads, with Thomasius, to the ‘positive science 
of right’, to the ius internum – the jurisdiction of conscience – and the ius externum, the 
positive constraint of legal order that had been thoroughly laid down by Hobbes. It is in 
this context – to anticipate and point ahead to the discussions of Chapter Four – that the 
Stände will be conceived that develop between the formal absolute and the isolated 
individual in the transition to consciousness, which I will show is present in embryonic 
form in System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3). 
For Hegel, Kant’s abstraction ‘is completely lacking in any content… it can do no 
more than make the formal appropriateness [Form der Tauglichkeit] of the will’s maxim 
into a supreme law’. This leads to a fundamental dichotomy: ‘the will’s maxim has a 
content and includes a determinacy; the pure will, on the other hand, is free from such 
determinacies’.103 Either the absolute ideal is posited as with Kant and the retreat of the 
will into a pure formalism with no content other than the will’s own self-grounding, or the 
absolute principle of empiricism predominates and is raised to the infinite in ‘the 
absoluteness of the subject’ in ‘those systems which are described as anti-socialistic and 
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which posit the being of the individual as the primary and supreme value’ – Hobbes, 
Spinoza and, provisionally, Pufendorf whose thought, despite the divine imposition to 
Geselligkeit, ‘is shifted in its entire span onto the traces of Hobbesian problems’.104 Pure 
practical reason is purely theoretical rather than practical, purely metaphysical and no 
longer real, while pure empiricism ends in the absolute determination of singular details 
in the positive order of right, coercion, and raises these to the absolute ideal. Thus in the 
former, ‘known as practical reason, one can recognise only the formal Idea of the identity 
of the ideal and the real, and this Idea … does not escape from difference [Differenz], and 
the ideal does not attain reality’;105 while in the latter ‘this conceptual limitation, the 
fixing of determinacies and the elevation of one selected aspect of appearance to 
universality so as to give it precedence over others, is what in recent times has described 
itself not just as theory, but as philosophy and as metaphysics’.106 
Thus the Hegel of the Jena essay of 1802–3 is left to abandon his original 
synthesis of ancient republicanism and Kant, yet the shift remains incomplete. It is only 
towards the end of the Jena period that Hegel discovers that ‘political economy is in the 
eminent sense a “practical” science … [and] therefore it replaces the old economics…’107 
– the oikos. Aristotle’s dichotomy domestic society – political society was only slowly 
replaced by the Hobbesian one of state of nature – civil society, and in the final analysis 
the two forms were mixed insofar as the civitas, as the recognised sphere of politics, was 
modelled on the oikos of the pater familias subsequent to the state of nature as was 
emphasised through the lasting impact of Roman law on the development of modernity. 
These conceptualisations of the state form conceiving of sovereignty along the lines of the 
pater familias were thus maintained alongside the Aristotelian formulation of the oikos as 
I showed above (III.1).108 In considering natural law in immediate reference to the ethical, 
Hegel bypasses the autonomy of the will in metaphysical speculation that the mature Kant 
laid down as the basis for practical philosophy, and is an intrinsic element in Hegel’s 
understanding of ‘practical philosophy’ and the dissolution of the dichotomy between 
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108 See the exhaustive treatment of these issues in Riedel 2004. 
  125 
politics and morality that, along with natural law, now ‘fall under the concept of “ethical 
life” understood in fundamentally political terms’.109 
If the historical and theological studies of the Bern and Frankfurt periods 
‘foreshadow’ the return to classical political philosophy when Hegel is in Jena, they do so 
with an important addition: the critique of Mosaic law as it emerges in Der Geist des 
Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798–1800). The conception of God as a mere 
command opposed to inclination appears here and coincides with Hegel’s famous 
criticism of Kant’s foundation of the pure will and obligation, which he overcomes 
through Christian love. It is here that Hegel’s critique of the dichotomy between the 
autonomy of the will isolated in morality and the real as expressed in nature – and in 
history and in politics – emerges for the first time. For Hegel, the particular will and 
autonomy must receive ethical concreteness and this will be accomplished by way of the 
Stände not in Frankfurt, however, but in Jena (1802–3). It is in this way that the natural 
law model in Hegel’s hands leads towards an institutionalisation. What can be seen in this 
development is that Hegel comes to abandon love as a way of overcoming Kant and the 
moral law as it originally appeared to him in Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount. Love did not 
fully overcome the dichotomy (arguably historically) as it remained solely in the inner 
sphere of conscience and the heart, it was not yet spirit externalised in the institutions of 
the world (the later significance of a ‘second Reformation’ for Hegel). As K.H. Ilting has 
pointed out, 
 
Although in love all contradictions are overcome love still completes itself contrary 
to everything that is alien to it and thus stands in contradiction towards the outer 
[Äußeres]. This contradiction can only be negated after Hegel’s interpretation of a 
community of beings [Gemeinsamkeit des Lebens] in which an equality of law is 
arrived at through his determined and strongly drawn expression [Äußerung] of 
consciousness.110 
 
This will significantly shape the discussions in Chapter Four when I turn to analyse 
Hegel’s Sittlichkeit as the externalisation of conscience – the inner – into self-
consciousness in institutions. At this initial stage in the discussion, however, I want to 
indicate that this critique of Kant by way of Christian love is what lays the foundation for 
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Hegel’s later distinction in the Jena natural law essay between Moralität and Sittlichkeit, 
which will engender the later shift from the Greek polis to the historical movement of 
Christianity and Protestantism.111 Again it is the Philosophie des Geistes of 1805–6 that 
marks the transition, signalling Hegel’s definitive departure from Greek ethical life in his 
realisation that ‘Plato did not set up an ideal, but rather grasped the state of his time in its 
inwardness [in seinem Innern] – but this state is past – the Platonic Republic is not 
feasible – because it lacks the principle of absolute individuality [Einzelheit]…’ 112 
I will soon show how the force of the young Hegel’s attempt to overcome the 
modern dichotomy between morality and politics, theoretical and practical philosophy, 
leads to the Stände, which can be initially seen in his return to Aristotle. It should be 
stressed, however, how the modern dichotomy orients the young Hegel’s re-thinking of 
the tradition, which certainly found its most extreme metaphysical representative in Kant, 
and perhaps most politically emblematic ruler in Frederick the Great. 
For the young Hegel, Kant’s dichotomisation represented in its purest form the 
very principles of absolutist rule that was perhaps best realised in the personality of 
Frederick the Great, but could be also found writ large in the natural law theories since 
Hobbes. The internal order of life – the nascent subject of the civil, social, sphere, of 
difference as I will show in Chapter Four – was disconnected from the overarching force 
of political constitution. This cleft would lead to Hegel’s characterisation of formalism, 
and the understanding of an alien fate standing opposite the subject that was already 
                                                
111 From the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) onwards Hegel began to develop a conception of history as 
the movement of self-consciousness, which implied the rise of particularity that had been interpreted 
negatively in the Jena 1802–3 essay. This led to his re-interpretation of the genesis of Christianity and of the 
inward sphere that gave depth to man (firstly with Socrates). This is what re-orients his thinking on right 
and his initial negative appraisal of codification. Hegel moreover identified Christianity (and Socrates) with 
private property, which he conceives in his mature period in the individual will, conscience, and the 
appropriation of the object (see Hegel 1995a, p. 75 (§26). Plato’s substantial state from Philosophie des 
Geistes (1805–6) onwards is seen to set up an ideal to ward off the particularity of the subject that threatens 
to break in and dissolve the polis. Hegel notes in the Heidelberg lectures (1817–18) that this is why Socrates 
– ‘the principle of being for itself with its attendant dangers’ – is excluded from Plato’s Republic (see Hegel 
1995a, p. 311 (§167)). It is for this reason that in Hegel’s account in the Grundlinien civil society – as the 
emblematic sphere of particularity, of difference – is situated logically prior to the state but, in actuality, 
chronologically follows the foundation of the political order through patriarchy and absolutism. Hegel thus 
grasped the essence of the historical movement that ‘the constitution of the state through a political force of 
rule is ahead of the formation of civil society’ (Riedel 2004, pp. 769–70). Modern civil society viewed in 
this light is part of the history and freedom of humankind for Hegel, it is the place where particularity and 
difference are given their due, and private property, love, marriage, and labour are its bases as these come to 
form the ethical activities of the world. 
112 Hegel 1987, pp. 240–1. 
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present in the Bern (1793–6) and Frankfurt (1797–1800) periods. ‘So long as internal 
ideals are kept isolated in principle from external actions, morality must remain 
individualized with no chance of realization and politics must remain in a real realm of 
compulsion and necessity. This kind of politics administers a law which has no moral 
content but only a negative form addressed to the realization of morality…’.113 It is 
precisely in this sense that Hegel sought to bring natural law under the guiding influence 
of a newfound ethical science, which would reunite the thoroughly isolated metaphysical 
subject to the social whole as the ideal of the polis had originally done with the freedom 
and happiness of the Greeks. 
The unity formed by the Aristotelian model provided the young Hegel with an ideal, 
yet the writings of the Jena period often clarify ‘the forced nature of his attempts to 
submit a mass of materials to concepts often not derived from the material itself and of 
contrary origin’.114 Much has been made in the Hegel scholarship of this renewed 
proximity to Aristotle. The modern critics from Hobbes to Wolff and Kant ‘are all related 
to Aristotle either at a direct historical distance (Hobbes) or simply obliquely (Wolff and 
Kant), basing their work on a specific, relatively late, stage of Aristotelian scholasticism, 
[while] the young Hegel was one of the first people in Germany to study the texts of 
Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, thereby attaining a more accurate picture of the 
tradition’. 115  This allows Hegel to contrast ‘the primary individualist beginning of 
practical philosophy in the modern era’, with ‘the memory of the theory of the social 
                                                
113 Krieger 1972, p. 128. Krieger 1972, p. 128. This reveals the precise function of natural law from Hobbes 
onwards, which formed an increasingly ‘individualist’ (for Hegel, privatrechtlich) form as regards internal 
policy while it incorporated reason of state – ‘Machiavellianism’ – as the return of the Naturzustand in 
foreign relations. Hobbes had, moreover, made the interior of the conscience into a political rather than a 
religious subject (see Koselleck 1988, p. 29, note 27: ‘Hobbes’s real historical contribution, given the 
multiplicity of religious moral teachings, lies precisely in the functionalist reinterpretation of the phenomena 
of conscience’), which would shape the metaphysics of the age of Enlightenment and Hegel’s discrete 
politics of actuality as its attempted overcoming (I will analyse this in detail in Chapter Four). Both Hobbes 
and Pufendorf’s moral voluntarism, while remaining empirical and based on hypothetic imperatives, led 
logically to Kant’s categorical – and absolute metaphysical-moral – foundation. Hegel understood this in 
expressing his criticisms of both the empirical and formal sciences in the Jena essay of 1802–3, and saw 
them to a certain degree on an equal footing: ‘the first consists of relations and mixtures of empirical 
intuition with the universal, while that of the second is absolute opposition and absolute universality – it is 
nevertheless self-evident that the ingredients of both, namely empirical intuition and concept, are the same, 
and that formalism, as it moves from its pure negation to a [specific] content, can likewise arrive at nothing 
other than relations and relative identities’ (Hegel 1999, p. 106). 
114 Riedel 2011, p. 10. 
115 Riedel 2011, p. 9. The reference is to Christian Garve’s translations that were produced in 1798–1801 
(Ethics) and 1799–1802 (Politics) respectively. 
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character of humanity in teleological natural law’. It allows Hegel, ‘without recourse to 
the … social contract, to place the idea of the community again at the centre of a theory of 
right and the state’.116 By referring to Aristotle and developing Greek ethical life, Hegel 
was in a position to unite the practical and theoretical sciences that had been divided since 
the emergence of the modern rational natural law model and the development of 
Newtonian and Cartesian science and, as can be safely assumed on reading the Jena 
natural law essay and System der Sittlichkeit, took over the classical distinctions of the 
polis into Stände. 
When Hegel criticised the Kantian autonomy of the will, he no doubt had the 
history of Continental absolutism and the Enlightenment on his mind as well as the 
revolutionary conflagration in France that had spread across Europe and was re-shaping 
the bases of social and political life. The Enlightenment, as the dialectical opposite of the 
Middle Ages, led to the ‘active fanaticism’ of the Terror – the demand for absolute 
equality that destroyed particular institutions.117 On the other hand, the moral law took the 
individual in isolation; it had little to say of custom or the ethical life of communitarian 
relations, which Hegel, at this early stage, grasped in the Greek ideal of the polis. The 
history of Continental absolutism and the revolutionary demand for abstract equality are 
reflected clearly in the early Jena natural law essay (1802–3) under the guise of the 
emergence of formal legal equality in which ‘the real movement of the concept of legal 
right began’ under the Roman Principate. This signals the moment where ‘the polis was 
swept away and everyone became the property of one universal Lord’.118 At this stage, ‘it 
is the relations accepted as “natural” in the polis, that are treated as normal in Hegel’s 
“natural ethics”’.119 It is the appearance of labour and the negative that transforms this 
situation, the ‘liberation present in work’, the product of an initial subordination, which 
leads to true freedom and breaks the classical appropriation of the Stände based on a 
natural hierarchy. 
 
…while in the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy the movement arising out of 
the negative is directed to pure being [das reine Sein] Hegel expands the original 
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negativity always further in order to eventually engulf fixated existence [Bestehen] 
in itself. In Greek metaphysics the negative is a lack of being [Mangel des Seins] 
for Hegel the negation of the existing. This difference emerged most clearly in the 
foundational concepts in the determination of labour…120 
 
What Ilting isolates here is an essential element of the discussion; it shows how Hegel 
overcomes the classical model by way of antiquity itself, which had introduced a 
necessary division of labour and common system of needs at the basis of its conception of 
community. Yet in antiquity’s devaluation of labour it sought to restrict the polis, and 
ordered it along the lines of a hierarchy of statuses.121 This oriented the polis towards a 
restrictive ‘higher being’; the Idea and the perfection of the political were limited to the 
political Stand, or what Hegel in his youth terms the Stand of absolute ethical life. What 
emerges at the end of the Jena period (1805–7) is a revaluation of labour, which most 
clearly can be seen in the dialectic of lord and bondsman in the Phenomenology (1807). 
This overcomes the ‘natural intuition’ that originally oriented Hegel’s appropriation of the 
Greeks. The difference that emerges here leads Hegel to point to the transformative 
capacity of labour and the negative, which will in part concern the remainder of my 
discussions in this chapter. 
 
III.3 The Critique of Plato and the Ancients 
 
The current section will analyse the critique of Plato that appears in the Philosophie des 
Geistes of 1805–6. I already had the occasion to briefly discuss this above (III.2 fn.112). 
There I analysed how it was taken up into the Grundlinien (1820/21) alongside Hegel’s 
transformation of the state of nature as a conceptual and spiritual moment. The following 
section will thus how Hegel’s valorisation of labour replaces his original Greek ethical 
ideal drawn from Plato’s Republic, which he interpreted as having assigned individuals to 
Stände, as well as Aristotle’s teleology of polis life that divided the slave from the free 
man according to nature. This will lead me to a discussion of the positivisation of 
Aristotle’s hierarchy in Roman law and Hegel’s negative appreciation of it, which, as has 
been pointed out by insightful commentators, is by and large a misunderstanding brought 
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about by Hegel’s historical vision.122 This however will give me the opportunity to 
discuss elements that I brought up already at the outset of the chapter (III.1) regarding the 
positivisation of law as status. I will show in this section how the Roman legal conception 
of status, of the status civilis, which has etymological affinity to the Stände in German, 
developed into a ‘status society’, and how Hegel’s critique of Roman law set out from this 
tradition that was prevalent in German natural law (Heineccius). It is in this way that I 
will be able to move towards the conclusion of the present chapter and to the redefinition 
of the Stände that this entails. This will in turn allow me to slowly shift my discussion 
towards Hegel’s revaluation of Naturzustand (III.4), breaking with nature as such and 
reconceiving the hierarchy of beings inherited from the ancients. This will be seen to give 
new and essential meaning to the Stände in a spiritualised version of Naturzustand and in 
the construction of the modern sovereign state built through organisations and institutions. 
This is signalised by the conceptual development of modern civil society, and conveys the 
distinctiveness of Hegel’s institutional politics as a way of stemming the defectiveness of 
self-interest that threatens to undermine the political and transform it into partisan conflict. 
Prior to Hegel’s transformation of the state of nature into a conceptual and spiritual 
moment a critique of Plato and the ancients appears that is taken up into the Grundlinien 
(1820/21). This gives new meaning to the concept of the Stände – a critique of the 
substantiality of Plato’s state with the introduction of the subject and a movement away 
from the natural ordering of the Stände of the free and the unfree according to Hegel’s 
interpretation of Aristotle’s division of the polis. Hegel’s valuation of the relationship 
between lordship and bondage thus undergoes a reversal, whereby subordination – the 
subservience [Unterwürfigkeit] of the subject – becomes essential. The battle for 
recognition in the Phenomenology is now seen to establish an originary system of needs; 
it is the essential conflict whereby spirit divides itself from nature in the serf’s formation 
of the thing. It was through this process that Hegel eventually ‘discovered … that the 
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concept of the subject of rights, as well as individual freedom and equality contained in 
the “individual” will’s renunciation of itself in the “general will”, presupposed the 
liberation from nature by labour’.123 The lord however attempted to retain his natural 
relation to the thing and thus, according to Riedel, this describes the ‘historical moment 
… [that] concerns the emergence of the polis ethical life’.124 Therefore, 
 
the nations of antiquity, the Greeks and the Romans, had not yet realised [erhoben] 
the concept of absolute freedom since it was not yet recognised that the human 
being as such, as this universal I, as a rational self-consciousness, is entitled 
[berechtigt] to freedom. For them rather the human being was then only held to be 
free when he was born as free [Freier]. Thus freedom for them was still determined 
by naturalness. Therefore there was slavery in their free states and a bloody war 
emerged among the Romans in which the slaves sought to make themselves free to 
attain eternal human rights [ewigen Menschenrechte].125 
 
The first critique of Plato in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) in Jenaer 
Systementwürfe III repeatedly appears in Hegel’s later political works, and focuses 
precisely on the problem of ‘the lack [entbehrt] of the principle of absolute individuality 
[Einzelheit]’,126 the I, that signals his rejection of traditional relations of authority and 
marks the decline of the classical ethos with the awakening of self-consciousness in 
Socrates – a definitive break from the 1802–4 glosses. The rise of ‘private particularity’ 
destroys the classical polis and the substantiality of Plato’s Republic, which contains the 
movement of liberation that develops into modern civil society on the basis of the 
principle of individuality, which Christianity initially brings into being (§185). The attack 
on Plato, just as that on Roman law, involves the natural determination of freedom that 
was contingent on birth ‘excluding choice of social position [des Standes]’.127 
The novelty of Hegel’s conception of the Stände as they develop from the 
Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) onwards will come to lie in the principle of ‘subjective 
freedom’, which can be contrasted with Plato’s Republic and the feudal system, which 
were built on restraining particularity. 
 
In Plato’s Republic, it is the task of the guardians to allot individuals to their 
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particular Stände and to specify what particular services they have to perform. In 
feudal monarchies, the services required of vassals were equally indeterminate … 
In these circumstances, what is lacking is the principle of subjective freedom 
whereby the individuals substantial activity … is mediated by his own particular 
will.128 
 
The relation between the political and social dimensions of civil society and state lies in 
the conception of actuality or the character of ‘subjectivity as identical with the substantial 
will’.129 For Hegel this stands opposite the Asiatic principle in his philosophy of history, 
and is an amelioration of his earlier Spinozistic conception that lacked the innovation of 
the subject and remained in a substantial state prior to the Phenomenology , or conceived 
of ethical life along the lines of a natural intuition derived from the Greek polis.130 The 
‘simpler form’ of ethical life existent in the substantial state is now ‘sublated’ by the 
subjectivity of modernity. This follows on Hegel’s revaluation of his interpretation of 
Greek values in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) where he made an about-turn in his 
interpretation of Plato.131 The first appearance of reason in the Occident however is the 
dusk of the dawn that rose in the Orient: i.e., the Greek appropriation of Asiatic cultural 
and spiritual forms ‘captures the essence of Europe as well … because individuality is its 
universal substance’132 – even if at this stage Plato’s merely substantial state was designed 
to hinder the development of ‘private particularity’ in private property and with Socrates, 
this conception begins to break down and leads to the nihilism of Rome and the early 
Christian era.133 
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The critique of Plato and the substantial state – the state without subject – is 
connected in the Grundlinien with Hegel’s critique of the Roman law of persons and of 
status that, of course, originally distinguished the slave from the free man, or of the 
German political tradition, the status civilis of Wolff and Heineccius, for example, each of 
whom ‘came to the conclusion that the notion of status should be recognised as having 
primacy over the notion of an individual’.134 ‘What is called the right of persons in 
Roman law regards a human being as a person only if he enjoys a certain status… hence 
in Roman law even personality itself, as opposed to slavery, is merely an estate [Stand] or 
condition [Zustand]’.135 It should be recognised that this latter statement is a complete 
about-turn from the early essay of 1802 where Greek ethical life was directly contrasted 
with the rise of Roman ‘private’ law, seen as the genesis of the bourgeoisie and, in fact, as 
the decline of status differentiation between the slave and the freeman.136 Hegel has thus 
amended somewhat the failures of his original interpretation by recognising the contiguity 
of these two traditions and of the law of status as such, read by way of Heineccius in the 
Elemental Juris Civilis137 – even if he holds that Roman law is primarily private and not 
                                                                                                                                             
development of legislation’ (see Hegel 1999, pp. 147–50). For Hegel’s interpretation of Roman law see 
Villey 1975, and on Hegel’s changing perspective as regards codification, see Becchi 2009. 
134 Canale 2009, p. 166. 
135 Hegel 1991a, p. 71 (§40); Hegel also refers explicitly here to Heineccius’s Elementa iuris civilis §75 (see 
following footnote). 
136 See Hegel 1999, p. 148. As Michel Villey has noted with regard to the reference to Gibbon in the natural 
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– Roman law is seen as decadence and decline and as the destruction of Greek ethical life. Hegel’s 
knowledge of Roman law for Villey stemmed from Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten and the first third of 
Fichte’s Naturrecht that deals with abstract right. For Villey, Hegel thus ‘remains in the legacy of every 
Romanist from the sixteenth to seventeenth century whose dream it was to rediscover the authentic Roman 
law on the way to modern reason. …[T]he pinnacle of the “Roman principle” will represent for him 
absolute imperial rule. This perspective unfortunately ignores [what was] most original in the framework of 
the Roman civitas – that the remaining republican elements [were] preserved in the Roman civitas under the 
Principate – [as] the resultant [entstandene] moment of the development of Roman law’ (Villey 1975, pp. 
134, 136, 133). At this stage Hegel identified the rise of the bourgeoisie only as a problem and remained 
within the horizon of his early ‘class solution’ (Riedel 2011). The genesis of Privatrecht in Rome was seen 
as the destruction of ethicality and the Greek differentiation between Stände of the free and the unfree: As 
Riedel comments here on Hegel’s Jena natural law essay, this is a ‘historical falsity’ as ‘Roman law in its 
cultivation of the concept of the person in no way annuls the distinction between classes named by Hegel 
but rather establishes this very distinction in the title status libertatis’ (Riedel 2011, p. 115 who refers in 
note 21 to R. Sohm, Institutionen des Römischen Rechts, 4th edn (Leipzig, 1891), pp. 100f. and 105 ff.). At 
this stage in Hegel’s development positive legislation – in the formal aspect of Roman law or codification 
more generally, and the Allgemeines Landrecht and the droits de l'homme et du citoyen of 1789 are clearly 
in the background here – ‘fixes individual being and posits it absolutely’. The codifications are opposed for 
Hegel at this stage to Sittlichkeit, as they are focused strictly on individual right (Hegel 1999, p. 147). 
137 See Hegel 1986a, p. 33 where he quotes Heineccius in the Latin (I quote from the German translation p. 
34, note 2). ‘§75 …The person [Person] is considered [betrachtet] a human being in a determined status 
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yet public law. As both Michel Villey and Otto Pöggeler affirm,138 Hegel misunderstands 
the nature of Roman law and conceives of it within the horizon of the modern natural law 
tradition and, specifically, of the Neo-Scholasticism of Leibniz that sought to categorise it 
along the lines of mathematical deduction.139 The influence of the modern rational natural 
law tradition can be felt, moreover, in Hegel’s interpretation of abstract right and the 
contract as based on a theory of voluntarism, whereas in Roman law ‘the effect of the act 
arose from the form, not from the will’.140 Hegel recognised, however, and as is very clear 
from the structure of the Grundlinien – which, after all, sets out from the law of persons – 
that Roman law must lay at the foundation of any modern civil and legal science.141 
Aristotelianism formed the basis of Roman law insofar as ‘Gaius begins the Institutes in 
the words of Aristotle’ and bases the ius civile on the ius gentium derived from 
Aristotle.142 The conception of the person was firmly rooted in the early Roman period in 
household economics, which slowly transformed into ‘comprehensive groups’ that ‘may 
have enjoyed an extensive external dependence, and accordingly may be understood to be 
the forerunners of the state’.143 Such a situation as that belonging to the early centuries of 
                                                                                                                                             
[Status]. §76 Status is a property [Eigenschaft] on the basis of those different rights [Rechte] people enjoy. 
§77 The slave is thus human and he is also [a] person insofar as he is considered in the state of nature 
[Naturstand], but with regards to the civil [bürgerlichen] condition [Standes] he is “faceless” [ohne 
Gesicht]’. The inmixing of the modern conceptual model with the Roman legal tradition tends to reveal 
Heineccius’s eclecticism. 
138 See Villey 1975; and Pöggeler 1995. 
139 ‘That logical consistency which Leibniz praises is certainly an essential characteristic of the science of 
right, as of mathematics and every other science of the understanding; but this logical consistency has 
nothing to do with the satisfaction of the demands of reason and with philosophical science’ (Hegel 19991a, 
p. 34). Again, the extent of the perceived distinctiveness to which Hegel views his conception of reason and 
method can be seen here – that which divides him from the Naturrecht tradition firmly fixes him to it. 
140 Kaser 1968, p. 45. ‘This overrating of the will’ – stemming from the post classical period, the Eastern 
Roman school, Hellenic doctrine, and subsequently supported by theological doctrine, according to Kaser – 
‘caused the nineteenth century doctrine of Continental Common law to be biased in favour of the ‘will 
theory’ (Kaser 1968, p. 46). 
141 ‘Since his Jena days it was clear to Hegel that it was in Roman law that the categorization of everything 
as persons was worked out’ (Pöggeler 1995, p. 29). 
142 Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972, p. 105. 
143 Kaser 1968, p. 60. See Hegel 1986a, p. 507 (§349) on the ‘formal [formelle] realisation of the Idea of the 
state’ and the separation of the ‘patriarchal condition’ [Zustand] from the properly political: from nation, 
constitution, sovereignty, and state form. To this extent the question may be raised to what extent Hegel’s 
understanding of Roman law, as private law is contingent on his historical conception of the modern state – 
as a distinctly political sphere, as ideally autonomous and severed from private law – with the emergence of 
civil society. ‘Hegel views Roman law in the light of its later accommodation to natural law; in this way he 
fails to see that Roman law is primarily public law (not, as he stresses, private law). When Hegel portrays 
and criticizes Roman family law on account of the unethical privileges and rights of possession devolving 
on man, he disregards the fact that this system stemmed from kinship structures’ (Pöggeler 1995, p. 29). On 
the contrary Hegel views kinship structures as the ‘initial stage’ of the state form, and when he attacks the 
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the Roman era ‘did not regard man as an individual, but as a member of the group to 
which he belonged’ where the ‘state’ was still seen as composed of family households 
that ‘formed monocratic legal units’.144 This finds a parallel in the kinship groups of the 
German speaking lands, which formed themselves into Stände in the intervening centuries 
between the end of the feudal Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern period, but 
strongly resisted the formation of the state in the coming centuries. Within the 
codification process as ‘a legitimation of personal differences within society’ such groups 
saw the continuance of their rulerships in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but 
had opposed the legal positivisation of their privileges. Such an interpretation accords 
with the traditional interpretation of the civitas, the accepted society of the ancien régime: 
‘the construction of the law of civil society, formed during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, remained dependent on a concept of the contract, which had “property” 
[Eigentum] (dominium) as its prerequisite’, and property was based on the traditional rule 
and law of the pater familias. It is ‘privilege [that] proves itself to be the central category’ 
that ‘determines the legal-political position of the individual’ in ‘his affiliation to one of 
the “Stände” or “rulerships” [Herrschaften]’.145 By contrast, Hegel conceived of property 
first and foremost as the freedom of Christian conscience that led to the positing of the 
will, and interpreted the family on the basis of love already in 1797/1798 which was 
foreign to the Roman and Greek traditions of household economy.146 
Roman law imported very precise descriptions in its law of persons that could be 
linked to status and a social order of rank that, alongside the influence of Aristotelianism, 
which described the social whole framed as the fulfilment of particular functions,147 were 
adopted in the German natural legal tradition. ‘The law of persons (ius personarum) 
                                                                                                                                             
paterfamilias it is always from within the horizon of his early Christian view of the family as a love relation. 
Under the Principate moreover Augustus viewed his summa potestas or imperium along the lines of the 
household dominium already thereby conflating the ius privatum and ius publicum. ‘Even in the context of 
ordinary representations, we do not describe a patriarchal condition as a constitution, nor do we describe a 
people living in this condition as a state, or its independence as sovereignty. Consequently, the actual 
beginning of history is preceded on the one hand by dull innocence which lacks all interest, and on the other 
by the valour of the formal struggle for recognition and revenge’ (Hegel 1991a, p. 375 (§349)). 
144 Kaser 1968, p. 60 (text modified). 
145 Riedel 2004, pp. 741, 742. 
146 See Löwith 1995, p. 280; Hegel 1996, pp. 302–8. 
147 Politics 1254a29–1254a35: …‘for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of 
parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. 
Such duality exists in living creatures, originating from nature as a whole…’. 
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consists of those portions of the law which deal with liberty and slavery (status libertatis), 
citizenship (status civitatis), family (status familiae), marriage, guardianship and 
curatorship (personae sui iuris, alieni iuris)’.148 Just as Aristotelianism had prioritised the 
whole over the part so too did Roman law in its origins within kinship groups and in the 
transference of such legal right to individual patres familias that had potestas over the 
house community.149 These conceptions were formalised on the basis of the house 
community in the German speaking lands, the Hausvater as pater familias and the oikos, 
each of which coincided with the traditional conception of civil society.150 ‘“Hausstand” 
signified, beyond all moral or religious interpretations, the set [l’ensemble] of 
relationships and human activities that unfold [déroulant] in the house, in Greek “oikos”, 
understood as carrying out [l’accomplissement] the tasks [tâches] that lead to the 
domestic and rural economy (Otto Brunner). This “Hausstand” has a very patriarchal 
character, [and] is called as well Häusliche Gesellschaft…’.151 
What marks the transition in Hegel’s thinking is when he shifts from 
understanding the state as a ‘work’ to the emergence of labour as such and taken in its 
own right. The labouring Stand and merchant class [Klasse] were duly and justly 
subordinated to the militarised Stand in the ethical totality of polis life according to Hegel 
in the Jena essay (1802–3). This saw the justification of mechanisation and the ‘de-
humanisation’ of the labourer in System der Sittlichkeit written in the same period as well 
as the destruction of private property in the total organisation for war, which united the 
Stände into a whole.152 The development of reciprocal recognition and the subordination 
of the serf to the lord overturns the hierarchy by placing the active principle on the side of 
labour and reducing the lord to a natural ethical life – the ‘natural intuition’ that marks 
Greek ethical life interpreted in a limited sense from the Philosophie des Geistes (1805 –
6) onwards. The ancient Greek model of the polis and Hegel’s early understanding of 
‘socio-political’ stratification go hand in hand as they remain Platonist and Aristotelian 
                                                
148 Berger 1953, p. 628; compare Kaser 1968, p. 64: ‘According to the Romans, persona was every human 
being, slaves included, though the post-classical period preferred to style free men personae. Status did not 
mean personality but denoted the legal position of the human being in general’. 
149 See Kaser 1968, p. 60. 
150 See Riedel 2004. 
151 Stuke 1968, p. 43. The references are to Brunner 1949, pp. 33ff. 
152 Hegel never departs from this perspective on war as the destruction of bourgeois property as well as the 
emergence of equality among the Stände. 
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explanations for modern politics and predetermined forms of social interpretation. ‘The 
“absolute Stand” of the “System der Sittlichkeit” appears here, with reference to Plato and 
Aristotle, as the ‘class of free people’ which by nature is independent or “for itself”, and 
is differentiated from the “Stand of unfree people” which “is by nature not its own but 
another man’s”’.153 The Jena period is dominated by the shift Manfred Riedel traced in 
Hegel’s prioritisation of an active and free political Stände as a solution to the political 
problem to the amelioration of labour and the work as the free spirit of a people. Once the 
will is embodied in conscious labour and recognition social mobility raises its head, 
individuals still must belong to a Stand, but they are free to choose this in distinction from 
what Hegel perceives as the failings of Plato’s Republic and the feudal era where 
individuals had assigned social status. 
The ‘influx of ethical corruption’ into ancient Greek polis life is thus signalled 
precisely by Hegel’s interpretation of the rise of consciousness, which destroys the 
‘natural intuition’ of Hegel’s early ideal that ‘could not withstand the division which arose 
within the latter as self-consciousness became infinitely reflected into itself’.154 This was 
already present in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6). It is thus that labour appears 
subordinate to the active and free life of the politeia in the Jena essay of 1802–3. This 
becomes the work of spirit and its history, which is intertwined with the development of 
logic itself. The subject – or the principle of particularity that was formerly seen as a 
purely destructive force in ancient ethical life – is reconceived as the movement of the 
concept and, once it receives its concrete basis, as the principle moment in the substance 
of the modern state. Thus the naturally intuited social relations of the Greek and feudal 
ideals disappear through the innovative capacity of labour, which truly brings self-
consciousness into being: i.e., what were naturally stratified hierarchies in the late 
Frankfurt and early Jena periods now become organised through the spiritual capacities 
of labour. This, in the philosophical sense, for Hegel, is the labour of the spirit itself that 
appears in the movement of the concept in the Phenomenology (1807). 
Within this early shift from the natural to the spiritual contained within the 
principle of labour lies the crux of Hegel’s much later overcoming of the separation of the 
                                                
153 Riedel 2011, p. 15 (translation modified). 
154 Hegel 1991a, p. 222, §185. 
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civil and the political as it appears in the Grundlinien with the ‘discovery’ of modern civil 
society that left ‘political life hanging, so to speak, in the air’.155 This movement 
necessitates the development of reciprocal recognition in the civil, social, sphere and its 
articulation in the various Stände, the honour of belonging to an estate – the Ständeehre. 
Abstract right is therefore to be sublated through the ‘substantial’ aspect of the person 
‘discovering their essential self-consciousness in institutions as that universal aspect of 
their particular interests which has being in itself’,156 thus entailing a reorganisation of the 
traditional individualist premise of natural law along the lines of an inter-subjectivist 
conception of labour. Thus ‘labour is neither only a means to the satisfaction of needs 
[Bedürfnisbefriedigung] nor the purpose [Zweck] of this society, but rather a moment in 
the formation [Bildung] of the (formal) universality [Allgemeinheit] of individuality, 
which through it and on its basis [Boden] fulfils the shift [Schritt] from nature and the 
inhibition of natural arbitrariness to culture and freedom’.157 
While the young Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle allows him to view this matter 
in a different light, i.e. in his attempt to reunify the theoretical and practical sciences and 
‘the scientific ways of treating natural law’ in practical philosophy which were 
irredeemably cleft by Kant, he still interprets the ‘natural’ ethical life of the Greeks – 
intuition – as the solution. The young Hegel has yet to depart from the mere concept of 
nature by way of the labour process as an appropriation and transformation of natural as 
such and the grasping of the individual ‘according to his concept’ which will thoroughly 
replace the Aristotelian hierarchy ‘according to nature’. While he begins to recognise the 
importance of political economy he remains tied to the natural hierarchy of the 
construction of the polis in his original idealisation of the philosophical and military Stand 
of the Greeks: i.e., the Greek polis was ordered into ‘two Stände … in accordance with 
the absolute necessity of the ethical’158 – a society of the free, the nobility, and the unfree, 
the labourers or the traditional division between the active life of polis and the labour of 
the household, the oikos. 
                                                
155 Hegel 1991a, p. 342, §303. 
156 Hegel 1991a, p. 287, §264. 
157 Riedel 2004, p. 780. 
158 Hegel 1999, p. 147. 
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The importance of Hegel’s return to the individual as the negative will be analysed 
in the following section whereby he grasps right and the individual ‘according to its 
concept’. This coincides with a definitive return to a reading of the modern natural law 
tradition, which from this moment onwards (1805–6) orients his thinking. I will 
demonstrate how this transforms the natural basis of the polis in his readings of the 
Greeks and to limit the Greek world historically. This will also set his philosophy firmly 
in the horizon of the modernity of the French Revolution that had placed natural rights at 
the basis of modern civil society. Thus Hegel reconceives of his relation to antiquity, 
while at the same time forming a new relation to modern natural law that he had criticised 
since his Frankfurt period (1797–1800). This will lead to a significant reformulation of 
the central concept of the modern natural law tradition – the state of nature – and to a 
redefinition of the importance of the Stände within the context of modern civil society. It 
is in this way that I will point to the theoretical potential in Hegel’s institutional theory 
and of the importance of the Stände as the most significant component to his institutional 
thought. 
 
III.4 From Nature to Right by way of Labour and Recognition 
 
In this section I will examine how the Stände are transformed from a natural order in the 
Jena natural law essay of 1802–3 to a spiritual order through the concept of reciprocal 
recognition as it first appears in the Philosophie des Geistes 1805–6, which eventually 
established a nascent system of needs and a division of labour. I will also show how 
Hegel reinterpreted civil society in this circumstance, and how the old societas civilis was 
transformed into the modern concept. This is central to showing how the concept of the 
Stände emerges as a unique attempt to answer the problems of a modern society 
increasingly determined by private interests – formal freedom for Hegel must become 
concrete in institutions. 
The novelty of Hegel’s developing conception of the Stände – and what I will show 
underlies their eventual modernity – is the principle of ‘subjective freedom’. As a 
philosophy of right Hegel’s later politics fully follows the modern tradition and 
eventually breaks with the classical ethos that, from his mature historical perspective, he 
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sees as constraining the particularity of the individual. Natural law as a law ‘according to 
nature’ falls to the wayside in turn. Reciprocal recognition replaces the state of nature as 
the natural; it is a conceptual-spiritual moment of the overcoming of nature as such. In 
this section of the chapter, I analyse this transformation in Hegel’s thinking through the 
fundamental shift in the valorisation of labour and the negative in his thought that 
proceeds by way of reciprocal recognition as a relation of right and leads to a 
reassessment and reformation of the Naturzustand. It is in this context that a new meaning 
will be given to both the state of nature and the relationship of the Stände to it. As I show 
in the present section, for Hegel the Stände answer the ‘formal’ problem of individualism 
that lay at the basis of the developing modern state. I show how the institutional formation 
of the Stände came into being as a distinctive answer to the progress of the modern 
natural law tradition and the French Revolution. This allows me to reflect on the 
peculiarity of Hegel’s approach to modern natural law in the determination of the concept, 
and to stress the importance of his institutional politics that mediate between the newly 
cleft dimensions of civil society and state. Moreover, I show how the Stände in the 
Grundlinien serve as an organisational form institutionalising individual right into the 
political community opposed to the private conflict between individuals when isolated in 
a modern market economy. Hegel arrives at a new concept of the Stände, which is now 
divorced from the tradition and attains its meaning and significance in relation to 
modernity. 
With Hegel’s interpretation of the French Revolution, the principle of abstract 
equality, which is the state of war, reveals the historical shift from positive coercive law 
to right as the foundation of the state, and the Entstehungsgeschichte of civil society, or at 
least a sphere of formal (what in the Grundlinien is called ‘abstract’) right that he 
recognised and interpreted in the 1802–3 Jena essay in terms of the legal revolution in 
Rome where he saw the differentiation between Stände disappear.159 It is not until Hegel 
significantly prioritises the individual will and freedom that a departure from such an 
interpretation of the decline of the classical epoch and the affirmation of the Greek polis 
will be transformed; it occurs historically within the context of the movement from law to 
                                                
159 Hegel’s failure to perceive Roman law correctly is to due his fixation on the historical progress of reason 
(see footnote 122 above). His use of the concept of the Stände in this context, however, is not necessarily 
anachronistic as Roman society was ordered along the lines of status civilis (see footnote 136 above). 
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right, ‘from the metaphysics of natural law to that of natural rights’, which undoes the 
hierarchy of the Greek polis for Hegel. 
 
[This] process [is] often obscured by the fact that both concepts in German 
commonly are denoted by the word Naturrecht. As the matter was clarified, 
Menschenrecht(e) (human right(s)) became the common word for the subjective 
concept, no doubt reinforced by the French droits de l’homme.160 
 
The combined achievement of the Kantian and French revolutions in thought produced 
natural rights where a ‘logical individualism [was] inevitably impelled to annihilate any 
idea of the independent existence of the group’.161 For Hegel, the ‘newer systems of ethics’ 
in their linguistic preference for Moralität rather than Sittlichkeit, ‘which make a principle 
out of individuality and being-for-itself, cannot fail to reveal their allegiance’ which 
places private interest above the ethico-political order: i.e., ‘There is no other possibility 
to convince [the individual other] than by appealing to the promptings of his own 
reason’.162 
At the centre of Hegel’s conflict with modern natural law is the notion of the 
contract and rational individualism, which firmly anchors the formation of the state in the 
arbitrary will of the individual. Since 1793 in Volksreligion und Christentum Hegel had 
been preoccupied with conceiving of the individual in immediate ethical life, in the ethos 
of the (Greek) community rather than in the morality (in Der Geist des Christentums und 
sein Schicksal (1798–1800)) of isolated individual actions. This stood in explicit contrast 
to the modern natural law tradition that had stemmed from Hobbes, recalcitrant in its 
advocacy of the individual will, which led to the primacy of the property relation in 
Pufendorf and Locke as I analysed above (III.1), and in Kant was exemplified in his 
‘abstract universality’ or the ‘formalism’ of pure reason according to Hegel (III.2), which 
Hegel will equate with the French Revolution in the Grundlinien (1820/21). While 
Hume’s critique of Locke’s notion of the contract parallels Hegel’s, the former’s was 
empirical and based on an historical event. On the contrary, Hegel’s critique of the 
contract will be rational in orientation insofar as he is attacking Rousseau, Kant and 
                                                
160 Haakonssen 2006, p. 280. 
161 Gierke 1934, p. 114. 
162 Hegel 1999, p. 159 (also see editorial note 97, p. 295); Scattola 2003, p. 15. 
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Fichte.163 The very idea of isolated individual actions, and of the deductive principle of 
reason grounded in a strictly individual (formal) understanding are subject to Hegel’s 
criticism and developing conception of reason as dialectical from the early Jena essay of 
1802–3 onwards. It takes on various forms – the family, language, and labour – through 
which the very notion of reason and the rational will be transformed. Hegel divides the 
Verstand – reason conceived as oppositional or, rather, the understanding – to Vernunft, 
reason as scientific cognition, which conceives of the mediation between opposites, in this 
case undoing the atomism of the isolated metaphysical subject in relation to the political. 
When assessing the state of nature in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) Hegel 
arrives at an essential contradiction: the impossibility of discovering the ‘pure concept of 
the person’ prior to the construction of the civitas,164 which from Hobbes onwards was 
formed on the basis of the contract and – insofar as the societas civilis is the bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft for the Hegel of the Grundlinien – is founded on the abstract right of the 
person. This for Hegel is firstly the private person and secondly the sphere of contractual 
relations, which proceed only by way of the initial recognition that the right I possess also 
corresponds to the duty to recognise the right of the other. In asking the question of what 
right and duty are in the Naturzustand in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6), Hegel can 
only answer in the negative as had Hobbes: ‘in this relationship – of the free indifferent 
being of individuals – [individuals] have no rights or duties towards each other, but obtain 
them first through leaving [das Verlassen] this condition [desselben]’.165 A state of ‘pure 
recognition [reines Anerkanntsein]’ would mean precisely a non-relation, and the 
impossibility of forming the association as such – or real recognition, which is the same 
thing. The beginning of such association therefore must begin with the system of needs – 
and not with the Naturzustand – a step beyond the natural order, and into the spiritualised 
one of reciprocal recognition between multiple figures of self-consciousness. Thus 
abstract right for Hegel in the Grundlinien will retain the form of a fiction that is 
structurally possible only after the establishment of the system of needs, even if it comes 
                                                
163 See Bobbio 1975, p. 88; Kersting 2004, pp. 939–42. 
164 This reflects the contradictory aspect of ‘nature’ much later in the reflection on Naturrecht in the 
Encyclopaedia (§502). Here we find Hegel, at once speaking of nature in the ‘immediate natural way’ or 
‘through the nature of the thing, determining itself [according] to the concept’ (Hegel 1974, p. 311). The 
reference is not only to the modern tradition of natural law, but also to Aristotle. 
165 Hegel 1987, p. 197 (text modified). 
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logically prior in the discussion.166 Historically speaking, it is also preceded by many 
different political forms.167 Hegel thus shows how the system of needs develops as a 
fundamentally relational phenomenon and must be so as simple death brings ‘a new and 
greater contradiction’ into being whereby recognition is impossible and the natural state 
continues.168 Thus freedom is initially established by submission to authority, and then 
leads to the division of labour and the system of needs and to right that, historically 
speaking, would be patriarchal or religious at this stage.169 Hegel thus ends by asserting – 
most clearly in the Encyclopaedia – that  
 
In place of the raw destruction of the object steps the acquisition, preservation and 
formation of it as the mediation whereby the two extremes of independence and 
dependence are incorporated – the form of universality in the satisfaction of needs 
is a constant means and a certain provision for the future.170 
 
Thus when Hegel famously poses the question in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6): 
‘what are right and duty for the individual in the state of nature?’ He discovers that ‘right 
is a relation [Beziehung] to others… or a determination, [a] constraint [Beschränkung] on 
my empty freedom’. Yet the factum brutum of nature is complicated insofar as the human 
being is always already grasped according to the concept and not as a mere existence. ‘I 
consider the human being in his concept, that is not in the state of nature… in the state of 
                                                
166 I refer the reader to Ilting’s discussion mentioned at the outset of this chapter (Ilting 1971, p. 91). 
167 See Riedel’s exhaustive treatment (Riedel 2004, pp. 719–800).  
168 See Hegel 1974, p 221ff (§432 Zusatz) whereby ‘the absolute proof of freedom in the struggle for 
recognition is death’ by means of which ‘naturalness itself will be negated’ when ‘the I [is] abolished 
[aufgelöst]’. The ‘new and greater contradiction emerges’ as the one who proves his inner freedom cannot 
be recognised as subordination did not take place, the other combatant is dead. It is to this degree that ‘each 
submission of the selfishness of the serf forms the beginning of the true freedom of the human being’ – and, 
as is well known, this is subordination in and through labour. As Goldschmidt 1964, pp. 63–4 notes, the 
curious status of the dialectic of lordship and bondage is that it is almost entirely lacking from the 
philosophy of history and, according to him, this is an anomaly that Hegel neglected to solve. We are left 
aptly turning to the political philosophy – or more precisely the philosophy of objektiver Geist – for a 
possible solution; indeed, insofar as this relation is structured after a fiction, its historical status need not be 
questioned. I refer the reader to Chapter Two, however, where I spoke of the ‘protective relation of feudal 
protection’. It was this context in the Lecture on the Philosophy of History that Hegel spoke of the ‘principle 
of free possession; i.e. freedom originated in its direct contrary’ (Hegel 2001, p. 402). In this sense we see 
the dialectic of Lord and Bondsman form distinctively in feudalism, the question of subordination of nations 
in the ‘right of heroes’ may be another matter (see following footnote). Regardless, structural recognition is 
the Hegelian engine of dialectical development par excellence that continually proves its truth in a variety 
of different conditions. 
169 See Hegel 1974, p. 225 (§435 (Zusatz)) where he cites the examples of Solon and Peisistratos in Athens 
as well as the kings of Rome. 
170 Hegel 1974, p. 224 (§434). 
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nature he is not in his concept, but in his natural essence [Naturwesen], in his existence 
[Dasein]’. For Hegel, it is the movement of thought that, moreover, determines this 
development. 
 
…this depiction [Zeigen] is rendered by me [fällt in mich]; it is the movement of 
my thought, although the content is the free self; – this movement does not let it be 
what it is – or it is the movement of this concept – right is the relationship 
[Beziehung] of the person in its behaviour [Verhalten] to another (person) – this 
universal element of its free being – or the determination [Bestimmung], the 
circumscription [Beschränkung] of its empty freedom’. 171 
 
The ascendency of the principle of particularity that destroys Greek ethical life Hegel now 
affirmatively associates with development of self-consciousness and the movement of 
freedom in history. The battle for recognition leads to an originary division of labour that 
sets history in motion, rather than the stupidity of (the Lord’s) natural satisfaction sunken 
in desire. 
The system of needs as Hegel will eventually come to describe it becomes the 
object of the developing science of political economy; it provides him with his summary 
account of civil society in the Grundlinien §185 as ‘a spectacle of extravagance and 
misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both. Within social 
needs, as a combination of immediate or natural needs and the spiritual needs of 
representational thought, the spiritual needs, as the universal, predominate. This social 
moment accordingly contains the aspect of liberation’.172 Whereas the Stände before lay 
in the context of the natural hierarchical relations of the polis, they now appear 
‘spiritualised’, which has become the work of labour when Hegel re-described the state of 
nature in the Phenomenology (1807) as the lord’s negation of his own nature through the 
risk of death in the battle of recognition, which then led to the true negation of nature in 
                                                
171 Hegel 1987, pp. 196–7 (original emphasis); 1974, p. 225. The importance of this conceptual moment in 
the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) truly reorients Hegel’s thinking and indicates a new starting point 
(this was noted firstly by Ilting 2006 and again by Riedel 2011). The disciplinary cleft between the natural 
and spiritual sciences in Hegel has its origin here: natural law is now conceived as problematic precisely 
because it starts from a nature that knows no law at least insofar as the human being is considered. As he 
will put it in his maturity, ‘the point of view of the free will, with which right and the science of right begins, 
is already beyond that false point of view whereby the human being exists as a natural being’ (Hegel 1991a, 
p. 87 (§57)). 
172 Hegel 1991a, pp. 222–3, 230 (§144). 
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the serf’s labour and formation of the thing followed by the system of needs.173 Thus the 
development of ‘private particularity’ in modern civil society with the conflict of 
recognition represents a ‘spiritualisation’ of nature, which is liberation from nature as 
such – even if at this stage such liberation is only ‘formal’: i.e., not yet incorporated into 
institutions and the idea of the political community, but involves the return of relational 
conflict at the level of abstract right. As Hobbes put it, ‘all society therefore is either for 
Gain, or for Glory; not so much for love of our Fellows, as for love of our Selves; but no 
society can be great, or lasting, which begins from Vain Glory; because that Glory is like 
honour, if all man hath it no man hath it’.174 Once Hegel has ‘detraditionalised’ the 
conventional societas civilis such ‘vain glory’ lies at its basis, which he explicitly 
identifies in the Grundlinien §289 as the ‘crisis of the bourgeois production society’ 
which is indeed founded on such greed and self-interest as it is ‘the field of conflict in 
which the private interests of each comes up against that of everyone else’.175 
 
The spirit’s objective right of particularity, which is contained in the Idea, does not 
cancel out the inequality of human beings in civil society – an inequality posited by 
nature, which is the element of inequality – but in fact produces it out of spirit itself 
and raises it to an inequality of skills, resources, and even intellectual and moral 
education.176 
 
Such conflict will only be stemmed by passing over into the state by way of the rational – 
read, institutional – organisation of the general will, which will imply the Stände. The 
crisis of modernity then is only the occasion to bring about a higher stage of right, not 
abstract but concrete. This is precisely how Hegel uses the Stände, as Pöggeler 
suggested,177 in a new sense, and articulated thoroughly within the horizon of abstract 
right and with the abstract universality of the Terror in view, as I have been emphasising 
in the French Revolution’s abolishment of the Generalstände throughout this study. For 
Hegel, in taking over the modern distinction bourgeois and citoyen established by 
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Rousseau, the ‘essential distinction between the citizen and the isolated man [is] similar to 
that between the parts of an organic body and the parts of an inorganic body’ – the atom is 
self-subsistent and autonomous, the organic is interrelated to the whole – it thus requires 
an institutional articulation.178 
The spheres of abstract right and the contract that mark the opening sections of 
Hegel’s mature theorisations in the Grundlinien are where a philosophical science of right 
necessarily begins; that is, subsequent to the French Revolution that had realised the shift 
from the law [Gesetz] of the civitas in the formation of the Herrschaftsvertrag to the right 
[Recht] of the individual as the basis of the Gesellschaftsvertrag. Yet for Hegel this shift 
always left right in a precarious position, and it is for this reason that the right of 
particularity was always considered ‘abstract’ and not ‘concrete’ until it became organised. 
Hegel’s concern stems from the danger of what he sees as ‘abstract freedom’, 
individualism and contract theory that precisely lay at the core of modern natural law 
theory and at the basis of the new society, which ‘were always liable to transform 
themselves into social absolutism, just as social absolutism was equally liable to 
transform itself into individualism’.179 It can thus be seen that for Hegel civil society 
never appeared in ‘the unthreatening and stable form of a natural economic order’, 
whereby the requirement of ‘natural law was interpreted as no more than the principles 
that underpinned the minimum framework of positive law needed to sustain this natural 
order’. If ‘civil society and the state of nature were eirenically reunited’,180 for Hegel the 
same particularity and rivalry that characterised the first order was sublated into the 
second. ‘The right of nature is therefore the existence of the strong [das Dasein der 
Stärke] and the reign of violence, and the state of nature is a condition of violence 
[Gewalttätigkeit] and injustice [Unrechts]’.181 Just because Hegel writes at a moment 
when ‘the redescription of natural law as subjective natural rights’ occurs does not mean 
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that this ‘removes at a stroke any need for consideration of the “state of nature” as the 
foundation of humanity…’.182 What was natural has been made abstract and formal – and 
is a formal ‘liberation’ as such. For Hegel, in his early reflections on the Naturzustand in 
the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) the will [Wille] is free, but the arbitrariness 
[Willkür] of ‘this freedom is empty, formal [Formale] and evil [Schlechte]’ – it is only 
subsequently transformed by language, recognition and consciousness, labour and law: 
the immediacy of natural existence, and in this case the sphere of ‘formal liberation’ of 
civil society as the sphere of representation ‘must be cast off’.183 
 
This relationship is usually what is referred to as the state of nature; the free 
indifferent [gleichgültig] being of individuals against each other [gegeneinander] 
and natural right [das Naturrecht] is believed to [soll] answer what rights and 
obligations [Pflichten] individuals have towards one other… 
 
As for Hobbes, so too for Hegel: ‘the state has been formed to end the kind of war that 
exists in the state of nature’.184 This conflict will only be stemmed by passing over into 
the state by way of the rational organisation of the general will, i.e., through 
institutionalism, which turns the civil into political society. This is the reconciliation of 
evil with itself as it appears in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6). Thus just as modern 
rational natural law replaced the old Aristotelian dichotomy of oikos – polis with the state 
of nature – civil society so too Hegel transforms this in turn: into civil society and the 
state, which he then reunifies by way of the Stände as drawn from the logical-dialectical 
method that refuses the existence of ‘abstract oppositions’. I will turn to a brief discussion 
of Hegel’s dialectical method and its relation to the tradition at the close of this chapter. 
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The modern natural law theorists for Hegel – and most specifically related to the 
contemporary political conditions of the French Revolution, Locke and Rousseau and, in 
Germany, Kant and Fichte – radicalised social atomism and the individual to such an 
extent that they did not allow for any aspect of the institutional formation of the will; this 
was already clear with Hobbes who had conceived of individuals along the lines of atoms 
and the state as a mechanism. In contrast to the modern natural law tradition, for Hegel, ‘it 
is extremely important that the masses should be organised, because only then do they 
constitute a power or force; otherwise they are merely an aggregate, a collection of 
scattered atoms’.185 
As I have just asserted, the changing way in which Hegel understands natural law 
must be seen as leading to his conceptual discovery of modern civil society – i.e., to the 
conceptual discovery of the individual, the individual according to his concept that leads 
to ‘abstract right’ in the Grundlinien. This in turn leads to the rejection of the natural basis 
of natural law and to reciprocal recognition. For Hegel, modern civil society thus becomes 
a spiritualisation of the state of nature, which follows on the Hobbesian principles 
whereby ‘Profit is the measure of Right’ and ‘the state of equality is the state of warre and 
therefore inequality’186 as I analysed above when I quoted Hegel speaking of ‘the element 
of inequality produced out of spirit itself’.187 The Naturzustand is thus now restricted to 
the context of an emerging modern market economy inside the state itself. The conceptual 
object here has thus shifted from the merely fictional to a concrete and real object through 
political economy and the system of needs that ‘provides Hegel with a frame of reference 
for a completely altered conceptual deduction’. 
 
Labour is a specific mode of action, need is the natural basis of man as a ‘private 
person’. Hegel’s philosophical achievement in this field consists above all in 
having the private frame of reference of individuals as publically mediated and 
grasped their natural basis as a social constant.188 
 
The shift to a spiritual order now determines the organisation of a nascent society as I 
have just shown, which represents an about turn from the natural intuition that dominated 
Hegel’s interpretation of Greek ethical life and the natural ordering of the polis. 
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By the end of the Jena period the individuated will emerges as the primary 
foundation of the community, yet the ‘will of the individual is a collective will 
[gemeinsamer Willen]’; that is to say, ‘the person, the pure being-for-itself is not 
respected as an individual will separating itself from the collective will, but only as 
collective [do] I become compelled to be a person’.189 It is thus that one can discover the 
basis for Hegel’s concrete conception of individuality arising in institutions, on the one 
hand, out of needs and reciprocal exchange and, on the other, out of liberal individualism 
itself by way of the reciprocal recognition and the relation of myself as a subject of right 
recognising the other as a subject of right as well. The Stände, as institutional forms, are 
maintained although significantly transformed from a natural order – of hierarchical 
intuition that accords with the classical tradition – to a conceptual schema based on the 
division of labour, recognition and self-consciousness.190 
 
The Realphilosophie of 1805–6 gives as this basis the I, which is intelligence and 
will; it thus becomes possible to think the ethical spirit no longer merely as nature, 
but as the other of nature, which is itself formed through reciprocal recognition of 
its own self through the other. This gives new significance to the motives of 
modern natural right and of the Kantian-Fichtean philosophy. In the Ständelehre the 
foundations of the ethical life of the polis of antiquity are lost: the lower Ständen 
(farmers, professionals [Gewerbe-] and traders) confront the universal Stand in 
which the man of affairs [Geschäftsmann] (that is, above all the administrative civil 
servant [Verwaltungsbeamte]) exist alongside the scholar and the official.191 
 
For Hegel the appropriation of nature through the labour process is now the 
Entstehungsgeschichte of freedom, which has its own history through the initial 
subservience of the serf in the dialectic of lordship and bondage; this is his redescription 
of the modern ‘fiction’ of the Naturzustand. This, moreover, marks the initial move 
towards the philosophy of spirit and the departure from the natural law model, or the 
rejection of the foundation of law in nature – the division of society into Stände now 
develops along conceptual lines, consequent to the subordination that engenders the 
labour process and the system of needs. Thus the naturally intuited social relations of the 
Greek and feudal ideals eventually disappear through the innovative capacity of labour: 
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i.e., what were naturally stratified hierarchies in the late Frankfurt and early Jena periods 
now become organised through the spiritual capacities of labour whereby ‘freedom 
consists solely in the reflection of the spiritual into itself, its distinction from the latter, 
and its reflection upon the latter’.192 This becomes the object of philosophy proper. 
The replacement by way of the battle for recognition of the central fiction of the 
Naturzustand of modern natural law clearly begins in the period when Hegel was 
occupied with the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6), as I have shown above. Such 
recognition has the character of freedom dialectically originating in its own opposite – 
subordination, serfdom, and labour eventually develop into right: in sum ‘freedom 
originated in its direct contrary’.193 The process of freedom is engendered through 
subordination to a higher authority (the Staatsgewalt at the level of nations that, ‘in order 
to be free, … must first undergo the severe discipline of submission to a lord after which 
lordship itself becomes redundant’),194 or the battle for recognition as a replacement of the 
Herrschaftsvertrag,195 as Hegel rejects both the latter and the Gesellschaftsvertrag by 
now envisioning the reciprocal relation as primary. The contract makes no sense for 
Hegel without the notion of a prior conflict of recognition; this comes before any 
contractual basis can be laid down, which only then can lead to its validity or dependence 
through subordination and labour. In patriarchal or feudal society it was not the reciprocal 
relation of private individuals that predominated, for example, but the instantaneous 
affiliation to a group and the recognition between groups. Yet such originary recognition 
also leads to an initial system of needs. This is what Hegel will designate the communal 
character of property in the Philosophie des Geistes 1805–6 within the sphere of the 
family and love as shared labour.196 This will eventually, through the development of 
labour, lead to the modern dynamic that introduces the civil, social, and abstract-rightly 
condition.  
 
[Thus] labour is neither only a means to the satisfaction of needs nor the aim of this 
society but a moment of its formation in the (formal) community [Allgemeinheit] of 
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individuals, which through it and on its basis fulfils the move from nature and the 
inhibition of natural arbitrariness to culture and freedom.197 
 
Only once the conceptual shift from the state of nature to the system of needs, which 
develops historically with the modern world into civil society for Hegel, ‘which for the 
first time allows all the determinants of the Idea to attain their rights’, and from civil 
society to the political state has been made, can he give concrete meaning to the 
Naturzustand as a sphere where the personality of the person necessarily destroys the 
organic ethical life of the family and the ethical ideal in abstract right.198 This justifies the 
division between abstract formal right based on the contract – ‘the pure concept of the 
person’ which Hegel could not find in the state of nature bequeathed by the modern 
political tradition – that develops from the dissolution of the family in civil society and 
the formation of the political community or the ethico-political Idea that sublates such 
particularity and individuality and concretises it firstly in the universality of the Stände by 
way of the division of labour.199 Spiritual rather than natural conflict characterises civil 
society, yet ‘it retains both natural and arbitrary particularity, and hence the remnants of 
the state of nature’.200 Liberalism and its principle of individualism is thus the natural 
order of civil society, and is inherently conflictual and opposed to the political ends of the 
community if it does not lead to the concrete associations in the Stände and the other 
institutions of civil society. The recognition that grows out of the spiritualised conflict 
between particular individuals that sets up the rudimentary system of needs transforms 
into civil society. 
 
Needs and means, as existing in reality, become a being for others by whose needs 
and work their satisfaction is mutually conditioned. … This universality, as the 
quality of being recognised, is the moment which makes isolated and abstract 
needs, means, and modes of satisfaction into concrete, i.e. social ones.201 
 
As Hegel puts it elsewhere, ‘the family is the primary basis of the state, the Stände are the 
second’.202 
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The Naturzustand of foreign relations for the late Hegel has as its correlate the 
‘remnant of the state or nature’ in civil society as a sphere of arbitrariness and 
contingency, which gives meaning to the legitimate organisation of social and political 
power. The abstract sphere of personality in the Grundlinien is not connected with the 
Stände, but on the contrary signals the destruction of ethical relations (both at the level of 
the family and the state insofar as the abstract person exists in the contractual field of 
right as a private person). In the Jena essay of 1802–3 the downfall of the ancient ethical 
order, ‘immediately introduced the formal legal relationship which fixes individual being 
and posits it absolutely’. This is the genesis of ‘universal private life’ and the abstract 
person. Hegel subordinates ‘relative ethical life’ here – the labouring classes – to the 
absolute ethical Stand while in the Grundlinien the person becomes concrete by way of 
the division of labour in the institutions of modern society. It is thus ‘in the Stand that 
human particularity receives its right’.203 Thus one can see in the maturity of the 
Grundlinien that Hegel begins with the abstract right of the person and furthermore in the 
Encyclopaedia states that ‘right and all of its determinations [Bestimmungen] are based on 
free personality alone, a self-determination [Selbstbestimmung]’ which is rather the 
opposite of the natural determination [Naturbestimmung]’.204 
As Hegel moves from natural law to develop his philosophical science of right 
from 1805 onwards, it is in increasing proximity to the moderns rather than the classical 
tradition. The Stände have thus in turn transformed from the natural order of the 
Aristotelian and Platonic hierarchies to associations based on labour and need and the 
spiritual division that occurs by way of reciprocal recognition. This in turn will allow for 
representation between the social and the political, and their reunification through the 
ethical. The Grundlinien divides the Stände into ‘legitimate powers’ that act contrary to 
the atomistic principle of the social aggregate (§301). The Stände thus appear firstly as 
classical forms – or the persistence of local legal bodies proximate to the Enlightenment 
tradition stemming from Pufendorf, Wolff and Heineccius – yet are, with the removal of 
their fixed status, inculcated to a modern conception of the will following Rousseau, 
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which for Hegel is also freedom of self-consciousness.205 Therefore Hegel continues his 
explicit reference to the Stände in his later analyses, but they have lost their classical 
colouring or the form they had in the German natural law tradition. Clearly, the will and 
institutionalism are not to be directly opposed as it is only through institutions that the 
will takes on concrete organic form. By Hegel’s later period, the one-sidedness of the 
French Revolution in its abolishment of the Generalstände, and the conflict with 
Rousseau and social contract theory more generally is contrasted with an ‘organic’ 
conception of the political embodied in the concrete universality of the Stände perceived 
‘as a rationally organized expression of the general will’.206 
The Jena essay of 1802–3 contains an idealised version of the feudal arrangement 
and the military Stand, and is precisely opposed to the rise of the bourgeoisie, ‘“the 
languid indifference of private life”’ as Hegel quotes from Gibbon, which leads to ‘a state 
of affairs in which the people consists solely of a second Stand’.207 Yet the essay attempts 
to take into account a much broader conception of social-political relations given through 
the introduction of labour, a problematic that Hegel solves in an anachronistic fashion by 
referring to Aristotle and Plato and the negativity introduced through universal legislation, 
which is conceived historically as leading to bourgeois society as I showed above (III.3). 
Lordship and bondage appear here in a classical form, as a dichotomy without mediation 
that reflects the antique division of Greek ethical life into the polis and the oikos. On the 
one hand, there is the military Stand, ‘which is directed not towards the nullification of 
individual determinacies, but towards death, and whose product is again not something 
individual, but the being and preservation of the whole of the ethical organisation’; on the 
other, ‘there is the Stand of those who are not free, and which has its being in the 
differentiation of need and work and in the right and justice of possession and property; 
its work deals with matter of detail and consequently does not entail the danger of 
death’.208 
Hegel had here opposed the classical natural law model to that which emerged 
with Hobbes, and was further radicalised by Kant and Fichte to the point where the 
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phenomenal and noumenal realms became utterly opposed, which led, as I analysed above 
(III.2), to the positive science of law. The original strength of the classical model for 
Hegel in the Jena essay lies in its natural-intuitive understanding of socio-political 
relations and the unity of the pre-scientific order rather than in the technical-analytical 
deduction of the body politic as it first appeared in Hobbes in light of the emergence of 
Galilean and Cartesian science. He sought in ‘the old and utterly inconsistent empiricism 
… a great and pure intuition [that] can in this way express the genuinely ethical in the 
purely architectonic qualities of its exposition’.209 Essentially, in the movement from 
natural intuition to the concept as I showed above (III.4), Hegel’s eventual ‘conceptual 
innovation’ of modern civil society became possible; this underlay Hegel’s break with the 
inherited model of the civitas – both the classical Greek and German traditions of 
practical philosophy and the status civilis in Roman law (III.3). It was precisely in this 
way that he was able to enact a ‘speculative dissolution of the relation of production 
(poiesis) and activity (praxis)’ in which political economy is consequently transformed 
into the practical science.210 Such a shift clarifies how Hegel’s thinking develops, from his 
struggle to maintain the classical tradition alongside an increasingly profound 
understanding of modern political economy to his significant rejection of the natural law 
model on the basis of the principle of ‘nature’. 
As I have shown, individuality for Hegel emerges into its own only with the later 
privileging of labour – initially, the state had appeared as a ‘work’ and labour was seen as 
subordinate to the ethical life of the polis. It might also be added how the outer fabric of 
the political community mediates the inner conscience of the subject dialectically in 
Hegel’s developing theory of language and his conception of right as recognition. It is not 
until the Phenomenology, however, that the truly essential moment of transition emerges 
insofar as Hegel finally shifts definitively away from his strictly Spinozistic conception of 
the natural ethical community as substantial being and introduces the notion of the 
subject. Indeed the use of Spinoza’s substance and Aristotle inhibited the discovery of the 
subject, as self-consciousness and individual will.211 Hegel comes to prioritise labour but 
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now, in the dialectic of lord and bondsman, firmly privileges the active aspect of labour 
over the mere status civilis, ‘the Stand of the free’ which had dominated the natural law 
essay in its proximity to the German and Greek traditions as well as System der 
Sittlichkeit. Already in this early period, Hegel’s initial theorisation of the state of nature 
appeared and proposed – along Platonistic or Aristotelian lines – the necessary inherent 
organisation of the various Stände. Yet at this point in Hegel’s encounter with natural law, 
it is more appropriate to speak of the Stände – and certainly contrary to Hegel’s references 
in the essay – in terms of the Roman ‘law of status’, which forms the basis of his later 
criticisms in the Grundlinien. Only once labour and self-consciousness have been 
prioritised can Hegel arrive at his mature formulation of actuality as the subject, the 
substance and substantiality of the state: 
 
The principle of modern states has enormous strength and depth because it allows 
the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the self-sufficient extreme of 
personal particularity, while at the same time bringing it back to substantial unity 
and so preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.212 
 
From here the articulation of the Stände as ‘concrete universality’ can be truly derived on 




A disciplinary shift from natural law to systematic philosophical science determined the 
academic productions of Hegel’s time.213 Philosophy as a systematic science was the aim 
of the Neo-Scholasticism of Christian Wolff who had moreover attempted to reduce right 
to philosophy, which prepared the ground for the German Idealism of Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel.214 Hegel identified Wolff’s system in the Encyclopaedia Logic as part of the 
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‘metaphysics of the most recent past’ – a metaphysics, moreover, that he himself sought 
to supplant in the development of his dialectical logic. This metaphysics, for Hegel, 
however, ‘belongs to the past… only in relation to the history of philosophy’.215 Wolff’s 
‘insistence that philosophy alone possessed a rational deductive method of demonstration’ 
expressed the claim ‘that the unique ability of philosophy … should entitle it to lead the 
other faculties’.216 Wolff’s assertion, moreover, that ‘the truth is nothing other than the 
world of reason’ and his notion that ‘its content is not only disclosed through the logic 
[but that] it is the logic itself, because the laws [Gesetze] of right are analogous with the 
laws of human reason’217 would find a distinct echo in Hegel’s work. Even if Hegel 
rejects what he sees as the one-sided theorisation of Wolff’s philosophy, his own system 
can be seen as directly deriving from the new emphasis on the disciplinary structure of 
philosophy as right that Wolff established. Hegel’s conception of reason as dialectics, 
moreover, places philosophy in the leading role in the most systematic fashion as it 
proceeds from the logic (form) to the other disciplines (content). Hegel discussed this at 
the outset of the Grundlinien: 
 
form in its most concrete significance is reason as conceptual cognition, and 
content is reason as the substantial essence of both ethical and natural actuality; the 
conscious identity of the two is the philosophical Idea.218 
 
As he expressed it in the Preface to the 1817 Encyclopaedia: 
 
The present exposition ... sets out a new elaboration of philosophy, according to a 
method that will, I hope, be recognised eventually as the only genuine one, the only 
method that is identical with its content.219 
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The social-historical position of philosophy as Christian Wolff had expressed it can 
already be seen in Hegel’s attempt to integrate the empirical sciences and bring natural 
law as well as positive law back under the guidance of a unifying philosophical method in 
the Jena 1802–3 natural law essay. This provides evidence of a distinct continuity in the 
concerns that mark the philosophical epoch of the young and mature Hegel – the demand 
for a definitive philosophical system expressed from within the horizon of the Neo-
Scholastic paradigm of German natural law. 
According to the young Hegel as I analysed above (III.2), the sciences had been 
cleft by Kant’s formalism and the critical philosophy, which failed to restore the 
‘theoretical sciences’ to philosophy. 220  Hegel’s perspective was guided by a 
rapprochement to Greeks, in an attempt to consolidate once again the theoretical and 
practical sciences.221 At this stage Hegel begins to critique and reject ‘the earlier ways of 
treating natural law’ that will be part and parcel to his development throughout the Jena 
period and culminate in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6). The premise of such 
rejection is a failure in their methods, which cannot claim to be genuinely scientific 
insofar as they do not understand ‘opposition and negativity as absolute negativity or 
infinity, which alone is appropriate to science’.222 Hegel ultimately rejects natural law in 
the 1805–6 glosses on the basis of the development of the concept,223 which no longer 
corresponds to the natural order. Hegel thus reformulates his position, which will 
eventually determine the later cleft between the philosophy of nature and subjective and 
objective spirit. Yet, in rejecting the earlier ways of treating natural law – and in explicit 
accordance with the modern rational natural law tradition – Hegel comes to define his 
philosophical science of right as a negative or dialectical science and thus takes over 
                                                
220 Hegel 1999, p. 104. 
221 Hegel 1999, p. 115. 
222 Hegel 1999, p. 105. 
223 The final and conclusive formulation of Hegel’s Naturrecht appears in the Philosophie des Geistes 
(1805–6) (compare to the Encyclopaedia §502 and Grundlinien §57). It now conflicts with the conceptual 
form of right as a speculative science and must be abandoned. Yet it is clear that Naturrecht is maintained, 
at least formally as a title. The late Hegel directly equates ‘natural law’ with the Naturzustand and foreign 
relations between states and develops a ‘spiritualised’ conception of the state of nature in modern civil 
society as I analysed above (III.3, III.4). Naturrecht appears alongside Staatswissenschaft in the original 
title – Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft – which only later came to be known by its subtitle: Grundlinien 
der Philosophie des Rechts. This is important as Ilting has pointed out as it directly equates political science 
with natural law (see Ilting 1983, p. 106) – the political as the organisation of right is the concretisation of 
civil society, the stemming of the Naturzustand as ‘spiritualised’ for Hegel and its eventual externalisation 
into the conflict between states, which in turn develops into history. 
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one of the fundamental aspects characterising the rational natural law school: a 
nova methodus discendae docend aeque jurisprudentiae, a new method for 
learning and teaching legal science, a method that leads to a systematic 
construction or reconstruction of law.224 
 
This reconstruction of law along the lines of a ‘speculative science’ or ‘speculative 
knowledge’ directly extends to the determination of the concepts of the Grundlinien, and 
is explicitly stated by Hegel in the outset of the ‘textbook’. I want to note here that Hegel 
makes a remark on this in the Introduction to the Grundlinien: ‘Since I have developed 
the nature of speculative knowledge in my Science of Logic, I have only occasionally 
added an explanatory comment on procedure and method in the present outline’.225 Thus 
what marks Hegel’s interpretation of political modernity is not only the emergence of 
civil society as a concept differentiated from the political order of the state, but also this 
distinctive logical form that breaks with ‘the metaphysics of the most recent past’, which, 
for Hegel, was essentially a form of ‘dogmatism [that] consisted in adhering to one-sided 
determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites’.226 It is safe to say, 
following what I have quoted from Hegel above, that metaphysical problems are also to 
be understood politically, which consequently permits Hegel a very distinctive approach 
to modernity. It is thus that questions of method will to an equal extent determine the 
content of Hegel’s concepts, and the Stände will be no different in this respect. Civil 
society and the state accordingly must not be regarded ‘as separated from one another by 
an infinite abyss’ as ‘determinations that stand opposed to one another never able to reach 
each other’: 
 
On the contrary, what is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have 
any such one-sided determination in it, and is therefore not exhausted by it; on the 
contrary, being a totality, it contains the determinations that dogmatism holds to be 
fixed and true in a state of separation from one another united within itself.227 
 
It is thus that the organisation of the Stände in civil society can express the political 
sovereignty of the state. And indeed for Hegel they must do so in order to prevent the 
                                                
224 See Pattaro 2009, p. xvi. This refers to the title of a book by Leibniz, but adequately expresses Hegel’s 
conception of dialectics applied as a new method in treating the juridical as well as the empirical and natural 
sciences and deriving a new basis for practical philosophy. 
225 Hegel 1991a, p. 10. 
226 Hegel 1991b, p. 70 (§32 Addition). 
227 Hegel 1991b, p. 70 (§32, addition). 
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dissolution brought about by the dialectic of poverty and wealth that threatens to dissolve 
the system of right and freedom into a society of classes [Klassengesellschaft]. This state 
of nature, which I discussed above (III.4), reveals itself for Hegel not only as a system of 
inequality, but also ‘that, despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy 
enough…’.228 
 
The ‘state’ as ‘civil society’ [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] becomes the ‘political state’, 
the actuality of concrete freedom, in which the history of the emancipation of 
humanity comes to a standstill – from the society of citizens [Bürgergesellschaft] 
of the Greek polis and Roman civitas, in which only one is considered to be free, 
right up to the civil society [bürgerliche Gesellschaft] of the modern legal [Rechts-] 
and constitutional state [Verfassungsstaates] which guarantees the freedom of 
all.229 
 
Hegel explicitly appeals to the logic in his remark to §302 in order to reunify civil society 
and the state by way of the Stände. The ‘dialectic in institutions’ belongs precisely to the 
‘attempt to overcome spiritually and speculatively the revolution occurring with the 
emergence of civil society’ that ‘is the driving force of political revolution [that] brings 
dichotomy into history’. 230  Hegel’s conceptual redeployment of the Stände as a 
‘mediating organ’ can also be understood in this sense, as derived from ‘one of the most 
important insights of the logic: that a specific moment which, when it stands in opposition, 
has the position of an extreme, loses this quality and becomes an organic moment by 
being simultaneously a mean’.231 
As I have shown in this chapter, Hegel’s early concept of the Stände – in its 
proximity to the ancients – is to be contrasted with how it appears in his maturity, a 
maturity I might add that lay in its nascent state at the close of the Jena period in the 
Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) just before the appearance of the Phenomenology 
(1807), that contentious introduction to the system. This is furthermore shown through 
Hegel’s encounter with the modern tradition of natural law that develops by way of his 
interpretation of the crisis of modern civil society as seen in the spiritualised version of 
the state of nature. It is important to note that while Hegel slowly rejects the ancients in 
                                                
228 Hegel 1991a, p. 267 (§245). 
229 Riedel 2004, p. 781. 
230 Ritter 1984, pp. 103, 76. 
231 Hegel 1991a, §302 (original emphasis). 
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his development of a theory of labour, the complex of ethical life is maintained, but in the 
developmental context of history as a distinctive political form and as integral to the 
philosophical science of right. Indeed Sittlichkeit, in part, distinguishes Hegel’s 
Naturrecht from earlier theories. To a certain degree, through his rejection of the contract 
and his specific institutional formation of right, Hegel’s reformulates ‘the entire tradition 
of modern natural law, [which saw in] the justification of state sovereignty and its 
compatibility with the postulate of the autonomy of each individual the central problem, 
which must be solved with the model of a treaty [Staatsvertrag]’.232 Yet to be fair to 
Hegel it is not as if he denied this tradition its full significance; it simply took on a new 
meaning for him in the transformed context of modern civil society, where ‘abstract right’ 
and the contract had their proper place just as they had previously for Pufendorf in the 
state of nature. The basis for the political order for the mature Hegel is reliant on the 
individual will becoming concrete in institutions – in this way the general will also attains 
its actuality. It was there that Sittlichkeit took root, developing in the self-consciousness of 
the individual that recognised its right in the form of law and institutions, as I will analyse 
in detail in Chapter Four. This consciousness has a history, which Hegel traced through 
the theory of reciprocal recognition, of the development of self-consciousness and of law 
as the substance of the individual. In Chapter Four I will trace the theory of the Stände in 
the context of Sittlichkeit that implies the overcoming of the dichotomy of the interiority 
of the individual’s conscience and the external order of the state by way of self-
consciousness. This will add an additional dimension to the concept of the Stände that 
involves Hegel’s universal history of freedom – the necessity of institutions in which the 
subjective spirit of the individual can come into correspondence with objective spirit of 
the community. 
 
                                                
232 Ilting 1983, p. 108. 
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Chapter Four: Ethical Life 
 
There is no outer thing that 
drawn into this movement 
could not forthwith become 
the most inward.1 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to analyse Hegel’s usage of the Stände in the framework 
of his theory of Sittlichkeit, which I will show is his attempt to dissolve the dichotomy of 
inner and outer introduced into the modern tradition by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and 
then carried into the metaphysical domain by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). The 
development of this dichotomy has an important history, and eventually leads to the 
distinction between morality and politics that will further lay the basis for the 
development of modern civil society and the state. I will analyse both Hobbes and Kant 
and some other major figures, most notably Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), and the 
historical significance of these developments. This will in turn allow me to analyse 
Hegel’s developing political theory of the Stände in more detail and how they form and 
shape his concept of Sittlichkeit from a very early period (Jena 1802–3), and to further 
highlight how they seek to respond in a novel and distinctive fashion to the problems 
posed by the modern political tradition. 
The present chapter will be divided into three parts. For practical purposes, however, 
I will divide the first and second sections (IV.1, IV.2) into subsections (α, β, γ). The first 
subsection of section one (α) deals with the introduction of the dichotomy of inner and 
outer as it appears in the modern tradition with Hobbes and the unity of morality and 
politics in his thought. I will then show how this is essentially transformed in the ensuing 
century, notably by Thomasius, into a cleft between morality and politics (β) through the 
developing independence of conscience. This will lead directly to a discussion of the 
divide between the public and private use of reason and the developing metaphysical 
tradition as it appears with Kant (γ). In the second section of this chapter (IV.2) I will 
analyse Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and the institutional form of his politics as it takes shape in the 
Stände, which make their first appearance as a form of conceptual stratification in System 
                                                
1 Barth 1973, p. 405. 
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der Sittlichkeit [Critik des Fichteschen Naturrechts] (1802–3).2 In the first subsection of 
section two (α) I will show how Hegel’s concept of the Stände is initially shaped and 
formed as a specific response to what I will have by then already laid out in some detail. 
This introduction and context to System der Sittlichkeit will be framed by the perspective 
of the modern dichotomy of inner and outer, of morality and politics, and the 
metaphysical tradition that Kant introduced as a ‘formal’ moral autonomy that acted as a 
‘compulsion’ on the ‘sensuously effected will’.3 I will also situate System der Sittlichkeit 
in this section in the broader horizon of Hegel’s early work. After having introduced and 
contextualised this early Jena manuscript, I will then (β) discuss Hegel’s shift away from 
the Christian religion as a response to Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), the 
development of the Greek influence on the young Hegel in the context of the house 
community in System der Sittlichkeit, and his developing conception of love as a family 
relation. It is essential to trace this moment as the family has a central bearing on the 
Stände, which are conceived as the return of the familial element at the level of the civil 
in Hegel’s maturity. This analysis of the family in System der Sittlichkeit will lead to an 
analysis of Hegel’s early conception of Lordship and Bondage, which will lead me to the 
final subsection. The third subsection (γ) deals with the structure of rule in System der 
Sittlichkeit, which involves the development of Hegel’s conception consciousness, 
subject-objectivity, the Stände and the organic state. I will show how a rejection of the 
early Jena period in the structuration of right and recognition (1805–6) in Hegel’s 
development makes a proper understanding of his institutional thought impossible. Thus I 
will stress the importance and significance of System der Sittlichkeit and its introduction 
of the Stände in Hegel’s development alongside his return to modern ‘individualist’ 
natural law. After having analysed System der Sittlichkeit in some detail in the second part 
of this chapter (IV.2), I will be in a position to critically approach debates in the existing 
literature and reframe the emphasis on Hegel’s politics with specific attention to the 
                                                
2 For a critical edition see Hegel 2002; see Meist 2002 pp. ix–xxxix on Karl Rosenkranz’s error of 
judgement [Fehleinschätzung] on the dating and placement of System der Sittlichkeit in the 
Frankfurt period, and the former’s ‘fictional reconstruction’ of the manuscript prior to Hegel’s 
teaching in Jena. The manuscript’s proper placement and value is as a systematic critique of 
Fichte’s theory of natural law, which Hegel was studying and intended to lecture on. Based on the 
study of Hegel’s handwriting undertaken by Heinz Kimmerle, this manuscript now appears to have 
been composed in winter 1802 or spring 1803, after he had composed the Jena natural law essay. 
3 See Ilting 1983, pp. 230ff. 
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question of the Naturzustand, which significantly oriented my discussion of the modernity 
of Hegel’s institutional articulation of the Stände in Chapter Three. In so doing, I will 
analyse Hegel’s mature Rechtsphilosophie from the perspective of System der Sittlichkeit, 
and relate how the attempt to overcome the divide between inner and outer, morality and 
politics, civil society and state still relies in part on the earlier conceptions of Sittlichkeit 
and the Stände, which in this case leads to a recognition of the individual in the positive 
order of law in the state. This will lead to the final section of this chapter (IV.3), which 
concludes my discussion by showing how Sittlichkeit eventually comes to replace – or 
transform – the traditional discussion of civil religion as it had appeared in Hobbes and 
Rousseau and is formative of the distinctiveness of Hegel’s late ideological approach. 
Sittlichkeit for Hegel is nothing other than the customs, laws and institutions of the 
political community, thus the Stände are implied here as a central element. 
The approach I will develop to this early period of Hegel’s development has not as 
yet been explored in the existing literature. By continuing to clarify the objectivity of the 
Stände for Hegel as an institutional form within the context of the modern political 
tradition – in this case in the introduction of the distinction between the inner and the 
outer – I will stress how Hegel conceived of the Stände in a novel fashion related to what 
he came to conceptualise as the history of the freedom of self-consciousness. The general 
trajectory of this chapter will analyse how the development of Hegel’s political thought is 
characterised by how the individual will and consciousness become concretely organised 
in the institutions of the state, and how the inwardness of the subject is identified with the 
substantiality of the external positive order of law and politics. The way in which Hegel 
goes about this differs in extremes, and entails tracing the development of his early 
thought specifically that entails an original appropriation of the Stände as an institutional 
solution to the problems of the absolutist state and the French Revolution, as many of 
these ideas are largely absent in the early manuscripts or appear as specific problems that 
he seeks to solve. It is my general contention, however, and I will show this in detail in 
this final chapter, that Hegel’s late institutionalism is in no way comprehensible without 
taking the early Jena period developments fully into account. It is thus central to study the 
conceptualisation of the Stände in System der Sittlichkeit as the first example of Hegel’s 
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rigorous institutional thought. Thus the novelty of Hegel’s Stände will be seen to lie in 
their derivation and transformation of the tradition of classical political thought. 
 
IV.1 From Forum Externum to Forum Internum 
 
The present section will be subdivided into the three major figures concerning my 
discussion (Hobbes, Thomasius, and Kant). At this initial stage, I will be largely 
unconcerned with a substantial textual analysis of Hegel’s work but rather more focused 
on tracing certain intellectual developments leading up to Hegel’s period that will be 
pertinent to my later discussions (IV.2). The central problem will be to establish how the 
dichotomy of inner and outer becomes a central conviction of the classical epoch, a 
process that on a philosophical level took hold through the dissemination of the political 
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes who correctly perceived that the interest in conscience 
must be excluded from the political question, which had marked both civil obedience and 
civil disobedience since the Reformation (1517–1648). I will analyse why and how the 
ensuing century of Enlightenment will substantially invert Hobbes’s original intention and 
how this leads to a cleft between morality and politics, which, in its condemnation of 
political power, lays in part at the basis of the French Revolution.4 I will show how Hegel 
fully comprehended this process and the particular history that underlay it in both the 
history of philosophy and politics, and how Christian Thomasius figures centrally in these 
debates. This will then lead me to a discussion of Kant, firstly by way of his cleft between 
public and private reason and, secondly, in terms of his late metaphysics in the context of 
the young Hegel’s early conception of Sittlichkeit. This will lead to an initial study of 
Hegel’s Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798–1800), which will then 
situate my subsequent discussion that shifts to a more substantive textual analysis of 
Hegel’s works (IV.2) and System der Sittlichkeit in particular and the role the Stände play 
in this early manuscript. 
 
α) Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) 
 
                                                
4 See Koselleck 1988, whose analysis I follow his closely in this respect. 
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It has been perceptively noted that Hobbes’s state theory is not only an English but also a 
European-wide phenomenon. Living in exile in France, Hobbes was immersed in the 
political developments on the continent. The religious civil wars of the period were not 
unique to his homeland but also widespread on the continent. Thus his theory may also be 
said to reflect on political events there. Indeed, he was also formed by the period he spent 
in emigration as he shaped the future tenets of his political doctrine.5 The inner rights of 
conscience consequently found their way into his political philosophy as the only peaceful 
answer to the religious conflicts; it was thus determined, and took its shape, from the 
ideas that broke into history with the Reformation. Hobbes perceived correctly that the 
law erred when it extended beyond ‘the rule of actions to the very thoughts and 
consciences of men by examination and inquisition of what they hold’.6 Consequently 
conscience slowly became a question of natural right, of the internal reason of the subject, 
while law became identical with the positive order of the state and was juridically limited 
to the external behaviour of human beings. In order to restrict the religious conflicts an 
inner moral sphere autonomous from the political structure developed, which, however 
lay at its foundation. This is the ‘logical paradox’ of Hobbes’s notion of the origin of the 
state ‘arising from a contract pre-ordained in time’. 7  Moreover, it underlies the 
inconsistency of Hobbes’s discussion of the possibility of forming contracts in the state of 
nature and the contractual origin of the state as such. 
 
The logical paradox lies in the fact that the State owes its existence to a contract, 
and that it then exists as an autonomous formation. It takes Leviathan to be a State 
which is at once the cause and effect of its foundation. Thus Hobbes did away with 
the supposed priority of inner individual resolutions so as to elucidate that each 
fulfillable morality was just as originally dependent on the State order.8 
 
It is precisely to this extent that Leo Strauss identified Hobbes’s theory of self-
preservation with morality and the peaceable attitude whereby ‘natural law and moral 
                                                
5 ‘Unequivocally, Hobbes’s doctrine of the State grew out of the historical situation of civil war. For 
Hobbes, who had experienced the formation of the Absolutist State in France, having been there when 
Henry IV was assassinated, and again when La Rochelle surrendered to the troops of Richelieu – for 
Hobbes there could be no other goal than to prevent the civil war he saw impending in England, or, once it 
had broken out, to bring it to an end’ (Koselleck 1988, p. 23; compare Schmitt 2008, p. 79). Hobbes’s old 
friend Henry Hammond also asserted the overlapping of his political ideas with the development of 
continental politics (see Tuck 2004, p. 122). 
6 Hobbes 1651, p. 427. 
7 Koselleck 1988, p. 32. 
8 Ibid. 
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philosophy are essentially the same’ – self-preservation ‘compels to assuring the future, to 
peace and to the state’.9 Thus the possibility of civil war is the premise of the sovereignty 
of the state. It is important to note that this logical paradox for Hegel occurs also insofar 
as ‘the expression nature has a double significance’ for Hobbes: ‘in the first place the 
nature of man signifies his spiritual and rational Being’ in the second, it is the condition in 
which ‘man conducts himself according to his natural impulses’.10 Hobbes’s acuity lies 
precisely in the confluence of the state of nature with the realm of opinion, religious 
conflict, and desire – each of which arouse strife.11 Thus the natural state is preserved at 
the core of Hobbes’s philosophy, and not only at the pinnacle of the state with the 
sovereign but also in the inward sphere of conscience where formerly externalised 
(confessional) conflict is subjectivised. Hegel understood this process in his youth in the 
Verfassungsschrift at a time when he was reading Hobbes,12 but equated it directly with 
the Reformation and the establishment of the European states system. 
 
The German character seized upon the innermost being [das Innerste] of man, 
upon religion and conscience, and firmly established the isolation [of individuals] 
on this basis; the separation of the external realm [das Äußeren] into states was 
merely a consequence of this.13 
 
Therefore in the creation of inwardness, in the toleration and developing neutrality of the 
state form towards questions of conscience, an aspect of nature is preserved at the 
foundation: the morality of self-preservation leads to the inwardness of the human being 
formally separated from the external realm of legal actions. Hobbes’s radicality lay in the 
fact that both the inwardness of conscience and the externality of action need not or must 
not conform to each other. There are no precepts to the law that would regulate internal 
thought or behaviour, but only a positive content by which each subject must externally 
abide. Hobbes thus fully separated himself from the confessional aspect of conscience and 
its coercion that had dominated European politics since the Reformation. He was 
interested in law insofar as it preserved peace, and natural law was a mere moral means to 
                                                
9 Strauss 1982, p. 229. 
10 Hegel 1995b, p. 318. 
11 See Hobbes 1651, pp. 40, 41. 
12 See Rosenkranz 1844, pp. 156–9 where this influence is documented in the Hegel’s 
Habilitationsdisputation 27 August 1801 – precisely during the period when he was still occupied with the 
concerns of the Verfassungsschrift. I owe this reference to Ilting 2006, p. 27. 
13 Hegel 1999, p. 51. 
  167 
this end; indeed, it was a positive law that was paramount as concretised in the will of the 
sovereign ruler.14 And in order to enable its legality 
 
in a neutral, supra-partisan, religiously indifferent fashion, Hobbes continuously 
cited the very difference once derived from historical reality, that between inner 
inclination and outward action, which according to his analysis would stroke the 
flames of civil war, so as to make it serve public order… Hobbes’s cogitative 
achievement lay in shifting the cleft between conscience and politics.15 
 
At the bottom of Hobbes’s ‘functionalist reinterpretation of conscience’ lay his 
justification for the supremacy of state sovereignty, and his desire to bring unity back 
once more to the political order.16 The outer order of the state could remain undivided so 
long as individuals had jurisdiction over their inner life. Thus precisely at the point where 
Hobbes established the unity of religion and politics, he distinguished fides and confessio 
‘from which everything else was logically derived in the century that ensued until the rise 
of the liberal constitutional state’.17 The positive law of the sovereign could be established 
precisely by way of the removal of confessional questions, from their ‘detraditionalisation’ 
or ‘depoliticisation’ – the shift from their centrality in political conflict to a question of 
individual conscience and eventually personal choice. Consequently, the individual was 
divided into the human being and the citizen.18 Thus the primacy of the political was 
established in the same instance as private, internal (natural) right. So long as the Church 
possessed both temporal and spiritual power the internal and external were unified or, 
more precisely, conceptually indistinct; the confessional conflict of the Reformation truly 
marks the beginning of their disunity.19 The demand for a less external conception of the 
Church and the more inward one of the predestined community first arose with John 
Wycliffe, and ‘so prepared the way for that German Reformation which at this very point 
broke thoroughly away from the medieval idea of unity’.20 
 
                                                
14 See Bobbio 1989, p. 115: ‘Hobbes belongs, de jure, to the history of legal positivism’. 
15 Koselleck 1988, pp. 35–6. 
16 See Koselleck 1988, p. 29, footnote 27 on Hobbes’s ‘functionalist reinterpretation of conscience’. 
17 Schmitt 2008, p. 56. 
18 Hobbes’s division of the individual here of course transforms in the ensuing centuries once the state of 
nature is identified with the embryonic relationships that lead to modern economy and society – into 
Rousseau’s famous division of bourgeois and citoyen. Also see my discussion in Chapter Three (III.1) 
relating this development to Pufendorf. 
19 Koselleck 1988, p. 29, footnote 27. 
20 Gierke 1922, p. 19. 
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The Middle Ages had possessed a uniform culture, which even the Reformation 
had not destroyed. What did destroy it was the relentless progress of the intellectual 
movement of the Renaissance, of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
emancipation of culture from the Church which compelled the Church’s 
emancipation from culture seemed an accomplished fact. The entire intellectual 
surge of the Enlightenment, but the struggle against the Enlightenment too, had had 
the effect of widening this rift.21 
 
The integrity of Hobbes’s political theory of the Leviathan was accomplished only 
through the unification of church and state. But this came at the cost of a contradiction 
insofar as ‘the Christian religion was and is not a cult consecrating a national culture but a 
transcendent faith in a future redemption’.22 Christianity therefore was in essence contrary 
to civil religion as in its origins it had little or no concern for the world. Thus Hobbes, 
according to Rousseau (1712–88), ‘ought to have seen that the domineering spirit of 
Christianity was incompatible with his system, and that the interest of the priest would 
always be stronger than that of the state’.23 Spinoza (1632–77) had also recognised the 
principle of the Christian religion as fundamentally one of privacy and of secrecy, which 
would return in the secular priesthood with the Enlightenment in the following century as 
morality turned into a political weapon directed at absolutism.24 For Hegel, Roman 
Christianity inherited a spiritualisation totally alienated from the world. And from 
Constantine onwards this was placed inside the imperial Church, which in turn ‘negated 
sensuousness [and] did not know how to be ethical’.25 
 
An epochal turning inward [Epochale Einkehr in sich selbst] grips mankind in 
antiquity, as people turn away from the state and its organisations because it has 
                                                
21 Barth 1973, p. 410. ‘Hegel wanted to do justice to both sides, with an equity and a circumspection such as 
none had summoned before him. He wanted to be a modern man, without forsaking or conceding anything, 
and we must also credit his other desire, his wish to be a Christian, and indeed a Lutheran Christian, without 
forsaking or conceding anything (1973, p. 411). 
22 Löwith 1949, p. 30. 
23 Rousseau 2002, pp. 248–9. 
24 See Spinoza 2004, p. 254; and see Koselleck 1988, p. 39 footnote 50 on the awareness of the 
Enlightenment as successor of the clergy. Koselleck has traced the secrecy in the secular cults of morality, 
in the Masonic lodges and societies in the eighteenth century (mainly in France). The contours of 
Koselleck’s argument and the basis for his overarching historical analysis are to be found in Schmitt 2008, 
pp. 60–2. 
25 Hegel 1999, p. 199. The shift for Hegel, as I will show in the conclusion of this chapter, occurs with the 
Reformation – the becoming worldly of the ethical in the family (love, procreation, education), trade and 
industry (labour) and, for the early Hegel, the unity of the church with the state (‘the actuality of the 
kingdom of heaven [Himmelreichs]’ – Hegel 1987, p. 259 (original emphasis)). 
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nothing spiritual to offer. This creates a longing for something beyond doubt, 
something which would survive the collapse of the old order.26 
 
The eschatological aspect of Christianity took centre stage in Hobbes’s political 
philosophy, and he used it in order to bolster his political argument for supremacy of state 
sovereignty. In so doing, he reduced the essence of Christianity to 
  
simply the acceptance of the truth of [the] prophetic history that Christ will return 
to earth in a corporeal form, and will rule over the resurrected saints. In the 
meantime, death means extinction, the soul has no existence after death, nor does 
the spiritual realm intrude on the present physical world. 
 
Therefore in Hobbes’s scenario the role played by the subject was that of merely ‘waiting 
submissively for the return of Christ’.27 In the meantime the temporal state took over the 
role traditionally assign to Roman (in essence imperial) Christianity as restraining the 
Anti-Christ (Katechon), but was limited, since 1648, to the internal borders of the 
juridically defined inner space of the state. As far as doctrinal dispute was concerned this, 
according to Hobbes in Leviathan, was wholly in the jurisdiction of the sovereign; it was 
no longer to be decided by a mere established clergy as this proved to lead to the disunity 
of the civil.28 Yet the idea of a national Christian church, as Rousseau rightly perceived, 
would always be as tenuous as the concentration of absolute power, religious and political, 
in the hands of the sovereign. The unity that Hobbes asserted for his state was constructed 
on the basis of a religion that was fundamentally unsuitable for such purposes. And, in the 
words of Rousseau, Christianity brought with it ‘a perpetual conflict of jurisdiction, which 
has rendered any good polity impossible in Christian states’.29 Hobbes had merely shifted 
the lines of the conflict, and the sovereign still had no jurisdiction over the other world. 
As Reinhart Koselleck notes, Hobbes ‘did not argue from inside outwards but the 
reverse, from the outside in’ thus introducing ‘the state as a structure in which private 
                                                
26 Taubes 2009, p. 59. 
27 Tuck 2004, p. 121. Tuck references Pocock’s interpretation that ‘by putting forward this particular 
eschatology, Hobbes was able to refute the assertions of those who claimed spiritual authority prior to the 
risen Christ’. And adds that ‘the clear desire to refute all claims to spiritual authority only appears in 
Hobbes’s work at the same time as the eschatology itself – that is, in the Leviathan’ (ibid). 
28 See Tuck 2004, pp. 120–38 on the transformation in Hobbes’s thinking from an established clergy 
interpreting scripture to the sovereign’s right to interpretation as such. 
29 Rousseau 2002, p. 248. 
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mentalities are deprived of their political effect’.30 The success of Hobbes’s political 
theory of sovereignty on the continent, however – and particularly in the Holy Roman 
Empire – entailed a reversal of the traditional dichotomy of inner and outer, of morality 
and politics. The construction of modern state was now derived on the basis of inner 
rightly conviction, on the absolute autonomy of morality. As I will show in far more detail 
below (IV.2, IV.3) Hegel’s development of Sittlichkeit attempted to abolish the 
dichotomy. And it did so by first returning to the thought world of the Greeks alongside 
Spinoza’s doctrine of substance. As I will show in the conclusion, the later Hegel saw this 
in a different light and, by contrast, affirmed certain aspects of the very historical 
developments that had led to the dichotomy in the first place, specifically those that dealt 
with the growth of Protestantism and the German Aufklärung in the Berlin Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History (1827–31). For Hegel this now entailed the history of the freedom 
of self-consciousness, which represented ‘the momentous transition of the inner to the 
outer, that incorporation [Einbildung] of reason into reality which the whole of world 
history has worked to achieve’.31 
 
β) Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) 
 
Hegel was fully aware of the reversal of the traditional dichotomy of inner and outer, of 
morality and politics. This was writ large in his interpretation of Hobbes and Pufendorf in 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.32 His interpretation of Hobbes is marked not 
only by the ‘phenomenon of consciousness’, which he imputes to Hobbes as laying at the 
basis of the state, but also ‘the passive obedience of subjects, the divine authority of rulers, 
whose will is absolute law – without appeal as regards law and positive religion and their 
external relations’.33 By contrast, while Pufendorf recognises the divine constitution of 
authority for Hegel 
                                                
30 Koselleck 1988, pp. 29, 30. 
31 Hegel 1991a, p. 294 (§270). 
32 The Michelet volume was based on the original Jena notebooks (1805–6) that Hegel used in his lectures; 
these were combined and edited by Michelet with a fragment of Hegel’s on the history of philosophy from 
Heidelberg (1816–18), Hegel’s introductory lectures (1820), and several sets of lecture notes: Michelet 
(1823–4), J.F.C. Kampe (1829–30), and Griesheim (1825–6). 
33 Hegel 1995b, p. 316; compare 1991a, p. 277 (§258) where Rousseau is spoken of in similar terms, and in 
distinction from the mere ‘form’ of the ‘social instinct’ (Grotius and Pufendorf) and ‘divine authority’ 
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the impulses and necessities present in mankind were now considered as well. 
These were regarded as the inward principles for private and political law, and 
from them the duties both of the government and of rulers were deduced, so that the 
freedom of mankind might not be interfered with. The basis of the state in 
Pufendorf’s view is the social instinct: the highest end of the state is the peace and 
security of social life through the transformation of inward duties as prescribed by 
conscience into external duties as compelled by law’.34 
 
Carl Schmitt later developed a similar insight, yet with the important addition of Christian 
Thomasius: ‘Through Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, Hobbes’s theory emerged 
victorious on the continent, but only at the expense of the relationship between outer and 
inner which was reversed’.35 Hegel, however, does not neglect Thomasius, who appears 
in a far less condescending light in the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of History 
(1827–31) than in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. In the latter he appears in the 
entry on Wolff, where his philosophy is discussed in terms of its ‘superficial character’ 
and ‘empty universality’.36 
The persistence of Hobbes’s ideas and the political efficacy of his theory in the 
German-speaking lands have been traced adeptly by many scholars.37 Hobbes’s theory 
answered the peculiar political conditions established since the religious peace of 1555 
with the territorial ius reformandi, but did so by providing a secular basis that shifted the 
emphasis from theological dispute and confessional conflict to jurisprudence.38 Rather 
than the independence of the churches advocated by John Locke in his Letter on 
Toleration (1689), Hobbes advocated the subordination of church to the state.39 Due to the 
multiplicity of confessional divides in the struggle for the consolidation of princely power 
on the territorial state, Hobbes’s impact in Germany – and particularly on Prussia – was 
more pronounced than Locke’s.40 The latter’s theory of toleration saw the congregation of 
                                                                                                                                             
(Hobbes). ‘Rousseau put forward the will as the principle of the state’, which was ‘thought’ as its ‘form’ and 
‘thinking’ as its ‘content’ (ibid). 
34 Hegel 1995b, p. 322 (emphasis added). 
35 Schmitt 2008, p. 58. Thomasius was Pufendorf’s most important follower. 
36 Hegel 1995b, p. 349. 
37 See for example Dreitzel 2003; Palladini 2008; Schröder 1997 and 2001. 
38 This process is particularly acute in Thomasius and his development of secular jurisprudence that 
conflicted with the Lutheran clergy at the university in Halle. 
39 See Hobbes 1651, pp. 107–13, 205–17. 
40 See Schmitt 2008, p. 97; compare Schröder 1997, p. 61. 
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churches as ‘absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth’,41 which was the 
exact opposite of the reigning state of affairs in the Holy Roman Empire since Martin 
Luther.42 By contrast, Hobbes’s doctrine of the absolute sovereignty and the external cult 
of the state were more generally applicable in the German-speaking lands. 
Hobbes’s emphasis on Jesus’s teaching that his kingdom was not of this world can 
be corroborated to the true church in Pietism that, insofar as it is invisible, ‘opens itself to 
state rule’.43 From this moment onwards, according to Christian Thomasius, ‘the state 
power limits itself to watch over the public peace’ – it becomes a pouvoir neutre.44 In the 
telling reversal of the Hobbesian paradigm, ‘Thomasius wants to protect not only inner 
conviction as such, but to exclude from all external efforts that which would impair the 
freedom of the individual’s decision’.45 This leads to a fundamental cleft between right 
and morality: on the one hand, to the positivisation of all law whereby ‘obligation is now 
based on the force and intelligence of the ruler rather than voluntary agreement’; and, on 
the other, to ‘“the refusal of natural law as a law by Thomasius and the recognition of the 
positivity of all right”’.46 It is thus that natural right is transformed from a normative 
theory to a mere compliment of political absolutism; it is represented as an inner virtue 
while the external compulsion of positive law rules in the field of the state.47 Thus what 
Hobbes had done for politics in freeing it from the constraints of religion Thomasius had 
done for jurisprudence by creating an independent sphere for human law.48 
In the Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1827–31), Hegel praises Thomasius 
as having first given ‘the secular aspect’ to conscience and law opening space for ‘the rise 
                                                
41 Locke quoted in Schröder 1997, p. 61. 
42 The ‘final goal of Luther’s efforts’ was ‘the reforming despots of the Aufklärung’ (Figgis 1999, p. 54) and 
this eventually led to secularism in the field of the state. 
43 Rüping 1979, p. 80. 
44 Rüping 1979, p. 80. Compare Schmitt 2008, p. 44: ‘When Frederick the Great said in his political 
testament of 1752: “Je suis neutre entre Rome et Genève”, he was alluding to his pride in the perfection of 
the Prussian state rather than his “philosophical” attitude toward taking sides in theological controversies. 
What is discernable in his statement is neutrality in the technical-political (staatlichen) sense rather than 
tolerance or personal skepticism’. The quote from Bluntschli that the work of Thomasius constitutes ‘“the 
learned preparatory course for the state of Frederick the Great”’ (Schmitt 2008, p. 58) is corroborated by 
Hegel. 
45 Rüping 1979, p. 80. 
46 Ilting 1983, p. 92; Welzel quoted in Ilting 1983, p. 92, note 283. 
47 Rüping 1979, p. 83. 
48 See Schröder 1997, p. 72. 
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of the universal, the growing consciousness of universal laws of freedom’.49 ‘Historically 
speaking, Thomasius was primarily concerned with the secularization of politics and with 
establishing it as an autonomous activity in clearly specific fields’.50 Hegel’s reappraisal 
of Thomasius in comparison to his denigrating caricature in the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy coincides with changing perspective on Frederick II who is now ‘named as the 
ruler under whom the new era attained actuality, the era in which the actual political 
interest acquired its universality and supreme justification. He deserves particular 
emphasis because he grasped the universal end of the state by means of thought’.51 Hegel 
uses the same terminology in speaking of Frederick II’s rule as he does in his 
interpretation of Locke, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf and, pre-eminently Rousseau in the 
Grundlinien where thought and consciousness become paramount. 
If ‘the main thrust of Hobbes political writings was to free politics from 
religion’,52 the same can be said of Thomasius, but with an important addition: he also 
freed morality – the inner life of the subject – completely from political jurisdiction and 
deduced the basis of the laws of the state from morality following Pufendorf. Hobbes’s 
infamous Auctoritas non Veritas facit legem held the authority of the sovereign above the 
confessional conflict over religious truth; in so doing he was able to reduce confessional 
conflict and confine it to the newly established inner sphere of conscience. Yet insofar as 
Hobbes argued for the supremacy of the external cult of the sovereign in the arbitration of 
religious matters, the adiaphora,53 the indifferent things of religion that were seen as 
unnecessary for salvation fell under the positive laws of the state and ‘the sovereign’s 
competence for the sake of peace and security of the commonwealth’.54 On the contrary, 
what arose with Thomasius was an extension of the inner space of conscience into the 
field of the state itself insofar as the adiaphora were limited neither by sovereign power 
                                                
49 Hegel 1999, p. 207. 
50 Barnard 1965, p. 437. 
51 Hegel 1999, p. 209 (original emphasis), ‘thought’ is a trope for Hegel’s definition of modernity. 
52 Schröder 1997, p. 70. Compare Tuck 2004, pp. 124ff who has shown an added complication to this in 
Hobbes’s development in De Cive where ‘the sovereign is under the duty to use apostolically ordained 
clergymen in deciding doctrine’. 
53 A concept derived from Stoic philosophy meaning those things lying outside of the moral law to which it 
is indifferent – in Christianity, what is inessential to faith. For Thomasius, ‘according to natural religion all 
external worship of God is an indifferent matter’ (Thomasius 2007, p. 50). I will have the opportunity below 
in the conclusion to analyse this in the context of §270 of the Grundlinien, which reveals Hegel’s proximity 
to Thomasius and Hobbes in these debates. 
54 Schröder 1997, p. 71. I am following Schröder’s argument to the letter here. 
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nor by the clergy. ‘Unlike Hobbes, [Thomasius] attributed the sphere of adiaphora to the 
individual scope of the subject. What the prince could do however, was to enforce such 
circumstances where religious tenets would obviously disturb the tranquillity of the 
state’.55 The external cult became redundant insofar as Thomasius perceived that the 
‘external ecclesiastical ceremonies and practices in themselves are not divine worship, nor 
an essential part of it’.56 In the following century the power of society is constituted on the 
basis of the free proclamation of conscience, of public opinion. Hobbes had already 
reduced conscience to opinion, and Locke in turn transformed it ‘into constant acts of 
judgement by the rising society … by virtually requiring citizens to proclaim their private 
opinions to be generally binding laws’.57 – A nascent sphere of publicity was therefore 
seen to arise by means of private reason, which leads us to the path later taken by Kant 
and, inadvertently, to the development of modern civil society. I will turn to analyse Kant, 
for the time being however I will pursue Thomasius’s reversal of the Hobbesian 
dichotomy of the inner and the outer to its logical conclusion, which indeed lays the basis 
for Kant. 
 
As evident in Hobbes, the moral inner space that had been excised from the State 
and reserved for man as human being meant (even rudimentarily) a source of the 
unrest that was originally exclusive to the Absolutist system. The authority of 
conscience remained an unconquered remnant of the state of nature, protruding into 
the formally perfected state. The neutralisation of conscience by politics assisted 
with the secularisation of morality. … A morality striving to become political 
would be the great theme of the eighteenth century.58 
 
The consequence of the secularisation of morality following on its separation from 
politics led to a genuine sphere of moral autonomy. Thomasius pursued the externality of 
obedience Hobbes had established to a rigorous protection of the internal belief of the 
subject. He opened up a realm for moral autonomy and faith that would be pursued and 
established on a metaphysical plane by Kant through the continual exclusion of religious 
                                                
55 Schröder 1997, p. 71. 
56 Thomasius 2007, p. 49. 
57 ‘The Law is the publique Conscience – private Consciences … are but private opinions’ (Hobbes 
Elements of Law II, 31 quoted in Koselleck 1988, p. 37). Koselleck 1988, p. 57. ‘Hobbes was not privy to 
the present day distinction between conscience and consciousness’ (see Koselleck 1988, pp. 26–7, footnote 
17); he moreover reduces conscience to said facts and opinions and mutual influence and, above all, to 
secret thoughts (see Hobbes 1651, pp. 40–1). 
58 Koselleck 1988, p. 39. 
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irrationalism from politics and the valorisation of human reason in judgment. Just as 
Pufendorf attempted to ‘show the falsity of Hobbes’s claim … that justice, no less than 
dominion over other things, owes its ultimate existence to states’ that,59 as I analysed 
above (III.1), led to a nascent ‘natural’ sphere of social relations so too had Thomasius 
furthered the extension of the jurisdiction of the ius internum to the adiaphora carving out 
an even larger inner space wholly separate from sovereign jurisdiction and the dominium 
of the ius externum. Thomasius thereby reversed the Hobbesian paradigm and approach – 
‘the sovereign is [no longer] the head of the church and therefore the ultimate authority in 
settling religious conflicts’.60 ‘Our reason cannot but conclude that there is nothing in the 
nature of God that commands us to worship him in an external way’.61 Originally 
following Pufendorf by commenting on and defending the latter’s work in his 
Institutiones (firstly in 1688),62 Thomasius subsequently parted ways with him in the 
Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium (1705).63 ‘Although outwardly appearing as an 
addition and improvement of the Institutiones, there lies in the separation of right from 
ethics [Ethik] and morals [Sitte] [something] essentially new’.64 Whereas for Pufendorf 
the concept of a ‘commanding God’ is at the basis of every morality, for Thomasius only 
the law of the state can be considered law in its proper sense – right had become 
thoroughly positive.65 
 
Since Thomasius, the separation of right and morality has become a standard 
theory and a communis opinio of jurists and politicians. By contrasting juristic 
heteronomy and moral autonomy Kant, in his theory of right and the state, 
undertook to present a summary of such views in the eighteenth century, which 
was meant perhaps to rebalance but not annul the fundamental separation of inner 
                                                
59 Pufendorf 1994, p. 134. 
60 Schröder 1997, p. 70. 
61 Thomasius 2007, p. 54. Rousseau, following on the tenets of Pufendorf’s compulsion to sociability 
[Geselligkeit], secularised the external cult into ‘a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it is 
the duty of the sovereign to determine, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociability, 
without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject. Without having the power to compel 
anyone to believe them, the sovereign may banish from the state whoever does not believe them… not as 
impious, but as unsociable’ (Rousseau 2002, p. 252). 
62  Institutionum jurisprudentiae divinae libri tres: in quibus fundamenta juris naturalis secundum 
hypotheses illustris Pufendorffi perspicue demonstrantur, et ab obiectionibus dissentientum… liberantur. 
63 Rüping 1979, pp. 88, 82. 
64 Rüping 1979, p. 82. 
65 Korkman 2003, p. 216. See also Barnard 1965, p. 435: ‘Natural law, therefore, has no binding or 
compelling force other than that of a moral precept’. For Ilting 1983, p. 209 Hobbes anticipated 
Thomasius’s division between right and morality half a century later in his reduction of the moral 
obligations of natural law. 
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and outer, the state remaining, for the time being intolerant. For example, Christian 
Wolff proposed the banning of pietists and opted for strict censorship; Kant 
decisively rejected the right to resist. In retrospect, however, such variations are not 
decisive for the comprehensive development of constitutional law. What is of 
significance is the seed planted by Hobbes regarding his reservation about private 




γ) Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) 
 
The extent of the reversal most proximate to Hegel’s time is revealed in Kant’s Was heiβt 
Aufklärung? (1784). In this essay, the public use of reason assumes the form of what 
appears to be, paradoxically, private; that is, derived from the reflections of the inner 
space of conscience, which has now become publicity itself. By contrast, the holding of a 
public office is associated with the private use of reason, of mere obedience to command. 
Hobbes had not identified the inner realm with the right of public opinion, ‘for 
disobedience may lawfully be punished in them that against the laws teach even true 
philosophy … let them be silenced, and the teachers punished, by virtue of his power to 
whom the care of public quiet is committed, which is the authority of the civil’.67 
Rousseau followed similar principles in the exclusion of those ‘unsociables’ who refused 
to confess the civil religion.68 Hobbes goes further still in the subordination of the private 
individual to the constraint of the positive laws: ‘a private man, without the authority of 
the commonwealth; that is to say, without permission from the representant thereof to 
interpret the law by his own spirit, is another error in the politics’.69 Kant clearly and 
precisely expresses the opposite tendency in his concept of the reforming capacity of 
public (internal cum external) reason as the ‘use that one makes thereof as a scholar 
before the reading world’.70 
What can be seen with the Frühaufklärung and Aufklärung is how ‘political 
absence in the name of morality turns out to be an indirect political presence’.71 What this 
                                                
66 Schmitt 2008, p. 59. 
67 Hobbes 1651, p. 430. 
68 Rousseau 2002, p. 252, see footnote 61 above. 
69 Hobbes 1651, p. 428. 
70 Kant 2006, p. 19. This was certainly a consequence of the freedom associated with the Gelehrtenrepublik 
that represents in essence the emergence of the new world. 
71 Koselleck 1988, p. 83. 
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means is that the moral denunciation of absolutist politics was in turn politicised during 
the seventeenth century and historically, if not logically, led to the French Revolution.72 
In his Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1827–31) Hegel isolated this as the 
core of the revolutionary politics that had taken place in France. Morality, the formerly 
neutralised sphere of conscience, became political inside the state and led to the renewal 
of civil war whereby ‘the aim of society is itself political, the aim of the state’.73 For 
Hegel, the aims of society with the French Revolution had overturned the former political 
regime. The sole purpose of the state established with the French Revolution was ‘to 
uphold natural rights; but natural right is freedom, whose further determination is equality 
of rights before the law’.74 One can thus see the full extent of the reversal of the classical 
epoch: natural right, which was to be left behind in the formation of the sovereign 
absolutist state in the formation of the political community, but which I showed had 
retreated into the inner sphere of conscience, now was to be maintained as the foundation 
and principle of the modern state. I have already discussed at length (III.2, III.4) Hegel’s 
criticisms of the issue of equality and ‘abstract right’ or freedom that lay at the basis of 
the French Revolution and how this formed and shaped his institutional politics. Now I 
will go into further detail on the relationship between Kant and the revolutionary 
developments for Hegel, and Kant’s further shifting of the debate between internal and 
external jurisdiction whereby the metaphysical is given priority over any empirical 
derivation of the law. 
For Kant, it is the ‘duty’ of the sovereign ‘to dictate nothing to men in matters of 
religion, but rather to ensure them perfect freedom in such matters’.75 And Frederick the 
Great ‘deserves to be praised both by the grateful world of the present, and by posterity, 
as the one who first freed the human race from the side of government, from immaturity 
and let everyone be free to make use of his own reason in all matter of conscience’.76 This 
should be compared to the minimal character of ‘toleration’ in Hobbes grounded on the 
mere fact that ‘internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted 
                                                
72 See Koselleck 1988 for an exhaustive treatment of these developments, particularly concerning the 
French rather than the German Enlightenment. 
73 Hegel 1999, p. 212 (emphasis added) speaking in reference to the Droits de l‘homme et du citoyen of 
1791. 
74 Hegel 1999, p. 212 (original emphasis). 
75 Kant 2006, p. 22 (original emphasis). 
76 Ibid. 
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from all humane jurisdiction’.77 There is no question here of the legislating capacity of 
what, for Hobbes, remains the fundamentally internal and ‘private’, the sphere of 
conscience, faith and reason. For Kant, by contrast, the free use of reason is also a ‘spirit 
of freedom [that] extends outward, even to where it must struggle with the external 
obstacles presented by a government that misunderstands itself’.78 From this statement it 
is clear that the Aufklärung represents the great reversal of the Hobbesian recta ratio of 
sovereign decision; the ‘remnant’ of the Naturzustand that lay in the interior of 
conscience and subjectivity – mirroring the sovereign’s absolute supremacy in directing 
the internal life of the state – now emerged as social power. This also points in the 
direction of the formal will for Hegel that, due to its ‘abstract indeterminacy’ of ‘duty for 
duty’s sake’, can ‘justify any wrong or immoral mode of action’.79 It is for this reason that 
Hegel perceives the French Revolution in the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History (1827–31) as the victory of Kantian philosophy. For which 
 
the simple unity of self-consciousness, the ‘I’, is inviolable and utterly independent 
freedom and the source of all universal determinations (i.e. determinations of 
thought), namely theoretical reason, and likewise the highest of all practical 
determinations, namely practical reason as free and pure will; and the rationality of 
will consists simply in maintaining itself in pure freedom, in willing only the latter 
in all particular instances, in willing right and duty purely for the sake of duty.80 
 
But to return more directly to Kant, it can be clearly seen how a shift thus takes place here, 
which moves from toleration considered a matter of reform to freedom of conscience as a 
natural right and inherently moral principle. This signalises a shift from an absolute form 
of sovereignty to the constitutional state, to the externalisation of inner freedom, which 
will come to constrain the external polity: i.e., ‘the demand for the legal protection of this 
individual right of private judgment in religious matters finally led to the abandonment of 
the notion of toleration and the demand for constitutional reform’.81 And the latter shift is 
                                                
77 Hobbes 1651, p. 285. 
78 Kant 2006, p. 22 (emphasis added). 
79 Hegel 1991a, p. 162 (§135). 
80 Hegel 1999, pp. 212–13. 
81 Zurbuchen 2006, pp. 782, 779; see Gierke 1934, pp. 138–9 on the conflict between the Rechtstaat and 
sovereignty. 
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apparent in Kant’s esteem for Frederick II, ‘a prince who thus himself rejects the arrogant 
name of tolerance’.82 
What Kant terms ‘the century of Frederick’ expresses in its most extreme form the 
dichotomy of politics and morality that the Enlightenment had brought to a head. The core 
of Frederick the Great’s rule is marked by this dichotomy as is his personality, divided 
between the philosopher clothed in Enlightenment ideals and the monarch practicing 
reason of state. The former envisions himself as rex natura, conceiving of Prussia as 
‘based on a nature rightly foundation of the state through a contract between ruler and 
ruled’ while ‘nature rightly principles find no application in the relationships between 
states’.83 As Frederick II himself saw it, ‘the policy of the great monarchies has always 
been the same. Their fundamental principle has constantly been to grasp at everything in 
order to increase their territory continually… It is a question of their ostensible glory; in a 
word they must increase their size’.84 As Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954) comments on 
this passage, ‘what did the humanitarian department of the Enlightenment say to this 
crude conclusion reached by its causality department? Here one sees the complete 
helplessness and powerlessness of one with regard to the other’.85 This was moreover the 
same Frederick who said ‘I recognise God through the light of reason; his law is written 
in my heart … and this law [Gesetz] is the law of nature, which teaches me my duties’.86 
The hidden current behind Kant’s position in Was heiβt Aufklärung? may indeed 
be the renascent Spinozism that was at the centre of controversy surrounding Lessing’s 
death in 1781 (the Pantheismusstreit). This was the same Spinoza that Frederick II had 
execrated in his youth as ‘sapa les fondements de la foi, et ne tendait pas moins qu’à 
renverser toute la religion’.87 And, I might add, execrated alongside Machiavelli, who 
‘corrompit la politique, et entreprenait de détruire les préceptes de la saine morale’.88 
Indeed, Kant’s essay follows very precisely the principles Spinoza laid down in his 
Theological-Political Treatise Chapters 19 and 20 where ‘the object of government is not 
to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop 
                                                
82 Kant 2006, p. 22 (original emphasis). 
83 Baumgart 1979, pp. 146, 150. 
84 Frederick II quoted in Meinecke 1998, p. 288. 
85 Meinecke 1998, pp. 288–9. 
86 Frederick quoted in Baumgart 1979, pp. 144–5. 
87 Frederick II 1941, p. 97. 
88 Ibid. 
  180 
their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled’. For Spinoza, 
moreover, ‘the true aim of government is liberty’.89 As Karl Barth put it, Spinoza was ‘the 
secret patron saint of all enlightened opponents to the Enlightenment’.90 It was Spinoza 
who developed the public capacity of reason. And it was in this way that Kant was able to 
emphasise its reforming capacity in Was heiβt Aufklärung? (1784). Rather than the mere 
obedience to the external cult, the light of reason was seen along the lines of its possible 
reforming power. Kant paraphrases Spinoza on the use of public reason, and also on the 
necessity of the individual to be subordinate in the private use of reason as a functionary 
of the state or as a member of the commonwealth. Here the obedience to command or the 
duty to obey the sovereign power is conceived as paramount.91 Thus for Spinoza as for 
Kant, ‘the best government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation’.92 And in so 
doing Spinoza lay the basis for the extension of the inner space itself into the field of the 
sovereign state; the capacity of conscience transforms into a truly public function with 
Kant and free thought and its cultivation becomes a principle of a truly enlightened 
absolutism.93 
Such an early version of Kant before his truly metaphysical turn in practical 
philosophy would not have been objectionable to Hegel. Indeed in the discussion of 
Frederick II and Thomasius in the Berlin Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1827–31) 
Hegel mirrors Kant’s praise in many respects.94 This is to be opposed to his youth when 
he is closest to Spinoza and Machiavelli and where he conceives of the ‘mechanistic 
hierarchy’ of absolutism, ‘highly ingenious and dedicated to noble ends’, as extending ‘no 
                                                
89 Spinoza 2004, p. 259; compare Hobbes 1651, p. 178, ‘civil law is obligation, and takes from us the liberty 
which the law of nature gave us’. 
90 Barth 1973, p. 394. 
91 See Kant 2006, p. 19; compare Spinoza 2004, p. 259. 
92 Spinoza 2004, p. 261. 
93 See Spinoza 2004, p. 265. Carl Schmitt (1938) traced the origin of the reversal of the Hobbesian paradigm 
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‘otherwise’, in his own words, ‘I would have withheld the present observations, which I offer here only in 
order to see to what extent chance might yield a unanimity of thoughts’ (Kant 2006, p. 23). According to 
Schröder, ‘Thomasius was explicitly not prepared to give room for Spinozism’ (Schröder 1997, p. 78 
footnote 88). As Ilting has pointed out, the fundamental agreement between Thomasius and Spinoza is 
broken in ‘that for Thomasius God was in no way pantheistic but in a similar fashion to Pufendorf theistic 
and indeed grasped substantially in the sense of Protestant Scholasticism’ (Ilting 1983, pp. 215–16; compare 
Gawlick 1989, pp. 256 –73). 
94 Hegel 1999, pp. 207, 209. 
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trust whatsoever towards its citizens, and therefore cannot expect any from them in 
return.95 Indeed, the freedom of opinion Kant praised in the Prussian state and the 
neutrality of its state machinery was as empty for the young Hegel as it was his forerunner 
Lessing who, writing to Nicolai on August 25, 1769, stated: 
 
Please do not talk to me about your Berlin freedom; it is really confined to the 
single freedom of bringing to market scurrilous anti-religious pamphlets to one’s 
heart’s content… Just wait until someone should appear at Berlin to raise his voice 
for the rights of subjects and against exploitation and despotism, as happens now in 
countries like France and Denmark – you will then see what country in Europe is in 
fact characterized by the worst slavery at the present day.96 
 
It is the appearance of Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten (1797) that transforms Hegel’s early 
period, which had blended the ideals of ancient constitutionalism, the ethical life of the 
Greek polis, with Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (1788).97 By the Frankfurt period 
(1797–1800) the conflict with Kant in Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal 
(1798–1800) appears. For Hegel, Kant’s most recent conception of morals was a 
destructive and alien force dominating over the individual and nature, which was 
transformed into lifeless and dead matter. He became preoccupied with countering this 
conception of morality, which was indeed the result of the preceding philosophical 
developments, notably Wolff’s separation of philosophy into a rational and empirical 
part.98 As I will show in more detail below (α, β), Hegel set out to solve this initially by 
way of Christianity and the development of a Volksreligion. It will be part and parcel of 
my discussions below how this becomes insufficient for him by System der Sittlichkeit. 
 An example of Kant’s metaphysical formalism is formulated very precisely in his 
political philosophy where the legal equality of all citizens before the law – developing 
the classical liberal concept of civil society – is developed on moral-metaphysical grounds. 
By identifying freedom with universal human rights, he ‘thereby introduced and justified 
                                                
95 Hegel 1999, p. 24. Is it any wonder that Hegel’s opposes Frederick II in the Verfassungsschrift and his 
l’Anti-machiavel? Hegel was studying Machiavelli at the time, mediated by way of Spinoza whose works he 
was editing with his Jena colleague Paulus (1802) in comparison with the French edition. Whereas 
Machiavelli is quoted explicitly in the Verfassungsschrift, Spinoza remains but a cryptic reference behind 
Hegel’s first formulation of actuality (see Hegel 2004, p. 5). As Ilting has adeptly shown, Spinoza lay at the 
basis of System der Sittlichkeit of the same period (see Ilting 2006, p. 16 footnote 9 who lists the letters of 
Hegel referring to Spinoza during this period). 
96 Lessing quoted in Epstein 1966, p. 350. 
97 See Riedel 2011, pp. 10–11, for this by now classic interpretation. 
98 See Riedel 2011, p. 6. 
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the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie out of the continuity of European history and 
philosophy’.99 Nevertheless, this all comes to nothing due to the fact that political 
emancipation is connected to rule, freedom to domination.100 Thus what one sees here is a 
moral ‘ought’ forced to revert to the old feudal forms of stratification in order to relieve 
itself of the problem of actualisation.101 Such a late version of Kant – i.e., after the French 
Revolution and its fervour – can be compared nonetheless to the Kant who esteems 
Frederick the Great’s aufgeklärter Absolutismus, where the theoretical and practical 
divide becomes emblematic of his political morality of world civil society, which he saw 
as leading to the possibility of perpetual peace: a universal state of freedom between 
nations and states based on the rights of individuals. However, he realised too late that he 
required a transcendental ground for this practical philosophy. Thus while ‘the absolute 
obligation of foundational norms is undoubtedly given, he teaches, in an experience 
similar to Hobbes, Thomasius, or Rousseau that right in the full sense is given first on the 
basis of state order’.102 
 
In the theory of Kant, the principle of popular sovereignty is still retained in its full 
integrity, as a theoretical basis, but it is transformed for practical purposes into a 
mere ‘idea of reason’ [or logical presupposition]. As such, it ought to guide the 
possessor of political authority, but it involves no diminution of the formal rights 
inherent in a sovereignty of the ruler which finds its justification in the fact of 
historical growth’.103 
 
It was thus that the ‘optimism and perfectionism of the Enlightenment was compensated 
by human imperfection in the field of the state [and the] preservation of the law was the 
only ground, which the people induced, to give to the superior; because it meant the 
preservation of the origin of the ruler’s power’.104 This also meant the continuance of 
traditional society as the originary equality of all men that formed the basis of the contract 
had nothing to say of the differences of duty and obligation, which were applied 
subsequently. Thus Kant’s moral ‘formalism’ – indeed he had used this as a description of 
                                                
99 Riedel 2004, p. 762. 
100 See Riedel 2004, p. 763. 
101 See Riedel 2004, p. 762: ‘Kant’s experience obliges him to apply the concept of civil society 
conventionally again, because the systematic place of its principle is the “right of the household society” 
which he treated under the title of “on the thingly types of personal right”’. 
102 Ilting 1983, p. 98. 
103 Gierke 1934, p. 153 (emphasis added); compare Kouvelakis 2003, pp. 12–27. 
104 Baumgart 1979, p. 147. 
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his own conception of the metaphysics of the understanding opposed to the ‘facts of 
experience’ and the ‘material’ world since 1786 – was essentially the result of an 
interpretation of original sin; that is to say, his moral philosophy was above all oriented 
by the radical evil of human nature and was steeped in Manichean, Augustinian, Lutheran, 
and Pietistic roots.105 In this he was not at all a radical, but accorded with the Wolffian 
framework of teleological perfectionism. This was evident in Kant’s emphasis on the 
immortality of the soul and the countervailing righteousness of the beyond. And he was 
not so far from a Pufendorfian stoic or neo-stoic shaped conception either where ‘the 
cause and the constitution of state will become still clearer if we reflect that no other 
means would have been adequate to restrain the evil in man’.106 The difference lies in the 
derivation of the latter systems from an element of nature as such; they are far too 
empirical when considered alongside Kant’s categorical imperative, which he had so 
utterly alienated from any particular property of human nature. For Kant, this underlies 
the very basis of the validity and the universality of the moral law. 
 
Thus he wanted to initially and above all make distinct that the type of obligation, 
which we attribute rightly to moral claims, cannot be derived from the facts of 
experience [Erfahrungstatsachen]. Each attempt to ground Sittlichkeit 
anthropologically, perhaps after the striving after happiness … proves to be 
insufficient. But also each return to the God of Christian revelation misses its 
target.107 
 
In so doing the categorical imperative became subjectively identifiable only in the inward 
life of the individual. The principle of its universality was that it could be similarly 
recognised as such by every individual. In so doing Kant transformed the tradition in turn, 
leaving esteem for this inward reflection of the law as the only way of deducing and 
organising ethical life. 
 
Therefore if in Kant’s analysis of Sittlichkeit the divine will is interpreted as a 
command of practical reason so too does moral obligation still remain for him a 
fact of inner experience, (‘a fact of reason’), which has no immediate relation to 
another person: the doer remains (expressed religiously) answerable alone to his 
conscience and regarded for that reason as free.108 
 
                                                
105 Ilting 1983, p. 231. 
106 Pufendorf 1991, p. 134. 
107 Ilting 1983, p. 227. 
108 Ilting 1983, p. 232. 
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Before proceeding with the subsequent discussion of the following section (IV.2) that will 
concern in part the young Hegel’s conflict with the inner determination of the moral law 
in Kant, it is necessary to firstly review what I have traced thus far in this first section and 
its subsections on Hobbes, Thomasius, and Kant. I set out by analysing how due to the 
religious civil wars in Europe a very specific political development occurred, whereby 
confessional conflict retreated into the inner realms of conscience – and how conscience 
was transformed into a neutral sphere as such. This led in turn to a shift from the 
predominance of religion unifying the state to politics, and eventually to the development 
of a separate sphere of morality. Hobbes was the first to grasp and formulate the 
necessary division between the forum externum and forum internum, between politics and 
conscience. Moreover, morality for Hobbes was a morality of self-preservation and thus 
could be identified with obedience to positive law in the organisation of the civitas.109 In 
this way, Hobbes had levelled the significance of the traditional norms of natural law, 
which now had no binding force opposite political power. In this he ‘anticipated the 
differentiation between right and morality that Christian Thomasius came to 
terminologically define half a century later, and which was to predominate over all 
discussions in Germany until the end of the eighteenth century’.110 I then analysed the 
inversion of the Hobbesian paradigm in Germany, whereby the internal came to 
predominate over the external. The Enlightenment was shown to lead to the condemnation 
of princely absolutism and, ultimately, to the French Revolution where, as Hegel saw it, 
society became political. I will have a chance to develop this theme more generally 
throughout the remainder of this chapter. At the end of the present section I analysed how 
the division between morality and politics underwent a metaphysical transformation with 
Kant, and how he articulated the new horizon of the inner and the outer current by the 
young Hegel’s time (1797). In the following section I will have the opportunity of 
showing how Hegel initially attempted to counter Kant in his Frankfurt period (1797–
1800) with the development of Christianity and a Volksreligion and how this grew into his 
formulation of Sittlichkeit and Stände. 
 
                                                
109 See Ilting 1983, p. 208; compare Koselleck 1988; and Strauss 1963, p. 15. 
110 Ilting 1983, p. 209. 
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IV.2 The Development of the Stände in System der Sittlichkeit 
 
In the present section, I will analyse Sittlichkeit and how the Stände are shaped in the 
institutional form of Hegel’s politics in System der Sittlichkeit. By now I have sufficiently 
traced the background in the preceding section for what I will show consistently underlies 
the logic of the distinctive institutional form of the young Hegel’s politics in this early 
Jena manuscript (1802–3). At the outset of System der Sittlichkeit, Hegel references the 
dichotomy of the inner and the outer in the modern tradition and his full intention to solve 
this ‘formalism’ through the ‘absolute concept or absolute movement’ – a development 
that will proceed through various levels [Potenzen] and to the definitive early formulation 
of the Stände and Sittlichkeit.111 I will show how this is at once a clear reference to 
Hobbes and is also linked to Kant by way of Fichte in the discussion of formalism. As 
K.H. Ilting put it, ‘since the Differenzschrift (1801) Hegel had known Fichte’s state 
philosophy as little more than the ideal of a “genuinely free community of living 
relationships”; in the theory of natural Sittlichkeit this ideal receives a real foundation’.112 
In the first subsection (α) here I will comment more broadly on the influences and context 
of System der Sittlichkeit. I will show how Hegel is engaged, given the broad range of 
influences on his thought, in reworking the modern political tradition partly by way of the 
classical model. This will supply a framework for the following discussions and establish 
the foundations for the two remaining subsections. The first (β) of which will analyse the 
theory of natural Sittlichkeit as it appears in the first part of Hegel’s manuscript. Thus 
showing how Fichte’s ideal receives a real foundation in the institutions Hegel develops. 
The second (γ) will analyse the structure of rule that Hegel is developing and the 
individual’s place within it and his definitive formulation of Sittlichkeit. 
An approach to Hegel’s thought by way of the modern dichotomy of the inner and 
the outer is currently lacking in the literature. While Norberto Bobbio mentions it,113 he 
neither pursues its implications in any depth nor analyses how it orients Hegel’s thinking 
from a very early period onwards, right up into his mature thinking in the Berlin period 
(1818–31). In so doing I will also be able to point towards how this continually shapes 
                                                
111 Hegel 2002, p. 4. 
112 Ilting 2006, p. 23. 
113 See Bobbio 1975, p. 91. 
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Hegel’s engagement with the modern tradition that I have been analysing in this study, 
and how it informs his approach to the crisis of modern civil society. As Manfred Riedel 
pointed out long ago, ‘the dialectical method completes what was left undone by the 
geometrical, rational, and transcendental methods: the dissolution of the tradition’.114 It is 
within the context of this method that the ramifications of Hegel’s dissolution of the inner 
and the outer in his developing institutional thought are first fully felt. But this must be 
also placed within the horizon of the development of Hegel’s thinking more generally. 
Central to my discussion as I will analyse in detail is that it is only by way of a 
combination of the institutional perspective – firstly developed with the Stände in the 
early Jena period (1801–4) – with the return to individualist natural law (1805–6), which 
had initially preoccupied Hegel in Frankfurt (1797–1800), that one can arrive at the full 
comprehension of his mature political thought. Essentially, the development of Hegel’s 
concept of ‘ethical life’ in the Jena period cannot be reduced to a one-sided interpretation, 
which strictly prioritises the return to individualist natural law in the Philosophie des 
Geistes (1805–6). In the end a position that strictly prioritises the Hegel of the late Jena 
period (1805–7) is a limited one, which will become evident in the remaining sections of 
this chapter. For Riedel, however – who is evidently at the core of my polemic here – this 
Hegel made 
 
his way back to the view of natural law found in Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte, which 
he had supported once before during the 1790s with the recognition of ‘law’ as the 
immediacy of ethical life and its assimilation into the concept, the moment of 
individuality after the vacillations of the early Jena period.115 
 
What I will stress throughout the remainder of this chapter is that Hegel did not make his 
way back to the individualist perspective by wholly negating the ‘vacillations’ of the 
period in question (1801–4). Indeed, as I will show, this period thoroughly transformed 
and reoriented his thinking and led directly to the institutional perspective of his politics. 
That is to say, Hegel made his way back to the individualist view of natural law informed 
by his concept of the Stände and, consequently, by the theoretical potential of his newly 
formed institutional thought. Moreover, Sittlichkeit is never an immediate relation 
between the individual and the political community strictly speaking. Even if the 
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individual appears under the form of the negative in System der Sittlichkeit to be absorbed 
by the positive conception of the community Hegel, nevertheless, retains the Stände first 
elaborated in the early Jena period albeit within the horizon of the freedom of individual 
self-consciousness that orients his thinking from the Phenomenology (1807) onwards, 
which I analysed in Chapter Three in the context of labour and the state of nature (III.4). 
‘The doctrine of thought as law’ developed in the Grundlinien (1820/21) implies more 
than simply the ‘formal’ Kantian subject contemplating the social substance from an 
abstract arbitrary point of view; on the contrary, it involves the mediation in ‘laws and 
institutions which have being in and for themselves’.116 In the end, it seems rather an open 
question as to whether Hegel ever truly departed from Sittlichkeit as ‘the “sittliches 
Ganzes” of a people with which particular individuals are completely at unity’.117 
Even if System der Sittlichkeit does not form an ‘early and first systematic 
conception [Systemkonzeption] of the functional role of “objective spirit”’,118 a clear shift 
occurs in the manuscript towards an emphasis on the institutionalisation of politics by 
way of the family and the Stände that continue to have a bearing on Hegel’s later political 
thought once subjective and objective spirit have been prioritised. Since the Stände owe 
their systematic existence in Hegel’s thought to this early Jena period manuscript it is 
essential to analyse System der Sittlichkeit in depth. Manfred Riedel has shown the proper 
development of objective spirit and how it breaks from Hegel’s earlier conception of 
practical philosophy.119 Yet even if one does not find a direct link to the development of 
objective spirit in System der Sittlichkeit, as I will show in the following discussion, this 
neither excludes drawing parallels nor indicating substantive similarities in theoretical 
                                                
116 See Hegel 1991a, p. 294, 189 (§§270, 144) (original emphasis). The abstract good of morality (Kant) 
becomes concrete in ethics in the transition between morality and ethical life in the Grundlinien. 
117 Ilting 1983, p. 244. ‘The ethical substance, as containing self-consciousness which has being for itself 
and is united with its concept, is the actual spirit of a family and a people’ (Hegel 1991a, p. 197 (§156)). 
This calls Riedel’s assertion that Hegel quickly rejected the notion ‘of the placement of ethical life in a 
“people”’ into question (see Riedel 2011, p. 88), even if the ‘nature’ of law has been almost wholly 
exchanged for the ‘spiritual’ relations of right already in the Philosophie des Geistes 1805–6 as I analysed 
above (III.3, III.4). Yet the ethical relations of the family in the Grundlinien, as the ‘immediate 
substantiality of spirit has as its determination the spirit’s feeling [Empfindung] of its own unity, which is 
love’ – feeling is ‘ethical life in its natural form’ (Hegel 1991a, p. 199 (§158) (original emphasis) the latter 
part of the quotation comes from the addition Hotho/Griesheim). As I will show below (β) Hegel develops 
this natural ethical life fully in System der Sittlichkeit. 
118 See Meist 2002, p. x criticising Rosenkranz’s conviction and ‘fictional reconstruction’ of the manuscript. 
119 See Riedel 2011, pp. 3–30; compare Bienenstock 2001 who has criticised Riedel’s perspective as out 
dated, and framed her own discussion by way of Charles Taylor. 
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content and practical purpose. Moreover, as I will analyse, this permits a tracing of the 
proper development of Hegel’s institutional thought. It is an essential aspect of my 
argument in this study that the early Jena period (1801–4), where the Stände first appear, 
forms an important transitional phase in Hegel’s thinking where, as I will show below, the 
theoretical potential of his institutional thought in the development of Sittlichkeit is first 
expressed with the utmost clarity. It is not by leaving aside the discoveries of this period 
that Hegel formulates the position of his mature Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31), but, on the 
contrary, by sublating these early developments in turn to formulise his final 
philosophical perspectives. As far as speculative foundations are concerned, according to 
Ilting in System der Sittlichkeit ‘Hegel undertook the attempt to produce a type of 
synthesis of the naturalist conception of natural law in Spinoza and the teleological 
natural law theory of Aristotle [that] was to roughly anticipate his later philosophy of 
right’ 120 It is with this in mind that I will now turn to an analysis of System der Sittlichkeit. 
 
α)  The Contents and Contexts of System der Sittlichkeit 
 
In this short introduction to System der Sittlichkeit, I will initially point out the political 
and philosophical context that Hegel seeks to respond to in the manuscript. This will set 
up the subsequent discussion, which proceeds by way of an exegetical analysis of the 
manuscript itself. It is important to highlight the circumstances in which System der 
Sittlichkeit was written and I will touch on this as well by comparing the manuscript to 
aspects of the Verfassungsschrift that I fully explored in Chapter Two. I will also frame 
my subsequent discussion by pointing to the insights other scholars have made on the 
manuscript – notably H.S. Harris and K.H. Ilting. 
The structure of sovereignty apparent in the Hobbesian mortal god had represented 
the way political absolutism had progressed on the Continent from the seventeenth 
century onwards, not only in theory but also in practice.121 By the time the young Hegel 
was writing System der Sittlichkeit a great reversal had taken place, which could be fully 
                                                
120 Ilting 1983, p. 104; see 2006, pp. 11–35 for Ilting’s definitive treatment of this subject. 
121 The importance of the variations in political form in Holy Roman Empire was pointed out long ago by 
Gierke, which led to federal descriptions and in some cases to limitations on absolutism (see Gierke 1934, 
and more recently Dreitzel 1991). On Hobbes influence, see Dreitzel 2003; Schröder 1997; and on his 
predominance in Prussian absolutism, Schmitt 2008. 
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perceived in the Enlightenment and the eruption of the French Revolution where moral 
judgment condemned the politics of princely sovereignty. Morality, the formerly 
neutralised sphere of conscience became political inside the state and led to the renewal of 
civil war. For Hegel, the aims of society with the French Revolution had overtaken the 
state. As he expressed it in his Berlin period (1818–31), the state’s sole purpose 
subsequent to the French Revolution was to maintain the natural rights of humanity; he 
then framed this critically by understanding natural right as strictly freedom (undoubtedly 
a reference to modern natural law), whose determination was simply the ‘equality of 
rights before the law’.122 This freedom for Hegel consistently remained ‘abstract’ and, as I 
have been showing throughout this study, it is to this that the development of the Stände 
was meant to respond. The central issue is that the individual in society now stood 
opposite the political order and directly determined and judged the constitution of the 
state from the abstract point of view of his own private opinion. This appears to be a 
direct inversion of Hegel’s contention with Hobbes in System der Sittlichkeit, where the 
sovereign of the absolutist state as a persona ficta ‘hovered’ over the individual. But it is 
important to note and it will be analysed in more detail below (β) that the same was true 
for Hegel with the ‘formal’ and ‘abstract’ character of equality in constructions of the 
general will (Fichte and Rousseau). Each of these influences can be seen in the following 
quotation: 
 
In this subsumption then [of intuition under the concept whereby intuition remains 
the unity of the inner] the intuition of Sittlichkeit, which is a people [Volk], is a 
manifold reality or an individual [Einzelnheit], an individual person [Mensch] and 
thereby the absolute withdrawal [Zurücknehmen] of nature into itself as something 
hovering over this individual or something formal because the formal is precisely 
unity, which is not in itself absolute concept or absolute movement.123 
 
As H.S. Harris has noted, Hegel was determined ‘to bring Hobbes and Fichte together, 
and to criticize them both at once’. This was already ‘strongly suggested by a reading of 
the Natural Law essay, and confirmed by the later evolution of Hegel’s philosophy of 
spirit’.124 K.H. Ilting was of a similar opinion in the transition from the Verfassungsschrift 
                                                
122 Hegel 1999, p. 212. 
123 Hegel 2002, pp. 3–4. 
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(1800–3) to System der Sittlichkeit. 125  According to Ilting ‘the depth of Hobbes’s 
influence – direct and through the mediation of Spinoza – had been exerted on [Hegel] in 
his youth’.126 
System der Sittlichkeit indeed sets out from a conflict with the modern political 
tradition, and no doubt most clearly with Hobbes and Fichte in the passage quoted above. 
The general will in Fichte’s metaphysics took on an even more abstract character and he 
‘was a professed adherent of Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty’ but was ‘pledged 
to an even more radical form of individualism’.127 Hegel’s main concern in this Jena 
manuscript is to develop the relation between the individual and the political by way of 
the ‘absolute concept and absolute movement’ that, as I will analyse, leads to the 
development of the Stände. This is what will allow Hegel to problematise the lack of 
concrete structure in the general will (Rousseau and Fichte) as well as the Hobbesian 
conception of the fictive persona along the lines of the alien power that confronts the 
individual as in the quotation above, which can be seen to reflect the absolutist political 
order. On the other hand, the isolated individual of Kant’s ‘formalism’ is divorced entirely 
from reality and indifferent to the ‘facts of experience’; Hegel will respond to this one-
sided metaphysics in turn. Each of these influences can be seen as central to System der 
Sittlichkeit. And undoubtedly the political problems dealt with in the Verfassungsschrift 
(1800–3), from a much more purely pragmatic angle, also found their way into this first 
systematic manuscript of Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie (1802–3) – indeed, the work on each 
of these manuscripts converged.128 
I remind the reader of the quote from the Verfassungsschrift that I cited at the 
outset of this chapter (IV.1α). There Hegel spoke of how the division of conscience in the 
religious realm that led to the division of individuals was the same process that led to 
separate state formation after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Hegel here has further 
grasped the ‘fate’ of Christianity, this time in the political context after the Reformation 
(moreover the Verfassungsschrift coincided with the completion of Der Geist des 
                                                
125 See Ilting 2006, p. 27. 
126 Ilting 1994, p. 199. Michelet’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy reveals the extent of this influence 
where Hobbes is favoured over Spinoza as founding the origin of society on individual fear, thus making it 
into ‘a phenomenon of consciousness’ (Hegel 1995b, p. 317). 
127 Gierke 1934, pp. 131ff. 
128 See Harris 1983, p. x1ix for a commentary on this development. 
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Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798–1800)). Hobbes’s persona ficta with its atomistic 
isolation of individual conscience and seat of sovereign authority was made possible by 
the Reformation, which undid ‘the synthesis of reason and faith [that] underlay the 
Roman Catholic doctrine of natural law’.129 Sittlichkeit and the problem of morality fell 
away from the Church and Aristotelian scholastic practical philosophy, retreating into the 
conscience of human beings. For Hobbes, as I showed above, this was absolutely 
necessary as the confessional conflict led to civil war. At the same time as the individual’s 
relationship with God transformed so too did the individual’s relationship to political 
power. As Ilting put it, ‘the individual found himself immediately opposite his God and 
could no longer understand himself primarily as a collective entity 
[Gemeinschaftswesen]’.130 
In Der Geist des Christentums, Hegel compared Kant’s new practical philosophy 
with the Mosaic Law as an absolute positive command that rules over the individual and 
their ‘nature’ – inclination, the will, drives and desire – as an alien form of compulsion. 
The moral law was bound to the strictures of an interior sphere of conscience – negating 
the natural and essentially constricting the will of the subject while simultaneously being 
its autonomous foundation: i.e. its metaphysical realisation as the ‘formal’ will. The 
comparison with Mosaic Law for Hegel was that the God of the Jewish religion was alien 
to its people and, on the other hand, appeared as the external coercion of a theocratic 
political order directing every activity of the subject. For the young Hegel, both were 
identified with ‘the command of an external power’ – and the latter reflects the 
subordination to the external cult that was writ large in Hobbes’s mature political 
philosophy.131 
The isolation of the individual in the Christian religion becomes a political 
problem in the Verfassungsschrift in the isolation of absolutist states in the realm. Citizens 
moreover are treated like atoms by the ‘illiberal jealousy’ of the ‘political authority’ that 
‘has dressed itself up in the guise of rational principles’. According to this model, ‘a state 
is a machine with a single spring which imparts movement to all the rest of its infinite 
mechanism, and all the institutions which the essential nature of society brings with it 
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should emanate from the supreme political authority and be regulated, commanded, 
supervised, and directed by it’.132 I am quoting from the Verfassungsschrift here as it will 
become clear in the following discussion that the same terrain is being staked out in 
Hegel’s early speculative language in System der Sittlichkeit. In order to grasp Hegel’s 
organic model of the Stände in the organisation of the political community in System der 
Sittlichkeit it is worth quoting Hegel at length in the Verfassungsschrift, where his 
solution is conceived in a far more direct fashion. 
 
Given the size of modern states, it is quite impossible to realise the ideal of giving 
all free men a share in the discussion and resolution of universal political issues. 
Political authority must be concentrated in one centre, both for the implementation 
[of decisions] by the government, and for the decisions themselves. If popular 
respect ensures that this centre is secure in itself and immutably sanctified in the 
person of a monarch chosen by birth in accordance with natural law, the political 
authority can freely allow the subordinate systems and bodies, without fear or 
jealousy, to regulate a large part of the relationships which arise in society, and to 
maintain them in accordance with the laws; and every Stand, city, village, 
commune, etc. can enjoy the freedom to do and implement for itself what lies 
within its province.133 
 
What is important to note with this quotation is the mixed form of Hegel’s politics. At 
once ‘centralised’, but also appearing ‘federated’.134 Once I turn to discuss natural ethical 
life in System der Sittlichkeit in more detail (β) and its construction of the constitution (γ), 
I will be able to show the consistency of Hegel’s political perspective. It is important to 
note already at this stage how Hegel’s political structure is mediated – between centralism 
and federalism, as is evident in the above quotation from the Verfassungsschrift. This has 
as its analogue Hegel’s non-conventional identity philosophy in the early 
Rechtsphilosophie, whereby differences are maintained – albeit in unity – but are not 
necessarily dissolved. The latter is something that I will have to explore more fully below 
(β, γ). 
The eventual solution to the problem of the ‘formalism’ of the absolute that Hegel 
arrives at in his Rechtsphilosophie more generally – the primacy of conceptual mediation, 
consciousness as recognition in right as a relation in the concept of law – has been 
                                                
132 Hegel 1999, p. 22. 
133 Hegel 1999, p. 21. 
134  For Hegel’s ‘federalism’ and the predominance of the representational form particularly in the 
Verfassungsschrift, see Maier 2004, p. 210 and also Chapter Two above. 
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differentiated from the first steps in this direction in the early Jena period (1801–4). This 
is clear insofar as Hegel’s mature concept affirmed the rights of particularity as ‘contained 
in ethical substantiality, for particularity is the mode of outward appearance in which the 
ethical exists’.135 By contrast, the individual is almost entirely negative in relation to the 
positivity of the whole in System der Sittlichkeit insofar as ‘all existing individualities 
dissolve in the pure infinity of the absolute’.136 Yet the contrast with the early Jena period 
may not be as clear as it has been presented in the scholarship, and my analysis will show 
the existence of aspects of continuity to Hegel thinking in this respect thus problematizing 
some largely predominant interpretations. 137  What Hegel called variously ‘natural 
intuition’ or ‘the spirit of the people’ in the Jena natural law essay and System der 
Sittlichkeit (1802–3) has been related to the destruction of the individual as such – and 
Hegel’s language has not helped to clarify the situation in this respect.138 Rather than the 
subordination of particularity, of individuality to substantial nature, the identity of 
consciousness in institutions and laws is developed by way of education in the 
Grundlinien; this takes the place of the earlier formation of Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit 
where ‘he evoked [erinnert] Spinoza’s doctrine of substance [Substanzlehre] and 
ultimately with explicit reference to Aristotle’s “Volk”’: 
 
Spinoza’s doctrine of substance will be apparently [and] unscrupulously identified 
with Aristotle’s theory [Lehre] of the political community so that after Hegel the 
positive process [Vorgang des Positiven] or the people [Volkes] are only based on 
                                                
135 Hegel 1991a, pp. 197 (§154). 
136 Ilting 2006, p. 33. Hegel did continue to conceive of the totality as pre-existing and determinative of the 
part into his mature period, and indeed this was consistent with the Aristotelian approach used in System der 
Sittlichkeit (see Hegel 1991a, p. 197 (§156 Hotho addition)). Yet he employed the notion of totality only 
within the context of his mature conception of dialectical mediation whereby particularity was seen as 
central element in ‘the substance and true subjectivity of the concept’ – the ‘animating soul of the state is 
subjectivity’ (Hegel 1991a, pp. 286, 303 (§§278, 270)). If the actuality of the transition were to be traced, 
we may see his departure from the mixture of Spinoza’s doctrine of substance with Aristotle’s prioritisation 
of the whole in the Phenomenology: ‘That the True is actual only as system, or that Substance is essentially 
Subject’ (Hegel 1977, p. 14). See also Ilting 2006, pp. 17, 34–5 for a similar discussion where he shows 
how Hegel departs from Spinoza already in the Jena lectures on the history of philosophy in 1805–6 where 
Hegel uses Aristotle’s critique of the Eleatics to undermine Spinoza’s doctrine of substance. 
137 Notable in this respect is Ilting’s study of System der Sittlichkeit (2006), which Riedel 2011 in turn 
follows to the letter. 
138 See most infamously Hegel 2002, p. 35: …‘murder does away with the life of the individual subject, but 
Sittlichkeit does this as well’. Hegel, however, goes on to qualify this and this will be central to the ensuing 
discussion. 
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the opposite of the negative or the individual [dem Einzelnen] ‘according to 
nature’.139 
 
What Ilting points to is what he sees as the unresolved character of Hegel’s metaphysics 
at this stage, which in its tendency towards totalisation completely abolishes the 
individual (the negative) as such in the natural substance (the positive) of the political 
community. ‘In affirming this equivalence and final identity of things within and things 
without, of ego and non-ego, of familiar and unfamiliar, Hegel affirms the insight of 
Romanticism’.140 And it is precisely at this time (1801–3) that Hegel is also closest to 
Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854). Yet as Ilting has remarked in this respect: ‘what is 
initially most conspicuous might indeed have the least significance – Hegel’s dependence 
on Schelling’s language [den Sprachgebrauch Schellings]’.141 Indeed I will follow Ilting 
in this respect, and leave any possible ‘insights of Romanticism’ to the side as inessential 
to my argument. It is my contention that what is essential is to identify how the 
development of Hegel’s political thought in this period is characterised by the problem of 
the individual, and how this entails organisation before thought and consciousness are 
fully developed as mediation by the end of the Jena period (1805–7), which, as conceptual 
elements of mediation, will allow Hegel to more fully elaborate how the inwardness of the 
subject can be fully identified with the substantiality of the external positive order of law 
and politics. 
In the next subsection I will analyse the beginning of Hegel’s manuscript that, as an 
encounter with the modern tradition, develops from his encounter with Kant in Der Geist 
des Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798–1800). I will show how the insufficiencies of 
reconciliation with the law in the Christian religion for Hegel reaches its limit by the 
beginning of the Jena period, and how the taking up of the classical tradition of Plato and 
Aristotle and the principle of love in the family leads Hegel to a reformulation of the 
bases of the modern political tradition. I will then show how by prioritising activity and 
the lack of self-subsistence Hegel, following the ancients is led to a novel description of 
the house community and a higher good (β) – the teleological unfolding of the political 
and of Sittlichkeit that will determine his mature Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31). This 
                                                
139 Ilting 2006, pp. 15–16; compare Riedel 2011, pp. 82–3. 
140 Barth 1973, p. 392. 
141 Ilting 2006, p. 23. 
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follows logically from the doctrine of potentialities [Potenzen-lehre] (or levels) in System 
der Sittlichkeit that Hegel develops to show how the ethical community is organised,142 
which will imply the substantive development of the Stände at level of the constitution.143 
Thus far in this short introduction I have introduced some of the context and contents that 
will shape System der Sittlichkeit. In the final subsection (γ), I will substantively analyse 
the structure of rule in this early manuscript in detail. This will in turn critically frame my 
approach to the individualist natural law question that returns at the close of the Jena 
period (1805–7) and that I will engage with more substantively in the final part of this 
chapter (IV.3). 
 
β)  From Love as Reconciliation to the House Community 
 
The significance of the religion of early Christianity for the young Hegel in the Frankfurt 
period (1797–1800) is attested to in Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal 
(1798–1800). What is essential to take away from Hegel’s explication is how love 
overcomes the opposition between the (Kantian) law and the individual (will), which he 
conceives at this stage as their ‘fulfilment’. The example of love that overcomes the moral 
command and the law in Der Geist des Christentums is Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount, 
thus giving weight to the infamous statement by Taubes that ‘Kant is the Old Testament 
and Hegel the New Testament of German Idealism’.144 For the young Hegel, love 
overcomes the external form of the law, because it ‘is’, as he terms it, ‘which is the 
synthesis of subject and object, in which subject and object have lost their opposition … 
while in the Kantian conception of virtue this opposition remains, and the universal 
becomes the master and the particular the mastered’.145 
 
In the ‘fulfilment’ of both the laws and duty, their concomitant, however, the moral 
disposition, etc., ceases to be the universal opposed to inclination, and inclination 
ceases to be particular, opposed to the law, and therefore this correspondence of 
law and inclination is life and, as the relation of differents to one another, love; i.e., 
it is an ‘is’ which expressed as (α) concept, as law, is of necessity congruent with 
                                                
142 Indeed the doctrine of potentialities is a perfect example of Hegel’s use of Schelling’s language (see 
Schmidt 2004, pp. 116ff). 
143 See Hegel 2002, pp. 51–70. 
144 Taubes 2009, p. 149. 
145 Hegel 1996, p. 214. 
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law, i.e., with itself, or as (β) reality, as inclination opposed to the concept, is 
likewise congruent with itself, with inclination.146 
 
Already in this early manuscript one can get an inkling of what will lead Hegel to 
conceive the identity of individual right in the positive laws of the ethical community 
insofar as right and duty are recognised in the form of life and as real whereby the 
individual and law become unopposed and are reconciled. Thus from this very early 
period onwards, for many commentators, the eventual shape, formation, and significance 
of Sittlichkeit in Hegel’s mature work can be grasped.147 In the space of a few years from 
Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal (1798–1800), Hegel transformed his 
individualist approach to natural law and the Christian solution of love as overcoming the 
Kantian/Mosaic law. According to the interpretation I will put forward in this subsection 
the inner reconciliation of the subject with the law present in the Frankfurt manuscript 
must turn outwards for Hegel and it is precisely this that he foregrounds in his 
interpretation of Sittlichkeit in the early Jena period (1801–4).  
As I already pointed out above (III.2) in reference to K.H. Ilting, Hegel’s early 
concept of love as a solution to the Kantian moral law as it emerged in Der Geist des 
Christentums was one-sided and thus a limited ideal.148 This is apparently the case even if 
it lay at the basis of Hegel’s development of Sittlichkeit, firstly as love, then as life, and 
finally as spirit. The reconciliation of the will and inclination through love rather than the 
moral command remained internal to the subject, emancipation was strictly in the heart 
and stood opposite the becoming worldly of the Christian,149 which accorded with Hegel’s 
later historical interpretation of spirit. By contrast, ‘a healthy folk-religion is necessarily a 
public religion; it invests and embraces all the normal activities and institutions of a 
healthy public life, i.e. a political society of free citizens’.150 Thus for Hegel in System der 
Sittlichkeit the dichotomy of the inner and the outer must come undone. This he attempts 
to do in the manuscript in the cleft from the natural continuum by way of the doctrine of 
                                                
146 Hegel 1996, p. 215. 
147 See Ilting 1983, pp. 244ff for this interpretation of the importance of the Frankfurt period and its relation 
to Hegel’s mature concept of Sittlichkeit; compare Henrich 1983, p. 17; and Riedel 2011, p. 95 each of 
whom also see the importance of this early moment, and for the latter of a return to its individualist bases 
subsequent to the early Jena period as I noted above at the outset of this section.  
148 See Ilting 1983, p. 243. 
149 See Hegel 1999, pp. 197–224 for Hegel’s Berlin (1827–31) interpretation. 
150 Harris 1972, p. xxiv. 
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potentialities – in tool, language, labour, etc. – or in concrete organisations – family, 
house community, Stände, administration of justice, etc. – and the absolute movement of 
the concept, whereby dichotomy itself disappears. This is the significance Sittlichkeit 
takes on in Hegel’s early Rechtsphilosophie. 
 
Absolute life remains something inner because it is not absolute concept, thus inner 
life [Inneres] does not appear together under the form of its opposite 
[Entgegensetzung], the outer [Äußern]. And for the very same reason absolute 
intuition does not exist [vorhanden] for the subject in this relationship as such, and 
thus its identity cannot be absolute.151 
 
The more proximate ideal of love’s relation to Sittlichkeit is present in the Frankfurt 
fragment on religion and love (1797/98) where Hegel develops the concept as an initial 
communal bond that ‘excludes all oppositions’, and through the generation of the child 
leads to the immortality of the people.152 The bases for the later development of the 
family in System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3) and the relation between parents and children, 
which I will analyse, is originally established in the fragment. Thus love now remains a 
principle internal to the family, which is Sittlichkeit constructed on natural (spiritual) 
feeling, and not morality, which Hegel interprets from the Jena natural law essay onwards 
(1802–3) as inherently individualised.153 This is an important distinction for Hegel, which 
would lead him to assert the primacy of Sittlichkeit as the customs of a people over 
morality as a passing stage – indeed a lower stage – in the movement towards the political 
community. 154  It is the forcefulness of this development, which breaks out in an 
embryonic fashion in the latter half of the Jena natural law essay as an interpretation of 
morality as a declining form of ethical life, as the decay of the attic polis as it appears 
with the rise of absolute individuality and equality in his interpretation of the development 
of universal legislation in Rome (see III.3). Yet, as Ilting has noted, 
 
this presupposition becomes questionable for him by the end of the Jena period 
once he began the historical unfolding of individual self-consciousness through 
                                                
151 Hegel 2002, pp. 4–5. 
152 See Hegel 1996, pp. 306, 307. This will be the ‘empirical’ (natural) limitation of the family as a model 
for Sittlichkeit at the close of the first part of System der Sittlichkeit, I will examine this below; it will also 
determine Hegel’s mature interpretation in the Grundlinien §158 (Hegel 1991a, p. 199). 
153 See Hegel 1999, p. 159; and Ilting 1983, pp. 242ff. 
154 This remains true for Hegel from the Jena natural law essay onwards. 
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which the original ethical unity of the Greeks would be destroyed, not strictly as a 
moment of decay but also due to a higher stage of human self-understanding.155 
 
That is to say, once Hegel had foregrounded the history of self-consciousness as freedom 
in the Phenomenology (1807), the attic polis became an equally limited ideal just as 
Christianity and its restriction to the internal sphere. The significance of the Reformation 
for Hegel – and also its eventual failing as it also does not turn fully outwards – lies in the 
becoming worldly of the ethical in the family (love, procreation, education), trade and 
industry (labour).156 What I initially want to note here is that while morality may be a 
declining form of consciousness for Hegel, the natural (spiritual) Sittlichkeit of family 
love is not. (I will analyse its natural and spiritual dimensions). Hegel continues into his 
maturity in the Grundlinien (1820/21) to maintain the natural (spiritual) family as the root 
structure of ethical life. And the concept of the Stände is also preserved along similar 
lines and the other institutions of modern civil society and the state as well.157 I will be 
able to draw larger conclusions from analysing the natural (spiritual) family as the root 
structure of ethical life when I turn to analyse the house community in System der 
Sittlichkeit in more detail. But this will also lead to broader consequences in the 
interpretation of Hegel’s larger political project as an attempt to reformulate the bases of 
the modern political tradition throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
Following Aristotle, for Hegel lack and human need lay at the basis of the tendency 
to human association: from the organisation of the house and its common activities, to the 
higher good of activity in the political community. Ilting noted the significance of this for 
Hegel’s appropriation of modern political economy. Indeed the Grundlinien (1820/21) 
also proceeded along the same bases of lack, needs, and common labour in the section on 
the ‘system of needs’, which in turn led to the distinctive institutions of Hegel’s 
conception of the modern state. Yet in the Grundlinien an important difference is to be 
noted, Hegel began at least in a conventionally ‘modern’ fashion from the fiction of a 
state of nature, from ‘abstract right’.158 By contrast Hegel’s attempt to develop distinctive 
                                                
155 Ilting 1983, p. 244. 
156 See Hegel 1999, pp. 197–224. Each of these aspects is also identifiable in System der Sittlichkeit as I will 
analyse. 
157 See Hegel 1991a, pp. 272–3 (§255). 
158 See Ilting 1971, p. 91; see Politics 1291a1–1291a30, 1328b15–1328b22; Hegel 1991a, pp. 219, 227, 233 
(§§181, 189, 199) on how subjective need and satisfaction leads to a system of needs and common labour.  
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forms of mediation in System der Sittlichkeit began with the natural continuum as it had 
for Aristotle. In the first part of the manuscript this proceeds through various levels or 
potentialities on the basis of the discovery of the tool (in its appropriation of the object, 
the annihilation of the immediate), need and enjoyment, memory and speech (the tools of 
reason), (family and mechanical) labour, etc. Indeed, with the latter modern political 
economy makes an appearance alongside traditional Greek (and German) oikonomik, 
while (Christian) family love structures the ethical relations of the household.159 From the 
very outset of the manuscript it is a question of the dissolution of the relation between the 
inwardness of the individual and the external, empirical, order, whether that takes the 
form of nourishment through need, and proceeds by way of all of the other levels in their 
totality. As the title of the first part of the manuscript indicates, Sittlichkeit here is to be 
understood as a relation between the inner and the outer;160 it is not yet the totalisation of 
the inner and the outer as it will appear in the final part of the manuscript where 
Sittlichkeit becomes truly absolute. For at this stage, 
 
absolute ethical life appears as nature, because nature itself is nothing other than 
the subsumption of intuition under the concept; intuition also remains the unity of 
the inner, whereby the multiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit] of the concept and its 
absolute movement rises to the surface.161 
 
For Hegel in natural Sittlichkeit – the first part of the manuscript – it will a question of 
tracing this absolute movement as it rises and then recedes in the different Potenzen. Love 
will appear paramount in this context, dissolving the dichotomous relation of internal and 
external most completely insofar as it is raised from a natural to a spiritual dimension in 
the generation of the concept of the child wherein which the parents see the common 
product of their love. The ‘oneness of nature’ existent in love separate from ethical life is 
‘nullified’ in ‘the relation of parents and children’.162 From this point onwards it is the 
family then – the family as the sphere of love – that forms the nucleus of ethical life and, 
along with education [Bildung], will come to be a central aspect of Hegel’s later 
conception of the political community. Yet Hegel already conceives of the separation of 
                                                
159 See Brunner 1949, pp. 33–61 for the traditional description of the economics of the household and its 
distinction from the modern.  
160 Hegel 2002, p. 4. 
161 Hegel 2002, p. 3. 
162 Hegel 2002 pp. 12–13. 
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parent and child in System der Sittlichkeit as reconciled in the common labour of the 
house community, which is an aspect of the ‘universal interaction [Wechselwirkung] and 
education of humanity’.163 To contrast once more Hegel’s development of the family to 
the earlier Frankfurt version of love overcoming the law (1798–1800), another important 
difference in love should be noted in respect to System der Sittlichkeit – love now leads to 
a complex of the broader needs of the house community, it is a reciprocal relation 
between parents and dependents, which are then in turn related to the broader sphere of 
the system of needs; that is to say, love is no longer an isolated internal phenomenon, but 
a dissolution of the dichotomy through the ethical relation. As Hegel says in this early 
Jena manuscript, 
 
The absolute unity of both [parents and children] immediately divides itself in the 
relation [Verhältnis]; the child is man subjective but in such a way that this 
particularity is ideal [and] is only an external form. The parents are the universal 
and the work of nature realises the negation of this relationship just as the work of 
the parent does, which continually negates the external negativity of the child and 
in so doing therefore establish a greater inner negativity and thereby a higher 
individuality.164  
 
Family love in System der Sittlichkeit appears as a moment of ‘real rationality’ and as a 
‘living substance’ through the ‘middle’ of the child. It is ‘the highest, individual feeling of 
nature [Naturgefühl], a feeling such as the totality of the living sexes that are whole in the 
child so that he is thus also absolutely real, individual and real for himself’.165 Hegel 
points to the fact that insofar as the marriage remains one of nature it does not yet truly 
belong to ethical life, but ‘the unity of nature is abolished in a completely opposite 
individuality’ in the generation of the child.166 Insofar as Hegel largely conceived of 
labour at this nascent stage of human activity in System der Sittlichkeit within the classical 
horizon of Aristotle’s Politics, as oikonmik, he thus speaks of ‘the totality of labour’ at the 
next level [Potenz] as the communal labour of the family as an individual.167 The family 
now represents the overcoming of feeling as well as desire and need and exists in 
                                                
163 Hegel 2002 p. 13 (original emphasis). 
164 Ibid. 
165 Hegel 2002, p. 14. 
166 Hegel 2002, p. 13 (original emphasis). 
167 Ibid. 
  201 
separation from nature even if it grew out of natural feeling.168 By way of reference to the 
central element of activity in Plato and Aristotle, Hegel is complicating the moral 
autonomy that had ended in a metaphysical absolute in Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten thus 
challenging the notion of autonomy as such at the level of natural need and enjoyment. 
On the other hand, in beginning with the house community, he has also undone what he 
saw as the fallacy of the Hobbesian atomistic model that began with the isolated 
individual in the state of nature. The reliance on the ancients in Hegel’s inspiration for 
Sittlichkeit is further revealed in the character of his solutions in the emergence of 
economic inequality.169 
At this point in my discussion it is necessary to make some summarising remarks on 
what I have been laying out in terms of System der Sittlichkeit and the few other 
manuscripts I have referred to in this subsection before moving on to its conclusion and 
indicating, in brief, what will follow, and how it is tied to the present concerns. The 
central issue of this subsection has been to trace the dissolution of the inner and outer in 
terms of the love relation existent in the household, which led to the generation of the 
child and to ethical life as a relation. I also briefly listed some other examples from 
System der Sittlichkeit each of which were designed to act as ‘middle terms’ mediating 
between the individual and the natural milieu. I focused on the family precisely because it 
emerged from the natural relation and was raised to the spiritual. Through exploring how 
this developed on the basis of human need and activity by way of the foundational 
influence of Plato and Aristotle, Hegel has been able to provide a concrete description of 
common organisation that could lead to the political even if it is not yet in view. This will 
be at the centre of my concerns in the remainder of this subsection, which will lead into 
the more elaborate discussions involving the Stände and the structure of rule below (γ). 
                                                
168 Compare Hegel 1991a, p. 199 (§158). 
169 See Hegel 2002, pp. 78ff and his reference to the Athenian law for the defrayment of festival expenses (p. 
79 footnote 1), which once more reveals the proximity to Aristotle (see Politics 1330a12). Hegel’s solution 
at this part of manuscript for the ‘necessary inequality’ established between the Stände, the intervention of 
the state in the economy, remains a consistent character in his political thought. According to Michael 
Wolff’s reading of the organic state in Hegel, its universal ‘purpose ultimately cannot consist in anything 
else other than the “union” of the members of civil society that tend to disintegrate into a plurality of classes 
[sic!] (§258). The final end and purpose of the state is consequently the union of the various classes [sic!] 
with one another’ (Wolff 2004, p. 307). 
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Clearly a concrete description of common organisation that could lead to the 
political was Hegel’s intention all along. I noted this at the beginning of this section (α) 
when I quoted from the very outset of System der Sittlichkeit where Hegel had referred 
cryptically to the Hobbesian structure of sovereignty in the absolutist state that ‘hovered’ 
over the individual. Yet by speaking of its ‘formalism’, the target of the polemic was also 
shown to be clearly Fichte (Kant and Rousseau).170 For Hegel, the problem of Hobbes’s 
fictive persona is precisely that, it is fictive and not real: ‘before the populus only the 
multitudo exists [gibt es] for Hobbes, which is apparent in the pactum unionis, and this 
populus, which begins in the civitas … is a persona moralis – that is to say, a fictive 
entity [Wesen]’.171 By contrast, it can be clearly seen how powerful the classical tradition 
has become in Hegel’s hands in answering a modern political problem – the individual 
isolated opposite state power or the power of the state founded on the fiction of isolated 
individuals in the state of nature. By way of the foundational reference to activity as the 
ordering principle of human community, Hegel has established a real being in his doctrine 
of potentialities. As I will show below (γ), the political community will now receive the 
structure it was lacking in actuality if only on a theoretical plane.172 Indeed, as H.S. Harris 
stated, Hegel set the manuscript aside and returned to the Verfassungsschrift at precisely 
the moment when he began to articulate the Aristotelian forms of government.173 This 
reveals the contiguity of these manuscripts as well as their common concern and political 
philosophical aim – the formation of a political community and how it may be brought 
into being. 
In System der Sittlichkeit – as well as in Philosophie des Geistes (1803–4) –
recognition takes place between patriarchal households in conflict with each other. In the 
former manuscript this takes place prior to the organisation of the Stände in the section on 
Die Staatsverfassung – by contrast, the Stände are absent from the Philosophie des 
                                                
170 Hegel 2002, pp. 3–4. I refer the reader to the insightful remarks by H.S. Harris and K.H. Ilting the 
subsection above (α) on the relation between Hobbes and Fichte at this stage in Hegel’s development. 
171 Bobbio 1975, p. 86. 
172 I refer the reader to the outset of the Verfassungsschrift where Hegel appeals (cryptically) to the authority 
of Spinoza from the outset of his Political Treatise to affirm his political realism. And, precisely, contra 
Kant and what ‘ought to be’ (see Hegel 2004, pp. 3, 4). 
173 See Harris 1983, p. x1ix. 
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Geistes (1803–4).174 Hegel will later recognise the patriarchal condition as ‘an initial stage’ 
when a ‘nation [Volk] is not a state’.175 It is the addition of law that makes the difference 
here, which as I will show emerges near the end of System der Sittlichkeit, but which 
Hegel still conceives of as ‘abstract’, ‘mechanical’, and ‘arbitrary’.176 Even if it is a 
question of consciousness, it is not yet identified with spirit and with movement. This will 
first appear in the Philosophie des Geistes (1803–4), while right will be identified with 
conceptual recognition only in Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6). For Hegel in the 
Grundlinien, the domestic association may be constructed on custom, but  
 
it lacks the objectivity of possessing a universally valid existence [Dasein] for itself 
and others in laws as determinations of thought, and is therefore not recognized; 
since its independence has no objective legality or firmly established rationality for 
itself, it is merely formal and does not amount to sovereignty.177 
 
Something similar is also the case in System der Sittlichkeit, where the domestic 
association in the battle for recognition is only rudimentary form as it is based on a series 
of private patrimonial relationships.178 War at this stage is merely another one of those 
private relationships. Indeed, Hegel distinguishes war at the level of the state as ‘not a war 
of family against family, but of nation [Volk] against nation’.179 But in the articulation of 
the conflict between house communities he points to the genetic origin of the state. But 
this is to jump too far ahead in the manuscript, as Hegel articulates the potentialities in a 
much slower and more methodical fashion. Indeed, he already limits the universality of 
the family in a similar way in which he did to the formalism of the persona ficta that 
‘hovered’ over the individual. He does this at the outset of the ‘Second Potentiality of the 
                                                
174 Hegel 2002, p. 57. This follows on the principle of the transition between domestic to political society in 
Aristotle: ‘And therefore, if earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and 
the nature of a thing is its end’ (Politics 1252b 28–35). 
175  Hegel 1991a, p. 105 (§75); it is also a context in which he rejects the Herrschafts- and 
Gesellschaftsvertrag. 
176 Hegel 2002, 83. 
177 Hegel 1991a, p. 375 (§349). 
178 Hegel 2002, p. 62. 
179 Hegel 2002, p. 54. Hegel distinguishes war proper as ‘indifferent’ and ‘free of all personality’, the war of 
family against family is rather characterised by the blood feud and revenge – see also his infamous 
discussion here on the ‘indifferent’, ‘non-personal’, and ‘universal’ character of death appearing with the 
invention of firearms. 
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Infinite: Ideality [Idealität] in the Formal [Formellen] or in the Relation’.180 The family is 
now seen to remain ‘purely ideal, because this potentiality is itself a formalism [formelle]. 
 
The ideal is only the abstraction of the ideal; there is as of yet no question [Rede] 
that it would be constituted for itself as such, and become a totality. Just as in the 
preceding level [Potenz] where the individual [Einzelne] ruled so too here the 
universal is dominant. At the first level this remained hidden, an inner and there 
speech itself was only considered an individual, in its abstraction. In this 
subsumption individuality [Einzelnheit] immediately ceases.181 
 
Thus Hegel discusses once again how the formal concept ‘hovers’ over the individual that 
has now, however, become a ‘fixed relationship’ in the ‘living natural relation’ – it has 
negated the individual as such through the primacy of the house community.182 These 
potentialities now in turn remain isolated from universality, which is no longer opposed to 
them, as it had been at the first level. These relations of love, the child, education 
[Bildung], etc. must now be reunited with the universal. This is the case insofar as the 
universal no longer negates their particularity, but indeed preserves them through the 
‘equality set up [gesetzt] among them, or the universal that appears in them’.183 What 
Hegel is tracing here is how the legal relationship slowly replaces patriarchy, and leads to 
a ‘society’ – the relations of surplus labour, price, etc. that now come to the forefront of 
his discussion in the ‘Second Potentiality of the Infinite: Ideality [Idealität] in the Formal 
[Formellen] or in the Relation’.184 What Hegel points to in his discussion is development 
of a situation that will eventually lead to equality before the law [Gesetz] in the 
manuscript, but which appears here at the level of natural Sittlichkeit in the form the 
various households participating in a common community that preserves their right to 
property.185 These levels will also, however, be limited – mere stages in the construction 
of the community – as legal right remains an abstraction: ‘The individual is a property 
owner, yet legal ownership is not absolute in and for itself’.186 Indeed, it leads to the 
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negative (abstract) freedom of the individual that establishes itself opposite the universal 
in a conflict with it. Hegel’s discussion proceeds from the property relation to surplus 
labour and the ‘pure abstraction, or endlessness’ – what becomes a false infinity – of 
‘possession in right as property’; he shows how individuality is an abstraction at this stage 
of legal right, and how it constitutes itself as the negative of the universal.187 
Hegel’s relationship to a philosophy of nature at this stage is implicit in his attack 
on empiricism and formalism in modern natural law188 – in the relationship of natural 
right as property and individual equality that lay at the foundation of the new modern 
society. And this becomes incredibly clear when he speaks of the ideal connection in the 
property relation as a (false) infinite of legal right and surplus possession and ‘the real 
relationship [Beziehung] of use and need’. 
 
The separation is severe, but for that very reason so too the drive for unification 
[der Trieb der Vereinigung]. Just as the magnet holds its poles apart without this 
drive to reunite them so too, when it is severed, their identity being cancelled, [we 
have] electricity, a more severe separation, a real antithesis, a drive for 
unification.189 
 
The dialectic reappears here as it had in the relationship of family love and the relation of 
parents to the child, yet at the level of what Hegel calls ‘difference in movement’.190 It is 
only slowly throughout Hegel’s development that the modern fiction of the state of nature 
‘assumes the features of society in which a network of elemental economic relations 
develops (so much so that Hegel calls it “bourgeois” or “civil society”)’.191 Yet such 
elemental economic relations are traced in System der Sittlichkeit and precisely as a place 
of surplus labour, possession, use and need, which in turn lead to legal right and the 
establishment of value; this is ‘equality as abstraction, the ideal measure’ actually found 
empirically …[as] price’.192 This will lead Hegel to discuss property as a relation that 
leads to recognition in exchange and the development of the contract, which he in turn 
undoes as a real basis by way of the relationship of lordship and bondage where ‘living 
individual confronts living individual’ – obviously now a contrast to the limitations of the 
                                                
187 Hegel 2002, p. 23. 
188 See Harris 1983, p. 110, footnote 2. 
189 Hegel 2002, p. 23. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Bobbio 1989, p. 14. 
192 Hegel 2002, p. 24. 
  206 
‘formal’ relation of right established at the preceding level.193 I have traced lordship and 
bondage in some detail above (III.4), yet in the present discussion I want to relate it to the 
dichotomy of the inner and the outer: i.e. by way of the logic in which Hegel’s arguments 
in System der Sittlichkeit proceed through the various potentialities in the construction of 
the real bases of ethical life. This will allow me to transition to the next stage of my own 
argument insofar as Hegel limits the relation of lordship and bondage in turn as one of 
‘absolute identity’. 
 Hegel’s discussion is structured in a similar fashion as the transition from the 
sphere of needs (the oikos) to the higher activity of the polis. What is not present here is 
the fully developed dialectic that will be established later whereby the labour relation as 
the true negative overcomes the lord through the production of the thing. Yet the 
distinction between indifference and difference for Hegel in System der Sittlichkeit will 
lead to the necessary conceptual genesis of the Stände – the labouring, property owning, 
and merchant Stände as a system of organised inequalities, of differences,194 which will 
be at unity in the later conception of the ethical life in the manuscript as I will show below 
(γ). The relationship of lordship and bondage as Hegel proposes it here is moreover 
precisely opposed to ‘abstract equality and the formal thought of life [which occurred] at 
the first level, a purely ideal thought without reality’.195 Hegel leads his discussion back 
again to what had appeared at the first level, the problem of the formal structure of 
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sovereignty that ‘hovered’ over the individual, which he now interprets as the ‘equality of 
abstraction’, as a ‘formal thought of life’ lacking in ‘reality’. 
 
The plurality is here the plurality of individuals because, at the first level, absolute 
individuality had been posited in the formality of life; [it was] posited as the form 
of the inner, since life is the form of external indifference [der äußern Indifferenz 
ist]. And where there is a plurality of individuals, there is a relation between them, 
and this relation is lordship and bondage.196 
 
From here Hegel will be able to develop indifference as the principle of the political 
leadership in System der Sittlichkeit. This, however, allows for the continuance of the 
spheres of difference and relies on them as structuring elements of the community even if 
they are subordinate systems in the entire organism.197 The relationship of lordship and 
bondage provides Hegel with an initial conceptual tool whereby he can transmute the 
abstraction of a mechanistic equality dominant in formal absolutism – which led either to 
the chaotic multitude of revolutionary France (Fichte, Rousseau) or the sovereign 
(Hobbes) of traditional continent absolutism – into an organic, concrete and real structure: 
a ‘totality that can only be the unity of essence and form’.198 The reason why the 
relationship of lordship and bondage is central for Hegel is because feudalism was an 
originary means to the resistance to absolutism, which will later be formed into the Stände. 
Yet lordship and bondage will be limited in turn as it is based on the private patrimonial 
relationship. For Hegel in System der Sittlichkeit, the indifference of the free being that 
subordinated the bondsman through a trial of might or power entered into the inner life of 
the latter. There it was ‘concealed’ and left to relative identity and could not be reconciled 
externally due to the nature of the subordination. In this can be seen an inkling of Hegel’s 
later radical inversion of the relationship insofar as here the bondsman is the one to have 
truly understood what has taken place and it leaves something unsettled in the dialectic. 
Thus for Hegel lordship and bondage also become ‘formal’, ‘hovering’ over the 
individual as a legal right: i.e. as feudal privilege and arbitrary dominium.199 
At the end of ‘Absolute Ethical Life According to the Relation’, the first part of 
System der Sittlichkeit that I have been analysing, Hegel is led back to the family as the 
                                                
196 Hegel 2002, p. 29. 
197 Hegel 2002, p. 64. 
198 Hegel 2002, p. 63. 
199 Hegel 2002, p. 30; compare, pp. 61–2. 
  208 
universal, as the relationship of needs, of parents to children that I traced in detail above. 
He opposed this relation of love now to both property and contract and the Kantian 
contractual basis of marriage in Metaphysik der Sitten (1797).200 Yet even if the family 
was ‘the ultimate totality nature was capable of’ it too remained ‘merely inner’.201 The 
form of its ‘externality’, the bearing and education of children was strictly ‘empirical’ and, 
by contrast, in the ‘true totality form is in absolute unity with the essence’.202 It is to this 
discussion at the level of the structure of rule – Sittlichkeit, Die Staatsverfassung – that I 
will now turn. As for Aristotle so too for Hegel, natural ethical life, the originary customs 
of the house community led to the higher form of association in the political community 
where, as he put it in the contemporaneous Jena natural law essay (1802–3) ‘it is the 
nature of absolute ethical life [Sittlichkeit] to be a universal or an ethos [Sitten]’.203 
 
γ) The Structure of Rule and Freedom – The System of Sittlichkeit 
 
In the present subsection I will engage substantively with Hegel’s conception of ethical 
life as an attempted solution to the modern dichotomy of inner and outer that had 
dominated the absolutist structure of rule once Hobbes had introduced it at the core of his 
political theory. I have already been engaging in this issue in the two previous subsections 
(α, β), but now I will focus on the institutions of Sittlichkeit that move beyond the family, 
and which Hegel envisions as a system of real relations ‘at rest’ and in ‘absolute 
movement’.204 This involves analysing the elements that make up the ethical community 
in System der Sittlichkeit as well as the place of the individual within them. The latter is of 
central concern for my argument on the importance of the early Jena period (1801–4) in 
Hegel’s formation and the existence of the Stände that receive their first systematic 
treatment in this manuscript and will be a constant feature of Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie 
from this point onwards.205 As I have shown above Hegel faces the modern political 
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tradition in this early period through an appeal to the classical tradition of natural law, 
which conceived of the political community as by nature prior to the individual and as a 
higher order of perfection. For the modern political tradition since Hobbes, the entirety of 
its efficacy pivoted on individualism and natural right in the construction of the political 
community. It was thus clearly an inversion of the classical paradigm. And I have shown 
this most substantively already in Chapter Three.206 By contrast, Hegel was able to 
reorient the modern fiction of the isolated individual and to turn the house community 
into the central basis of his developing theory of ethical life through the primacy that the 
classical tradition received in his hands. As I have shown (β), he did this by way of human 
activity – the emergence of the human being from the natural continuum – and the 
meeting of the common needs of the household combined with the Christian conception 
of love taken over and expanded from his Frankfurt period (1787–1800). In this sense for 
the young Hegel, unlike the modern political tradition the individual in no way preceded 
the totality but was essentially its consequence. I proved this most emphatically through 
Hegel’s discussion of the generation of the child proceeding from the love relationship of 
the parents, and then through the development of common law between families in order 
to assure their continued existence (β). This was the beginning of a development whereby 
the inner became the outer in an, albeit at this stage, ‘empirical’ or ‘natural’ fashion – and 
thus Hegel came to limit it to the strictly inward in turn. The following discussion will 
concern the way in which Sittlichkeit is ‘accordingly determined by the fact that the living 
individual is equal with the absolute concept’.207 This involves the transition from 
‘empirical’ to ‘absolute’ consciousness, to real Sittlichkeit whereby ‘the individual exists 
[ist] in a perpetual mode [ewige Weise]’.208 It is in this way that Hegel will be seen to re-
establish a relationship to the tradition of Sittlichkeit, which had been determined in a one-
sided fashion since the ‘epochal turning inward’ of the Christian religion whereby the 
individual lost their direct identity with the collective character of the community.209 
At the outset of the section on Sittlichkeit in System der Sittlichkeit Hegel refers to 
the limitations of the principle of the family as a model for the ethical community. The 
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problem was that it remained in a relation – even if it was a totality. The central issue was 
the determining character of difference, which had led to a formal type of equality that, in 
his words, was determined by the levels of nature [Naturpotenzen] and thus ‘remained 
something [eine] inner, not born outwards [nicht herausgeborene], and unexpressed’.210 
In his conception of the dialectic, he refers to its one-sidedness; this indeed I have traced 
above (β) through the various potentialities of natural ethical life, which came to express 
themselves sequentially. Moreover Hegel showed how each passed into formalism and 
had to be discarded in turn, as being unrepresentative of the ethical. By contrast what he 
conceives of as truly ethical is present in the rational as ‘absolute concept’ without 
relation, which is the cancellation of both sides; it is a universality that precludes further 
cancellation. It is what he already calls at this stage the Idea, which in his mature 
Rechtsphilosophie is the coincidence of form and content.211 
What underlies Hegel’s rejection of the previous levels in System der Sittlichkeit in 
which he showed the transition of the inner into outer and its relapse into the formal, its 
return to the inward or merely ideal in opposition to the real, was that in these 
relationships ‘the absolute nature is in no way in spiritual form and thus is not existent as 
ethical life’.212 It was in this way that he came to reject the family as an ideal for ethical 
life. And perhaps in this respect he once again followed Aristotle.213 In the tradition of the 
identity philosophy, Hegel now says that ‘Sittlichkeit must be the absolute identity of 
intelligence, with the sheer annihilation of particularity and of relative identity which is 
all that the natural relation is capable of’.214 Indeed, given such stark language it is 
difficult to reconcile such a conception with his later notion of the subject as the substance 
and subjectivity of the state – or of the accordance of subjective and objective spirit. Here 
Hegel has expressed the severity of his institutional ideal in its harshest form. As I have 
already noted above in reference to Kurt Rainer Meist and Manfred Riedel, the concepts 
of subjective and objective spirit were non-existent at this stage in Hegel’s development. 
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Yet Hegel speaks of a ‘complete equalisation’ in System der Sittlichkeit whereby 
accordance exists between the empirical consciousness (the individual) and the absolute 
consciousness (the totality) whereby each is transformed in turn. And it is necessary as 
concerns my argument here to analyse this structure in detail and how it is made real in 
and through the contingent character of subjectivity. That is to say, how subjectivity is 
transformed in Hegel’s hands from the isolated ‘conscience’ which is ‘only something 
inner’ and ‘not inner and outer simultaneously’ – i.e. ‘something subjective [but] not 
objective at the same time’ – to ‘the individual subsuming absolute ethical life under 
himself’ so that ‘it appears to him as his individuality’.215 This is ‘because the ethical is 
the essence, the inner of the subject’.216 This is what Hegel designates as virtue, as 
‘subject-objectivity’ whereby ‘consciousness is the infinite, the absolute concept in the 
form of unity’ no longer as a relation but as the being of ‘opposites in the concept’.217 It is 
only in understanding this process and the importance of the subjective moment already at 
this stage in Hegel’s early system, that his work can be sufficiently distinguished from 
Fichte; that is, to appear different and distinct from the coercion that Hegel himself 
rejected in the Jena natural law essay (1802–3).218 It was there that Hegel had realised 
how coercion from above had its corollary in the identification of the abstract moral 
principle from below and its ascent to the absolute, precisely that contradictory character 
of absolutism that he isolated at the outset of System der Sittlichkeit. 
It is important to note that not only does Hegel relate conscience to inwardness in 
System der Sittlichkeit and restrict it to the inner, just as Hobbes had most definitively 
done before him in his political construction of the civitas, but that he also relates 
consciousness to the apprehension of the absolute.219 This absolute appears as ‘concept’ 
and is related precisely to the overcoming of opposition, to the cancellation of both sides 
(in this case, of inner and outer). Thus conscience and consciousness are to be 
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differentiated on the basis of these qualities; this is something expressed in an original 
form in System der Sittlichkeit and which reappears elsewhere in Hegel’s work.220 The 
first appearance of consciousness occurs at the beginning of the final part of the 
manuscript (Sittlichkeit), which will in turn be divided into the institutions of ethical life 
whereas conscience was limited to the early discussion of the phenomenon of guilt in 
‘The Negative, or Freedom, or Transgression’, and was ‘only reconciled in the danger of 
death and ceased in that danger’. 221  By contrast, Hegel introduces ‘empirical 
consciousness’, which is not yet ethical, as an essential ground between the particular and 
the universal that precisely allows for ‘absolute identity’ that was formerly only ‘natural 
and something inner to come into consciousness’ – to emerge as ethical.222 This is an 
essential development of the early Jena period insofar as it is precisely by way of the 
positing of empirical consciousness as a ground of mediation in the manuscript that Hegel 
is led to the introduction of the innovative ‘Idea of ethical life’ and ‘the form in which it 
appears in its particular part is the people [Volk]’.223 Hegel requires this level of empirical 
consciousness in his discussion in order to make the ethical concrete, which is implicit in 
his ensuing discussion and leads to the distinctive form of his institutionality. 
The character of ethical life for Hegel in System der Sittlichkeit is that it is intuited 
by and in the consciousness of the individual. At this stage in Hegel’s work, Sittlichkeit is 
no different from the individual’s own consciousness. This is what he calls ‘subject-
objectivity’, virtue, or ‘the ethical life of the individual’, which is the negative.224 Hegel, 
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however, has already differentiated his political conception in the manuscript from what 
appeared in the Jena natural law essay. It is not a natural form of intuition that 
characterises Sittlichkeit, but an absolute one.225 
 
The people are living indifference and all natural difference is destroyed, the 
individual intuits himself as himself in every other individual; he reaches the 
highest subject-objectivity [Subjektobjektivität] and this identity of all is simply for 
this reason not an abstraction, not an equality of the bourgeois way of life 
[Bürgerlichkeit].226 
 
The polemical character of Hegel’s concept of subject-objectivity, as becomes clear in the 
manuscript, is directed at both Rousseau and Fichte. Moreover the formulation of the 
‘abstract’ character of equality reflects Hegel’s critique of the French Revolution into his 
maturity. By emphasising the continuity between particular and universal consciousness, 
between the identity of individual thought and universality, Hegel is led to the concrete 
spheres of organisation in which both particular and universal are realised. Freedom for 
Hegel therefore inheres in the concrete existence in which it finds itself and not in an 
abstract declaration of natural right. This means that the indifference made possible in and 
by the ethical community is only plausible also on the basis of differentiation, which 
Hegel lays out in his subsequent discussion. 
What Hegel immediately faces is the structuring of the people, as he is consistently 
opposed to popular sovereignty from his very early Jena period onwards and this is at the 
core of his critique of Fichte and Rousseau.227 He has already been amply supplied with 
the bases for this in the genesis of the house community in natural ethical life; this already 
formed an organic relationship of private-patrimonial power that had the inward Christian 
love relation rather than consciousness as its ground. It is apposite in the present context 
where I am dealing with properly political power to remind the reader of the quote I used 
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from the Verfassungsschrift above (α); there Hegel had spoken of the impossibility of the 
realisation of the ideal of giving everyone ‘a share in the discussion and resolution 
[Bestimmung] of universal issues’.228 In that context he had affirmed a central unified 
power under monarchical authority, but at the same time rejected the absolutist structure 
of rule that led to the mechanisation of the state and production of social atomism. His 
conception was what may be called a politically federated form of centralism, and the 
same discussion emerges at a more explicitly philosophical level in System der Sittlichkeit 
– representation remains an ideal and he discovers it in the concrete institutions of the 
state. At the level of absolute Sittlichkeit, Hegel must avoid again the same issue that had 
appeared at the outset of the manuscript, and encounters once again the structure of rule in 
absolutism. On the one hand, in the abstract morality of the individual – with the French 
Revolution – that led to an ambiguous identification with the political or its condemnation 
in the name of what Hegel saw as abstract equality; on the other, to the problem of the 
persona ficta in Hobbes that ‘hovered’ over the individual in the mechanisation of the 
state. It is worth quoting Hegel at length here to show how this earlier discussion 
reappears at the point of transition in the manuscript to ‘The Constitution of the State’. 
 
The identity of this intuition and the Idea [must be] recognised – namely [that] the 
relationship of the people to the multitude [Mehrheit] of individuals is established 
generally and formally. A people are neither an unrelated mass nor a mere plurality. 
[On the one hand], they are not the former [because] a multitude as such does not 
establish the relationship present in ethical life – i.e. the subsumption of all under a 
universal, which has reality for their consciousness, has unity [eins] with them and 
power [Macht] and violence [Gewalt] over them, and, so far as they proposed to be 
single individuals, would be identical with them as either friend [freundlich] or foe 
[feindlich]. But the multitude is absolute individuality and the concept of the 
multitude – since they are at unity – have their abstraction external [fremd] to them, 
outside of them. [On the other], they are also not a mere plurality, because the 
universality in which they are at unity is absolute indifference. [By contrast], 
plurality is not absolute multiplicity [Vielheit] or the display of all differences 
[Differenzen] – it is only through this all-ness [Allheit] that indifference can 
embody [darstellen] itself as real and can be a universal.229 
 
This excerpt deserves a full explanatory commentary, and I will show here the basic 
structure that underlies it as can be viewed from where Hegel immediately leads his 
discussion. What will become apparent is the originality of Hegel’s conception of the 
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organic state, which will lead my discussion directly to the Stände as co-bearers of power, 
as the internal sovereignty of the state. This will then allow me to go into the intricacies of 
the structure of rule that predominate the remainder of the manuscript. 
As can be seen in the quotation above, Hegel opposes the relation of the individual 
to the state that had been established with the French Revolution, which he explains here 
in terms of individuals treated as an unrelated mass. He shows how the structure or rule 
functions if it is a question of isolated depoliticised individuals and the autonomy of state 
power. For Hegel, this leads to political regimes that are of no concern to the individual, 
i.e. it would be ‘identical with them as either friend or foe’, and to the moral absolutism of 
the individual as such who has no concern for the political structure and has divorced his 
being from the absolute and retreated into the privacy of the inner sphere. For Hegel, 
strictly speaking, if individuals are perceived as isolated they have no real way of 
participating in institutions – they remain bourgeois rather not citoyen. The second half of 
the quotation concerns the external sovereignty of the state, whereby the state is posited as 
the concrete individualisation of the multitude as the unification of their differences in the 
indifference of the political community, its universality. The abstraction of equality here 
receives its validation in one state as an organic individual in conflict with another – and 
in this Hegel follows Hobbes for whom international and the state of nature were 
equivalent.  
As K.H. Ilting has noted, ‘the most important application of Spinoza’s natural law 
theory for Hegel is international law [Völkerrecht]’.230 For Hegel, as Ilting argued, ‘the 
power of the real [Wirklichen] is the expression of infinite substance (Natura sive Deus) 
whereby history becomes a manifestation of the absolute’.231 System der Sittlichkeit 
according to this interpretation therefore shows how ‘conflict and power have the same 
position in Spinoza’s political theory [Staatlehre] as work and activity in Platonic and 
Aristotelian politics’ each of which Hegel combines in this early manuscript.232 Even if 
Hegel’s prioritisation of history is not yet present at this stage in his thought, Ilting 
discovers it in outline in Hegel’s expression of ‘the truth which lies in power’.233 This will 
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appear in the last section of the final part of the Grundlinien where the state becomes an 
individual actor in world history. 
 
[It was] firstly Spinoza who gave a metaphysical foundation to Hobbes’s natural 
law theory by determining being as activity and its unity as power, which is 
respectively a most limited expression of the infinite power of nature or God.234 
 
Ilting’s intentions become clearer when his letter to Carl Schmitt of 22 December 1962 is 
analysed. There he seeks to develop a genealogy of modern natural law that leads to 
Hegel’s conception of history: ‘Can one say that for Spinoza instead of the sentence Jesus 
is Christ stands the thought of Natura sive Deus and in the place of Auctoritas, non 
Veritas the Spinozistic sentence “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht”’?235 The same 
interpretation holds true for Norberto Bobbio, who coordinates his analysis of the 
organistic conception of the people (and of totalitarianism) on the bases of Carl Schmitt’s 
thesis (1938) regarding the total state in Hegel.236 ‘We must go through the German 
Idealists’ organistic conception of the people, in order to arrive at the conception of state-
totality. The philosophical premise of the totalitarian state is Hegel’s “ethical totality” and 
not Hobbes’s “persona civilis”.237 The affinity among these scholars also extends to 
Manfred Riedel’s interpretation of the Grundlinien. 
 
The dimension of history, which Hegel introduces at the end of the Philosophy of 
Right, is the actuality of that idea of the natural condition, which the theorists of 
natural law placed at the beginning of their systems. The movement which in their 
case runs from nature to civil society (in the sense of societas civilis) and ends 
there, begins for Hegel when the state does not relate any more to civil society, but 
to other states. This natural condition is a real and not a fictious one – the 
movement of history, which the philosophy of right incorporates and whereby it 
frees itself once more from the abstract natural theory of law and society.238 
 
In order to get to the core of the structure of rule and freedom in System der Sittlichkeit, I 
refer to the independence of Dieter Henrich’s conceptualisation of Hegel’s 
institutionalism. Henrich has formulated his thesis on Hegel’s ‘severe institutionalism’, 
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for example, by showing how the latter is based on the ‘universal-philosophical premises’ 
of Hegel’s philosophy as such, and ‘in the particular form of a speculative theory of an 
“Absolute”’,239 whereby, following Schelling, 
 
the world as such has conceptual form and not only according to its appearance. 
The logical form of the world permits it to be contemplated in all of [its] actuality 
[Wirkliche] as a well-ordered system of organised individuals [Einzelne]. It does 
not require to think the disappearance of all differences, but is rather centred and 
differentiated in itself [in sich selbst] from other real entities. Under the constant 
guidance of this principle Hegel could speak in the same breath of the planetary 
system and of the constitution.240 
 
Henrich adds that Hegel was ‘consequently a monarchist in no way out of political 
inclination, but out of theoretical obligation’.241 It is this that leads his philosophy directly 
to sovereign power. The question that concerns the present discussion is essentially which 
form of institutionalism (‘moderate’ or ‘severe’) is operative in the structure of rule in 
System der Sittlichkeit and what is its import for the mature Rechtsphilosophie (1817–31). 
The scholarship would indicate that in this earliest period Hegel has not yet developed the 
reciprocity or right as a relation in his thinking. 242  Yet the Stände and the other 
institutions Hegel conceptualises in this period are also taken up into his maturity. This 
needs to be emphasised as it brings out the importance of the manuscript for 
understanding Hegel’s mature institutionalism and formulation of the Stände. What 
Riedel called the ‘vacillations’ of the early Jena period can be shown to be as equally as 
central to the understanding of Hegel’s political thought – both in terms of 
institutionalism and of the later prioritisation of individualism, which only ever becomes 
concrete and free within institutions as such. The manuscript reveals the same ambiguities 
that mark Hegel’s mature institutional thought insofar as we already have a structure of 
rule, of the absolute, which is represented as freedom insofar as it is organised. Yet in 
System der Sittlichkeit the individual is only ‘the material’, not the ‘true’ but the ‘formal’ 
absolute.243 The individual, as a potentiality, is subordinated to the higher levels, the 
institutions, the Stände, in which it has its organised being. The Stände become 
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individuals in turn; they are ‘organised totalities’ that ‘carry in themselves the other levels 
as form’.244 In other words, the individual reaches its concept only by way of organisation. 
I have already mentioned the ground of ‘empirical consciousness’ that structures Hegel’s 
initial discussion of Sittlichkeit and the thesis of ‘subject-objectivity’; this also occurs in 
System der Sittlichkeit at the level of the Stände and in terms of the administration of 
justice and law. 
For Hegel in System der Sittlichkeit ‘the organisational principle is freedom insofar 
as the ruler [Regierende] is himself the ruled [Regierte]’.245 This proceeds from Hegel’s 
insight that the ‘constitution belongs more to the nature of the Stand itself and its organic 
essence [Wesen] and not to the government, [which rather] belongs to external constraints 
[Beschränkungen]’.246 It is in this context that Hegel arrives at his early formulation that 
the utility of the government is the unity of all Stände and collapses the distinction 
between the governing and the governed by way of the organic organisation of the ethical 
totality. The goal of Hegel’s politics in System der Sittlichkeit is to have the external 
powers of the community consequent to their internal articulation: i.e. the very 
organisation of the Stände is at the same time the universal governing power. Otherwise 
for Hegel the state relapses into the ‘formal abstraction of equality’, a persona ficta, or 
ethical life according to the relation (β). It is thus that he says that ‘this separation is … a 
formal one’. What must not occur is the intuiting of the ‘single individual’ posited 
‘external’ and separate from the ‘organic compound’ [Organischen Gesetzte]. 
 
Subsumption under the concept would be the abstraction of the relationship of 
foreign peoples [Völker] as individuals against each other [gegeneinander]; but the 
organic process is immediately an ideal cancellation [Aufheben] of this difference 
or the determinacy [Bestimmtheit] is immediately the singularity [eigene] of a 
people [Volk], a difference in itself, and the living movement cancels it absolutely. 
Thus there can be no absolute foundational division between internal and external 
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government; and neither is an organic system comprehended within the universal 
as subordinate, but simultaneously independent and organic.247 
 
At the level of ruler and ruled it is the differentiation between the Stände in the section on 
absolute government in System der Sittlichkeit that becomes essential. Hegel sees the need 
here to supplement Spinoza’s theory of the will to freedom that lies in the acquisition of 
temporal goods, and equate it with the ordering principle of reason in a nascent division 
of labour. If the government was to appear simply in the form of Spinoza’s opposition 
between the wise – the priests and the elders of the first Stand in Hegel’s manuscript – 
and the multitude as it had for Spinoza this would reintroduce the formalism of 
oppositional power that is at the centre of Hegel’s critique of the absolutist state. It would 
represent the supreme government ‘hovering’ from above, which is clearly present in his 
decisive distinction of the priests and the elders in System der Sittlichkeit from the 
‘ephorate’ in Fichte’s Naturrecht.248 Everything is contingent, however, on the notion that 
the individual sees the realisation of their freedom in the organisations of the political 
community as Hegel had yet to  
 
recognize that under the conditions of the specific historical form of the modern 
state the application of a non-dialectical concept of politics, by burying the activity 
of the individual in institutions and depriving him of the possibility of opposition, 
could only lead in practice to political absolutism…249 
 
In the final analysis, Hegel has replaced the persona ficta of Hobbes with the organic 
articulation of the political multitude; it has become a real organism, whereby atomistic 
individuals disappear in the structures of the Stände. This multitude has its abstraction not 
between the isolated individuals existent in the state as these have now become identical 
with the ethical essence. By contrast, the abstract occurs only in the external relation of 
the state as an individual in conflict with other states.250 Hegel uses the same terminology 
in speaking of the priests and the elders as that of a soul to a body, evidently again 
returning to Aristotle. The Stände represent difference in the political community, while 
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the priests and the elders sublime indifference, yet each are required to complete the 
absolute Idea of supreme government that 
 
does not affect any form of particularity and determinacy, which is manifest in the 
ramification of the whole into its subordinate systems. The government does not 
have to repeat this Idea in these, for otherwise it would be a formal power over 
them; on the contrary once this difference between Stände is established, it 
proceeds to maintain it.251 
 
For Hegel, ‘the external form of this government’s absolute force [Macht] is that it 
belongs to no Stand irrespective [of the fact] that it arose out of the first’.252 It is only by 
way of the differentiation between the various Stände that, moreover, the ethical 
community will be given a concrete and real structure: 
 
The absolute government is only not formal because it presupposes the differences 
between Stände… without this presupposition the entire force of reality relapses 
into lump… For the absolute government to be the absolute idea is to posit endless 
movement absolutely, or the absolute concept. In this there must be differences and 
they must also, because they are in the concept, be universally infinite; they must 
therefore be a system.253 
 
Clearly the structure of Hegel’s institutionalism at this stage sees all difference contingent 
on the existence of the Stände, the individual’s consciousness at one with it and the 
ethical substance. For Hegel Spinoza’s substance, which appears under the guise of the 
ethical or spirit of the people, must become certain in the totality, while this is constructed 
and expressed at each level [Potenz] of its existence the absolute overcomes all relation. 
Yet as H.S. Harris has noted, if the principle elements of mediation – the Stände – from 
System der Sittlichkeit that led to the organisation of the political community were 
inserted at the moment where Philosophie des Geistes (1803–4) breaks off, an important 
insight into the later developments of Hegel’s philosophy of right would come into view. 
 
As soon as we put the theory of natural classes [sic!] in the System of Ethical Life 
into the context of the ‘consciousness’ theory of the first philosophy of Spirit, we 
can see why [Hegel] always thought of civil society in terms of self-regulating 
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‘corporations’. These communal systems are the necessary foundation of individual 
self-awareness.254 
 
Harris’s insight into these manuscripts is essential here as once the Philosophie des 
Geistes (1803–4) is analysed alongside System der Sittlichkeit the beginning of the 
modern labour relation becomes evident and its connection to the Stände, which leads to 
the break with the classical ethos.255 In the Philosophie des Geistes (1803–4), 
 
the attempt to develop communal consciousness in the world of machine 
manufacture and international trade forces Hegel to spell out the enormous 
difference between the ancient polis and the modern state. In a passage which 
anticipates Marx, he shows quite clearly why the consciousness of a modern 
labourer must differ toto coelo from that of a classical artisan. The economic 
process of which he is only a vanishing element, replaceable on the instant, is 
inexorably forcing him back into the bondage of natural need, without even a 
reasonable hope of natural enjoyments.256 
 
Thus on the one hand in System der Sittlichkeit the essentials of the form and necessity of 
institutions in Hegel’s political thought are present, on the other, with the addition of the 
consciousness of the modern labourer in Philosophie des Geistes (1803–4), his later 
political theory also come into view. In this context it is incredibly tempting to quote the 
entirety of §264 of the Grundlinien, once the subject has been prioritised in Hegel’s 
thinking where the individual comes to ‘embody a dual moment’, 
 
namely the extreme of individuality [Einzelheit] which knows and wills for itself, 
and the extreme of universality which knows and wills the substantial … in the 
second respect, individuals attain actuality by discovering their essential self-
consciousness in institutions as that universal aspect of their particular interests 
which has being in itself, and by obtaining through these institutions an occupation 
and activity directed towards a universal end within a corporation.257 
 
It has become a convention in the Hegel scholarship that it is only by way of a renewed 
approach to the modern concept of the Naturzustand that Hegel returns to the modern 
tradition he had rejected in Frankfurt and at the beginning of the Jena periods (1797–
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1804). 258 It in this sense that the infamous passage from Philosophie des Geistes 1805–6 
on right as a relation between individuals has been interpreted.  
 
Right is a relation [Beziehung] of the person in their relationship [Verhaltens] 
towards others [anderen] – the universal element of their free being – or the 
determination, the limitation of their empty freedom. … In recognition the self 
ceases to be this individual; it is legally [rechtlich] in recognition, that is to say, no 
longer in its immediate [natural] being [Dasein].259 
 
The contrast between Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) and System der Sittlichkeit (1802–
3) can be brought out on the level of how the ethical itself is conceived, and the level of 
the relation of the individual to the totality. It is also worth remarking that it is the very 
character of the relation that Hegel conceived of as problematic in the totalisation of 
ethical life in System der Sittlichkeit. The goal of the absolute was to overcome the 
relativity of relation. But, as I analysed above, he also formed ‘empirical consciousness’ 
as the ‘ground’ between the particular and the universal – and thus it is not as clear a 
rejection as appears at first glance. As Hegel develops it in System der Sittlichkeit the 
dichotomy between inner and outer disappears under the sway of the ethical, ‘because the 
ethical [Sittliche] is the essence, the inner [das Innere] … which is conscious ethical life 
[and] through this consciousness subjectivity and morality are retained’.260 What can be 
seen here is the correspondence between the moral (read the individual) and the conscious 
with the absolute. A few sections later in the manuscript, Hegel thus conceives  
 
the particular, the individual [Individuum], as a particular consciousness is 
absolutely equal to the universal and this universality, which has absolutely 
coalesced with particularity itself is the divinity [Göttlichkeit] of the people….261 
 
At the same time that the Stände are affirmed as organisational structures of difference in 
the identity of the supreme government in System der Sittlichkeit, law [Gesetz] is posited 
and appears as a middle term itself in the negation of the particular. The individual must 
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come to knowledge of the law, which is the limit of his particularity as it opens onto the 
universal dimension of the community.262 This manuscript was written directly after the 
Jena essay (in the winter of 1802 or spring 1803), which attacked the ‘infinite’ character 
of legislation in Rome by affirming Plato’s perspective that ‘“it is unworthy to lay down 
rules for good and admirable men””.263 Law as it appears in System der Sittlichkeit is thus 
neither a question of recognition nor a relation, nor the substance of the person as such. 
Yet a minimal difference can be observed in Hegel’s work on the systematic manuscript 
and the Jena essay. For the Hegel of the Jena essay the nobility stood independent of 
legislation; it was divided and free from the Juristenstand, which was limited to the 
possessing Stand der Besitz – legislation and rule by law was a bourgeois preoccupation 
and was recognised as the decline of the ethical in Hegel’s interpretation of ancient 
Rome.264 By contrast, in System der Sittlichkeit, insofar as the constitution is expanded 
from the ‘narrow circle’ of the nobility to ‘a totality [Ganzen]’, a ‘living unity’ is 
constituted whereby law is considered in terms of equity and not simply in terms of 
abstraction (legislation). This leads to an emphasis on court procedure in the 
administration of justice.265 
The apparent structural similarity between the conception of jurisprudence at the 
close of System der Sittlichkeit and what occurs in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) 
should be approached with caution. In System der Sittlichkeit ‘right in the form of 
consciousness is law [das Gesetz]’.266 Yet this consciousness of right is still subordinate 
(as it is ‘mechanical’ and ‘arbitrary’ as it is related to ‘individual cases’). 267 What is to be 
noted is the absence of self-consciousness, and of right as a relation, each of which 
develop from the concept of structural recognition that coincides with Hegel’s return to 
individualist natural law.268 Yet the same issue that appeared in the context of ‘empirical 
consciousness’ that provided the ground for absolute ethical life reappears here in the 
manuscript. One can begin to see Hegel’s comprehension that ‘as administration of justice 
it is the totality of all right, but with complete indifference for the interests of the 
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relationship of the thing to the need of this specific [bestimmten] individual; for it this 
individual is a thoroughly indifferent universal person…’.269 
It is useful to highlight once again that even if the substantial is predominant in 
System der Sittlichkeit, Hegel in no way understands it as a question of a strict structure of 
rule (a formalism) over the individual. It is for this reason that he attempts to construct the 
individual in the relation of natural Sittlichkeit in the family in the first part, and why he 
places the individual in the contexts of institutions (the Stände) in his discussion of 
Sittlichkeit in the final part. I remind the reader of what I set out from above (β) when I 
quoted from Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal (1797–1800) where, in 
opposition to the Kantian structure of the moral law, Hegel spoke of the problem of a 
fundamental opposition, whereby ‘the universal becomes the master and the particular the 
mastered’.270 Indeed, this is precisely what has been at the bottom of Hegel’s opposition 
to both the Hobbesian conception of the persona ficta and Fichte’s conception of ‘formal’ 
natural law and Rousseau’s general will. Hegel may celebrate ‘the truth which lies in 
power’ in System der Sittlichkeit,271 but he conceives of this truth as ‘something free 
which we neither master nor are mastered by’.272 This leads Hegel in System der 
Sittlichkeit to reduce the external ‘arbitrariness of the subject’ through an identity with 
virtue whereby ‘the ethical becomes the essence, the inner of the subject’.273 This is 
Hegel’s continuing attempt to mediate the privacy and inwardness of the Christian 
religion, which had led to the modern bourgeois world as he had already conceived it in 
the Jena natural law essay. ‘As Jesus had been a “private” person fleeing from life in “the 
world”, so his Church was bound to be a private association’.274 System der Sittlichkeit 
shows the extent to which Hegel attempted to use the Greeks to answer this problem. The 
later development of his philosophy, however, makes clear the limits of this solution. The 
inner and the outer necessitated a logical construction by means of ‘conceptual transition’ 
whereby, while the dichotomy was dissolved, each would persist in it difference in the 
complex institutional relations that became the concrete laws and institutions of the 
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ethical community. The lack of inner life and the uncertain rational spirit leads Hegel to 
historically limit the Greek epoch. Nevertheless, the structure of ethical life as custom is 
maintained at the basis of his thinking into his maturity as is the institutional form of the 
Stände. The Stände are the concrete spheres of organisation in which the inner is 
preserved under the form of the outer in the individual’s activity as a citizen of the state. 
 
IV.3 Hegel’s definition of Sittlichkeit 
 
Sittlichkeit distinguishes Hegel’s Naturrecht from earlier theories, and he makes this 
distinction from very early by relating how ‘natural law has immediate reference to the 
ethical’.275 This is a clear formulation of how Hegel interpreted natural law according to 
the customs of a people – natural law in this instance being the customs of the political 
community, the natural relations and laws of the polis. This forms an element of 
continuity in his thinking. What can be noted, however, is that in System der Sittlichkeit 
the relation to the ethical is immediate, while in Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) 
mediation becomes primary. This is what distinguishes the different interpretations of law 
that lie at their bases. As I noted already in the Introduction, Ilting isolated the particular 
aspect of ethical life in Hegel’s thought by emphasising its pre-Socratic origin in the 
Grundlinien where he quotes positively from a Pythagorean: 
 
When a father asked him for advice about the best way of educating his son in 
ethical matters, a Pythagorean replied: ‘Make him the citizen of a state with good 
laws’.276  
 
The task of System der Sittlichkeit was to attune the social substance – the state or the 
civitas – to the ethical as the customs of a people. By contrast, Hegel’s starting point in 
the Grundlinien is abstract right and morality where the natural and abstract will and 
conscience already exist – the family emerges only under Sittlichkeit. Hegel thus begins 
the later treatise with already established (abstract) right, with the modern fiction of the 
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state of nature,277 while the concern of System der Sittlichkeit is with the construction of 
right and the state as such and its coming into being (the state is prior to the individual in 
a completely modern rational sense by contrast in the Grundlinien, upholding the abstract 
rights of society). As Hegel put it in the Jena natural law essay (1802–3) the state must be 
an ‘immortal animal, but one whose soul and body are eternally born together’.278 Hegel’s 
relationship to a philosophy of nature at this stage is implicit in his attack on empiricism 
and formalism in modern natural law.279 This is why he begins System der Sittlichkeit 
with the forms of activity proceeding from ‘human need’: ‘the structural context between 
the foundational constitution of human beings and their respective goods [which] is the 
essential task of Aristotle’s practical philosophy’.280 This leads him from the bases of the 
human being in nature to the organisation of the house community and the division of 
labour, and from there to the constitution, which contains the system of needs and the 
administration of justice. This betrays the definitively limited character of System der 
Sittlichkeit in terms of what Hegel would define later as the conceptual cleft between civil 
and political insofar as both the administration of justice and the system of needs are 
limited to modern civil society according to the final Rechtsphilosophie. The philosophy 
of nature as the proper sphere of practical philosophy also disappears in Hegel’s 
development only to be replaced by spirit – the animal organism becomes a rational cum 
spiritual organism, and the theory of mechanism is limited to the conflict of modern 
market relations in civil society in the Grundlinien (1820/21) – the last refuge of 
Hobbes’s leviathan. 
What leads to Hegel’s late conception of ethical life in the Grundlinien where the 
modern state form as the realisation of conscious freedom rids itself of the internal 
isolation – atomism – is a continuation of his attempt to break out of the constraints of an 
external order of domination. This leads him after System der Sittlichkeit to realise the 
importance of the individual, of inwardness and its mediation in the development of the 
institutions of the political. Yet as I have shown in this chapter his conception at this early 
stage is not as one-sided as it at first appears. In other words, the ambiguity that marks 
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System der Sittlichkeit and the freedom of the individual, the question of its ‘moderate’ or 
‘severe’ institutionalism, is also a characteristic trait of Hegel’s later Rechtsphilosophie. 
In System der Sittlichkeit, however, Hegel not only follows the Aristotelian notion that the 
individual ‘when isolated is not self-sufficing’,281 individualism is also perceived as 
suffering.282 The political community in this respect takes on the form of redemption 
where ‘all difference and grief are abolished’.283 By contrast, in the Grundlinien, the 
private particularity of individuals must become concrete and in this way the subject 
becomes an essential moment, the self-consciousness that makes for the substantial 
character of the state. The Stände appear here as distinct institutional forms of self-
consciousness, mediating between internal and external, that stem from the original 
ethical life of the family along with the corporation to dissolve the modern antithesis of 
civil society and the state. Hegel initially articulated this process in the Grundlinien in the 
movement from ‘formal’ to ‘true conscience’, which led to ethical life and the 
identification of individual self-consciousness with laws and institutions, which had 
developed from custom and habit.284 
For Hegel as for Spinoza the substance of the spiritual is equivalent to the political 
insofar as there is a ‘necessary connection between the inner freedom of the individual 
and the external freedom of society and in society, [which] is as certain as the 
corresponding manifest alliance between spiritual and political order’.285 As in Spinoza’s 
version of God, for Hegel the will and spirit as individual consciousness have become one 
and the same as divine consciousness: ‘the unity of divine and human nature is not only 
significant in determining human nature, but equally so in determining divine nature’.286 
This is why the eighteenth century perceived Spinozism as atheism,287 and why the 
divinisation of the state was seen to make God contingent on the order of humankind and 
to make individuals wholly subordinate to political power. As God has become nature, 
                                                
281 Politics 1253a 25. See Hegel 1987, pp. 197ff. 
282 Hegel 2002, p. 52. 
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284 See Hegel 1991a, p. 189 (§144). 
285 Strauss 1982, p. 224. 
286 Hegel quoted in Barth 1973, p. 418 (Philosophy of Religion, III, 131). 
287 ‘And yet one would have expected that this century would have recognised in Spinoza’s doctrine of God 
an expression of its own absolutist tendency achieved at its most decisive point’ (Barth 1973, p. 131). 
  228 
history has become truly human history – the transcendence of salvation history confined 
to immanence alone as ‘judgement is contained in the historical process as such’.288 
For Hegel in the Grundlinien, the true universal basis of the state, of a ‘sovereign 
political power’, must be understood along the lines of ‘the substance and true 
subjectivity of the concept’289 – which is at first born with Socrates and the Christian 
principle of particularity which engenders the decline of the Roman World and is 
solidified with the Reformation and the epoch of Charles V (1500–58) that begins the 
essential period of transformation where modernity begins in the Berlin Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History (1827–31). For the mature Hegel, the Reformation initially carries 
the unrequited freedom represented in the initial Christian principle.290 The Reformation 
initially represents ‘the spiritualisation of the world [which] is at the same time a 
secularization of the spirit; the materialization of the spirit means losing it to the 
world’.291 Thus according to Hegel ‘there are two divine kingdoms’, and the Reformation 
is limited like the medieval period as it retreats into individual conscience, and remains 
one-sided in orientation, bound strictly to ‘the intellectual in the heart and cognitive 
faculty’. The second divine kingdom is ‘the socially ethical whose element and sphere is 
secular existence’.292 It is for this reason that the necessary accordance of reason with 
reality entails a so-called ‘second Reformation’.293 Religious inner freedom must turn 
outwards and become political freedom. Thus, according to Joachim Ritter, ‘the inner 
religious and political dimensions belong together in freedom; freedom loses its basis 
where they are opposed to and separated from one another’.294 
For Hegel, the history of the development of modernity placed the extreme of 
individuality in and for itself and that of universality in contradiction. This growing divide 
had always threatened the fabric of the Europe for Hegel, yet it was an essential danger – 
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even the essence of the Occident in the historical movement of the freedom of self-
consciousness that he came to describe at the close of the Jena period (1807). The 
individualism of the modern political tradition was thus at once the essential political 
problem for Hegel just as it was a ‘“higher kind of radiance”, namely the radiance of the 
absolutely free and hence critical spirit, whose dangers and greatness are as yet unknown 
to the East’.295 The central issue in the long development of modernity is when inner life 
is free to develop its own character in distinction from the political order with the 
proscription that such inwardness – the religious principle – not ‘wear the appearance of 
being altogether directed outwards and leaving its proper sphere’ as it had in the late 
Middle Ages. For Hegel this direction of inwardness of conscience to the externality of 
politics was contained in the doctrine of law in the state. It was self-consciousness in 
institutions that perfectly mediated the identification of subjects with the positive order of 
laws.296 It is the peculiarity of Hegel’s dialectical reasoning that demands such mediation 
between internal and external, i.e., the rise of self-consciousness and private particularity 
must now be fully realised in the modern state form.297 As Hegel put it in Philosophie des 
Geistes (1804–5) 
 
…the absolute concept of consciousness exists as absolute singularity, [it must] 
exist here as [an] externally [Äußerliches] determined concept or as a multiplicity 
essentially in itself and it must resume [resümieren] itself out of both to absolute 
totality so that it likewise exists as a great universal individual, as the spirit of a 
people.298 
 
As Sittlichkeit was shaped and transformed throughout Hegel’s development it came to 
take on the character of what both Hobbes and Rousseau had indicated in the past; it 
answered the needs of a civil religion, but it did so on an originally classical basis. The 
appeal to the Greeks is what allowed Hegel to identify the character of Sittlichkeit as the 
existence of the laws and institutions of the state. It was this centrality of custom that 
allowed Hegel to make the secular institutions and law of a political community 
equivalent to a civil religion. This secularity became apparent because it was precisely the 
institutions and laws of the state in which individuals received their realisation and 
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freedom. The otherworldliness of the Christian religion, the isolation of the individual in 
conscience, materialised as present spirit. The divinisation of the state was at the same 
time the entrance of God into history and his reduction to the action of human beings, 
which with the capacity for freedom took on the principle of history itself. 
As Dieter Henrich has noted, it is unlikely that the ambiguities and tensions of 
Hegel’s political thought can be eliminated. To liberate Hegel’s political theory of its 
ambiguities is to lose its very theoretical foundation and to make it untenable.299 This is 
because Hegel’s philosophy represents ‘one last and independent foundational thought’, 
and one in which ‘the world of institutions is primary, but also secondary as it is a mere 
stage on the way to spirit and its knowledge’.300 
                                                
299 Henrich 1983, p. 35. 
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Conclusion 
 
As I pointed out in my Introduction, many of the ‘liberal’ interpretations of Hegel have 
now assumed a canonical place in the literature and are taken as a given point of departure. 
These presumptions have been increasingly adopted in an unreflective fashion just as 
other previous (largely dismissive) interpretations assumed paradigmatic status in 
analysing Hegel’s political thought in the past. The dissertation began by consciously 
conflicting with the liberal perspectives and the individualism that was at the core of this 
interpretation of Hegel. What I have stressed throughout the chapters is the necessity of 
Hegel’s institutional thought and his understanding that the individual becomes a concrete 
universal only through the organisations of civil society that, by way of such organisation, 
represents the internal sovereignty of the state. My study took its guidelines from both 
Joachim Ritter and Manfred Riedel, though only in order to place them in question: firstly, 
in terms of Hegel’s relation to the modernity of the French Revolution and, secondly, in 
the interpretation of Hegel’s conceptual discovery of civil society [bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft]. I took Riedel’s method, which had attempted most thoroughly to separate 
itself from the ideological interpretations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the 
methodological starting point. However, I did so in relation to the concept of the Stände, 
which Riedel himself rejected as anachronistic and showed its historical actuality for 
Hegel’s thought in the context of the modern political tradition and the emergence of 
modern civil society. Thus I complicated Riedel’s conceptual approach in a new way 
through the discussion of the Stände, introducing the insights of Otto Pöggeler on the 
concept’s novelty and the theoretical potential of Hegel’s institutionalism introduced by 
Henrich. Each of these scholars suggested a different approach for research into the 
concept of the Stände, which had not been applied systematically in the existing 
scholarship. I developed these perspectives systematically throughout the ensuing 
chapters and analysed Hegel’s institutionalism with a view to his modernity. I traced the 
genesis of the concept of the Stände in Hegel’s thought to the late Frankfurt and early 
Jena periods (1800–1804), in which I showed how his institutionalism was essentially 
shaped by an encounter with the modern political tradition. As I showed throughout the 
dissertation, a more complex periodisation of modernity than Riedel had permitted in his 
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conceptual study was required to assess Hegel’s institutional thought and its particular 
emphasis on the Stände. 
I established this more complex periodisation in Chapter One through a brief 
historical-conceptual introduction to the development of the Stände from the perspectives 
that most influenced Hegel’s development of the concept. In so doing I was able to 
develop an historical approach to Hegel’s thought and concepts, which situated him in a 
broader intellectual constellation as well as historical context. By giving a general 
historical overview of the Stände, I laid the basis for the subsequent chapters whereby 
Hegel’s political theorisations were seen as an attempted response to the problems raised 
by his epoch and the French Revolution in particular. Hegel’s political thought attested to 
a process of conceptual transformation. This was the direct result of the development of 
modernity, and emphasised a complex of problems in dealing with the work of an author 
in a period undergoing conceptual change. I showed the insufficiency of translating 
Hegel’s concept of the Stände in terms of ‘classes’ or in terms of a division between 
‘social’ and ‘political’ categories. On the one hand, this bypassed the institutional 
dimension of the term in Hegel’s politics; on the other, it maintained the division that 
Hegel’s sought to overcome through the development of the concept. I closed the chapter 
by asserting that the conceptual interpretation involves more than simple transformations 
in meaning and linguistic usage and forces the adoption of a much broader referential 
horizon. Hegel’s place within modernity as well as the conceptual resources of his 
thinking were shown to belong within the horizon of what Reinhart Koselleck has 
described as the Sattelzeit – the understanding that the period from the middle of the 
eighteenth century saw a profound transformation of the meaning of concepts inherited 
from the classical epoch. This allowed Hegel to give renewed significance to the 
institutions of the Stände in a period which would fundamentally lead to their demise. The 
insights of this chapter found a direct application in my historical analysis of the concept 
of the Stände in Chapter Two in Hegel’s early critique of the imperial constitution and the 
traditional function of the Landstände in the Verfassungsschrift (1798–1803). 
Chapter Two traced Hegel’s constitutional history of Europe in the 
Verfassungsschrift, which he analysed as a history of representation. Modern political 
development as Hegel aptly showed owed its origins to ‘pre-modern’ forms, specifically 
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to the concept of the Stände. I set out to show the logic of Hegel’s development and the 
affinities between his early politics and historical conceptions and his mature theorisations. 
Hegel’s early derivation of the concept of the Stände, and his awareness of its historical 
meaning in constitutional history, clarified his own distinct usage of the concept. The 
fundamental purpose of analysing Hegel’s development in the Verfassungsschrift was to 
show how he conceptualised the epoch and responded to the demands that had been 
placed in the philosophical and political context since the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. By providing this material I showed how Hegel was able to recast the history 
of Europe at this very early stage as a history of the development of representation. The 
force of Hegel’s early arguments led to his much later insights into the Germanic World 
in the Berlin period (1818–31) as the historical ascendency of representation and 
individual right. I demonstrated the difference between the traditional concept of the 
Reichs- and Landstände in Hegel’s early critique and his late political conceptualisation 
of the Stände as an organisational form that contrasts with private particularity. This was 
necessary as it allowed me to define his use of the concept as a political category far more 
precisely. This could then be contrasted with Hegel’s critique of the contractual form of 
the imperial constitution with the organisational form of the Stände developed in the 
Grundlinien (1820/21). There Hegel had conceived the institutional capacity of the Stände 
in contrast to the dominance of private right. This allowed for the possibility of stressing 
the importance of the institutional organisation of right and representation for Hegel, and 
how he would develop this on the basis of common needs as a foundation for political 
association. This permitted a novel approach to Hegel’s early period whereby an emphasis 
on the political function of the concept was foregrounded. The question of the specific 
linguistic usage of the concept at play Hegel’s maturity in the Grundlinien enabled a 
discussion of the contiguity between social and political dimensions. Hegel’s concept was 
further differentiated from reactionary and conservative circles in the period of 
Restoration (1815–30) in the call for a return to the Ständestaat. This was necessary as 
this has been part and parcel to the liberal attack on Hegel’s work in particular in terms of 
the concept of the Stände from Rudolf Haym onwards. 
As I showed in Chapter Three, Hegel’s usage of the Stände in the early Jena 
period was equated with the Greek conceptuality of hierarchy and rank in the polis with 
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its negative valorisation of labour. This lay within the horizon of Hegel’s attempt to 
breathe new life into the polis and the classical ideal of ethical life as he saw it at this 
stage. At the same time, or even since the Frankfurt period, as this chapter emphasised, 
Hegel continued his reading of modern political economy placed alongside the German 
tradition of natural law stemming from Pufendorf, whereby the state of nature 
increasingly took on the form of a nascent society of property and exchange relations. I 
showed how Hegel’s concept of the Stände received its institutional character and 
significance in view of the state of nature as a sphere of spiritualised economic conflict 
between liberal – atomised – individuals. The chapter showed the importance of the later 
Jena period, as it was there that the Stände are first theorised in view of the slow 
emergence of an economic modernity no longer based on the household [oikos], as it had 
been for the Greeks and the classical epoch stemming from Hobbes. This led Hegel to his 
rejection of the status civilis, where individuals were restricted to strictly defined Stände 
and social strata. I thus showed how an essential transformation took place in Hegel’s 
concept of the Stände, which accorded with the theoretical passage from the state of 
nature as a fiction to its real basis as reciprocal conflict that can only be stemmed through 
the individual’s subjectivity realised in its concrete institutional form – as the substance of 
the state in its institutions whereby civil society is transformed into the political state. I 
showed how this took place in a novel fashion through the critique of Plato as it appears 
in the Philosophie des Geistes (1805–6) and how this was taken up into the Grundlinien 
(1820/21) alongside Hegel’s transformation of the state of nature as a conceptual and 
spiritual moment. This was necessary to show how the basis was laid for Hegel’s critique 
of the emergence of the modern market economy as it is fully developed in the 
Grundlinien, a critique that lent to the concept of the Stände its significantly modern 
import as an institutional and organisational form. I was thus able to reframe the 
importance of the concept in the conceptualisation of Hegel’s modernity and to liberate it 
from its reduction to anachronism. 
Chapter Four involved an analysis of the cleft between the inner and the outer that 
lay at the basis of the modern state from Hobbes onwards and shifted to a metaphysical 
domain in the development of moral autonomy in the German Idealism of Kant and 
Fichte. This was central to Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit and the institutional basis of the 
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Stände by which he sought to overcome the dichotomy of inner and outer through the 
institutional bases of civil-cum-political life. This was already introduced in an explicitly 
Hobbesian and Fichtean context in System der Sittlichkeit (1802–3), which marked 
Hegel’s first significant development of the concept of the Stände. For Hegel, the 
significance of the Kantian revolution thoroughly transformed the ‘empirical ways of 
treating natural law’ that had been current in the classical epoch since Hobbes. A central 
aspect of the Kantian project, as I analysed it, hinged on the metaphysical development of 
the forum internum and the forum externum. The originality of these concepts in the 
context of the modern state form had been originally shaped by Hobbes’s political 
reflections; Thomasius in turn transformed them in the German tradition of natural law. 
The concept of the Stände as Hegel develops it from his early Jena period in connection 
with Sittlichkeit is directly connected to this discussion. According to my analysis, it was 
an attempt to answer the crisis of the development of civil society as a sphere of 
depoliticisation – the cleft between morality and politics. It was from this manuscript that 
the initial institutionalisation of right in the form of the Stände was derived, which led to 
the mature formalisation of the individual’s actual existence in the state and the existence 
of the state itself in the Grundlinien. In this way Hegel was able to mediate the private 
inner concerns of the individual with the external order of the state in his developing 
conception of dialectical politics. As I argued in the conclusion of this chapter, concrete 
freedom was the mediation between inner and outer life, and the Stände were a stage in 
this development. This led back towards the theory of (self)-consciousness in institutions, 
which I analysed was first formed on the basis of the family – a concept Hegel had 
derived from both Christianity and the Aristotelian tradition of the oikos. The Stände in 
Hegel’s maturity represent the return of the familial element at the level of civil society 
and the state, whereby right and consciousness, the inner and the outer, were to be 
embodied in the institutional structures of ethical life. I showed the essential importance 
of the early formation of Hegel’s institutional thought, which had been neglected in the 
scholarship due to the foregrounding of the return to individualist natural law at the end of 
the Jena period (1805–7). By asserting the centrality of institutions as the mediation 
between inner and outer I have emphasised the significance of this historical development 
for the study of Hegel’s political philosophy. 
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The character of the dissertation, while focusing on the distinctive concept of the 
Stände, at the same time opens onto the broader dimension of Hegel’s intellectual 
formation and historical context. Throughout the study I have reaffirmed the significance 
of the late Frankfurt and early Jena periods in the development of Hegel’s institutionalism, 
thus introducing a novel aspect to the existing scholarship on this period. By emphasising 
the Stände, I have stressed the modernity of Hegel’s institutional thought and his 
conception of the modern constitutional state and its connection with previous political 
forms. This has allowed for an essential reframing of the debate on Hegel’s modernity, 
and the liberal form of politics that goes along with it. In so doing I have stressed the 
importance of context and historical development in Hegel’s interpretation and 
transformation of modernity. 
The dissertation detailed the possible formal results of situating Hegel’s work 
through a focus on a singular conceptual development – precisely in a period of 
transformation in conceptual meaning. It would be useful to extend this analysis further, 
and to different conceptual materials in Hegel’s writing during this early period while at 
the same time augmenting such studies by highlighting the peculiar context for the 
development of such concepts – at once a question of intellectual history, but also of the 
specific historical context of Germany and of Europe during this period. What remains to 
be done is to compliment this study with other specialised work on different sets of 
concepts. In particular, the peculiarity of Hegel’s concept of civil society and its political 
ordering by the Stände needs to be elaborated within a broader framework of intellectual 
debates, some of which I have been able to indicate briefly in the current study. The 
importance of the Stände as this study has shown lies in their capacity as a form of 
mediation in modern civil society. It is in this way that Hegel posits an institutional form 
of political order. 
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Afterword 
 
The significance of the concept of the Stände lies in its capacity to stem the emergence of 
social conflict based on the development of abstract right and formal individualism in 
political modernity. Hegel shaped and formed his concept of the Stände in the context of 
the modern revolution in right and the development of a modern market economy. What 
he perceived in each case was how the self-interestedness of isolated individuals had 
become the primary determining factor in the emergence of modern civil society. Thus 
Hegel’s institutionalism coincided with his re-reading of the Naturzustand and clarified 
the decisive formation of the state as he had defined since the Philosophie des Geistes 
(1805–6). There he spoke of the state as ‘cunning’ [List], ‘the reconciliation of evil with 
itself [sich selbst Versöhnten]’.1 The freedom of the ‘endless [Wollende] will’ as ‘the 
empty, formal [formale], [and] evil’ must be subordinate to a ‘higher principle’.2 This is 
what Dieter Henrich perceived as the logic behind Hegel’s concept of spirit that ‘is 
entirely oriented to the foundation of a concept of the state in which subjective legal rights 
[Rechtsanspruchen] could have no autonomy [eigenständig] from the right of the state 
itself…’.3 From this point onwards, Henrich added, ‘one can likewise understand why 
Hegel lets this development end in the theory of world history, which grasped the 
historical movement from state form to state form…’.4 The enduring preoccupation of 
Hegel’s political thought is the development of the state organism from which the Stände 
were derived as institutional structures. They represent a ‘higher principle’ whereby 
individualism takes on a concrete character as the internal sovereignty of the state. They 
lead directly to the political (institutional) state, which is also represented according to the 
‘cunning of reason’ in that it is ‘the rational destiny [Bestimmung] of human beings to live 
within a state, and even if no state is present reason requires that one be established’.5 
Hegel’s institutionalism and the Stände were thus the organisational opposite of the 
development of the rabble [Pöbel], which was formed through an excess of wealth that in 
                                                
1 Hegel 1987, pp. 241, 236; compare 1991a, pp. 157–85 (§§129–41) for Hegel’s mature formulations of 
these ideas. 
2 Hegel 1987, p. 186; Henrich 1983, p. 17. 
3 See Henrich 1983, p. 35. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Hegel 1991a, p. 105, (§75). 
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turn led to poverty through the economic devaluation of labour.6 As Werner Conze argued, 
the daily growth of an underclass led to pauperisation and statistically to overpopulation.7 
 
[This furthermore led to] a transitional period, [to] the decline of the attachments to 
the Ständegesellschaft and to the new constitutional shape of industrial society… 
[Yet] in Germany the old European noble rural life extended into a period in which 
already the concept of ‘industrial society’ had been shaped.8 
 
The latter explicitly marks Hegel’s political philosophy in the Grundlinien; he conceived 
of a ‘modern labour society’,9 yet as its opposite posited the ‘substantial’ character of the 
peasantry and the ‘natural ethical life’ of landed property that, ‘as far as its livelihood is 
concerned’, is meant to have the independence to practice the art of politics.10 This he 
weighed against ‘the possibility of hostile opposition’ of the Stände ‘in their political 
capacity’ that could lead to the destruction of the state.11 
The young Marx most clearly recognised this. An essential dimension of his 
Critique of the Grundlinien consisted in his assertion that the Stände, while ‘supposed to 
be “mediation” between monarch and executive on the one hand and the nation on the 
other’, … ‘are rather the organised political opposite of civil society’.12 Yet Marx also 
recognised that Hegel’s solution to political modernity, his organic or institutional ideal of 
the state ‘was the most successful attempt yet “to look upon the state from the perspective 
of human eyes and to develop its natural laws [Naturgesetzen] on the basis of reason and 
experience”’.13 
 
But if the earlier philosophical theorists of the state constructed the state on the 
basis of certain instincts, whether of ambition or sociality, or indeed on the basis of 
reason, albeit the reason of the individual rather than the reason of society, the 
more ideal and fundamental perspective of the most recent philosophy [does so] on 
the basis of the idea of the whole. This perspective regards the state as a great 
organism in which legal, ethical, and political freedom are to find their 
actualization, and in which the individual citizen of the  state obeys in the laws of 
                                                
6 See Hegel 1991a, p. 266 (compare §243, addition §244, §245, remark §253). See Ruda 2011, pp. 49–57. 
7 See Conze 1954, pp. 335–6. 
8 Conze 1954, p. 340. 
9 See Ritter 1984, p. 73. 
10 Hegel 1991a, pp. 235ff, 345 (§§203, 305). 
11 Hegel 1991a, p. 344 (§304). Hegel views the attributes of ‘immediate’, ‘substantial’, and ‘natural’ as 
defining the patriarchal order. By contrast, the Stände of trade, industry, and universality are identified with 
political modernity in their capacity to be ‘spiritual’ and ‘reflective’. 
12 Marx and Engels 1975–2004, vol. 3, p. 92. 
13 Marx quoted in Wolff 2004, p. 294. 
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the state [Staatsgesetzen ] only the natural laws [Naturgesetzen] of his own reason, 
of human reason.14 
 
Clearly, as Michael Wolff rightly argued, Marx thus did not understand Hegel’s 
philosophy of the organic state to imply ‘anti-individualism as such’, 
 
but on the contrary [it] allows us, and better than the earlier tradition of natural and 
rational law was able to do, to ground the freedom of the individual citizen of the 
state on the autonomous exercise of his own thinking.15 
 
The development that led to the formation of the proletariat implied a discrete 
organisational form. This has been related to Hegel’s concept of the Stand in the 
scholarship, rather than that of the rabble [Pöbel]. For Carl Schmitt, for example, the 
formation of the proletariat in Marx and Engels takes on the character of a conflict against 
Bakunin – of moral education against anarchism. 16  Moreover, Étienne Balibar has 
highlighted the importance of the universal Stand of the civil service and its intellectual 
character in Hegel’s Grundlinien for the development of the notion of the proletariat in 
Marx. 
 
Marx described the proletariat as a ‘universal class’, a mass situated virtually 
beyond the condition of class, the particularity of that mass being denied in its very 
conditions of existence. But he could not have formulated that idea if Hegel had 
not, in his Philosophy of Right of 1821, developed a theory of the ‘universal 
Stand’.17 
 
The significance of the universal Stand has also been argued to have influenced Lenin and 
the Russian Revolution. J.F. Suter has argued that  
 
while Hegel’s conception of the middle class [sic!] as the stabilising element in the 
state reminds us of Aristotle (Politics 1295b), the Hegelian civil servant (conceived 
as the main instrument of rationality) points to Lenin’s professional revolutionary. 
Hegel’s view that the people was unable to rule may have suggested to Lenin the 
idea that the proletariat, left to itself, would never go beyond trade unionism and 
would never seize power unless organized by revolutionary leaders.18 
 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Wolff 2004, p. 294. 
16 See Schmitt 1996, p. 36–7. 
17 See Balibar 2007, p. 51. 
18 Suter 1971, p. 70. 
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What each of these examples emphasise is the force of Hegel’s institutional conception of 
the Stände and the underlying rationality of his formation of the state that influences the 
organisational structures of political modernity, even if the foundational principle of the 
absolute in his political philosophy has been rejected. 
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